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Abstract 
 
This PhD thesis investigates the influence of the regional financing systems in 
Spain on the evolution of the territorial agendas of the mainstream Basque and 
Catalan nationalist parties, the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, 
PNV) and Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (Convergència Democràtica de 
Catalunya, CDC). Spain offers the opportunity to compare two different models of 
fiscal decentralisation and their significance for the political evolution of two 
contrasting nationalist movements. While Catalonia forms part of the common 
financing system, which gives the regions relatively limited tax-raising competences 
and involves substantial revenue transfers from central government, the Basque 
region raises almost all of its own taxes under a separate system of extensive fiscal 
autonomy (the Concierto Económico or Economic Agreement).  
At different times since the late 1990s, both the PNV and CDC have sought a 
fundamental reconfiguration of their respective territories’ relationship with Spain. 
The question posed is why the form of accommodationist politics practised by the 
PNV and CDC in the 1980s and 1990s has been transformed since then, leading to 
shifts towards pro-sovereignty agendas, which embrace a spectrum of potential 
projects ranging from some degree of statehood and political sovereignty within Spain 
through to full independence. This thesis investigates the issue of regional financing 
as one explanatory factor. Based on an extensive programme of elite interviews with 
current and former politicians and civil servants in the Basque and Catalan regions, it 
is argued that in both cases, albeit in different ways and to different degrees, the 
regional financing systems have played a fundamental role in influencing the 
nationalist parties’ evolving territorial agendas. These systems, and the different 
levels of fiscal autonomy and financial resources they provide, have influenced the 
timings of shifts in strategy and the prospects of one agenda or another being adopted, 
especially when a party is already under pressure to change. Moreover, they have 
often informed the very content of these agendas.  
Bilateral tensions with Madrid, as well as wider inter-regional dynamics 
within Spain, have influenced regional financing preferences; but so too have intra-
regional factors such as territorial heterogeneity and/or party competition within the 
home region. The internal political dynamics of regional financing in each 
autonomous community have had different consequences for the territorial strategies 
and behaviour of the nationalist parties in each case. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and framework 
 
Introduction 
           This thesis investigates the influence of the regional financing models in 
Spain on the evolution of the territorial demands of the mainstream Basque and 
Catalan nationalist parties. Spain offers the opportunity to compare two different 
models of fiscal decentralisation in relation to two different nationalist movements. 
Spain’s 17 regional governments all gradually acquired extensive public spending 
competences in the decades following the Spanish transition to democracy of the late 
1970s, but their revenue-raising powers differ substantially since the historical 
development of the Spanish state and its relationship with specific regions has 
resulted in asymmetric fiscal decentralisation arrangements. On the one hand, 
Catalonia forms part of the common financing system (régimen común de 
financiación), a revenue-sharing system applicable to 15 of Spain’s 17 autonomous 
communities or regions, under which the regions have some relatively limited tax-
raising competences while also depending heavily on financial transfers from the 
central government. On the other hand, for historical reasons, the Basque region 
raises almost all of its own taxes under a separate system of substantial fiscal 
autonomy, the Concierto Económico or Economic Agreement (hereafter Concierto), 
as also does the neighbouring region of Navarre under its respective Convenio 
Económico (hereafter Convenio). The two Economic Agreements, the Concierto and 
the Convenio, together form the ‘foral’ financing system (régimen foral de 
financiación, where ‘foral’ stems from ‘fuero’ or medieval charter) (see Figure 1, 
p.2). How have these different regional financing models contributed to 
contemporary shifts in the Basque and Catalan nationalist parties’ territorial agendas, 
understood as their goals regarding the relationship of their respective regions to the 
Spanish state? 
            Across Europe, the 21st century has witnessed a rise in demands for political 
sovereignty from nationalist parties that had previously seemed reconciled to seeking 
greater decentralisation or devolution rather than full independence (Gillespie 2015a: 
3-4). The Scottish National Party (SNP)’s achievement of a referendum on 
independence for Scotland in September 2014 was a crucial example. Spain is a 
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 Figure 1: Different regional financing systems in Spain 
 
particularly interesting case where pro-sovereignty movements have emerged in two 
different regions, yet with important differences in the objectives pursued. The 
mainstream Basque and Catalan nationalist parties, traditionally preeminent in their 
regions in the democratic period, have each sought, at different times since the turn 
of the century, to secure a fundamental reconfiguration of their fit within or with 
Spain. Notwithstanding different approaches, they share the demand for their 
respective peoples to be granted the ‘right to decide’ their own political future and 
for their governments to be invested with sovereign political power, rather than this 
being the sole preserve of the Spanish state. The nationalist parties under 
consideration are the Basque Nationalist Party (Eusko Alderdi Jeltzalea-Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco, EAJ-PNV, hereafter PNV) and Democratic Convergence of 
Catalonia (Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, CDC), both of which are 
centre-right parties. CDC was the dominant partner in a longstanding alliance with 
the smaller Christian Democrat party, Democratic Union of Catalonia (Unió 
Democràtica de Catalunya, UDC), which saw them enter elections together as 
Convergence and Union (Convergència i Unió, CiU), initially as an electoral 
coalition from 1978 and then as a federation from 2001, until its dissolution in June 
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2015.1 Both the PNV and CiU won their first respective regional elections held in 
1980 following Spain’s transition to democracy and became the predominant 
political force in their regions from then onwards. In the 35 years since, they have 
formed governments (usually minority or coalition governments) after almost all of 
their respective regional elections, apart from a period spent in opposition to 
Socialist-led governments due to coalition politics (2003-2010 in the Catalan case; 
2009-2012 in the Basque case).2  
          Throughout most of the 1980s and 1990s, CiU and the PNV both prioritised an 
essentially ‘accommodationist’ stance, which involved seeking further autonomy 
within existing legal and political frameworks and by working with Spanish political 
actors. This was achieved fundamentally by collaborating with and supporting 
Spanish governments in return for gains in autonomy. Of the two, CiU at the time 
came across as the more resolutely pro-autonomy party, while the PNV’s long-term 
territorial goals appeared relatively more ambiguous due to its longstanding more 
factional party organisation, divided between those in favour of an 
‘accommodationist’ strategy aimed at winning more autonomy within the Spanish 
state and those taking a more radical stance in favour of secession. From the turn of 
the century, first the PNV and later CiU (especially CDC) would increase their 
demands to advocate the right of the Basque Country and Catalonia to self-
determination and some degree of statehood, if not outright secession. In the Basque 
region, the PNV’s main shift would occur under the leadership of regional president 
(lehendakari) Juan José Ibarretxe, with his frustrated attempt from the turn of the 
century to upgrade the Basque region’s autonomy to turn it into a semi-independent 
associated state of Spain. In Catalonia, the change would come later, with CiU’s 
fundamental shift in strategy away from accommodationist approaches towards a 
pro-sovereignty stance taking place in 2012, presaged by developments from around 
2007 onwards – differences over which eventually led to the breakdown of the CiU 
coalition in 2015, when UDC rejected the secessionist agenda embraced by CDC. 
Nevertheless, the trajectory from accommodationist to pro-sovereignty politics has 
                                                
1 Throughout this thesis, CDC/CiU will often be used when reference is made to CDC during 
2 In CDC’s case, at the latest regional election on 27 September 2015 it did not win alone but 
rather as part of a single list Junts pel Sí comprising CDC, ERC and other independent 
candidates, and the party then changed its name to run as Democràcia i Llibertat in the 
December 2015 Spanish elections. This thesis focuses primarily on the development of CDC 
prior to this, but an explanation of the these developments in late 2015 in relation to the 
party is provided in Chapter 2 (pp.77-79).   
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not been wholly consistent, nor are the two always entirely mutually exclusive: the 
PNV, for example, returned to more accommodationist tactics in the years after 
Ibarretxe’s plan was thwarted, though by means of these it would still seek to work 
towards a new political relationship with Madrid based on a more bilateral 
partnership of equals, involving the possibility of self-determination and co-
sovereignty. 
           Such developments raise the question of why the pre-eminence of the form of 
accommodationist politics practised by these parties in the 1980s and 1990s has been 
transformed since then, leading to periodic shifts towards more pro-sovereignty 
stances, which embrace a spectrum of potential territorial projects from some degree 
of statehood and political sovereignty within Spain to full secession from it. An 
emerging literature has identified a number of different external dynamics 
influencing these parties’ shifts between territorial accommodationism and pro-
sovereignty demands: for example, the state of bilateral relations between the region 
and the central Spanish government; pressures from the support bases of nationalist 
parties and civil society groups; competition from other parties in the home region; 
and international influences (Gillespie and Gray 2015). Identifying the evolution of 
the regional financing systems in Spain as one such external dynamic, this thesis 
aims first and foremost to contribute to this literature by investigating the influence 
of the regional financing systems on the evolution of the territorial agendas of the 
PNV and CDC. Most existing research on the regional financing models in Spain is 
by economists and focuses on economic outcomes (e.g. Zubiri 2015, De la Fuente 
2013a, López Casasnovas and Pons Novell 2005, etc.). This research focuses instead 
on the political drivers behind regional financing reforms and the political 
consequences of these for the evolution of nationalist party agendas.  
           The following sections introduce the specific aims and rationale of the thesis; 
the research questions it poses; the time period under study; the proposed 
terminology; and the analytical framework and methodology. The latter section 
includes subsections on the theoretical background to the thesis, on the choice of 
elite interviews as the main research method and on the choice of case studies. 
Finally, an introduction to the historical reasons for two different regional financing 
systems in Spain is provided, followed by a chapter outline for the thesis.  
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Background, aims and rationale 
 
In Spain, the existence of two different models of regional financing, the 
common financing system (régimen común) on the one hand and the ‘foral’ 
financing system (régimen foral) on the other, has been a source of endless 
controversy and intense political debate, owing first and foremost to the different 
economic outcomes of each model. Since at least the late 1990s, numerous studies 
have shown that the ‘foral’ financing system results in significantly higher per capita 
financing levels than the common financing system (e.g. Castells et el. 2000; De la 
Fuente 2012a, 2014; Uriel and Barberán 2007; Zubiri 2015). This is primarily on 
account of the fact that the Basques and Navarrans do not contribute to the 
equalisation mechanism for financing public services included in the common 
regime, which has become the main means of inter-regional solidarity in Spain, 
overtaking the Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund originally designed for this 
purpose and to which the Basques and Navarrans do contribute. The resources the 
Basque and Navarran regions receive are based on their own fiscal capacity since, 
broadly speaking, they keep all their tax revenues, except for the small proportion (in 
the Basque case, around 7%-10%) which they pay each year as a quota to the 
Spanish government to cover their share of the few remaining centralised spending 
competences in Spain, such as foreign affairs, defence and areas of infrastructure. 
Since the Basque Country and Navarre are relatively rich regions whose GDP per 
capita is among the highest in Spain, a system in which their resources are based on 
their own fiscal capacity rather than estimated needs (as in the common regime) 
gives them greater resources. This contributes, among other factors, to a level of per 
capita financing far higher than the average of the other fifteen regions (De la Fuente 
2012a: 4-5; Zubiri 2010: 112; see also Chapter 3) (see Table 1, p.6).  
           This debate over the different levels of solidarity that the two regional 
financing systems entail became increasingly politicised from the late 1990s 
onwards, and in particular in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-2008. This was 
fundamentally due to opposition from Catalonia to its fiscal and financial treatment 
under the common financing system, though several other regions have also voiced 
dissatisfaction with aspects of the system that they perceive as prejudicial to their 
respective territories. The equalisation mechanism included in the common financing 
system produces arbitrary outcomes, proving overly redistributive in some cases but  
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Table 1: Resources provided by the regional financing systems for 
homogeneous competences (average 2007-2011) 
 
 Basque Country Catalonia Average (of 15 
regions under the 
common system) 
Resources per 
capita (in euros) 
4887 (204) 2433 (102) 2396 (100) 
Resources as % of 
GDP 
16.2% (153) 9.0% (88) 10.6% (100) 
Source: Based on Zubiri 2015: 215 
 
Table 2: Basic statistics for the Basque and Catalan regions 
 Basque Country Catalonia Spain 
Area (sq km) 7234 (1.4) 32113 (6.3%) 506030 (100%) 
Population 
(million) 
2.19 (4.7%) 7.52 (16.2%) 46.52 (100%) 
GDP (€bn) 65.9 (6.1%) 204.7 (18.9%) 1081.2 (100%) 
GDP per capita (€) 30459 (130.8) 27663 (118.8) 23290 (100) 
Sources: Anuario Estadistico de España, 2000, INE (area data); Padron 1 January 
2016, INE (population data – provisional); Contabilidad Regional de España, 2015, 
INE (GDP at market prices and GDP per capita, estimates for 2015). 
 
insufficiently so in others (e.g. Bosch and Durán 2008; De la Fuente 2012b, 2012c, 
2013a). Most notably, the relatively richer regions under the system – particularly 
Madrid, the Balearics and Catalonia – tend to be overly penalised, losing their 
comparative advantage post-equalisation and falling significantly in the ranking of 
regions in terms of per capita resource levels. Political obstacles have repeatedly 
prevented a proper revision of the common financing system to improve the 
equalisation mechanism and other flaws in the system, since the fight for resources is 
a zero-sum game between different regions and each reform has been at the mercy of 
central and regional governments’ political strategies (Blöchlinger and Vammalle 
2012: 113-121; León 2009, 2010). As a result, Catalonia started to make repeated 
calls, in particular from the late 1990s onwards, for a form of bilateral fiscal pact 
akin to the Basque Concierto instead. The Basque and Catalan regions are 
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comparably wealthy (relative to other parts of Spain) in GDP per capita terms, but 
Catalonia is much larger, accounting for approximately 19% of Spain’s GDP, 
compared to around 6% in the Basque case (see Table 2, p.6). Successive Spanish 
governments have refused to consider a bilateral deal for Catalonia akin to the 
Basque Concierto – the Basque model is not easily generalizable (Spain would not 
raise any revenues of its own otherwise) and Spain would struggle to afford it for a 
region as large as Catalonia. This impasse over regional financing became one of the 
key factors contributing to the deterioration in Spanish-Catalan relations, particularly 
in the wake of the financial crisis and thus the increased pressure on resources. The 
phrase ‘Spain robs us’ (España nos roba) and reference to Catalonia as a victim of 
Spain’s ‘fiscal plundering’ (expolio fiscal) became oft-repeated leitmotivs among 
Catalan nationalist and pro-independence forces and supporters.     
           In the light of this intense debate, most of the recent literature on regional 
financing in Spain has focused on analysing the shortcomings in particular of the 
common financing system and to a lesser extent of the ‘foral’ system, and on 
comparing them in terms of the different levels of resources they provide (e.g. De la 
Fuente 2009, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2014; Castells 2014, etc). It is generally accepted 
that Catalonia is disadvantaged by the common financing system in the sense that it 
falls significantly in the ranking of regions post-fiscal equalisation, a problem that 
also affects other regions of comparative wealth per capita, most notably Madrid and 
the Balearics. Nevertheless, heated political debate has emerged over the question of 
to what extent the system disadvantages Catalonia and to what extent it is to blame 
for the region’s financial woes, relative to discretionary spending decisions taken by 
the Catalan government. The debate has been exacerbated by the difficulties inherent 
in quantifying Catalonia’s fiscal deficit with the Spanish state and the political bias 
to which the different possible calculations are invariably subject. Numerous studies 
have centred on the different methods of calculating the fiscal balances of each 
region with the central Spanish government (where the net fiscal balance is usually 
based on the difference between the amount of money a region receives from the 
central government to pay for its public services and what its residents contribute to 
the central government in taxes), and their relative merit and utility (e.g. Bosch et al. 
2010; López-Casasnovas and Rosselló-Villalonga 2014). More recently, a group of 
economists undertook a project commissioned by the Madrid-based Sepi 
Foundation, a government-linked public organisation, which involved developing a 
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new methodology for calculating each region’s respective and relative position in 
terms of financing levels, to provide a new System of Territorialised Public 
Accounts (Sistema de Cuentas Públicas Territorializadas, SCPT) (De la Fuente 
2014). The new methodology, first made available in July 2014, would thereafter be 
used by the Spanish government. The aim was to go beyond the limitations of 
looking at traditional fiscal balances, which are often based on the direct financial 
amount that each region derives from central administration in comparison with their 
tax contribution, but risk overlooking the benefits a region may derive from public 
policy decisions which do not involve spending money directing in the region (for 
example, Spanish embassies funded by the Spanish government around the world are 
designed to benefit all Spaniards including Catalans, but the expenditure is clearly 
not made in Catalonia itself). The SCPT inevitably gives results that suggest that the 
territorial inequalities produced by the system are not as large as other more 
traditional methods of calculating fiscal balances might suggest.  
         Given the lack of one standard or universally accepted method of calculating 
the impact of the regional financing system on individual regions, the issue has been 
heavily subject to political bias and interpretation, with politicians invariably citing 
versions of figures that best suit their argument and rejecting those that do not. The 
announcements made in mid 2014, regarding the fiscal balances for 2011 – the first 
time the Spanish government used its new methodology – were emblematic of the 
discrepancy. In June 2014, the Catalan government published its report on the fiscal 
balance of Catalonia with the Spanish state in 2011 with a headline figure that 
Catalonia had suffered a EUR 15.006bn deficit that year (7.7% of its GDP).3 This 
was the deficit the Catalan government had calculated under the monetary flow 
method, which calculates the balance between taxes paid by residents of the region 
to the central government and direct expenditure by the central government in the 
Catalan region. Further down in the report, the Catalan government acknowledged 
that the figure reduced to EUR 11.087bn (5.7% of GDP) under the tax-benefit 
method of calculation, which also takes into account central government expenditure 
on policy areas that may benefit Catalonia but not involve a direct payment to the 
region. The monetary flow method, which gives a higher deficit, is nevertheless the 
                                                
3 Generalitat de Catalunya, ‘Els resultats de la balança fiscal de Catalunya amb el sector 
públic central l’any 2011’, June 2014. Available online here: 
http://file02.lavanguardia.com/2014/06/12/54408942366-url.pdf  
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one almost always cited by Catalan nationalist and pro-independence politicians and 
forces, with repeated references in public declarations and the media to an average 
annual Catalan deficit of around EUR 16bn or 8% of GDP.4 In contrast, the new 
SCPT system (similar in principle to the tax-benefit method with some further 
adaptations) gave a Catalan deficit of EUR 8.455bn (4.35% of GDP) for 2011.5 Both 
sides accused the other of political bias in their calculations. 
            Beyond strictly academic literature designed primarily for an academic 
audience, the debate has also spawned a plethora of paperback books designed to 
make the issues as accessible as possible for a more general public interested in 
understanding the economic issues at stake. Usually written by academics and 
experts in their field or sometimes by more general commentators, these books are 
designed to convince the reader firmly of one side or the other. Either they have 
sought to explain Catalonia’s ‘poor’ financial treatment by the Spanish state and 
make the economic case for independence (e.g. Bosch and Espasa 2014; Paluzie 
2014) or, alternatively, they analyse the smoke and mirrors in the figures and 
economic arguments repeatedly cited by nationalist and pro-independence politicians 
in order to suggest flaws in those arguments (e.g. Borrell and Llorach 2015).               
            Exact numbers aside, it is widely acknowledged that the issue of the Catalan 
fiscal deficit – alongside other economic matters such as the perceived lack of 
sufficient central government investment spending in Catalonia – has contributed to 
the rise in pro-independence sentiment in Catalonia in particular from 2010 onwards, 
with tensions reaching a height in the wake of the financial crisis. After Spanish 
prime minister Mariano Rajoy once again refused to consider a fiscal pact for the 
region in 2012, Catalan regional president Artur Mas and his party CDC decided to 
join and lead the rising tide of pro-independence sentiment. In stark contrast, in the 
Basque Country, the fact that the region weathered the crisis better than most regions 
in Spain (see Tables 3 and 4, p.10) helped the PNV to retain popularity with a more 
moderate territorial agenda. Figures show that since tax collection in Spain as a 
whole dropped more rapidly then in the Basque region during the crisis, the Basque 
region’s comparative advantage in terms of resource levels relative to other regions 
                                                
4 For example, ‘La Generalitat cifra en 15.006 millones el déficit fiscal de Catalunya en 
2011’, La Vanguardia, 12.06.14. 
5 For example, ‘El déficit fiscal de Catalunya es de 8.455 millones según las balanzas del 
Gobierno’, La Vanguardia, 23.07.14. 
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in Spain actually increased further during the crisis (Zubiri 2015: 218). Since the 
Basque region clearly emerges at a distinct advantage in terms of final resource 
levels regardless of which method of calculation is used, politicians in Basque 
government, technical teams within the Basque treasuries, and a number of Basque 
academics have focused their efforts on negating any untoward ‘privilege’ by 
explaining the historical origins of the Basque model and attributing the region’s 
higher resource levels to better fiscal management rather than a lack of solidarity, 
given the level of fiscal responsibility that fiscal autonomy requires (e.g. Uriarte 
2015). 
 
Table 3: Regional debt to regional GDP (%) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Basque Country 1.5 4.1 7.7 8.6 11.4 13.2 14.1 14.4 
Catalonia 10.0 12.7 17.5 22.0 26.7 29.9 32.7 35.3 
Spain 6.6 8.6 11.4 13.6 18.1 20.3 22.7 24.2 
Source: Bank of Spain 
 
Table 4: Regional unemployment rates (%) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Basque Country 6.6 11.3 10.7 12.3 15.6 16.6 16.3 14.8 
Catalonia 8.9 16.2 17.7 19.2 22.5 23.1 20.3 18.6 
Spain 11.2 17.9 19.9 21.4 24.8 26.1 24.4 22.1 
Source: INE: Annual average unemployment based on EPA Quarterly 
unemployment data 
 
           Beyond the frenzied debate and value judgements as to which numbers or 
calculations are right or wrong, there has been insufficient attention in both the 
economic and political science literature to the question of how the issue of regional 
financing in all its complexity has contributed to the evolution of the territorial 
agendas of CDC/CiU and the PNV in recent decades. While economists have 
focused on the numbers to make specific economic arguments, historians and 
political scientists have tended to focus their efforts on analysing other external 
dynamics (social, institutional and political factors) that have shaped strategic shifts 
in territorial agendas, usually with only a cursory mention of regional financing in 
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passing. Often, such cursory mentions can be misleading, since statements 
suggesting that Catalonia suffers an ‘annual deficit of 8% of GDP due to the 
financial arrangements imposed by the Spanish state’ (Guibernau 2014: 17), without 
acknowledging the methodological disputes over this figure, fail to acknowledge the 
complexity of the issue. The focus on the numbers by economists, and on other 
social, institutional and political factors by political scientists and historians, has 
obscured a fuller appreciation of the significance of the political dynamics of 
regional financing for the evolution of territorial agendas. This thesis hopes to help 
bridge the gap between the two types of study by providing an in-depth analysis of 
this dimension. To do so will require providing an extensive account of the many 
debates over regional financing and reforms of both the common and ‘foral’ regional 
financing systems that have taken place since the first regional financing systems of 
the democratic period were designed in 1980, with a particular focus on the more 
conflictive period since the late 1990s. Rather than entering into value judgements 
about the relative merits of these, the intention will be to do justice to the full 
complexity of the debates and the divide in perspectives as a foundation for 
analysing what factors have shaped the stances and strategies of CDC/CiU and the 
PNV towards their respective regional financing arrangements in different periods, 
and what the wider consequences have been for their territorial agendas regarding 
the relationship of their respective regions to Spain. Regional financing preferences 
and the extent to which these have influenced the territorial agendas of the Basque 
and Catalan nationalist parties have depended not only on bilateral Catalan-Spanish 
and Basque-Spanish tensions over the issue and wider inter-regional dynamics 
within Spain, but also on intra-regional dynamics such as party competition, which 
require an adequate exploration. 
           The main aim of this thesis, as stated, is thus to contribute to the literature 
identifying the different dynamics influencing shifts in territorial agendas undertaken 
by the PNV and CDC by investigating the influence of the regional financing 
systems as one such dynamic. As a qualitative case study intended to provide an in-
depth comparative case study of the Basque and Catalan cases within Spain, this 
thesis does not intend to extract conclusions that are necessarily generalisable to 
other countries and contexts, particularly given the vastly different levels of fiscal 
centralisation or decentralisation in different European countries, which make 
generalisations problematic. It is nevertheless hoped that the thesis will also be of 
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wider interest to political scientists interested in the evolution of nationalist party 
behaviour in Europe and to political economists studying the pros and cons of 
different models of fiscal federalism. While comparisons between the common and 
foral financing systems are commonly made within Spain, cross-country 
comparisons of fiscal federal systems tend usually to factor the common system only 
in Spain into their comparative analyses, with little more than a passing reference to 
the fact that the Basque and Navarran regions come under a separate model (e.g. 
Blöchlinger and Vammalle 2012; Cottarelli and Guerguil 2014). Since the foral 
financing system offers the most substantial level of fiscal autonomy at substate 
level within any EU member state, Spain offers a unique opportunity to compare and 
contrast a revenue-sharing model (the common regime) with a model of substantial 
fiscal autonomy, in terms of their implications for the accommodation of nationalist 
movements within Spain.  
 
Research questions 
In the light of the above, the main research question this thesis will investigate is: 
- How have the regional financing models in Spain contributed to shaping the 
evolution of the territorial agendas of the mainstream Basque and Catalan 
nationalist parties, in terms of their respective shifts along a continuum 
between accommodationist and pro-sovereignty politics? 
This will involve exploring the following sub questions: - What shifts have occurred in the territorial agendas of the PNV and CDC 
along the spectrum from territorial accommodation to pro-sovereignty 
politics since the late 1990s? - What political, social and economic drivers help to explain these shifts? - What influence have regional financing issues had on the shifts in 
conjunction with other drivers?  - What factors have driven the PNV and CDC’s evolving aspirations with 
regard to the respective financing models in their regions since their first 
design in the democratic period in 1980? And what have been the main areas 
of contention with Spanish governments and other parties in this regard? - Why have reforms of their respective regional financing systems repeatedly 
failed to satisfy the PNV and CDC? 
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- How has the bilateral nature of the Concierto contributed to shaping the 
PNV’s conception of sovereignty? - Beyond bilateral Spanish-Basque fiscal and financial relations, what are the 
consequences of the complex nature of the intra-regional dimension of the 
Concierto (in terms of fiscal and political relations between provincial and 
regional administrations) for the PNV’s territorial agenda? 
 
Time period under study 
           The main focus of analysis in this thesis will be on the behaviour of the PNV 
and CDC from the mid 1990s until the end of 2015, an approximately 20-year period 
in which a number of fundamental developments that would impact their territorial 
agendas took place. Some of these factors enabled a continuation of 
accommodationist tactics, but many favoured shifts towards more pro-sovereignty 
agendas. Understanding some developments from the mid 1990s nevertheless also 
requires knowledge of their origins or background in the earlier years of democracy. 
This thesis will therefore take into account Spain’s national and territorial 
problematic from the transition to democracy of the late 1970s onwards (after the 
death of dictator Franco in 1975), including the development of the regional 
financing systems ever since both the common system and the Basque Concierto of 
the democratic period were first designed in 1980. 
           A first significant development in the mid 1990s was the change from 11 
years of absolute majority Spanish government under the Socialist party (1982-1993) 
to the first of what would become a regular occurrence of minority Spanish 
governments dependent upon the regionally-based nationalist parties for support in 
the Spanish parliament, given the absence of alternative state-wide coalition or 
alliance partners at the time for either the PSOE or the PP. The turning point came in 
1993, when the PSOE won the Spanish general elections with only a relative 
majority, following its lengthy period of absolute majority government from 1982 to 
1993. At the next general elections in 1996, the PP under José Maria Aznar won for 
the first time but with a relative majority too, thus also forming a minority 
government dependent upon the support of regionally-based nationalist parties. The 
start of Aznar’s first mandate reinforced the emerging trend whereby CiU and/or the 
PNV would negotiate gains in regional autonomy in return for lending support in the 
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Spanish parliament to the governing statewide party. From then on, this became the 
main ‘accommodationist’ tactic nationalist parties could use to extract 
decentralisation or economic gains from the central government (minority Socialist-
led Spanish governments were also formed in 2004-2008 and 2008-2011), whereas 
their bargaining power during times of absolute majority PP-led Spanish government 
(2000-2004 and 2011-2015) would be severely diminished.6 Spain had previously 
experienced four years of minority government under UCD following the first post-
constitution elections (Suárez 1979-1981, Calvo Sotelo 1981-1983) and regional 
parties including CiU had lent their support, but at that stage regional governments 
were still at the formative stage (the first regional elections were held between 1980 
and 1983) and the consensual political context of the Transition was in place. By 
1993, when minority governments became a feature of the Spanish political 
landscape again, the context was very different: a spirit of political competition had 
replaced the spirit of consensus (Hopkin 2005), and regional governments had 
become firmly established political arenas.  
           However, other dynamics from the mid 1990s onwards contributed to shifts 
away from accommodationism towards pro-sovereignty agendas. In particular, the 
second half of the 1990s witnessed the beginnings of a significant shift in the PNV’s 
territorial agenda. In 1998, the party’s longstanding alliance with the Basque 
federation of the Socialist Party (with which it had been in coalition in regional 
government since 1985) came to an end, and it signed the Lizarra Pact (Pacto de 
Lizarra) to ally instead with left-wing nationalist and secessionist parties. The 
alliance was short-lived, but a new PNV-led Basque government headed by Juan 
José Ibarretxe would subsequently attempt to take forward proposals (which were 
ultimately thwarted) to turn the Basque region into a new semi-independent 
associated state of Spain.  
         In Catalonia, an explicit shift within CDC towards a pro-sovereignty agenda 
and alliances, such as that undertaken by the PNV in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
would not come until several years later. CDC started to make moves in this 
direction from around 2008 onwards, before the shift became explicit in 2012. 
Nevertheless, some crucial developments in this regard began to take place earlier, 
from the late 1990s onwards. For example, after the 1996 reform of the regional 
                                                
6 On the behaviour of minority governments in Spain, see Field 2009, 2014, 2015, 2016. 
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financing system very quickly proved insufficient to satisfy Catalan interests, the 
then longstanding Catalan president and leader of CDC/CiU Jordi Pujol came out 
publically in favour of a new bilateral fiscal pact for Catalonia akin to the Concierto 
for the first time from 1997. Such developments were tentative only, and at this stage 
moderate and accommodationist tendencies continued to prevail within CDC and 
CiU under Pujol. Artur Mas, Pujol’s successor, then ended up in opposition to a left-
wing coalition government headed by the Catalan Socialists and including ERC and 
ICV, which would be the parties to take forward statute reform in Catalonia from 
2003 onwards, with CiU in opposition. Many years later, in 2012, when the 
opportunity came for Artur Mas, now president, to lead a pro-sovereignty process for 
Catalonia, CDC would this time want to take the lead on issues relative to 
Catalonia’s autonomy.  
 
Terminology  
           Terminology in the field of nationalism studies is inherently problematic, and 
particularly so in the case of nationalisms in Spain. This is because many terms from 
the social sciences have become associated with a particular political standpoint, and 
often this has indeed become the expectation, since political scientists and historians 
carrying out academic research in Spain are often associated with a partisan stance. 
This study attempts to provide an analysis that spans the divide in perspectives, and 
the following clarifications are thus essential to avoid misinterpretation of meaning. 
In all cases, the terminology chosen is not intended to convey any political bias or 
value judgement, either positive or negative. 
           This thesis investigates shifts in territorial agendas by mainstream nationalist 
parties between accommodationism and pro-sovereignty politics, where ‘territorial 
accommodation’ is understood as ‘the capacity of states to contain conflict within the 
mechanisms and procedures embedded in existing institutional arrangements’ 
(Gillespie 2015a: 4; after Muro 2009: 453). Accommodationist strategies, when used 
by Basque and Catalan nationalist parties, have involved working with Spanish 
political actors to seek incremental gains in autonomy within the existing legal 
frameworks of the Spanish Constitution and the regional statutes of autonomy. These 
statutes themselves have allowed for flexibility, making accommodationism 
compatible in principle with initiatives for new statutes. Accommodationism 
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involves accepting, at least temporarily, the existing structures of the Spanish state to 
concentrate on what can be achieved within that context. Often, this has been 
achieved through informal pacts or mutual support arrangements with the central 
government, whereby the nationalist party supports the governing Spanish party in 
central parliament in specific areas of legislation, and in return secures a 
commitment from the Spanish government to certain advances in decentralisation or 
a favourable resolution to certain pending central-regional government 
disagreements regarding regional competences. Such ‘accommodationist’ politics is 
often also referred to as ‘moderate’ or ‘pragmatic’ nationalist politics in the media 
and academia – words with positive connotations, and thus often indicative of the 
general sympathy in the media and the wider Spanish political arena for 
accommodationist behaviour by nationalist parties (in contrast with pro-sovereignty 
politics that risks a rupture with the Spanish state). The terms ‘accommodation’, 
‘moderation’ and ‘pragmatism’ will all be used within this thesis but in the full 
knowledge that whether or not a nationalist party can behave in a ‘moderate’ and 
‘pragmatic’ way is not always down purely to party choice. External contexts and 
constraints, including the behaviour of the central Spanish government, can limit the 
viability of moderate and pragmatic nationalist politics.   
            In contrast, pro-sovereignty politics involves a determined push by Basque 
and Catalan nationalists for their respective territories to be granted the ‘right to 
decide' their own political future and to be invested with sovereign political power, 
rather than this being the sole preserve of the Spanish state. It refers to their desire 
for substantial changes to the Spanish legal and constitutional framework, or to break 
with it, to secure a fundamental reconfiguration of their respective territories’ fit 
within or with Spain. Pro-sovereignty politics can, but does not have to, imply a push 
for full independence or secession. It can also imply attempts to reconstruct centre-
periphery relations on a different basis from the existing ‘state of autonomies’, 
involving a push for some form of confederalism involving bilateral relations and 
co-sovereignty with the Spanish state (Gillespie 2015a: 10). Former PNV regional 
president Juan José Ibarretxe, for example, sought to upgrade the status of the 
Basque region to that of a semi-independent associated state of Spain, based on 
bilateral relations and co-sovereignty between the Basque Country and Spain. After 
adopting an explicitly pro-sovereignty lexicon from 2012 onwards, CDC still 
maintained a degree of ambiguity for a while as to whether the ‘state structures’ it 
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sought for Catalonia implied full secession or, rather, could be incorporated into a 
more confederal Spain. Shifts away from traditional accommodationism towards 
such pro-sovereignty stances by Basque and Catalan nationalist parties thus take 
place on a continuum which can involve various different options ranging 
somewhere between the polar opposites of the status quo and secession.7 Moreover, 
accommodationist and pro-sovereignty politics are not necessary entirely mutually 
exclusive. From 2009 onwards, for example, the PNV under the new leadership of 
Iñigo Urkullu would return to more accommodationist tactics in the years after 
Ibarretxe’s plan was thwarted, though he would use accommodationist tactics to seek 
to work more gradually towards a new political relationship with Madrid based on a 
more bilateral partnership of equals, involving the possibility of self-determination 
and co-sovereignty, hoping to build a greater consensus among political parties in 
the Basque region (including the Basque federation of the Spanish Socialist party) in 
this regard.  
There is no consensus in Spain as to the language used to describe such shifts 
towards pro-sovereignty politics. For political opponents, it marks a ‘radicalisation’ 
of agendas, while Basque and Catalan pro-sovereignty forces, on the other hand, 
reject the pejorative connotations of such a word and see their actions as healthy 
democratic practice. This thesis will refer fundamentally to shifts between 
accommodationism and pro-sovereignty politics. Where ‘radicalisation’ is very 
occasionally used in reference to territorial agendas, it is intended only to denote 
movement along the continuum between accommodationist and pro-sovereignty 
politics, without any value judgement intended. ‘Radical’ itself is reserved for 
reference to the anti-capitalist, anti-systemic and secessionist left-wing parties of the 
izquierda abertzale in the Basque region, and the CUP in Catalonia (see below).   
          Terminology regarding place names also needs to be clarified. Within the 
Spanish ‘state of autonomies’, the Basque Country refers to the autonomous 
community of that name (also officially denominated Euskadi), while Catalonia 
refers to the autonomous community of Catalonia. However, there can be some 
confusion since the Basque Country in its widest sense, for historical reasons long 
prior to the creation of the Spanish state of autonomies, also incorporates Navarre 
(an autonomous community of its own) and parts of the south of France. In the 
                                                
7 For a more in-depth description of the wide-ranging continuum of ‘autonomist’, ‘federalist’ 
and ‘independentist’ options that regionally-based parties can embrace, see Lluch 2014.  
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Catalan case, the wider Catalan-speaking territories in Spain (primarily Valencia and 
the Balearics, as well as Catalonia) and France are known as the ‘Catalan Countries’ 
(Països Catalans in Catalan) rather than Catalonia, thus reducing the risk of 
confusion. In the Basque case in particular, there remains an attachment among 
Basque nationalists to the wider Basque homeland, which they refer to as Euskal 
Herria in Basque (meaning ‘country of euskera’, the Basque language). Certainly, 
greater cooperation with Navarre is something to which many Basque nationalists 
would still aspire, if there were sufficient political will from Navarre itself. From a 
practical perspective, however, the PNV focuses its efforts regarding the political 
future of the Basque Country first and foremost on what is achievable for the Basque 
autonomous community, just as CDC’s efforts are centred on the autonomous 
community of Catalonia, since the autonomous communities are the most significant 
levels of political action for these parties in the period under analysis. The PNV does 
have a reasonably significant presence in Navarre but it has never attained anywhere 
near the dominance there that it has had in the Basque autonomous community. In 
addition, the regional financing arrangements under study here apply to the 
autonomous communities. In the light of this, since the analysis in this thesis is 
focused on political action and regional financing arrangements at the level of the 
autonomous community, the term ‘Basque Country’ is usually used to refer strictly 
to the Basque autonomous community or region. Basque Country and Basque region 
will be used interchangeably in this thesis. In all cases, where possible, English 
translations of names of territories and places are used rather than the Spanish, 
Catalan or Basque versions. However, where there is no widely used translation in 
English, the most commonly known version (in Spanish/Catalan/Basque) will be 
used. For example, the capital of Guipúzcoa will be referred to as San Sebastián 
(rather than by its Basque name Donostia) and the capital of the Basque Country as 
Bilbao (rather than Bilbo). 
           For historical reasons and to respect their tax-raising tradition, the Basque 
provinces retained elected governments (diputaciones forales) and parliaments or 
assemblies (juntas generales) under the Basque statute of autonomy, in contrast to 
the provinces elsewhere in Spain which are more purely administrative levels of 
authority. These will be referred to as Basque provincial governments and provincial 
parliaments or assemblies in this thesis. The Basque provinces, also known as ‘foral 
territories’ or ‘historical territories’ (as reflected in the First Additional Disposition 
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of the Spanish Constitution) are thus endowed with far more substantial powers than 
the provinces elsewhere in Spain. Some Basque officials dislike the use of the term 
‘provincial’ to refer to their territories, governments and parliaments at provincial 
level, arguing that it risks confusion with other provinces in Spain which have fewer 
powers, and thus they tend to use ‘foral’ or ‘historical’ instead. The view here, 
however, is that it is preferable wherever possible to use ‘provincial’ in English, 
while fully acknowledging and explaining the specific characteristics of the Basque 
provinces, since ‘foral’ and ‘historical’ are specific to the Basque history and context 
and have no direct equivalent in English.  
           The term ‘nation’ is hotly disputed in Spain. The Spanish Constitution only 
recognises Spain as a nation, while the Basque Country and Catalonia are considered 
‘nationalities’ but not ‘nations’, and in an administrative sense they are designated as 
autonomous communities. Nevertheless, Basque and Catalan nationalists consider 
the Basque Country and Catalonia to be nations and have sought their official 
recognition as such. The then Spanish prime minister Zapatero agreed to allow the 
2006 Catalan autonomy statute to refer to Catalonia as a nation in the preamble, but 
not in the body of the text itself, which would have been required to make the term 
official. Basque and Catalan nationalists tend to avoid any designation of their 
autonomous communities as ‘regions’ or use of the term ‘regionalist’ to describe 
themselves or their projects, since they consider themselves a nation. ‘Regionalist’ 
has only been used historically in the Catalan case by pre-Civil War pro-autonomy 
forces (e.g. the Lliga Regionalista) and very occasionally in relatively more recent 
times to refer to the pro-autonomy stance of the Catalan Socialists, though more 
often than not the latter’s stance has been referred to instead as ‘Catalanist’. 
Catalanism also requires definition here, since it is an umbrella term used to cover all 
parties (not just nationalist, but also the Socialists and other left-wing parties such as 
ICV) that have at times sought recognition of Catalonia as a nation and/or its right to 
shape its own autonomy (be it on specific issues such as language, or on matters 
more generally), thereby taking a stance able to compete with the nationalists. In 
more recent years, the Catalanist phenomenon has also evolved to embrace a fluid 
relationship between parties and civil society in support of Catalonia’s ‘right to 
decide’. Returning to the question of regions and nations, however, the Spanish 
autonomous communities are regularly referred to in literature in English as 
‘regions’ and their governments as ‘regional governments’ for purely practical 
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reasons, since ‘autonomous community’ is a term unique to the Spanish setup and 
‘region’ is its closest generic equivalent in English. As a result, ‘region’ and 
‘autonomous community’ will be used interchangeably in this thesis to refer to that 
level of political administration. The decision to use the term ‘region’ does not 
reflect any judgement as to whether or not the Basque Country and Catalonia should 
be officially recognised as nations. It is simply a shorter means of referring to the 
administrative level of government of the autonomous communities, widely used in 
English translation.  
           Use of the term ‘Spanish state’ also requires clarification here. Basque and 
Catalan nationalists who consider themselves first and foremost Basque or Catalan 
rather than Spanish, and who wish to distance themselves from Spain, frequently 
refer to ‘the Spanish state’ (‘el Estado español’) instead of Spain. ‘Spanish state’ has 
thus become a rather pejorative and negative means of referring to Spain when used 
in this sense. In political science literature, however, the term ‘state’ is widely used 
in a neutral sense as part of standard terminology to distinguish between 
supranational, state and substate levels of government. In this thesis, where frequent 
reference is made to the ‘Spanish state’, it is strictly in this neutral sense, without any 
negative connotations intended, in order to make clear the distinction between state 
and substate levels using the standardised political science terminology.  
           Another area of terminological confusion is how to refer to non state-wide or 
stateless political parties based in specific regions of a state. In the wider literature 
on such parties throughout Europe, they have variously been referred to as 
‘ethnoregionalist’, ‘nationalist’ or ‘autonomist’ parties, among various other labels 
(Hepburn 2009). This thesis, in accordance with general usage in the literature on 
Catalan and Basque parties, will refer to the PNV and CiU as nationalist parties, 
while acknowledging that the term ‘nationalist’ is a problematic one. Many within 
the PNV and CiU do not consider themselves as such and dislike the term, since they 
tend to believe the term ‘nationalist’ is more appropriate for Spanish centralist 
parties like the PP. They argue that the PP is more ‘nationalist’ since it seeks to use 
the Spanish state to create a Spanish nation, in contrast to Catalonia and the Basque 
Country which they consider pre-existing nations seeking to create a state.8 Some 
within the PNV would in fact prefer to change the party’s name to Basque National 
                                                
8 For example, personal interview with Germà Bel, 27 April 2015. 
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Party instead of Basque Nationalist Party.9 Still, there is a general acceptance 
amongst the PNV and CDC/CiU that they form part of the nationalist party family as 
broadly conceived of in the social sciences, and the term will be widely used in this 
thesis in this sense. The term nationalist will not only be used to refer to the substate 
nationalist movements (also often described in the literature as ‘peripheral 
nationalisms’), but also to Spanish nationalist discourse, which sectors of the PP in 
particular have sought to reassert to create a Castilian-centred national identity, in 
particular on the occasions where the party has been able to form absolute majority 
governments in Madrid (2000-2004 and 2011-2015). In Spain, there is thus a clash 
between competing nationalisms at state and substate levels.  
           Aside from the PNV and CDC/CiU, the traditionally dominant centre-right 
nationalist parties, both the Basque and Catalan regions are also home to left-wing, 
separatist parties. In Catalonia, the main left-wing secessionist party has traditionally 
been the Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, ERC), 
while another secessionist party with more radical left-wing views has been the 
Popular Unity Candidacy (Candidatura d’Unitat Popular, CUP). These parties will 
usually be referred to in this thesis primarily as secessionist or pro-independence 
parties, while acknowledging that in the case of ERC, the party has not always 
formally pushed for independence, even since it formally committed itself to this 
goal in the late 1980s – most notably, it moderated its territorial ambitions to enter 
government during the years of tripartite coalition government in Catalonia in 2003-
2010. These parties may also be grouped under the label ‘nationalist’ if a generic 
term is needed to describe them together with CDC. In Catalonia, around the time 
when CDC shifted to a more pro-sovereignty lexicon from 2012 onwards, many 
citizens who had never been Catalan nationalist supporters previously were joining 
the separatist cause, and the distinctions between the more mainstream nationalist 
party and other more traditionally separatist parties (ERC and the CUP) in terms of 
their territorial agendas became more blurred. The terms soberanista or 
independentista have become the preferred term by many within those parties and 
their supporters to describe themselves, since many do not see themselves as 
nationalists from the Catalan nationalist tradition (and since the traditional 
‘nationalists’ often do not like that term in any case). Those terms, soberantista and 
                                                
9 For example, personal interview with Iñaki Goikoetxeta, 7 July 2014.  
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independentista, or alternatively pro-sovereignty and pro-independence politicians 
and voters, may also be used in this thesis where appropriate. 
          In the Basque region, the radical left, secessionist alternative has been the 
parties of the izquierda abertzale (literally, ‘the patriotric left’, where ‘izquierda’ is 
the Spanish word for ‘left’ and ‘abertzale’ the Basque word for ‘patriotic’). The 
‘izquierda abertzale’ is an umbrella term used to denote the various left-wing, 
separatist parties and organisations in the region which have tended to ally together. 
Aside from their vision of an independent Euskal Herria, they are also known for 
their radical anti-capitalist and anti-system ideology. The term ‘izquierda abertzale’ 
will thus be used in this thesis but it requires some clarification here, since it has 
embraced a complex and changing mix of parties and party names over the decades. 
The izquierda abertzale was originally considered first and foremost the political 
wing of ETA when the terrorist group was in operation, though it would also come 
to embrace left-wing, secessionist parties critical of ETA but sharing the radical left-
wing, secessionist ideology of that milieu. The main formation was Herri Batasuna 
(HB, Popular Unity) from 1978 onwards, which registered as a political party in 
1986 and was later refounded as Batasuna in 2001, at which stage a minority faction 
which formed a critical current against ETA chose to leave and found a separate 
party, Aralar. In a controversial decision, Batasuna was outlawed in 2003 under the 
Spanish Law of Parties of 2002, which banned any political parties with links to 
terrorism. Previous formations HB, Batasuna and Euskal Herritarrok (‘Basque 
Citizens’) – the latter of which was a coalition including HB Batasuna formed in 
1998 – were also banned. Sortu (‘Create’), a new party created in 2011, was 
considered the main heir to Batasuna. Since Sortu was initially outlawed too (though 
the decision was later reversed on appeal), the izquierda abertzale formed instead a 
coalition called Bildu (‘Gather’) to stand at the 2011 regional and municipal 
elections. Bildu brought together the two parties Eusko Alkartasuna (EA, Basque 
Solidarity) and Alternatiba (‘The Alternative’), as well as some other organisations 
and independents of the izquierda abertzale. EA was the party that had formed after 
the split within the PNV in 1986, which had often allied with the PNV thereafter, but 
from 2009 onwards it had shifted definitively to join the izquierda abertzale. 
Alternatiba, meanwhile, was founded in 2009 as a result of the split within the 
Basque federation of the Spanish United Left party (Izquierda Unida, IU). While 
Bildu was the denomination used in the Basque region for the purpose of Basque 
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regional and provincial elections, it presented itself as Amaiur (‘Mother Earth’) at 
the 2011 Spanish elections. The Bildu coalition would be succeeded in 2012 by 
Euskal Herria Bildu (EH Bildu), a new version of the coalition also incorporating 
Sortu (now legalised following a successful appeal against its outlawing) and also 
Aralar, to stand at the 2012 Basque regional elections for the first time. 
           Finally, the definitions of and distinction between fiscal autonomy and fiscal 
sovereignty used in this thesis need to be explained here, since these are not clear-
cut. In brief, fiscal autonomy when applied to substate governments usually 
describes a large degree of freedom in raising and spending taxes but still within the 
boundaries of some rules set by the wider state, as is currently true of the Basque 
region. Fiscal sovereignty, meanwhile, is more often applied to states themselves and 
suggests complete autonomy in setting fiscal policies without any outside 
interference. In practice, complete fiscal sovereignty has now become almost 
obsolete in Europe since individual member states are subject to some wider 
European fiscal legislation, especially in the case of indirect taxation. In this thesis, 
however, fiscal sovereignty when applied to the Basque provinces describes the 
aspiration to reach the same level of sovereignty in setting tax structures and policies 
in most respects as held by Spain itself. Representatives of the Basque institutions 
refer to the provinces as fiscally sovereign already in the case of taxes for which they 
have been granted  regulatory autonomy (within the limitations of the harmonisation 
rules with Spanish legislation).  
 
Analytical framework and methodology 
This study is interested first and foremost in achieving an in-depth 
knowledge of the distinctiveness of the particular cases under study, in order to be 
able to contribute both to the specific debates surrounding their individual 
relationships to the Spanish context and to comparative Catalan-Basque analysis of 
the subject. A qualitative methodology will be used, informed by the conviction that 
in-depth inductive, qualitative case studies of the Basque and Catalan nationalist 
parties are still much needed to unearth the different dynamics and drivers shaping 
their evolving behaviour. By investigating the impact of regional financing on the 
evolving territorial agendas of nationalist parties, this thesis is located in the political 
science literature on the behaviour of regionalist and nationalist parties in Western 
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Europe. This section serves first to situate this thesis within the context of some of 
the relevant European literature in this field, using this as an introduction to the 
justification and explanation of the methodological approach chosen. The next 
subsection explains the choice of elite interviews as the main research method. 
Separate subsections then look at the reasons for the choice of a Basque-Catalan 
comparative case study (including key works on the topic) and the exclusion of 
Galicia and Navarre, while a final subsection provides an introduction to the two 
regional financing systems. 
 
Theoretical background: The literature on regionalist and nationalist party 
behaviour 
 The literature on nations, nationalisms and nationalist parties encompasses 
a very wide field of study. This thesis does not intend to enter into theoretical 
debates on the definition of nations or nationalisms, but rather it is located in the 
literature which seeks ‘to investigate the complex heterogeneity of political 
orientations within national movements and their temporal evolution’ (Lluch 2014: 
3). Lluch (2014) points out that theorists have too often assumed that nationalist 
parties who seek increasing increments of sovereignty are ultimately aiming towards 
the full and ultimate goal of full independence or secession, when in actual fact their 
visions of sovereignty can embrace a range of autonomist, federalist and secessionist 
options and their ‘orientations can evolve over time’ (2014: 4), which calls for a 
deeper exploration of what causes such shifts in nationalist party orientation. 
Moreover, this thesis is located in the wider growing body of literature seeking to 
understand and explain the behaviour of stateless regionalist and nationalist parties 
(hereafter regionalist-nationalist parties) as they strategize along both the territorial 
and left-right dimensions of party competition (e.g. Hepburn 2009, Massetti 2009, 
Elias and Tronconi 2011a and 2011b, Elias et el. 2015; Massetti and Schakel 2015). 
Notwithstanding the diversity of the ideological identities of the parties included 
under this definition, they are widely considered a ‘party family’ since they are 
united by the fact that their ‘party politics is firmly anchored in the specificity of 
their territorial claims’ (Gómez-Reino 2008:9, as cited in Hepburn 2009: 480-1). 
This subsection therefore provides an overview of the growing literature on 
regionalist-nationalist party behaviour and considers how this thesis fits within and 
contributes to it.  
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 When political scientists from Anthony Downs (1957) onwards first started 
to devise analytical frameworks for the study of party systems and competition in 
Western Europe, the focus was almost exclusively on the level of the nation-state 
and the left-right axis of competition (Alonso et al. 2015: 851). Jeffery (2009: 640) 
points out that when scholars from Stein Rokkan and his colleagues onwards then 
looked for evidence of the resurgence of territorial identities in the 1960s and 1970s 
having a significant impact on statewide party systems, ‘they did not find it’.  
Nationalist-regionalist parties were largely dismissed at the time as ‘niche’ or 
‘single-issue’ parties concerned with the territorial rather than left-right dimension, 
which commanded too little support to have an impact on the main pattern of 
competition. Alonso et al. (2015: 851) suggest that this interpretation of party 
competition ‘was later complemented by the notion of valence issues (Stokes 1963) 
and by the idea that parties also strategize by emphazising issues, positional or 
valence, in which parties have a reputational or credibility advantage while ignoring 
issues for which these advantages do not exist (Budge and Farlie 1983).’ This, in 
turn, led to the interpretation that the issues raised by ‘niche’ or ‘single-issue’ parties 
tended to be absorbed by the mainstream parties and subsumed into the dominant 
left-right dimension (Alonso et el. 2015: 851).  
 The outlook would however change as the sub-state level in Western 
Europe was strengthened with the introduction of regional elections in Spain, France, 
Belgium and the UK in the 1980s and 1990s and powers were gradually devolved to 
the regional or substate government level. As the number of regionalist-nationalist 
parties began to grow, so did their electoral and political success at substate level. 
Thereafter, a substantial number of regionalist-nationalist parties began to 
successfully gain control at sub-state level as majority or minority governments, or 
to contribute to substate governments through coalitions or more informal 
parliamentary support arrangements and alliances. In turn, the increased success of 
regionalist-nationalist parties at sub-state level would lead to many entering 
government coalitions at the state level (in Italy, Belgium and Germany) or 
supporting the central government through alliances, as seen in Spain, usually in 
return for concessions at the regional level.  
 This has prompted political scientists in the past decade to start to develop 
new analytical frameworks for the study of party systems in Western Europe to 
account for their multi-level and multi-dimensional nature. Swenden and Maddens 
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(2008) describe how reconceptualising party systems as multi-level requires taking 
into account the nature of regional party systems as well as the state-wide one; how 
regional party systems within a state interact with each other; and how they interact 
with the state-wide system via both top-down and bottom-up processes. Similarly, 
new frameworks now seek to account for the fact that party systems operate in 
multidimensional policy spaces where the left-right divide is only one among various 
axes of competition. In the case of Spain, for example, studies have emphasized that 
that the main issues driving party competition are territorial decentralisation, 
immigration and the state-Church relationship, rather than the classic left-right 
divide (Sánchez-Cuenca and Dinas 2012; Dinas 2012). Importantly, in the new 
literature on nationalist-regionalist party behaviour, ‘spatial and salience theories of 
party competition are increasingly seen as complementary rather than competing 
approaches’ (Elias et al. 2015: 839-840). 
 In this context, various studies from around 2008 onwards have focused in 
particular on the following three elements of party systems and competition in multi-
level and multi-dimensional policy settings in Western Europe: 
 
1) The adaptation of state-wide parties to regional party competition. 
Analytical frameworks have been developed to account for the strategic and 
organisational adaptation of state-wide parties to substate electoral arenas 
(e.g. Roller and Van Houten 2003, Fabre 2008, Swenden and Maddens 2008, 
Hopkin 2009) and the role of state-wide parties in decentralisation processes 
in Western Europe (e.g. Toubeau and Massetti 2013). State-wide parties 
show varying levels of organisational decentralisation and give varying 
degrees of autonomy to their regional branches in terms of campaign 
strategies, coalition formation options and policy decision-making. The main 
independent variables which have been cited as determinants of these 
variations include institutional features, cleavage structures, electoral and 
party system variables and party-specific variables.  
2) The behaviour of regionalist-nationalist parties. This strand of the literature 
focuses primarily on how regionalist-nationalist parties make the transition 
from being niche parties focused almost exclusively on territorial questions 
to becoming mainstream parties, developing broader policy agendas in order 
to cross thresholds of representation (e.g. De Winter and Tursan 2004; 
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Hepburn 2009; Massetti 2009). It also considers the consequences of 
government incumbency for regionalist-nationalist parties if and when they 
reach the stage of entering government (e.g. De Winter et al. 2006; Elias and 
Tronconi 2011a and 2011b).  
3) Government formation in regional party systems, especially in terms of 
coalition arrangements and behaviour. This literature (e.g. Stefuriuc 2009) 
has sought to develop new models to explain government and coalition 
formation at sub-state level in multi-dimensional and multi-level political 
contexts. In so doing it has sought to combat the longstanding theoretical and 
practical problems plaguing classical coalition theories originally devised in 
the 1950s and 1960s, which were based on assumptions that the policy space 
was unidimensional (focusing solely on the left-right axis) and treated parties 
as unitary actors with clear goals (thus essentially ignoring intra-party 
divisions and bargaining) (see De Winter and Dumont 2006).  
 
 The second of these areas of literature is of particular relevance to this 
thesis. The emergence of regionalist-nationalist parties has inspired a growing 
literature in recent years seeking to develop analytical frameworks to explain their 
positioning and behaviour. In this regard, as stated, the dominant trend has been to 
focus on the trajectory of these parties from ‘niche’ or ‘outsider’ to ‘mainstream’ or 
‘normal’ (e.g. Hepburn 2009, Massetti 2009, Elias and Tronconi 2011a and 2011b, 
Elias et el. 2015, Massetti and Schakel 2015). This has involved combining 
sociological, institutional and rational choice approaches to analyse the evolving 
priorities of regionalist-nationalist parties and their changing role in party systems as 
they seek to cross various thresholds of representation by gaining votes, policy 
influence and office, thus forcing them to develop mainstream policy agendas in 
addition to their traditional focus on their territorial goals. It has also involved 
analysing the opportunities, challenges and consequences for parties of seeking to 
compete in both a multidimensional policy space (beyond just the traditional left-
right axis) and a multi-level sphere (comprising sub-state, national and supranational 
levels), in contrast to the almost exclusive focus on the left-right axis and the state 
level in early political science frameworks.  
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 In this regard, the literature has focused on the increased complexities 
which regionalist-nationalist parties face in seeking to reconcile different objectives. 
Elias (2011a: 508), for example, argues that: ‘There are often tradeoffs between 
being in office, on the one hand, and policy influence and/or future electoral 
performance, on the other; these tradeoffs may be particularly complex in a multi-
level context.’ Hepburn (2009: 479) points out that, ‘Experience in government has 
created new challenges for these actors. In particular, they must strike a balance 
between establishing themselves as an effective and competent party of government, 
whilst at the same time maintaining their commitment to radically overhauling the 
state.’ For example, a regionalist-nationalist party forced to moderate its territorial 
goals to enter office and then suffer the attrition that comes with having to take ‘hard 
choice’ policy decisions must weigh up the risk of losing its hard-line supporters 
(e.g. ERC lost support after its experience as part of a tripartite coalition in 
Catalonia). At the opposite end of the spectrum, a regionalist-nationalist party which 
is successful in promoting its territorial goals once in office may risk losing its 
raison d’être. Deschouwer (2009) argued that the fate of the original regionalist-
nationalist parties seeking greater autonomy for their regions in Belgium is a case in 
point. Said parties became obsolete after years of collaboration with state-wide 
parties in coalitions had narrowed the distinction between the two, the state-wide 
parties had assumed the regionalist-nationalist parties’ demands for more autonomy, 
and new secessionist parties had emerged. 
 In seeking to show that regionalist-nationalist parties can no longer be 
considered ‘niche’ or ‘single-issue’ actors, academics have focused in particular on 
the importance of the class-based or economic interests and characterization of these 
parties, which has traditionally been neglected. Hepburn (2009: 490), for example, 
recalls Freeden’s (1998: 751) argument that nationalism focused narrowly on the 
idea of nation and national self-determination is too ‘thin’ an ideology for a political 
party seeking office and must therefore be supplemented with other ‘idea systems’ 
which mainstream ideologies address, such as social justice and the distribution of 
resources. In their study of regionalist-nationalist parties in Spain and the UK, for 
example, Alonso et al. (2015) explore the party strategies used in a two-dimensional 
space (compriing the left-right and centre-periphery axes of competition) and the 
circumstances in which the parties use one or another strategy, finding that 
‘regionalist parties engage mostly in blurring and two-dimensional strategies’ and do 
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not use the one-dimensional strategy (2015: 859). Moreover, Hepburn (2009: 479) 
reminds us that, ‘In many cases, the territorial goals of SNRPs are strongly informed 
by their socio-economic programmes, which shape their vision of the kind of society 
that they would like to create for the territory.’ Thus, adopting positions on 
mainstream left-right political issues is not just a mere rite of passage in order to gain 
votes, policy influence and enter government, and the centre-periphery and left-right 
axes of competition are not necessarily independent of one another. Rather, the 
socio-economic vision that a nationalist-regionalist party has regarding its territory 
very often forms a strong part of its vision of what the nation should be. Socio-
economic goals and territorial goals, in this sense, often go hand in hand.  
 The proposed study of the PNV and CiU in this thesis offers an opportunity 
to contribute insights to develop these emerging analytical frameworks on the  
behaviour of the regionalist-nationalist party family. Since the mainstream 
nationalist parties CiU and PNV are among the regionalist-nationalist parties in 
Western Europe which have governed at sub-state level for the longest, they offer 
excellent case studies to explore in more detail the challenges that regionalist-
nationalist parties face both to retain voters and achieve their goals once in power. 
Both parties are a somewhat awkward fit for the ‘niche-to-normal’ framework since 
this assumes the gradual movement of regionalist-nationalist parties into the 
mainstream, whereas the PNV and CiU became mainstream parties from winning 
their first respective post-Constitution regional elections in 1980 onwards, and due to 
Spain’s specificity as a relatively young democracy it had no great period of 
centralised democratic rule pre-devolution. Moreover, the two parties have managed 
to hold onto power for far longer than most regionalist-nationalist parties. The 
PNV’s 29 years in power in the Basque Autonomous Community from 1980 to 2009 
(30 if we include its leadership of the Basque General Council from 1979) gave it the 
longest regional incumbency record in Western Europe after the SVP in the South 
Tyrol region of Italy (De la Calle and Sánchez Cuenca 2009: 211), and it returned to 
power in 2012. CiU is not far behind, governing in Catalonia for an uninterrupted 
23-year period from 1980 to 2003 and returning to power from 2010 onwards. Not 
only do the PNV and CiU feature among the regionalist-nationalist parties with the 
longest incumbency records, but during that period they also practiced 
‘accommodationist’ politics for a longer period than most, prioritising pro-autonomy 
rather than secessionist positions and cooperation with state-wide parties and the 
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central government in Madrid, certainly in the 1980s and 1990s. For much of their 
time in power in their respective regions, the two parties’ moderate approach led to 
increasing gains in regional autonomy, and yet these neither led to a waning in their 
raison d’être nor to a need to ‘radicalise’ their territorial agendas to maintain their 
relevance – frequent outcomes for regionalist-nationalist parties once in power. From 
the mid 1990s pressures on the ability of both CiU and PNV to continue to garner 
support while maintaining their traditional autonomist stances would nevertheless 
emerge amid changing circumstances, some shared by both regions and some 
specific to each. 
           While the ‘niche-to-normal’ framework has often focused on the prior 
conditions (social, institutional, political and ideological) which shape the 
positioning of emerging regionalist-nationalist parties, the Basque Country and 
Catalonia thus offer excellent case studies to explore in more detail the challenges 
that regionalist-nationalist parties already in the mainstream face to stay in power 
and the implications for their territorial agendas. Cross-country studies have begun to 
emerge to provide analytical frameworks for assessing the consequences of 
government incumbency for regionalist-nationalist parties (e.g. De Winter at al. 
2006; Elias and Tronconi 2011a and 2011b). We are concerned here with the 
implications in particular for their territorial agendas. In the Basque and Catalan 
cases, the strategic behaviour of the PNV and CDC/CiU on territorial matters has 
been analysed in terms of the external dynamics acting upon their shifting agendas 
(Gillespie and Gray, eds. 2015). This thesis hopes to be innovative by looking in 
detail at the influence of the regional financing models on the evolution of territorial 
strategies and behaviour of the PNV and CDC/CiU as both have fought to stay in 
power in their respective regions. Spain is a particularly interesting case in that it 
offers the opportunity to investigate two different models of fiscal decentralisation in 
relation to two different substate nationalist movements, since the Basque and 
Catalan regions are each afforded different levels of fiscal authority.  
Generalised theories cannot account adequately for the specific 
characteristics, nuances and complexities of the individual cases under study here, 
which need to be analysed in depth in order to provide a more comprehensive 
account of the impact of the regional financing systems on territorial agendas in 
those cases, which constitutes the purpose of this thesis. This research thus seeks to 
uncover explanatory factors to explain individual cases for which existing theories 
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are lacking or too generalised, making a qualitative, inductive approach appropriate. 
This is in contrast to much quantitative research which derives hypotheses from pre-
existing theoretical frameworks and seeks to improve those frameworks by 
discovering explanatory variables that are generalizable across different cases. Since 
the regional party systems at work in different countries – as well as their respective 
relationships to the state-wide party system in each – vary widely, large-N cross-
country quantitative studies can risk overlooking important country-specific 
explanatory factors which a qualitative approach is more likely to capture. In seeking 
to explain the dynamics behind shifts in the orientation of nationalist parties, 
regional financing is certainly one such factor whose full significance in Spain risks 
being overlooked in cross-country comparative studies. Spain offers the opportunity 
to investigate two different models of fiscal decentralisation in relation to two 
different substate nationalist movements, since the Basque and Catalan regions are 
each afforded different levels of fiscal authority. While some other federal and 
decentralised states in Europe also have federal and decentralised fiscal frameworks, 
the characteristics of these differ considerably, making generalisations problematic, 
and there is no other region (apart from Navarre) in Europe with the extent of fiscal 
autonomy afforded to the Basque Country.10  
           Recent studies seeking to analyse party systems and competition in multi-
level political contexts and multi-dimensional policy environments have clearly 
demonstrated the need for inductive, qualitative methods to gain a fuller 
understanding of the factors driving the behaviour of parties in such complex 
settings, thus also justifying the approach selected in this thesis. The traditional focus 
almost exclusively on the framework of the nation-state and the left-right axis of 
competition in early political science literature placed significant emphasis on 
rational choice approaches of understanding party ideology and positioning as a 
function of the conditions of electoral demand and supply and tended to treat parties 
as unitary actors with clear goals. Such rational choice institutionalist approaches 
were combined with cleavage-based sociological approaches. The factors which 
these approaches failed to take adequate account of – most notably, the internal life 
of parties and the human behaviour of the actors involved – become ever more 
important in multi-dimensional and multi-level contexts, and in regionalist-
                                                
10 The closest similarities are with the Italian regions of Val d’Aosta and South Tyrol-
Trentino (Colino 2010:1). 
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nationalist parties where strong internal disagreements may emerge over issues such 
as the level of compromise members are prepared to accept between office-seeking 
goals and their ideological tradition.  
As an example, Stefuriuc’s case study (2009) of regional government 
formation in Spain demonstrates as much. She compiles a dataset of a total of 55 
regional coalition and minority governments that formed in Spain from the mid-
1980s to 2007, using average policy scores from post-electoral surveys carried out 
by the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research (Centro de Investigaciones 
Sociológicas, CIS) to measure party policy positions, and implements a conditional 
logit model to estimate the effects of a series of determinants of coalition choice (see 
Stefuriuc 2009: 105ff). The results of her quantitative analysis confirm the relevance 
of classical predictors of coalition formation (related to size, ideology and 
familiarity) as the model fit gradually improves with the addition of each. Yet when 
new variables are added to the model to investigate multi-level variables including 
the territorial dimension of party competition and coalition congruence, they 
surprisingly do not prove statistically significant. However, when Stefuriuc proceeds 
to carry out a more in-depth qualitative analysis of two coalition formation processes 
in Catalonia (2003 and 2006) using qualitative process-tracing, this contradicts the 
results of the quantitative analysis by showing clearly the crucial role of multi-level 
factors and the territorial policy dimension. The rationales for the two coalition 
formations comprise an ‘intricate mix’ of policy-, office- and vote-seeking 
motivations as well as multi-level considerations, and both the left-right and 
territorial policy dimensions contribute to the outcomes. Noticeably, CiU – the 
median legislator on the territorial dimension – was absent from both coalitions and 
hence the coalition that formed was disconnected, thus indicating that ‘[classical 
rational choice] characteristics, such as the median legislator or policy 
connectedness, do not always adequately grasp the policy calculations of political 
parties in multi-level settings’ (Stefuriuc 2009b: 112).  
Stefuriuc thus concludes that sufficient data for quantitative comparative 
analyses of regional government coalition formation is currently lacking. More in-
depth qualitative studies are needed to fully capture the multi-level dynamic in 
different countries in order ultimately to build a better model. This thesis, in a 
similar spirit, starts from the premise that an in-depth qualitative study is needed to 
reach an understanding of the full complexity of the relationship between the 
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regional financing models in Spain and the evolution of Basque and Catalan 
territorial agendas. 
 
Research method: The choice of elite interviews 
          This research is qualitative and inductive in nature, informed first and 
foremost by an extensive programme of in-depth semi-structured elite interviews in 
the Basque and Catalan regions carried out by the author in 2014-2016 during 
extended periods of fieldwork based in the Basque Country and Catalonia, 
respectively (see Appendix 1 for a full list of interviewees and short biographies of 
each, Appendix 2 for the information sheet provided to interviewees about the 
project, and Appendix 3 for a selection of sample interview questionnaires). 
Interviews with elite actors involved in Basque and Catalan politics at different times 
since the 1980s were considered essential in order to explore why party decisions 
were taken at certain junctures and what happened in their interactions with other 
elites over time. Given the often opaque nature of many of the negotiations over 
regional financing in Spain, elite interviews with a range of actors with direct 
experience of regional financing negotiations were also deemed essential in order to 
elucidate the different dynamics involved specifically in regional financing 
negotiations and ultimately their impact on the behaviour of CDC and the PNV.  
The original strategy was to aim to interview subjects who had been centrally 
involved in policy making in the Basque and Catalan regions at different periods 
since the 1980s (i.e. key members of current and former regional governments and 
party executive members), but also to obtain responses from different currents within 
the party (in the case of the PNV and CDC) and to access party subjects across the 
region where relevant (particularly in the Basque case, where interviews needed to 
be conducted at both regional and provincial level, since it is the Basque provinces 
that raise and collect the taxes for the region). While this original strategy was 
pursued as much as possible by identifying and contacting a wide range of 
appropriate interview subjects, the fact that some interviewees subsequently 
provided introductions to other interviewees during the project was seen as a bonus, 
providing additional information and further accounts of the same events – and thus 
a safeguard against the fragility of human memory – and sometimes additional 
documentation regarding negotiations. Some interviews were conducted with 
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representatives of the other parties in the region about the main nationalist parties, 
which was also intended to ward against bias insofar as possible.   
A ‘general inductive approach’ (Thomas 2006) was deemed most 
appropriate, whereby the research was guided by overall evaluation objectives rather 
than concrete hypotheses, since the aim was to unearth explanations rather than to 
test pre-existing theories. Potentially relevant areas of interest were identified which 
might contribute to gaining a fuller understanding of: (1) the impact of the different 
regional financing models in the two regions on the evolution of the territorial 
agendas of the respective mainstream nationalist parties in each, in comparison with 
or in interaction with other drivers; and (2) the in-depth dynamics of regional 
financing negotiations at different periods, and ultimately their impact on the 
behaviour of the PNV and CDC. Some interviews were also conducted on the 
evolution of Basque and Catalan nationalist politics more generally, to put regional 
financing concerns in context. In all cases, interviews were semi-structured, with 
interview questionnaires being used as an approximate guide only and questions 
being deliberately open. Such flexibility allowed a wider range of findings to emerge 
from interviewees’ accounts of their experiences, rather than the interviewer seeking 
to test pre-existing ideas and theories.  
Questionnaires were also tailored to each specific interviewee and his/her 
experience of party politics in general and/or regional financing negotiations, since 
different interviewees had been involved in politics at different times and had taken 
part in different negotiations, therefore it was not possible to use just one interview 
template since the aim was to understand different key junctures and negotiations in 
as much depth as possible (see Appendix 3 for a sample of interview questionnaires). 
Tables 5 and 6 (pp.35-37) provide details of the main topic areas which interviewees 
were asked about, and which interviewees contributed to which topic. Sometimes 
interviewees were asked about a particular topic in more depth than in other cases, 
depending on their level of involvement. In the case of all key negotiations or key 
turning points, at least two or three different actors involved were interviewed in 
order to ensure different perspectives were sought, so that the comments of one 
interviewee could be corroborated with at the very least one other, as a safeguard 
against bias. For example, interview questions on the debates over regional financing 
during the negotiations for the drafting of a new Catalan regional statute were posed 
to the main relevant spokespeople for each of the three parties forming the Catalan 
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tripartite coalition government at the time – Antoni Castells (PSC), Josep Huguet 
(ERC) and Jaume Bosch (ICV) – as well as the CDC spokesperson, Francesc Homs. 
To give another example, questions regarding how the PSOE and the PNV reached 
an agreement in 1987 to settle existing disputes over the Concierto as part of a 
tradeoff to allow the formation of a PNV-PSE coalition government in the Basque 
region were posed to representatives of both the PSE (Carlos Aguirre, Gonzalo 
Múgica, Manuel Salinero) and the PNV (José Antonio Ardanza, Pedro Larrea) who 
had been directly involved in the negotiations at the time.   
 
Table 5 – Interviews in the Basque Country 
TOPIC INTERVIEWEES (in alphabetical order) 
 
1) What factors explain shifts in the 
PNV’s territorial strategy (along a 
continuum from accommodationist to 
pro-sovereignty politics) in the 
contemporary period? The main focus 
here was on the shift away from 
accommodationist politics and towards 
pro-sovereignty politics from the end of 
the 1990s under the regional premiership 
of Ibarretxe, and the subsequent shift 
back towards a more moderate agenda 
under Urkullu. 
 
 
Xabier Agirre (PNV); Carlos Aguirre 
(PSE); Iñaki Anasagasti (PNV); Xabi 
Anza (trade union ELA); José Antonio 
Ardanza (PNV); Sabino Arrieta (PNV); 
Pedro Azpiazu (PNV); José Ramón 
Beloki (PNV); Antón Damborenea (PP); 
Joseba Egibar (PNV); Josu Erkoreka 
(PNV); Jonan Fernández (social 
movement Elkarri); Iñaki Goikeotxeta 
(PNV); Juan José Ibarretxe (PNV); 
Rafael Larreina (EA); Koldo Mediavilla 
(PNV); Laura Mintegi (Bildu); Txema 
Montero (formerly HB, subsequently 
close to PNV); Emilio Olabarria (PNV); 
Andoni Ortuzar (PNV); Manuel Salinero 
(PSE) 
 
 
2) How does the bilateral dimension of 
the Concierto work? And what have been 
the implications for Spanish-Basque 
relations? The main focus here was on 
key instances of bilateral negotiations 
since the 1980s, including the 1981 
Concierto law; the 1985 negotiation to 
devolve VAT collection powers; the 
agreements reached in 1987 between the 
PNV and the PSE to resolve 
discrepancies over the quota law and 
payments; the modifications made in 
1997 to the 1981 Concierto law; the 
negotiations for the new 2002 Concierto 
law; and disagreements since 2007 over 
 
Carlos Aguirre (PSE); Iñaki Anasagasti 
(PNV); José Antonio Ardanza (PNV);  
Pedro Azpiazu (PNV); Antón 
Damborenea (PP); Juan José Ibarretxe 
(PNV); Pedro Larrea (PNV); Gemma 
Martínez Bárbara (technical team, 
treasury of Bizkaia); Gonzalo Múgica 
(PSE); Emilio Olabarria (PNV); José 
Rubí Cassinello (technical team, treasury 
of Bizkaia); Manuel Salinero (PSE); 
Pedro Luis Uriarte (PNV); Aitor 
Uribesalgo (PP) 
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the quota law and settlement of the 
annual quota payments. 
 
 
3) How does the Concierto fit within the 
EU framework? And what have been the 
implications for Spanish-Basque 
relatios? The main focus here was on the 
two main areas of controversy 
concerning the fit of the Concierto within 
the EU that have emerged since Spain 
joined the European Community in 
1986: Basque legislative powers over 
corporation tax, and the quest for Basque 
representation in fiscal matters at EU 
level. 
 
 
Carlos Aguirre (PSE); Pedro Azpiazu 
(PNV); Antón Damborenea (PP); Juan 
José Ibarretxe (PNV); Gemma Martínez 
Bárbara (technical team, treasury of 
Bizkaia); Gonzalo Múgica (PSE); José 
Rubí Cassinello (technical team, treasury 
of Bizkaia); Aitor Uribesalgo (PP) 
 
4) How does the Concierto work 
internally within the Basque regions? 
And what have been the implications for 
political relations and agendas within the 
region? The main focus here was on the 
nature of fiscal and financial relations 
between the three Basque provinces 
(which each have tax-raising powers). 
 
 
Carlos Aguirre (PSE); Joseba Egibar 
(PNV); Helena Franco (Bildu); Juan José 
Ibarretxe (PNV); Gemma Martínez 
Bárbara (technical team, treasury of 
Bizkaia); Itziar Miner (Bildu); Xabier 
Olano (Bildu); José Rubí Cassinello 
(technical team, treasury of Bizkaia) 
(Bildu); Aitor Uribesalgo (PP); Sebastian 
Zurutuza Mujika (technical team, 
treasury of Guipúzcoa) 
 
 
 
Table 6 – Interviews in Catalonia 
TOPIC INTERVIEWEES (in alphabetical order) 
 
1) What factors explain shifts in CDC’s 
territorial strategy (along a continuum 
from accommodationist to pro-
sovereignty politics) in the contemporary 
period? The focus here was not only on 
CDC’s explicit shift towards a pro-
sovereignty agenda and alliances in 
2012, presaged by developments from 
around 2008 onwards; but also 
significant developments preceding this 
from the late 1990s onwards, with Jordi 
Pujol’s public shift towards support for a 
fiscal-type pact for Catalonia from 1997 
onwards, followed by CDC’s behaviour 
prior to and during the negotiations for 
the regional statute reform in the early 
 
Germà Bel (formerly PDC, now Junts 
pel Sí); Jaume Bosch (ICV); Antoni 
Castells (PSC); Agustí Colomines 
(previous affiliations to left- wing 
nationalist parties as well as CDC); Lluís 
Corominas (CDC); Francesc Homs 
(CDC); Josep Huguet (ERC); Andreu 
Mas-Colell (CDC); Heribert Padrol 
(linked to CDC); Jordi Pujol (CDC)  
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2000s. 
 
 
2) Why have repeated reformed of the 
common financing system failed to 
satisfy CDC despite the leading role 
played by CDC/CiU in negotiating each 
reform? 
 
 
Germà Bel (formerly PDC, now Junts 
pel Sí); Jaume Bosch (ICV); Antoni 
Castells (PSC); Agustí Colomines 
(previous affiliations to left- wing 
nationalist parties as well as CDC); Lluís 
Corominas (CDC); Francesc Homs 
(CDC); Josep Huguet (ERC); Andreu 
Mas-Colell (CDC); Heribert Padrol 
(linked to CDC); Jordi Pujol (CDC) 
 
 
3) What role did dissatisfaction with the 
common financing system play in the 
quest for a new statute for Catalonia and 
the statute reform negotiations? Why did 
the 2006 statute reform fail to resolve the 
issue of regional financing? 
 
 
Germà Bel (formerly PDC, now Junts 
pel Sí); Jaume Bosch (ICV); Antoni 
Castells (PSC); Agustí Colomines 
(previous affiliations to left- wing 
nationalist parties as well as CDC); Lluís 
Corominas (CDC); Francesc Homs 
(CDC); Josep Huguet (ERC); Andreu 
Mas-Colell (CDC); Heribert Padrol 
(linked to CDC); Jordi Pujol (CDC) 
 
 
4) What role has dissatisfaction with 
regional financing played in the rapid 
rise in CDC’s recent shift towards a pro-
independence agenda?  
 
 
Germà Bel (formerly PDC, now Junts 
pel Sí); Jaume Bosch (ICV); Antoni 
Castells (PSC); Agustí Colomines 
(previous affiliations to left- wing 
nationalist parties as well as CDC); Lluís 
Corominas (CDC); Francesc Homs 
(CDC); Josep Huguet (ERC); Andreu 
Mas-Colell (CDC); Heribert Padrol 
(linked to CDC); Jordi Pujol (CDC) 
 
 
 
In total, personal interviews were conducted with approximately 45 
interviewees in the Basque and Catalan regions (see Appendix 1). These included 
current and former politicians and their advisers representing political parties across 
the spectrum in both regions, as well as, in the Basque case, some relevant technical 
officials in the provincial administrations. These technical officials were interviewed 
not simply for technical information, but also because they had participated in key 
intraregional negotiatons over the Concierto, giving them first hand insight into the 
political dynamics between the provinces. Moreover, they often reflected the policy 
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of the traditionally dominant party in their province. Most notably, since Vizcaya has 
been governed consistently by the PNV throughout the democratic period, key 
treasury officials there, albeit not affiliated to a political party themselves, tend both 
to reflect and inform PNV policy.11 
Each interview lasted at least one hour; a number of interviewees were 
subsequently re-interviewed a second (and in some cases a third) time; and a number 
of more informal meetings and conversations with politicians and other experts such 
as academics were also held to unearth areas of inquiry. The majority of the 
interviews (approximately 35) were conducted in the Basque region, since the 
extensive role afforded to the provincial administrations there under the Concierto 
and the territorial complexity of the Basque region (which is more heterogeneous 
than Catalonia) made it necessary to conduct interviews not only at the regional 
government level, but also at the level of the three provincial governments. The 
dynamics of inter-provincial relations within the Basque region in relation to the 
Concierto are particularly opaque, given the very little existing literature on the 
subject, which made extensive interviewing at the level of the three provincial 
administrations necessary. This is in contrast to Catalonia, where the common 
financing system governs financial relations with the regional government level 
only, and thus interviews were focused only at this level.12  
All interviews were conducted in Spanish and each interview was recorded 
and subsequently transcribed, but interviewees were informed at the outset (in the 
information sheet provided to them – see Appendix 2) that the recordings and 
transcriptions would be for the author’s use only and would not be made publically 
available. Similarly, interviewees were informed that they would not be quoted 
directly without their permission. This method was designed purposefully in order to 
encourage interviewees to reveal details about negotiations which they might not 
have been willing to reveal if the recordings and transcripts were to be made public. 
Despite this reassurance, a few interviewees still requested that the recording device 
be turned off at certain stages of their interviews in order to disclose certain details, 
                                                
11 This was raised by PNV representative Pedro Azpiazu himself at interview.  
12 A wider range of interviews were also conducted in the Basque region since it was where I 
first started my fieldwork and the scope of my research project was initially wider (on 
regional financing but also other dynamics impacting the Basque and Catalan nationalist 
movements), but I narrowed the focus solely to regional financing in the early stages of my 
fieldwork there.  
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which was proof of the fact that interviewees were willing to provide more 
information without fear of being quoted directly or of interview recordings being 
published. Since the aim of this study was precisely to probe particular events and 
policy developments and get interview subjects to speak about them in detail, it was 
deemed fundamentally important to give the interviewees the opportunity to be as 
open about their experiences as possible by removing any potential fears about 
interview recordings or transcripts being made public. This process (including the 
information sheet provided to interviewees) was approved by the University of 
Liverpool’s ethics committee in the application I made to them to gain approval for 
my interview method prior to undertaking the fieldwork. It follows the same method 
used by my supervisor Professor Richard Gillespie in the wider ESRC-funded 
project on ‘The Dynamics of Nationalist Evolution in Contemporary Spain’ 
[ES/J007854/1] to which my PhD research was linked.  
Paraphrasing interviewees’ responses in English, rather than providing direct 
quotations, was also considered appropriate in order to provide a succinct and 
economical account, especially since this study is not concerned with discourse 
analysis, but rather with obtaining information about the political processes and 
relationships that are rarely discussed in official discourse. This also justified the use 
of semi-structured interviews, in order to ask supplementaries when initial responses 
were too general or evasive. Again, paraphrasing rather than using direct quotations 
follows the method used by Professor Gillespie in the publications produced as part 
of the wider ESRC-funded project to which my PhD research was linked.  
           Inevitably, basing research first and foremost on interviews runs the risk of 
giving subjective, imbalanced accounts. I attempted, within the constraints of a PhD 
project, to minimise this risk by undertaking interviews with political actors 
representing a range of parties operating in the Basque and Catalan regions and 
obtaining their respective views on key turning points in party trajectories and key 
episodes in regional financing negotiations, in order to be able to reflect different 
perspectives in an attempt to counteract bias. While the interview sample covered a 
wide political and geographical spread, it was not possible to contrast perspectives of 
all the key actors involved at certain junctures through interviews alone, thus the 
information obtained in interviews has also been supplemented by extensive reading 
of media reports and, where possible, of other publically available accounts of 
particular key junctures and negotiations, for example as published in memoirs. With 
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more time and resources I would also have undertaken interviews with current and 
former elite actors in the central administration in Madrid representing the main 
Spanish parties (particularly the PP and the PSOE), but for the purposes of this 
project it was decided to focus instead on the spectrum of perspectives within the 
Basque and Catalan regions themselves, taking into account the views expressed by 
the Basque and Catalan branches or federations of those Spanish parties in question 
in order to contrast these with the nationalist parties’ views. More informal 
consultations with Madrid-based academics and other analysts working on regional 
financing were, however, also undertaken. 
 
The choice of case studies: Basque-Catalan comparison 
 
The nature of the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements and the 
problematic question of their accommodation within the Spanish state have inspired 
an abundant literature, and yet there have been few Basque-Catalan comparative 
studies. This section will give an overview of relevant areas of research that have 
been undertaken to date and outline the reasons for the existing lack of Basque-
Catalan comparative studies, before explaining why there are strong grounds for a 
comparative study in this thesis.  
Prominent examples of existing literature include historically-informed 
individual case studies of the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements covering 
various periods from their nineteenth-century origins through to the present day (e.g. 
on the Basque case, Castells and Cajal 2009, De la Granja 2009, Lecours 2007, 
Pérez-Agote 2006; on the Catalan case, Dowling 2013, Guibernau 2004, McRoberts 
2001, Smith 2014). In the Basque case, this has included in-depth study of the more 
radical, violent strain of nationalism under ETA (e.g. Muro 2008, Watson 2007). 
Various individual case studies of the two mainstream nationalist parties under 
consideration here have been published to date which analyse some of the internal 
and external factors which help to explain the relative success of the two parties, as 
well as the reasons for their usually moderate form of nationalist politics during 
much of the democratic period and their more recent swings towards pro-sovereignty 
politics (e.g. Barrio and Barberà 2006, 2011; Mees and De Pablo 2005; Pérez-Nievas 
2006, 2011; Vazquez 2010).  
         On the wider context of Spain’s territorial problematic, there has been 
extensive study of the compromise on decentralisation that was agreed during the 
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transition to democracy in Spain and enshrined in the Constitution of 1978, resulting 
in the creation of the 17 autonomous communities (e.g. Colomer 1999, Moreno 
2001) and consideration of how the multi-level political dynamic in Spain, including 
both central-regional and inter-regional government relations, has shaped subsequent 
attempts by both Basque and Catalan nationalists at renegotiation of the state of the 
autonomies (e.g. Keating and Wilson 2009, Muro 2009). Other studies have 
addressed the rise in Spanish nationalism too, particularly its re-emergence in times 
of PP domination in Spain at various periods since the party won power for the first 
time in 1996, and how it impacts the Basque and Catalan nationalisms by means of 
competing nationalist dynamics (e.g. Núñez Seixas 2001; Balfour and Quiroga 2007; 
Mar-Molinero and Smith 1996; Molina 2010; Muro and Quiroga 2004, 2005). A 
number of studies have reflected on how territorial and cultural diversity could be 
accommodated in Spain today as part of broader theoretical and empirical reflections 
on the changing nature of the state in the modern and contemporary eras, the nature 
of plurinational states and means of recognition of their component parts, and the 
relationship between democracy and nationalism (e.g. Keating 2008, 2012; 
Guibernau 2014; Requejo 2005, 2010).  
           Despite this, there have been few direct comparative studies of the Basque 
and Catalan nationalist movements and their respective parties in academic research, 
notwithstanding frequent comparisons in the media and in general conversation 
(Gillespie 2015a: 5). Catalonia is more often compared to Scotland, Flanders and 
Quebec as examples of ‘civic nationalism’, classically being described as ‘one of the 
closest [among all the stateless nations] to being a ‘civic nation’, in other words, one 
whose nationalism is based not on ethnicity but on a common project, both political 
and cultural, to which all citizens can subscribe’ (McRoberts 2001: 183). In contrast, 
the Basque situation has tended to be compared to other ethnic conflicts with a 
terrorist dimension, especially the case of Northern Ireland. Thus attention has 
focused on ‘the puzzling question of why Basque nationalism is exclusionary and 
violence-prone, while Catalan nationalism is politically inclusive and 
accommodating’ (Encarnación 2008: 92). In contrast to the traditional desire among 
Catalan nationalists to articulate visions of a Spain in which Catalonia would play a 
fundamental role, there has also been a historically stronger tendency among Basque 
nationalists to seek ‘more fundamental constitutional and institutional rearrangement 
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than in Catalonia, when not outright secession’ (Lecours 2007: 58). This, too, has 
traditionally mitigated against comparison of the two cases.  
           Most of the few comparisons of the Basque and Catalan nationalist 
movements that do exist (e.g. Conversi 1997, Díez Medrano 1995, Payne 1971) are 
generally historically-informed and focus on the origins and early development of 
the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, not the more recent period, and they tend to reflect the civic-ethnic divide 
in interpretations. In this vein, for example, Conversi (1997) argues that widespread 
use and accessibility of the Catalan language served to create cohesion among the 
inhabitants of Catalonia and alleges violence was more likely to emerge in the 
Basque Country to fill this gap, given the more limited diffusion of the Basque 
language (euskera) and the privileging of other ethnic traits. Such black-and-white 
characterisations have nevertheless been problematised since then in nationalism 
studies in general (e.g. Harris 2009: 28-34) and also in relation to the specifics of the 
Basque and Catalan cases which concern us here. While the original Basque and 
Catalan nationalist ideological discourses and tropes of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries did to a large extent exemplify an ethnic-civic divide, this 
distinction can be more of a hindrance than a help when describing the nationalist 
movements in the contemporary period, for it imposes a black-and-white divide 
between the two cases that does not reflect the more nuanced reality. For example, 
there has been considerable debate over whether the privileging of Catalan language 
can genuinely be considered ‘civic’ (e.g. Miley 2006, Franco-Guillén and Zapata-
Barrero 2014), while Basque nationalism is no longer so heavily based on ethnicity. 
Interestingly, it was ETA, not the PNV, that pioneered the attempt to bridge the 
traditional community divide by defining a Basque as anyone who lived and worked 
in the Basque Country (Ugarte 2009: 368).  
           Focus on the above differences between the two nationalisms has risked 
obscuring more fruitful comparative study from other angles in the contemporary 
period. In particular, the focus on the history of violence in the Basque case has 
detracted from study of the more moderate form of nationalist politics under the 
PNV in the contemporary period. Although there were notable differences in the 
nationalist party politics in the Basque Country and Catalonia in the early decades of 
the twentieth century prior to Franco’s dictatorship, there have been marked 
similarities since the transition to democracy in the late 1970s in terms of the 
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behaviour of the mainstream nationalist parties in each region and the contexts in 
which they operate. While the PNV re-emerged after the Franco period as the 
dominant nationalist party in the Basque Country, in Catalonia the newly founded 
CDC, conceived in the early 1970s under Jordi Pujol, formed an alliance with UDC, 
one of the few Catalan parties of the Republic to re-emerge strengthened after the 
Franco era, to become the main political force of Catalan nationalism (Dowling 
2001, 2012). The alliance, later becoming a federation, would last until 2015. Both 
the PNV and CDC/CiU have traditionally been centre-right parties of business and 
the middle classes, which very quickly established themselves as the mainstream 
nationalist parties in their respective regions. Since winning their first respective 
regional elections in 1980, both have held onto power aside from a few years in 
opposition to Socialist or Socialist-led regional governments, in both cases earlier in 
the 2000s (2003-2010 in the Catalan case, 2009-2012 in the Basque case). And yet 
they have usually only secured a relative majority of seats in their respective 
parliaments (the PNV has never won an absolute majority, while CiU lost its 
absolute majority in 1995 and never recovered it thereafter), thus both have been 
heavily reliant on informal alliances (or at times formal coalitions in the Basque 
case) with other parties in order to govern. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, both 
parties tended to prioritise accommodationist politics whereby they sought to 
negotiate further autonomy within the context of the Spanish state, even if the PNV 
remained relatively more ambiguous regarding its ultimate territorial goals. Since the 
late 1990s, both parties have nevertheless undergone shifts in their territorial agendas 
between accommodationism and pro-sovereignty politics at different times, seeking 
a fundamental reconfiguration of their relationship to the Spanish state.  
           In further similarities, both parties have had the capacity at times to affect 
Spanish government formation or survival, gaining influence in Madrid by lending 
parliamentary support to minority Spanish governments on various occasions from 
1993 onwards, in return for decentralisation or economic gains, in what has become 
known as a system of ‘mutual backscratching’ (Field 2014: 293). Since the turn of 
the century, both have nevertheless lost much of their bargaining power in Madrid 
during times of PP absolute majority government (2000-2004 and 2011-2015). 
Meanwhile, within their respective regions, both parties have faced similar kinds of 
party competition of varying degrees at different times: as moderate mainstream 
nationalist parties, both have faced competition on the nationalist axis from more 
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radical left-wing, pro-independence forces, as well as across the nationalist/unionist 
divide from regional branches or federations of the state-wide parties (especially of 
the socialist PSOE). Competition on both the territorial and the left-right dimensions 
contributed to increasing pressures on the viability of their form of moderate, 
accommodationist nationalist politics from the late 1990s (see Chapter 2). Although 
both parties returned to power after losing control to the Socialists in their respective 
regions earlier in the 2000s, they would be constrained by other parties upon whom 
they would have to depend for parliamentary support. Other contextual factors are 
important too: both parties operate in regions with a comparable record of economic 
success relative to most other regions in Spain in recent decades (e.g. Zipfel et al. 
2015: 1). 
          Differences in nationalist party politics in both cases, in particular due to the 
history of terrorism in the Basque Country, inevitably remain and must be 
acknowledged and accounted for where relevant when comparing the parties. The 
differences on account of the history of violence have however been gradually 
reducing since ETA ceased its activities in 2011 and as the Basque Country becomes 
accustomed to a more normalised political environment, without violence. The 
radical pro-independence forces under the izquierda abertzale became a genuine 
competitor in the political sphere to more moderate, mainstream nationalist party 
politics for the first time upon entering political life properly from 2011 onwards 
after bans on previous parties during the last ten years. Adaptation and habituation to 
democratic competition takes time and many of the ramifications of the years of 
violence still condition Basque politics (e.g. unresolved questions regarding the 
regrouping of ETA prisoners, and victims’ rights), but the initial phase towards a 
more normalised political environment is underway, thus creating genuine 
competition between nationalist parties within the region. At the same time, in 
Catalonia, competition between nationalist parties has also increased, with CDC 
facing stronger electoral competition in recent years from ERC and the CUP, though 
this has to some extent been offset by the phenomenon of pro-independence political 
pacts involving CDC and ERC since 2012.   
           The above similarities between the PNV and CDC, in terms of their behaviour 
and the contexts in which they operate, provide a strong basis for comparative study. 
The territorial agendas of the PNV and CDC seem clearly to have shifted beyond 
accommodationism in the 21st century and much of the older literature in no way 
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anticipated such a development, particularly with regard to Catalonia. It is hoped that 
the comparative dimension of this thesis will serve to contribute new insights into 
reasons for the parties’ shifts and the significance of their contrasting regional 
financing arrangements in this regard.  
 
A stronger focus on the Basque case 
             While the thesis offers a comparative Basque-Catalan study, greater 
attention will be paid to the Basque case. This is because the relationship between 
regional financing and territorial agendas is more complex and less understood in the 
Basque case, and also since the Basque financing model has become a point of 
reference for Catalan demands, notwithstanding some inconsistencies over the extent 
to which the Catalans have wanted to follow it. The Basque case is particularly 
complicated due to the complexity of political and fiscal relations within the Basque 
region itself (between regional and provincial administrations, since the provinces 
are endowed with tax-raising authority), and also due to the question of how the 
Basque fiscal autonomy model fits within the European context given that it offers 
the most advanced level of substate fiscal autonomy in Europe. These intraregional 
and supranational dimensions require adequate analysis, beyond purely Spanish-
Basque bilateral dynamics over the Concierto, thus separate chapters will address 
each of these dimensions (bilateral, supranational and intraregional), as reflected in 
the chapter outline below. Catalonia does not have the same internal territorial 
complexity as the Basque region, and the regional financing system as applied to 
Catalonia is focused on the level of the regional government only, thus the focus 
here is first and foremost on the level of the regional government. Local financing in 
Catalonia and in the other regions under the common system comes under a separate 
system which is not the focus of this thesis, except insofar as the centralised nature 
of the local financing system, designed and controlled exclusively by the Spanish 
government, is another source of grievance for Catalan nationalist and pro-
independence parties since they argue that this should be a Catalan government 
competence. 
 
Why not Galicia? 
            Like the Basque Country and Catalonia, Galicia has a distinct historical 
tradition of self-government and its own language and culture, and was also 
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recognised in the Spanish Constitution of 1978 as one of Spain’s ‘historic 
nationalities’. The region has a significant nationalist movement too, but it is 
excluded from this study since it differs from the Basque and Catalan cases in almost 
all of the above commonalities identified (Gillespie 2015a: 5 fn. 8). Most 
fundamentally, the nationalist movement in Galicia has never gained the same level 
of support as in the Basque Country and Catalonia and the main Galician nationalist 
party, the Galician Nationalist Bloc (Bloque Nacionalista Gallego), has never held 
power at regional government level. The region has, instead, been governed by the 
Galician federations or branches of the two main Spanish statewide parties, the PP 
and the PSOE. While it is of interest to consider the reasons why the Galician case 
has evolved differently from the Basque and Catalan cases, this is not the purpose of 
this thesis, which aims instead to compare the evolving behaviour and territorial 
strategies of nationalist parties which have a long record of governing at regional 
government level and have shifted between accommodationist and pro-sovereignty 
strategies in that time.    
 
Why not Navarre? 
 Like the Basque Country, as mentioned earlier, Navarre comes under the 
‘foral’ financing system for historical reasons, and its Convenio is very similar to the 
Concierto (the main difference being that Navarre only has one province and 
therefore one treasury, whereas the Basque region has three provinces and three 
treasuries). However, Navarre differs from both the Basque and Catalan cases in that 
it has not traditionally had a strong nationalist party presence.13 The dominant party 
in the region since the start of the 1990s has been the Navarran People’s Union 
(Unión del Pueblo Navarro, UPN) which governed Navarre from 1991 until 2015, 
apart from one year out of government in 1995-1996. UPN is a strictly regionalist 
rather than a nationalist party which does not have sovereignty ambitions for 
                                                
13 This may now be changing. A major shift in governance occurred when the July 2015 
regional elections resulted in a very fragmented parliament and UPN was unable to form a 
government despite winning the most votes and seats of any party. The nationalist coalition 
Geroa Bai (‘Yes to the Future’) entered into power instead, supported by Bildu, Podemos 
and Izquierda-Ezkerra (the latter of which is a coalition of the Navarran branch of the United 
Left and other left-wing, nationalist forces). This put nationalist forces in power in Navarre 
for the first time. Geroa Bai includes the PNV in Navarre and the left-wing nationalist forces 
of Atarrabia Taldea – a political party which split from EA in 2011 – and Zabaltzea – a 
political association created in 2011 from ex-members of EA and Aralar.  
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Navarre. It is a conservative party which has traditionally been affiliated to the 
Spanish PP party and it has essentially behaved as a Navarran federation or branch of 
the PP, rather than as a nationalist party seeking to distinguish its territory from the 
Spanish state. Indeed, between 1991 and 2008 UPN officially acted as the Navarran 
branch of the PP, under an agreement which meant that the PP did not run at 
Navarran elections and in return the UPN supported the PP in other areas. This thesis 
aims to compare the evolving behaviour and territorial strategies of nationalist 
parties which have a long record of governing at regional government level and have 
shifted between accommodationist and pro-sovereignty strategies in that time, thus 
Navarre was not selected for study since it has not had such a party.14  
 
Two different regional financing systems: some initial clarifications  
            While the two financing systems will be explained in fuller detail in Chapter 
3, this section provides an introduction to the historical reasons for the existence of 
different financing systems in the Basque and Catalan regions. The reasons why the 
Basque and Catalan regions have separate regional financing arrangements in 
contemporary Spain date back centuries. The various medieval kingdoms and 
regions of the Iberian Peninsular were ultimately combined to form modern day 
Spain through a gradual process culminating in the union of the Crowns of Castile 
and Aragón in 1469 and their subsequent conquest of the last remaining territories of 
Granada and Navarre (Lecours 2007: 31-39). Thereafter, the Catalan and Basque 
regions still enjoyed substantial political and fiscal automony over periods through to 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries respectively, due to the maintenance of their 
own institutions of self-government and medieval fueros, which afforded them 
significant political and fiscal autonomy (e.g. Lecours 2007: 32-33). The fueros were 
legal statutes which applied to a specific province or locality, setting the rules and 
rights for that province granted by the King. They were the main system of local law 
used in the Iberian Peninsular from the middle ages onwards. However, the specific 
constitutional system in Catalonia was abolished in 1714 following the War of 
Succession and the Basque fueros were eliminated in 1876 after the Basque 
                                                
14 I nevertheless made a visit to Navarre in May 2014 to interview Mikel Aranburu (then 
member of the technical team of the Navarran treasury) and to meet with academics at the 
Public University of Navarre specialising in the Convenio, for purposes of comparison vis-à-
vis the Concierto. 
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provinces had lost the Third Carlist War. And yet the fiscal dimension of the Basque 
fueros was essentially reinstated again two years later by a new arrangement, soon to 
be named the Concierto Económico-Administrativo (from 1882 onwards), and then 
simply the Concierto Económico, which would grant the three Basque provinces the 
right to collect taxes again.15 Castile had originally agreed to the arrangement in 
1878 primarily for practical reasons since the central treasury did not immediately 
have the technical means or capacity to collect taxes in the Basque provinces after 
the abolition of their fueros. A vestige of the fueros in economic terms thus remained 
while any political dimension in the form of self-government had been abolished. 
The agreement was originally intended to be a temporary one for a transitional 
period of eight years until the Basque provinces became fully integrated into the 
Castilian tax system, but instead ended up staying in force thereafter, until Franco 
abolished the Concierto in Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa in 1937 (Álava, however, 
retained the Concierto by supporting the Francoist side).  
         During the transition to democracy of the late 1970s and early 1980s, a new 
updated agreement based on the ethos of the original Concierto would become one 
of the fundamental bases of Basque regional autonomy. The Spanish Constitution of 
1978 pledged in its First Additional Disposition to respect the ‘historical rights’ of 
the ‘foral territories’, which was fundamentally taken as a reference to the historical 
tradition of the Basque and Navarran provinces in raising their own taxes (Navarre, 
too, had retained tax-raising powers after its fueros had been abolished in 1841, and 
like Álava, it had retained them under Franco by supporting the dictator). In the 
Basque case, the Basque and Spanish authorities reached an agreement in 1980, 
approved by law in 1981, to restore tax-raising powers to the provinces of Vizcaya 
and Guipúzcoa and update them for Álava. While the three Basque provinces 
retained or regained their responsibility for tax collection, the new Concierto 
governed fiscal and financial relations with the Basque region as a whole rather than 
each individual province, following the creation of the autonomous community. 
Thus, only one annual quota payment would be made to Madrid, not three. The 
financing systems in the Basque and Navarran regions, the Concierto and the 
Convenio respectively, became known as the régimen foral de financiación 
(foral/charter financing regime, from fuero or medieval charter), in contrast to the 
                                                
15 On the historical origins of the Concierto, see Alonso Olea 1995. For a shorter overview, 
see Colino 2012. 
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régimen común de financiación (common financing regime). The latter was 
developed for Spain’s other autonomous communities (all except the Basque and 
Navarran regions) during the transition and first legislated under Organic Law 
8/1980 on the Financing of the Autonomous Communities (Ley Orgánica de 
Financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas, LOFCA). Both the Concierto 
legislation and the common financing system legislation would undergo significant 
reforms and changes in the following decades, but the starting point for the two 
systems in the democratic period were the first laws of 1981 (Concierto) and 1980 
(LOFCA) respectively. This study considers the evolution of both regional financing 
systems from then onwards.  
           For clarification purposes, it is important to note that the regional financing 
systems govern the raising of taxes only, not social security contributions. In Spain, 
the Social Security fund has remained centralised (and is often referred to as the 
‘caja única’ or ‘single fund’) since devolving social security has long been one of 
the ‘red lines’ for the PP and the PSOE alike that they are not willing to cross, given 
the PP’s ideological centralism and the PSOE’s longstanding view that one 
centralised fund and centralised legislation regarding pensions and other benefits is 
essential to ensure equality among Spaniards. Some administrative functions of the 
system (i.e. making payments) can be devolved to the regions under certain 
conditions under the provisions of the Spanish Constitution and the regional 
autonomy statutes, but not the authority to vary social security contributions or 
legislation regarding pensions and other benefits. The issue is a contentious one, 
since the centralisation of social security has been one of the main complaints of the 
PNV and CDC. For the PNV, in particular, the failure to devolve administration of 
the social security system is one of the main pending issues where it has accused the 
Spanish government of failing to fulfil the Basque autonomy statute.16 Article 18 of 
the Basque regional autonomy statute grants the Basque region the right to 
implement and develop the basic Spanish state legislation in relation to social 
security, apart from legislation regarding the financial system of social security 
(where it must abide by Spanish legislation), though it can manage the financial 
system. This article was worded to respect Article 141.1.17 of the Spanish 
Constitution, which attributes to the Spanish state the responsibility for developing 
                                                
16 Personal interviews with PNV representatives, 2014. 
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both the basic legislation and the financial system of social security, while 
recognising that these services may then be implemented by regional governments, 
in accordance with the relevant Spanish legislation. A Constitutional Court ruling in 
the late 1990s, however, determined that not even management of the financial 
system of social security could be transferred to the Basque region due to the risk 
that this would infringe the principle of the caja única, an interpretation which the 
PNV has disputed ever since. Some representatives of non-nationalist forces in the 
Basque region – e.g. the Basque Socialists – also dispute that interpretation of the 
Constitutional Court, arguing that the decentralisation of purely managing the social 
security system (e.g. paying pensions), while remaining fully subject to Spanish 
legislation regarding the raising of quotas, would not break the principle of the caja 
única.17 However, at the same time, the Basque Socialists warn against the PNV’s 
intentions, arguing that the latter’s goal is fundamentally to go beyond pure 
management to have legislative competence (Ibarretxe sought legislative power over 
social security for the Basque region, and under Urkullu, the PNV commissioned a 
report into the viability of the Basque Country having its own pensions system). This 
would violate the caja única and, Basque Socialists suggest, thus risk inequality in 
Spain (in line with the view of PSOE headquarters in Madrid). The current 
centralisation of social security in Spain is thus a contentious issue subject to intense 
debate, and a fundamental source of grievance for Basque and Catalan nationalists – 
notwithstanding the widespread view that the Basques in particular benefit in terms 
of resource levels under the current system, due to the particularly high pension costs 
and ageing population there (see, for example, Galende 2015). While this must be 
acknowledged and recognised, it is not the intention to investigate this further in this 
thesis. In Spain, there is a clear-cut distinction between general taxes and social 
security contributions (to a greater extent than in the UK, for example, where there is 
some overlap in some respects between general taxation and the National Insurance 
system). The regional financing systems under study here govern general taxation 
only. 
 
  
                                                
17 Personal interview with Manuel Salinero, 2 September 2014. 
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Chapter outline 
While this thesis focuses first and foremost on strategic shifts in the territorial 
agendas of the Basque and Catalan nationalist parties since the 1990s, some 
developments in recent decades need to be understood within the context of a longer 
history. Following this first introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides an analysis of 
the evolution of Spain’s national and territorial problematic and the challenges of 
accommodating the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements from the transition to 
democracy onwards. It then identifies specific factors underlying the strategic shifts 
in the territorial agendas of the Basque and Catalan nationalist parties, in order to 
contextualise this thesis.  
The rest of the thesis then focuses specifically on how, within this context, 
the different financing arrangements of the two regions have contributed to shaping 
the evolution of the nationalist parties’ territorial agendas and ideas on sovereignty. 
Chapter 3 is primarily technical in nature, for it is designed to explain how the 
Basque Concierto and the common financing system work. The explanation of each 
system is also used as a foundation to provide an analysis of the controversial 
question of whether the Basques contribute enough revenues to Spain compared to 
other comparably wealthy regions under the common system such as Catalonia, a 
longstanding source of political debate in Spain which has intensified in recent years.  
Chapter 4 addresses the bilateral nature of the Basque Concierto. It 
investigates how Spanish-Basque bilateral fiscal and financial relations work, what 
the main areas of contention have been, how these differences have (or have not) 
been resolved, and, ultimately, what the implications have been for the PNV’s 
territorial agenda. Chapter 5 then investigates in more detail one of the areas of 
contention raised in Chapter 4: the question of how to update the Concierto in the 
post-1986 EU context. Chapter 5 goes beyond the purely domestic Spanish-Basque 
debate over the Concierto’s fit within the EU context to consider the opportunities or 
obstacles at EU level itself that impact the development of the Concierto as well, and 
what the implications of these debates have been for the PNV’s attitudes towards the 
place of the Basque Country in Europe. 
After this analysis of the Concierto’s bilateral dimension and its place in the 
European context, the final chapter devoted to the Basque case (Chapter 6) then 
analyses the other side of the Concierto coin, namely its intra-regional nature, since 
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the Concierto affords tax-raising powers to each of the three Basque provinces, 
rather than to the regional government. This chapter explains how the Concierto 
works internally within the Basque region and it explores the consequences of the 
complex nature of this intra-regional dimension of the Concierto for fiscal and 
political relations between different provinces and political forces within the Basque 
region. This allows for an assessment of the ways in which the intra-regional 
dimension of the Concierto has contributed to shaping the PNV’s territorial 
strategies and behaviour. 
Chapter 7 turns to the Catalan case, examining how and when the issue of 
regional financing has contributed to shaping shifts in the territorial agenda of CDC. 
The main focus of analysis is on the history of debates over regional financing 
reforms and the quest for a fiscal pact and beyond, since demands for a significant 
reform of regional financing for Catalonia have been a major theme of political 
debate for more than a decade, thus long preceding the recent context of major 
economic  recession. As well as analysing the evolving nature of relations with 
Madrid, the chapter considers how intra-regional factors such as party competition 
and pressures from civil society have had a significant bearing on the timing of 
CDC’s shifts in attitude towards the financing question and beyond.  
Chapter 8 then concludes by outlining the main findings of the thesis and 
where it makes a contribution to knowledge, considering each of the two case studies 
individually as well as the benefits of the comparative approach. A final section 
outlines potential future areas of research arising from this project. 
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Chapter 2 
 Basque and Catalan nationalisms: Unravelling the drivers 
behind shifting party agendas 
 
            While this thesis focuses first and foremost on strategic shifts in the territorial 
agendas of the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements and parties since the 
1990s, many developments in that period need to be understood within the context of 
a longer history. This chapter provides an analysis of the evolution of Spain’s 
national and territorial problematic and the challenges of accommodating the Basque 
and Catalan regions from the transition to democracy of the late 1970s onwards until 
the end of 2015, in order to contextualise this thesis. It then identifies specific factors 
underlying the strategic shifts in the territorial agendas of the Basque and Catalan 
nationalist parties during the democratic period. This paves the way for a more in-
depth analysis in subsequent chapters of the ways in which, within this broader 
context, the different financing arrangements of the two regions have contributed to 
shaping the evolution of the nationalist parties’ territorial agendas and ideas on 
sovereignty. Throughout this chapter, the focus is on identifying a series of political 
dynamics within Spain (centre-periphery, inter-regional and intra-regional), as well 
as international influences, that have contributed to shaping the territorial agendas 
and conceptions of sovereignty of the mainstream Basque and Catalan nationalist 
parties. The chapter starts with an analysis of Spain’s national and territorial 
problematic in general in order to provide the overall context, before proceeding to 
account for the specific trajectories of the PNV and CDC respectively, investigating 
the drivers behind their shifting party agendas. The conclusion then compares the 
main differences that emerge between the two cases. 
 
Spain’s national and territorial problematic 
           Arguably the biggest challenge of the transition to democracy following the 
death of the dictator Franco in 1975 was how best to accommodate Spain’s different 
regional identities within the Spanish state, bringing them back into the fold in a way 
amenable to both the nationalists themselves and a range of Spanish forces 
(conservative, centrist, socialist and communist) (see Colomer 1998). The founding 
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fathers of the Constitution of 1978 designed an ‘ambiguous constitutional 
compromise’ on the issue of decentralisation as part of an attempt to create a 
consensual text that would straddle the demands of the different political forces in 
Spain (Colomer 1998: 40). This involved maintaining the provinces created in the 
19th century and grouping them into 17 autonomous communities or regions, each 
with its own regional parliament and government. Three of the autonomous 
communities, which represented the ‘historic nationalities’ of the Basque Country, 
Catalonia and Galicia, were given a ‘fast-track’ route to a certain degree of 
autonomy in an attempt to satisfy the nationalists in those regions (Galicia, like the 
Basque and Catalan regions, had approved a regional autonomy statute for the first 
time in the 1930s, before this was abolished under the dictatorship of Franco). While 
the Spanish Constitution did not recognise them as nations, conceiving of one 
Spanish nation only, it did nevertheless designate them as ‘historic nationalities’. 
The remaining 14 essentially more ‘administrative’ autonomous communities were 
given a slower route to autonomy. Of these, Andalusia, arguing its right to be 
considered a historic region, was later also fast-tracked (Colomer 1998: 45). Overall, 
the decentralisation formula was left deliberately vague in terms of exactly what 
competences the regions would eventually achieve and whether the ‘administrative’ 
regions would request the same level of competences as the historic regions or not – 
eventually they would, thus the system would later be dubbed one of ‘café para 
todos’ or ‘coffee for all’.  
           In the consensual spirit of the Transition, this formula was approved in 1978 
with the support of CDC, but the PNV abstained, primarily since the Constitution did 
not recognise Basque sovereignty and the PNV wanted to be able to push for greater 
autonomy via a flexible interpretation of the Constitution thereafter (Corcuera 2009: 
336; De Pablo and Mees 2005: 389-390; Lecours 2007: 88-89). Many Basques also 
disapproved of the fact that the founding fathers of the Constitution had included a 
representative of the Catalan nationalists (from CDC) but not the PNV. The PNV 
did, however, subsequently approve its regional statue of autonomy (the Statute of 
Gernika) in 1979 and Concierto legislation in 1981, both of which derived their 
legitimacy from the Constitution. Crucially, the Basques had secured recognition 
under the First Additional Disposition of the Constitution of the ‘historical rights of 
the foral territories’, a reference to the tradition of raising taxes in each of the Basque 
provinces. This Additional Disposition would provide the legal basis for the 
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restoration of tax-raising powers to all the Basque provinces under the new 
Concierto Económico, which would become the main basis of Basque autonomy and 
main differentiating factor between it and other regional levels of authority in Spain 
(except for Navarre, which also retained its tax-raising tradition). The bases for a 
common financing system for the rest of Spain’s regions apart from the Basque 
Country and Navarre were later set under Organic Law 8/1980 on the Financing of 
the Autonomous Communities (Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las Comunidades 
Autónomas, LOFCA). While the Constitution of 1978 had granted special 
recognition to the three ‘historic nationalities’ and promised them a fast track route 
to autonomy, a clear step towards ‘café para todos’ came in 1982 when the main 
Spanish political forces at the time (the PSOE and UCD) approved the Organic Law 
on the Harmonisation of the Autonomy Process (Ley Orgánica de Armonización del 
Proceso Autonómico, LOAPA), in the difficult climate after the attempted coup of 
23 February 1981 by the Spanish military. The LOAPA was designed in part to slow 
down the process of transferring powers and competences to the regions – a move 
which was vehemently rejected by Basque and Catalan nationalists, as well as other 
regional governments (Ugarte 2009: 358; De Pablo and Mees 2005: 40; Magone 
2009: 195-196).  
             After the numerous difficulties of the Transition period of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, the mid 1980s then saw the beginnings of a more settled pattern which 
would endure for at least a decade, as the regionalisation of Spain into autonomous 
communities seemed to be undergoing consolidation (Gillespie 2015a: 9). This 
involved the gradual transfer of competences to regional governments under the 
provisions of the Spanish Constitution and each region’s autonomy statute. Spain 
developed one of the most decentralised political systems in Europe over the period 
from the 1980s through to the early 2000s in terms of spending competences. The 
regions gradually acquired responsibility for spending in fundamental policy areas 
such as health, education and social services, among others, though the 
decentralisation of revenue-raising competences was much more limited, except in 
the case of the Basque Country and Navarre. The ambiguity of the Constitution, 
compounded later by the recurring reliance of minority Spanish governments from 
1993 onwards on alliances with regionally-based parties with representation in the 
Spanish parliament (primarily CiU and PNV) to secure working majorities, gave 
these parties bargaining power to negotiate increasing decentralisation gains, which 
56	
 
other regions then sought to emulate. Ultimately, however, this led to a greater 
degree of policy decentralisation in Spain than some of the founding fathers of the 
Constitution might ever have envisaged and ended up sowing more discord than it 
generated consensus, as the multi-level political dynamic in Spain resulted in 
frequent competition among the regions for competences and resources (Colomer 
1998: 40). Regional governments resorted to competitive bargaining with the central 
government for competences and/or resources, with each seeking to secure the best 
deal. The few forums that bring together the central government and the regional 
governments in Spain – primarily the fiscal and financial policy council (Consejo de 
Política Fiscal y Financiera, CPFF), meetings of the national and regional education 
ministers and the consultative conference on European affairs – have also tended to 
descend into conflictive rather than cooperative dynamics, as each regional 
government has sought the best outcome for its own territory. Spain lacks a fully-
fledged institutionalised framework for intergovernmental cooperation since the 
Spanish Senate (upper house) is not a proper territorial chamber typical of federal 
systems. While there is extensive decentralisation in Spain, it is not constitutionally a 
federal state, and there is general agreement among academics that ‘Spain does not 
meet the most important criteria found in federalist systems generally regarded as 
prototypes’ (Encarnación 2008: 103). 
          By the late 1990s the constitutional compromise on the national and territorial 
question was starting to come apart at the seams. In this context, growing calls 
would thereafter emerge from Basque and Catalan nationalists for a revision of their 
regional autonomy statutes and also of the Spanish Constitution. This also 
contributed to a wider wave of statute reform in other regions. While the 
decentralisation of policy competences has been extensive, Basque and Catalan 
nationalists lament the fact that the extension of the system to 17 regions has in 
practice put limits on their own ambitions and hindered their ability to negotiate 
bilaterally with the Spanish state on their own terms, without inter-regional conflict 
and competition. While the nationalists are usually in power in the Basque and 
Catalan regions, statewide parties govern in the other regions of Spain, which has 
meant that the party in power in Madrid has often sought to appease the regions 
where it governs. Although Spain is, to all appearances, one of the most 
decentralised countries in Europe, Basque and Catalan nationalists argue that this is 
only a façade for an ultimately still centralised Spanish state, in which the 
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traditionally dominant parties refuse to acknowledge the existence of different 
nations within the state or share sovereignty with these.18 They also see such 
centralism in the fact that the Spanish government can still introduce basic laws that 
override regional laws even in the case of decentralised competences, and that it has 
often been known to renege on promises in regard to the devolution of competences 
and their financing. Notable sources of grievance in recent years include, for 
example, the highly controversial 2013 education law, known as the ‘Ley Wert’ after 
its creator the then PP education minister José Ignacio Wert, which sought to 
increase Spanish control over regional education systems, the language of 
instruction, and course content. The politicisation of Spain’s Constitutional and 
Supreme Courts, the decisions reached in which tend to correspond to the interests of 
the statewide parties, has intensified the sense of an unfair system biased towards the 
centre.  
           Both the disposition and ability of the Basque and Catalan mainstream 
nationalist parties to cooperate with the Spanish government in return for 
decentralisation gains declined thereafter in this context. The limits of the ‘coffee for 
all’ model became clear since the Basque and Catalan regions seek greater autonomy 
and also sovereignty for their regions than other regions of Spain, and the Catalans 
perceive their lack of fiscal autonomy and the fiscal deficit they suffer as a result of 
the overly redistributive nature of the common financing regime as an additional 
injustice. Moreover, the fact that supporting minority central governments became 
the main bargaining tool of the Basque and Catalan nationalists to secure 
decentralisation gains was inherently subject to the risk of instability, since it has 
given the nationalists’ extensive leverage at times and yet has left them with little 
leverage at other times when a party has won the Spanish general elections with an 
absolute majority, as the PP has done twice since 2000. Looking beyond Spain to the 
wider European sphere, the nationalists’ hopes in the 1990s that the notion of a 
‘Europe of the regions’ and the revisiting of the concept of the state would afford 
them greater prominence were largely frustrated as it became clear by the turn of the 
century that the development of the supranational sphere was not facilitating the 
strengthening of the sub-state level to the extent they had hoped (Burgess and 
Vollard 2006).  
                                                
18 Personal interviews with current and former Basque and Catalan political representatives, 
2014-2015. See also Tremosa 2007: 8-12. 
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            Although both the Basque and Catalan mainstream nationalist parties are 
dissatisfied with the status quo and both have called for the right of their territories to 
self-determination, some degree of statehood and recognition as nations, there has 
been little direct collaboration between them over the years on possible ways 
forward since they each conceive of their own regions as being in a different 
position, especially due to their different financing arrangements and to the history 
of terrorist violence in the Basque region but not Catalonia. There has been no 
consensus on how to deal with Spain’s national and territorial problematic among 
Spanish statewide parties either, which each clash with Basque and Catalan 
nationalists on the matter for different reasons. Right- and left-wing ideologies 
among the statewide parties in Spain have broadly become synonymous with 
centralist and decentralist positions, respectively (Dinas 2012: 477; Verge 2013). 
Certainly, the PP is known for its stronger ideological centralism than the PSOE, 
with right-wing parties in Spain historically associated with the vision of a unitary 
and centralised state (Grau Creus 2005: 264). And yet this distinction is only 
relative, since both the conservative PP and the socialist PSOE, the two traditionally 
dominant Spanish parties since the transition to democracy, defend the idea of one 
Spanish nation and Spanish sovereignty. This stance is also shared by emerging 
party Ciudadanos, a centre-right party which was founded in Catalonia in 2006 to 
provide an alternative to Catalan nationalism, before it expanded to operate 
throughout the whole Spanish state and became one of the two new parties to thwart 
the traditional two-party dominance of the PP and PSOE at the Spanish elections in 
December 2015, coming fourth with 40 seats (out of 350).19 Ciudadanos can be seen 
as even more centralist than the PP and the PSOE in the sense that it was one of two 
new parties in Spain’s recent history to campaign for the abolition of the Basque and 
Navarran ‘privileges’ in term of their regional financing arrangements (the other, 
UPyD, never attained the same degree of electoral success as Ciudadanos). In stark 
contrast, the other other newcomer on the scene, the left-wing Podemos, which came 
third in the 2015 Spanish elections (with 69 seats) and reaped some of its best results 
in the Basque and Catalan regions, is the only Spanish party ever to have 
campaigned for the ‘right to decide’ (in other words, self-determination) of Spain’s 
constituent parts, arguing that only it can keep Spain together going forward by 
                                                
19 For the election results, see El País, 
http://resultados.elpais.com/elecciones/2015/generales/congreso/index.html 
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recognising and respecting its plurinational character and allowing Catalonia to hold 
a referendum. With the rise of both Podemos and Ciudadanos, the December 2015 
Spanish elections marked a sea change in the Spanish political scene, bringing an 
end to the traditional dominance of the PP and PSOE, amid a political crisis 
characterised by widespread disillusionment with existing political institutions, 
parties and politicians. While the PP and the PSOE still came first and second 
respectively, the inability of either to form a government for the first time since the 
PSOE won the 1982 elections was in part caused by the lack of agreement between 
possible coalition partners on the national and territorial question, among other 
factors. One of the many obstacles to a potential coalition of the PSOE, Podemos 
and a handful of other left-wing and peripheral nationalist parties, for example, was 
the disagreement between the PSOE and Podemos on how to address the situation in 
Catalonia. 
           With regard to the PSOE, while it is relatively more pro-decentralisation than 
the PP and Ciudadanos, it remains clearly in favour of a symmetric form of 
decentralisation to ensure equality for all Spaniards, in contrast to the Basque and 
Catalan nationalists who have traditionally sought a greater degree of asymmetric 
decentralisation to give their regions something approaching a more confederal 
arrangement (Balfour 2005: 5). The PSOE, like Ciudadanos, also strongly supports 
centralisation of competences in cases where it believes centralised management will 
best ensure equal treatment of all Spaniards.20 Most notably, the Socialists have 
therefore opposed calls from nationalist parties to devolve the caja única (single 
fund) of the social security system. While the PSOE’s current leader Pedro Sánchez 
claims to be in favour of a federal model for Spain, Basque and Catalan critics argue 
that the PSOE’s vision of federalism is a distortion of the reality of federalism in 
other countries and its theoretical conception in political science, where federalism is 
not subordinated to the ultimate purpose of ensuring equality of outcomes for all 
citizens but rather is designed to allow for a proper level of self-government at 
substate level.21 The PSOE leadership’s support for broadly symmetric federal-type 
models stems first and foremost from its desire for an egalitarian model that treats all 
                                                
20 Personal interviews with Basque Socialists, 2014. 
21 Personal interviews with Basque and Catalan nationalists, 2014-2015. Some Catalan 
Socialists also question the ‘federalist’ vision of their Madrid counterparts (personal 
interview with Antoni Castells, 25 March 2015).    
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Spaniards the same, but it has has been strengthened by the fact that the party has 
traditionally had electoral strongholds in many of the non-historic regions and in 
particular the relatively poorer regions in the south of Spain (Andalusia, Castilla-La 
Mancha and Extremadura), and thus it has needed to fight their corner. This has 
affected discussions over the common financing regime in particular, since any 
reduction in the relatively richer regions’ contribution to the wealth redistribution 
system has usually been fiercely opposed by some of the poorer, traditionally 
Socialist-led regions that benefit from it, most notably Extremadura.22 The situation 
has been complicated by the fact that the PSOE has at times been pulled in a 
different direction by its regional federation in Catalonia. The Catalan Socialists 
(PSC) have greater autonomy than the regional levels of the PSOE elsewhere in 
Spain since they are a federation of the party (Fabre 2008: 320; Hopkin 2009: 188-
189; Van Houten 2009: 176-177). As the PSC gradually ‘Catalanised’ its agenda in 
the late 1990s and first decade of the 2000s in order to compete and govern more 
effectively at regional level, this led to tensions and competing priorities with the 
PSOE headquarters in Madrid and the regional branches of the party elsewhere in 
Spain (Fabre 2008; Roller and Van Houten 2003; Van Houten 2009). The PSC’s 
decline in popularity in Catalonia during and following the experience of the PSC-
led tripartite coalition governments in Catalonia in 2003-2010 can in part be 
attributed to the fact that it became clear the regional federation, despite its extensive 
autonomy, was ultimately still subordinate to the party headquarters in Madrid.  
           At statewide and inter-regional level in Spain, competing political dynamics 
have thus reduced the possibility of a viable solution to Spain’s territorial 
problematic. There is no consensus among nationalists, socialists and conservatives 
and any significant change to the status of the Basque Country and Catalonia would 
require a willingness on all sides to agree significant amendments to the Spanish 
Constitution, which has not been forthcoming. This situation has been complicated 
further by intra-regional dynamics within the Basque and Catalan regions that impact 
their respective nationalist movements and parties, such as the pressures of intra-
                                                
22 Note, however, that the current common financing system does not uniformly benefit all 
of the poorer regions of the south, for example Andalusia’s per capita financing remains 
below average post-equalisation, in stark contrast to Extremadura which reaps the benefits of 
over-redistribution. On the arbitrary outcomes of the equalisation mechanism, see Chapter 3. 
61	
 
regional party competition 23  and influence of civil society movements. The 
following sections look at each of the Basque and Catalan cases in more detail, 
investigating the shifts in territorial strategies the nationalist parties in each have 
undergone and the contributing factors to these shifts. 
 
The PNV’s evolving territorial agenda 
           In the early post-Franco years, there were significant differences within the 
PNV over the party’s territorial agenda, continuing the original factional division 
that the party had experienced earlier in the twentieth century between those seeking 
independence and those in favour of a more moderate pro-autonomy agenda (Pérez-
Nievas 2011). One consequence of a traumatic split within the party in 1986 (see 
below) was a reduction in internal factionalism thereafter and a strengthening of 
moderate pro-autonomy stances within the party, though shifts in the PNV’s 
territorial agenda would still occur in subsequent decades (Pérez-Nievas 2006: 44). 
The party’s oscillation since its creation between territorial options ranging along a 
continuum from autonomy to independence has been likened by scholars to the 
party’s ‘two souls’, or the swing of a pendulum from one extreme to the other (De 
Pablo and Mees 2005). Party members themselves see the situation differently, 
arguing that throughout the democratic period they have all shared more or less the 
same ideology and end goal of the right to self-determination, nationhood, 
sovereignty and some degree of statehood (though not necessarily full independence) 
for the Basque Country, even if there are discrepancies over the exact formula under 
which this would be achieved and the degree of connection that would remain to 
Spain.24 Differences within the party (e.g. during the Ibarretxe period), they suggest, 
have been more to do with questions of speed and timing (i.e. when it is appropriate 
to take active steps towards this goal, depending on both Basque and Spanish 
contextual factors) rather than the fundamental essence of the end goal itself.25 Thus 
some party members who have generally been described in academic literature and 
the media as emblematic of the ‘moderate’ sector within the PNV – examples 
include former lehendakari José Antonio Ardanza and current party president 
                                                
23 On the different structures of party competition at regional level of government compared 
to the Spanish state level of government, see Wilson (2012).  
24 Personal interviews with current and former PNV politicians, 2014. 
25 Personal interviews with José Antonio Ardanza, 10 and 28 April 2014; and with Andoni 
Ortuzar and Iñaki Goikoetxeta, 10 April 2014. 
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Andoni Ortuzar – describe themselves instead as firm advocates and supporters of 
the end goal of self-determination and sovereignty for the Basque people, when the 
time is right to pursue it. Their criticism of Ibarretxe was not directed against the 
nature of the Plan itself, but rather Ibarretxe’s attempt to try and forge ahead with it 
even once it had become clear that circumstances were not propitious. There is also a 
clear acknowledgment within the party that how to articulate conceptions of 
sovereignty and nationhood for the Basque Country differ depending on which 
particular city, town or village each member comes from, given the vastly different 
geographic and sociodemographic makeup of different areas within the Basque 
region: in some the PNV coexists with the Basque Socialists while in others it 
coexists with the izquierda abertzale, which inevitably contributes to PNV members 
from different areas prioritising the need to secure agreement on the Basque 
Country’s relationship to Spain with the one or the other.26 Thus questions of timing 
and place have contributed to differences within the PNV on how to achieve its end 
goal, even if there is more or less agreement within the party that this end goal 
involves the right to self-determination and sovereignty for the Basque Country in 
some shape or format. In the light of this, rather than talking of shifts between pro-
autonomy and pro-sovereignty stances within the PNV, it may be more appropriate 
to speak of a de-emphasis of the party’s pro-sovereignty territorial agenda during 
times of territorial accommodationism.  
           Such a de-emphasis of more ambitious territorial agendas came during the 
fourteen-year period of PNV-led regional governments headed by lehendakari José 
Antonio Ardanza from 1985 to 1999, for the most part under stable coalition 
arrangements with the Basque federation of the Socialist Party (PSE). The PNV 
under Ardanza’s regional premierships became known for its moderation and 
territorial accommodationism, seeking to develop Basque autonomy within the 
parameters of the Basque autonomy statute and the Spanish Constitution, and in 
collaboration with Spanish parties. Ardanza himself makes a distinction between ‘the 
important’ and ‘the urgent’, where the former involves pursuing the PNV’s 
longstanding goal for the Basque Country to be recognised as a legal subject and the 
articulation of this via self-determination, while the latter involves addressing 
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immediate day-to-day crises that affect the Basque people’s everyday wellbeing.27 
When Ardanza took over the reins of Basque government in 1985, he was clear that 
addressing the ‘urgent’ had to be his priority, for three main reasons: (1) the trauma 
and instability within the PNV itself given the recent split within the party, which 
would result in the party’s poor performance at the subsequent 1986 regional 
elections; (2) the context of severe economic crisis in the Basque region; and (3) 
ongoing political violence under the terrorist group ETA.28 In this context, with such 
issues of immediate urgency to address, the PNV’s territorial agenda during the 
Ardanza years was focused on seeking and negotiating the transfer of competences 
to the Basque autonomous community envisaged within the Gernika statute, while 
more ambitious territorial goals aimed at achieving sovereignty and self-
determination for the Basque region were for a long time put on the backburner.  
           Ardanza first assumed the role of lehendakari in 1985 in very difficult 
circumstances for the PNV, following the acrimonious split which had seen then 
lehendakari Carlos Garaikoetxeta resign and found a new party, EA (De Pablo and 
Mees: 412-421; see also Chapter 6). The split weakened the PNV significantly at the 
time, with the party performing poorly in the subsequent regional elections in 
November 1986. This resulted in the first of a series of stable PNV-PSE coalition 
governments headed by Ardanza until the late 1990s. In this difficult context, 
Ardanza aimed first and foremost to get the party back on track and to address the 
immediate challenges of the economic crisis afflicting the Basque region and the 
ongoing political violence in the second half of the 1980s. To tackle the economic 
crisis, the late 1980s and early 1990s were marked by Basque government initiatives 
agreed between the PNV and the Socialists. These included programmes to fight 
poverty to address deprivation in the immediate term by making subsidies available 
to the unemployed (the unemployment rate was over 25% at the time), as well as 
investment plans with a medium- to long-term impact to develop the appropriate 
infrastructure to facilitate a fundamental industrial reconversion in the Basque 
Country, away from the traditional sectors of steelworks, mining and shipbuilding 
(Ardanza 2011: 233-234). Meanwhile, to address the question of political violence, 
Ardanza spearheaded the Agreement for the Pacification and Normalisation of 
                                                
27 Personal interviews with José Antonio Ardanza, 10 and 28 April 2014. 
28 Personal interviews with José Antonio Ardanza, 10 and 28 April 2014. 
64	
 
Euskadi (the Ajuria Enea Pact),29 which was signed in January 1988 by all parties 
operating in the Basque region (including the Basque branches of statewide parties) 
apart from HB. The Pact’s twofold plan involved (1) forming a joint front against 
violence and (2) seeking to ensure the full implementation of the Basque autonomy 
statute of 1979, by agreeing criteria for the transfer and financing of pending 
competences. The aim was to work towards a ‘final dialogado’ (in other words, an 
end to the conflict via dialogue) and to make it clear that acts of violence and 
demands for autonomy were two entirely separate issues, in order to isolate ETA and 
HB and encourage them to join the political mainstream to undertake legitimate 
negotiations regarding the relationship of the Basque Country to Spain (Pérez-
Nievas 2006: 33). 
          The PNV and the Basque Socialists collaborated together as coalition partners 
to reach numerous agreements with PSOE-led Spanish governments in Madrid over 
the transfer of competences to the Basque government and their financing. Under the 
first PNV-PSE Basque coalition government headed by Ardanza from 1987 to 1990, 
several key competences were devolved, including health and social services, and 
the relevant arrangements for a Basque regional justice system and a Basque regional 
police force (Ertzaintza) were put in place (Ugarte 2009: 369-370). In all cases, 
negotiations for the transfer of each competence also involved agreeing the valuation 
of the competence in financial terms and how the competence would be financed. 
Inevitably, negotiations over the devolution of competences and their financing were 
often subject to significant dispute between the Basque and Spanish authorities, 
particularly over the valuation of the competences (see Chapter 4). In almost all 
cases, the PNV and the Basque Socialists would agree their aims and objectives with 
regard to each competence, but the PSE would leave it to the PNV to take the lead in 
negotiations with Madrid, in order to avoid internal conflict within the Socialist party 
between the regional federation and party headquarters.30 Once the transfer was 
secured, a PSE member would then take charge of its implementation in the Basque 
Country. Notwithstanding the inevitable Spanish-Basque tugs-of-war over the 
transfer of competences and their financing, this system worked relatively well under 
the first 1987-1991 Ardanza government, in the sense that major agreements over the 
transfer of a number of competences were reached and implemented within the space 
                                                
29 For the full text of the agreement, see Ardanza 2011: 481-492. 
30 Personal interviews with José Antonio Ardanza, 10 and 28 April 2014. 
65	
 
of a few years. Ardanza would thereafter praise his Socialist deputy Ramón Jauregui 
for his ‘talante conciliador’ (conciliatory nature) (Ardanza 2011: 247) and both the 
PNV and many Socialists alike still speak of the period as one of fruitful 
collaboration.31  
            Such collaboration would continue under subsequent Ardanza-led PNV-PSE 
Basque coalition governments in the 1990s. One of the most notable developments 
under the 1991-1994 regional government term, for example, was PNV-PSE 
collaboration for the creation of a Basque education model for the first time since the 
policy competence for education had been devolved in 1981 (Ugarte 2009: 370). The 
PNV, the PSE and EE reached the Pacto Escolar (‘School Pact’) in 1992, and 
subsequently approved legislation on this basis in the years immediately thereafter. 
This laid the legal and organisational framework for a Basque education model, 
which remains the general basis for the system today. It was a Socialist (Fernando 
Buesa) who was Basque education minister at the time. Creating a specifically 
Basque education system was thus not solely the preserve of the nationalists, but 
rather the result first and foremost of joint PNV-PSE collaboration, with the 
contribution too of other parties. The fact that such cross-party agreements could be 
reached to address specifically Basque interests meant the PNV could reap 
satisfactory results while working within the bounds of the Gernika statute and the 
Spanish Constitution.  
           While the PNV’s territorially accommodationist approach would thus prevail 
for most of the 1990s, from the late 1990s the party would undergo a fundamental 
change in territorial strategy (Pérez Nievas 2006). First, the PNV shifted away from 
cooperation with statewide parties to seek cooperation with Basque separatist forces. 
It broke its long-established regional coalition arrangements with the Basque 
Socialists to pursue an alliance instead with the izquierda abertzale under the Lizarra 
Pact, a declaration of principles signed in September 1998 by the PNV, HB, EA and 
around 20 other nationalist and pro-independence organisations (including, for 
example, nationalist trade unions). Following the regional elections a month later on 
25th October 1998, the PNV, EA and the Basque federation of the United Left 
(Izquierda Unida, IU) would form a coalition government with the external support 
of Euskal Herritarrok (the name which the izquierda abertzale used to stand at those 
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elections). When that arrangement quickly fell through (due to ETA breaking the 
requisite ceasefire), following new elections in 2001, PNV lehendakari Juan José 
Ibarretxe would spearhead a new initiative which became known as the ‘Ibarretxe 
Plan’, seeking a revised regional autonomy statute to allow for a referendum on self-
determination in the Basque region and a redefinition of its relationship with the 
Spanish state as one of ‘free association’. What was proposed was essentially a 
confederal solution rather than full independence, but it would have left the Basque 
Country with a very loose connection to Spain, going well beyond its already 
extensive fiscal and policy competences to reconceptualise the region as a nation on 
an equal footing to the Spanish one and to establish a bilateral relationship of equals 
sharing sovereignty between them. The proposal was thus rejected by both the PP 
and PSOE as unconstitutional and a challenge to the integrity and national 
sovereignty of Spain. What factors and developments throughout the 1990s led to 
this change in the PNV’s territorial strategy?  
          Party representatives attribute the shift to two main factors: first, a growing 
sense within the party by the late 1990s that the Basque Country would struggle to 
make further gains in competences under the Spanish state of autonomies; and 
second, the need to address the ongoing problem of political violence by seeing a 
realignment with nationalist forces, in the hope that concerted joint efforts towards 
securing a new political relationship for the Basque Country with Spain might 
persuade ETA too to abandon violence and join the political route.32 Political 
opponents and critics of the PNV see the situation differently, however, arguing that 
the PNV’s shift in strategy marked a sign of the party being swept along by the 
radicals at the time, or becoming ‘radicalised’ itself.  
           On the first point, the feeling within the PNV that it would struggle to secure 
further competences within the context of the Spanish state of autonomies had 
gradually grown over the course of the 1990s. Once the main competences had been 
transferred in that period (in relation to health, education, justice and police, among 
other areas) as well as several other more minor competences, PNV interlocutors 
suggest they began to detect an increasing reluctance from the PSOE governments in 
Madrid to accede to further devolution in other areas.33 By 1995, Ardanza had 
concluded that the PNV’s relationship with the PSOE had reached its limits 
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(Ardanza 2011: 332). Two years previously, the PNV and their Basque Socialist 
colleagues had drawn up what would become known as the Zubia Report (Informe 
Zubia), named after PNV deputy Joseba Zubia who led the process. In the spirit of 
the Ajuria Enea agreement of 1988, this document offered a shared diagnosis agreed 
by different parties in the Basque Country as to which articles of the Gernika statute 
had not yet been fulfilled, specifically in terms of which competences could still be 
devolved under the statute’s provisions, and it was approved by the Basque 
parliament in 1993. A further text based on the Informe Zubia, establishing the 
priorities in terms of the transfer of competences, was also approved unanimously in 
the Basque parliament in 1995. The PSOE’s reluctance immediately to accept and 
act upon this text approved unanimously in the Basque parliament, with prime 
minister Felipe González saying that an agreement reached in a regional parliament 
was not binding for the Spanish government, was the culmination of a growing list 
of frustrations for Ardanza and the PNV, another being the increasingly politicised 
decisions of Spain’s Constitutional Court. 
The tables seemed initially to turn again under the new PP government. 
Despite the PP being a more centralist party than the PSOE, the agreements then 
struck with the new PP minority Spanish government in 1996 to enhance Basque 
autonomy gave rise to the oft-cited comment by the then PNV party leader Xabier 
Arzalluz, ‘I’ve achieved more in 14 days with Aznar than in 13 years with Felipe 
González.’34 While PNV members themselves have subsequently warned against 
taking this one off-the-cuff comment entirely at face value,35 it certainly reflected the 
spirit of optimism and satisfaction with developments at the time. Parliamentary 
support from CiU and the Canaries Coalition (Coalición Canarias, CC) would have 
been enough to allow the PP minority government to govern, but Aznar was keen to 
get the PNV on board too. Although the PNV was initially very hesitant to lend 
parliamentary support to the PP, to its surprise, Aznar agreed to the list of enhanced 
competences that the PNV drew up as a condition, including significant 
developments to the Concierto to increase the region’s fiscal autonomy (see Chapter 
4), and thus a deal was struck. Such optimism would nevertheless soon prove short-
lived. From the PNV’s perspective, Aznar’s initially conciliatory stance only lasted 
about a year and a half. From autumn 1997, they started to detect a new, very 
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35 Personal interviews with PNV representatives, 2014. 
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different phase, in which the PP adopted a more centralist stance and relations 
between it and the PNV cooled considerably. Ardanza would come to the conclusion 
that Aznar had only taken a conciliatory approach for an initial period as he sought 
to take hold of ‘the reins of power’ in Spain, making profound changes to institutions 
and structures that had long been in the hands of the Socialists, but once he had those 
reins firmly in his grasp, he and his party showed their ‘true colours’ (Ardanza 2011: 
337).  
           Ever since it was drawn up, the Informe Zubia has to this day provided the 
main basis for the PNV’s criticism of Spanish governments for failing to transfer all 
the competences envisaged under the Gernika statute. When the Report was first 
approved in 1993, the number of competences still subject to potential transfer was 
put at 54 (out of a total of 144 initially). Given that some of the competences have 
been transferred in the past two decades, this number has since reduced to 
approximately 35, according to a report published by the PNV in 2015 criticising the 
central government for not fulfilling the Gernika statute.36 Critics of the PNV 
nevertheless argue that the party has exaggerated the issue, since the qualitative 
weight of the competences still to be transferred is not the same as their quantitative 
number.37 Only a few of the remaining pending competences are qualitatively 
significant – most notably, management of the social security system and of the 
prison system – while others tend to be competences of relatively minor qualitative 
importance, such as coastal search and rescue services or weather forecasting. While 
the PNV tends to put the emphasis on what has not been devolved, its critics thus 
argue that this can be misleading since it detracts from a focus on the extensive 
competences that have been devolved, which make the Basque Country one of the 
most autonomous regions in Europe. Moreover, agreement over the numbers of 
competences still to be transferred is not unanimous. PSE members who were 
involved in the drawing up of the Report suggest that the PNV has thereafter at times 
misrepresented it for political purposes as a black-and-white list of competences to 
be transferred, when the wording is more complex in the case of some competences 
where an overlapping of state and regional obligations and dual competence which 
does not always allow for a simple transfer.38  
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 Regarding the need to address the ongoing problem of political violence in 
the late 1990s (the second main point above, identified by the PNV as a reason for its 
shift in agenda), it was informal contacts between PNV interlocutors and Herri 
Batasuna (HB), the main party of the izquierda abertzale affiliated with ETA in the 
late 1990s, that led the former to argue in favour of a realignment with nationalist 
forces, in the hope that concerted joint efforts towards securing a new political 
relationship for the Basque Country with Spain might persuade ETA too to abandon 
violence and join the political route. At the time, the Ajuria Enea Pact, after nearly 
ten years in operation, was starting to founder due to increasing discrepancies 
between the parties signatory to the agreement. The PP was distancing itself from the 
notion of a ‘final dialogado’ to which the conservatives had subscribed under the 
1988 Pact, since many within the party accused this of being too conciliatory 
towards terrorists and called for a tougher, more confrontational approach. From 
January 1997, Ardanza, heeding the request of the Ajuria Enea Committee, would 
make a final attempt to get the Pact and the notion of a ‘final dialogado’ back on 
track by drawing up a new plan for an agreement between the parties of the 
committee on how to bring the Basque conflict to an end, which became known 
thereafter as the Plan Ardanza.39 In the midst of these efforts, ETA kidnapped and 
killed the PP town councillor for Ermua (in Vizcaya), Miguel Ángel Blanco, in July 
1997, which resulted in a further hardening of the PP’s stance. In January 1998, 
Ardanza presented the Plan to the Ajuria Enea Committee, knowing full well 
(following prior personal negotiations) that both the Basque Socialists and PSOE 
headquarters in Madrid were in favour of backing the plan, but the PP was not so 
forthcoming, and the PSOE was reluctant to sign unless Aznar agreed to as well, 
given the pressure the PSOE was now under in Madrid having been forced into 
opposition. Although it was the Basque federations or branches of the statewide 
party that had to agree and sign, they could not do so on such an important issue 
without the backing of their party headquarters in Madrid. In the end, the PP would 
not support the plan. When the Basque PP representative Carlos Iturgáiz refused to 
sign, the by then PSE leader Nicolás Redondo also refused to sign. The dynamics 
within the PSE had changed following the loss of the PSOE’s power in Madrid in 
1996. Amid the party’s organisational crisis, both Ramón Jauregui and Txiki 
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Benegas, the PSE members who for the past ten years had established a close 
working relationship with the PNV (especially Jauregui), left the Basque political 
scene to take up positions in Madrid. Jauregui was replaced in his role of general 
secretary of the PSE by Nicolás Redondo who, according to Ardanza and his PNV 
colleagues, would lack Jauregui’s conciliatory nature and disposition for dialogue.40 
The refusal of both the Basque PP and PSE to sign the Plan Ardanza in March 1998 
marked the final meeting of the Ajuria Enea Committee and effectively brought the 
Ajuria Enea Pact to an end. Nicolás Redondo would also have the Socialists leave 
the PNV-PSE coalition government a couple of months later. Many within the PSE 
were in profound disagreement and uncomfortable with Redondo’s decisions, though 
at the same time there was a feeling within the party that the gradual shift of the 
PNV towards a territorial agenda going beyond the parameters of the Gernika statute 
from 1996/1997 onwards had reduced the viability of continued PSE-PNV 
collaboration.  
           In the meantime, the PP had won the Spanish general elections in Madrid in 
2000 with an absolute majority for the first time. No longer needing the support of 
nationalist parties in the Spanish parliament, it could toughen its centralist stance and 
its opposition to Basque nationalism in general, with its most hardline members 
seeking to equate all Basque nationalism with terrorism. This rise of the PP meant 
the Basque nationalists faced a stronger Spanish nationalist discourse than they had 
under the previous Spanish Socialist governments, pitting Basque and Spanish 
nationalisms against one another. The PP had also gained significant traction in the 
Basque Country throughout the 1990s to become the second largest party in the 1998 
regional elections. The fact that ETA had begun to target PSE and PP politicians led 
to increasing polarisation between nationalist parties on the one hand and statewide 
parties on the other, with the PSE essentially joining forces with the PP – its arch 
political rival – against the PNV and the izquierda abertzale.  
          Despite the failure of the Lizarra Pact (since ETA broke the ceasefire on which 
it depended), a significant win for the PNV under Ibarretxe at the 2001 elections 
propelled the party – and particularly Ibarretxe himself – to continue alone on its 
new trajectory. The Ibarretxe Plan, like the Lizarra Pact before it, was motivated to a 
significant extent by the fact that many within the PNV had by then lost patience 
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with the fact that the ongoing problem with terrorist violence was limiting the 
political progress they could make in terms of gains in autonomy and sovereignty for 
the Basque Country, thus the party wanted to make its own progress in this regard. 
For Ibarretxe, the extensive fiscal autonomy afforded to the Basque region under the 
Concierto was manifestly insufficient without full political self-government: using 
the analogy of a body, he likens fiscal autonomy to the ‘blood’ and political self-
government to the ‘bones and muscles’ needed to allow that blood to flow.41 The 
PNV also again argued that an improved status for the Basque Country would, as a 
by-product, remove ETA’s justification for violence, and Ibarretxe made it a 
condition that there would have to be a new ETA ceasefire before any referendum on 
an improved status could take place (a referendum would have been held to obtain 
societal backing for the plan if the plan had been approved by both the Basque and 
Spanish parliaments). The plan thus closely followed the moves in this direction 
under the Lizarra Pact, though in this case the PNV had to take the lead rather than 
establishing any firm alliances with HB, since ETA’s renewed activity had made any 
alliance with the HB politically unviable at the time. The Ibarretxe Plan was also 
motivated by international influences, since it resembled attempts by other 
nationalist movements to seek a ‘third way’ between state centralisation and 
devolution, proposing instead a form of ‘sovereignty-association’ with the member 
state (a notion the Parti Quebecois had attempted to formulate with Canada), in a 
new ‘post-sovereign’ era (Keating and Bray: 206: 348). 
Several contextual factors help to explain the leading role Ibarretxe assumed 
and his determination to take forward a pro-sovereignty agenda in that particular 
period. In contrast to Ardanza, who had taken hold of the reins of Basque 
government at a time when contextual circumstances made it important to focus on 
‘the urgent’, Ibarretxe became lehendakari at a time when circumstances seemed to 
make it relatively more possible to concentrate on ‘the important’ again, in particular 
since the Basque economy was by then much stronger. Also, ETA had been 
weakened by years of police action against it and figures within HB were working 
hard to bring an end to ETA’s violence and bring the izquierda abertzale into 
democratic practice, making the possibility of ceasefires and an end to violence 
relatively more likely. The intensification of the PP’s Spanish conservatism and 
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nationalism under Aznar also caused intense polarisation, encouraging Ibarretxe, in 
turn, to intensify his position further in the opposite direction. The PP was 
increasingly perceived as a serious threat to Basque competences and institutions as 
Aznar started to make attempts to recentralise powers in some areas or approve basic 
state legislation that would take precedence over regional legislation.42 Other steps 
which caused a furore included attempts by some PP representatives to associate all 
Basque nationalism with terrorism and the PP’s decision to approve a controversial 
Law on Political Parties in 2002, first and foremost to enable it to outlaw Batasuna 
for links to terrorism – a move which many Basque nationalists interpreted as an 
illegitimate attempt to prevent the incorporation of the political ideology of the 
izquierda abertzale into the democratic, political arena.43 Such decisions and the 
climate of polarisation between statewide and nationalist forces mobilised voters that 
might not usually back the PNV to do so (especially izquierda abertzale supporters, 
but also non-nationalists concerned about the intensity of the PP’s anti-Basque 
nationalism), contributing to Ibarrexte’s strong victory in the 2001 elections, which 
further convinced him to forge ahead.44  
          Changes in party leadership during the parliamentary term would also become 
a contributing factor. The PNV is unusual in that the party leader and the party’s 
candidate for lehendakari are separate roles, resulting in ‘a more dispersed style of 
leadership’ (Acha and Pérez-Nievas 1998: 101). Xabier Arzalluz, longstanding 
president of the PNV since 1980, would announce in 2003 his decision to step down. 
Under Ardanza’s years as lehendakari, a pattern was established whereby the 
president of the party (Arzalluz) became associated with stronger defence of the 
party’s ultimate territorial objectives, while the role of the lehendakari became 
known for relatively greater moderation, given the need to combine the PNV’s 
ultimate territorial goals with the practicalities of day-to-day governance. When 
Arzalluz neared retirement, however, the roles seemed to be reversed and Ibarretxe 
seemed to step into his shoes, taking the lead on the party’s territorial project. New 
party leader Josu Jon Imaz – the more moderate candidate of the two for the party 
leadership at the time, the other being Joseba Egibar – was more moderate in 
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comparison and would ultimately contribute in his four years in the role to returning 
the PNV to a relatively more moderate position on territorial matters.  
           The Basque parliament approved the Ibarretxe Plan in December 2004 but the 
vote was only just won due to the last-minute u-turn of three deputies from Batasuna 
(HB had been refounded as Batasuna in 2001), which had by then been outlawed 
under the controversial Spanish Law on Political Parties, due to its links with ETA. 
Most Batasuna members had deemed the Ibarretxe Plan insufficiently far-reaching. 
The plan then failed as it was rejected overwhelmingly by the Spanish parliament as 
unconstitutional after being presented to it in January 2005, and the PNV then 
suffered electoral decline at the early regional elections called by Ibarretxe in April 
2005 – in contrast to Ibarretxe’s own expectations of a strong win. Ibarretxe 
proposed holding an official vote in the Basque region incorporating two questions – 
one asking citizens whether they supported a negotiated end (‘final dialogado’) to 
violence, if ETA were to definitively renounce violence beforehand as a 
precondition; and a second asking whether Basque parties should initiate 
negotiations to reach an agreement on exercising the ‘right to decide’ of the Basque 
people – and submitting the agreement to a referendum by end 2010. The Basque 
parliament approved a Basque Consultation Law to this effect in 2008, but it was 
rejected by the Constitutional Court as unconstitutional, for infringing state 
competences under Article 149 of the Spanish Constitution. The subsequent year, the 
PNV lost power in 2009 for the first (and so far only) time despite winning the most 
seats, since coalition politics (a PSE-PP alliance) forced it into opposition, upon 
which Ibarretxe retired from political life.  
          In analysing why the Ibarretxe Plan failed and why the PNV’s support in the 
Basque region decreased immediately after rejection of the Plan by Madrid, there is 
widespread feeling within the PNV that in the end the timing was not right.45 Critics, 
on the other hand, argue that it was not simply a question of timing, but rather of the 
fact that the plan was too divisive, aimed at nationalist voters only (see, for example, 
Keating and Bray 2006: 360). Such an ambitious plan, which was almost inevitably 
going to be deemed unconstitutional by Madrid, needed ample support from Basque 
politicians and society to stand a chance of being taken seriously, not just a narrow 
majority dependent upon the support of politicians from HB, a party which had still 
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not managed to sever links with ETA and its violence, of late directed at PP and 
Socialist politicians. ETA’s renewed activity at the turn of the century had made 
much of Basque society very wary, the process of devising the Ibarretxe Plan was 
too heavily party-led without sufficient backing from society, and in the climate of 
political polarisation there lacked a much-needed cross-party consensus with non-
nationalist political forces in the region (at least the Basque Socialists). Ibarretxe was 
also penalised for losing sight of more everyday matters, most noticeably the social 
conflicts over health and education that emerged during his 2001-2005 mandate, 
which is thought to have contributed to the party’s poorer performance than expected 
by Ibarretxe himself at the 2005 regional elections. By then, the change from the PP 
Spanish government under Aznar to a new Socialist government under Zapatero in 
2004 also heralded the promise of a less conflictive Spanish-Basque dynamic, thus 
traditionally non-nationalist voters who had turned to voting the PNV in 2001 during 
Aznar’s particularly belligerent period now had hope for a different future under the 
PSOE.46  
             The thwarting of the Ibarretxe Plan and subsequent loss of power led the 
PNV to de-emphasise its territorial agenda once again, as became clearly evident 
when the party returned to power in the 2012 regional elections with Iñigo Urkullu 
as lehendakari, and again in 2015. Urkullu put the PNV’s territorial agenda 
temporarily on the backburner to focus first and foremost on ensuring the Basque 
Country would emerge from the economic crisis of 2007-2008. And in 2013 he 
prioritised restoring the PNV’s traditional relationship with the Basque Socialists 
(which had been broken for over a decade when the parties in the Basque Country 
divided into nationalist and non-nationalist blocs) to ensure his minority government 
would receive their support for the everyday matters of governance. The PNV had 
originally hoped to be able to govern by shifting alliances from the outset of its term 
following the 2012 elections, but its inability to secure parliamentary support for the 
region’s 2013 budget made it realise a more stable alliance was necessary. 
Noticeably, the areas covered by the pact or alliance which Urkullu re-established 
with the Basque Socialists in September 2013 to secure their support in regional and 
provincial administrations did not include any issues of Basque sovereignty or the 
region’s relationship with Spain – the focus was instead on fiscal reform during a 
                                                
46 Personal interviews with José Ramón Beloki, 27 February 2014, 8 April 2014. 
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time of economic crisis. The izquierda abertzale had re-entered formal politics under 
the Bildu coalition (subsequently EH Bildu) from 2011 onwards, gaining control 
over Guipúzcoa at the 2011 provincial elections. This followed ETA’s decision to 
make its ceasefire permanent in 2011. Batasuna had been refounded as Sortu, which 
joined the Bildu coalition (becoming EH Bildu) shortly afterwards, as soon as it was 
clear the party was not to be outlawed. And yet the PNV preferred to return to an 
alliance with the Socialists rather than pursuing collaboration with the izquierda 
abertzale, which had only just entered properly into formal politics and would take 
time to gain experience in democratic practice. Following the 2015 regional and 
provincial elections, which returned the PNV to power in the regional government 
and the province of Vizcaya as well as restoring it to power in Álava and Guipúzcoa 
(where it had been in opposition to the PP and Bildu respectively), the PNV 
consolidated its alliance with the Basque Socialists. 
           The relative de-emphasising of territorial politics under Urkullu’s 2011-2015 
government term, and the return to collaboration with a statewide party rather than 
the separatists, did not however mean the PNV had renounced its territorial 
objective. The party remained committed to seeking a new status which would allow 
for bilateral relations between the Basque Country and Madrid as equal partners and 
the Basque right to self-determination and co-sovereignty. Under Urkullu, the PNV’s 
conception of the notion of co-sovereignty that it seeks has envisaged an extension 
of the bilateral nature of the economic Concierto (whereby both Spanish and Basque 
delegations have equal negotiating rights and veto power) to wider political relations, 
with explicit calls for a ‘political Concierto’.47 In 2013, the PNV launched a 
parliamentary committee on self-government to investigate possibilities for a new 
autonomy statute defining a new political relationship with Madrid involving self-
determination and co-sovereignty. However, the committee’s progress would be 
slow, and reach the end of 2015 without any definitive conclusions as to the best 
way forward. Even within sectors of the party itself there had been scepticism it 
would achieve much, since the fundamental dilemma for the PNV remains how to 
secure a broader consensus within the Basque Country for a project which would in 
essence resemble the Ibarretxe Plan in many ways, so that it is not just a nationalist 
                                                
47 For example, ‘El PNV pide extender el sistema bilateral del concierto a todo el autogobierno 
vasco’, Deia, 10 July 2014. 
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project.48 Political opponents accused the PNV of using the committee simply to buy 
time without defining its ultimate intentions, thereby avoiding ‘getting its feet wet’. 
This time around, the PNV has been taking its time so as not to risk the same 
mistakes of the Ibarretxe period. It is reluctant to take any plan forward which does 
not have the backing of both the izquierda abertzale and the Basque Socialists, to 
ensure cross-party support which spans the nationalist-statewide divide – a very 
difficult feat to achieve – as well as sufficiently clear support from society. It has 
also been biding its time to wait and see what happens in Catalonia.  
         The ongoing ramifications of the history of terrorism in the region still 
condition the PNV’s political project and the feasibility of nationalist alliances with 
the izquierda abertzale, since the izquierda abertzale is still very new to the 
democratic arena and issues such as the regrouping of ETA prisoners in the Basque 
Country, their reinsertion in society, and victims’ rights remain unresolved. Both the 
PNV and the izquierda abertzale are also in competition with one another to lead the 
process of securing a new relationship of the Basque region to Spain, which further 
complicates the potential for nationalist alignment. At the same time, Basque society 
has been concerned first and foremost in recent years with the impact of the 
economic crisis, which it is the sole responsibility of the Basque government to 
address, since the fiscal autonomy model means it cannot look to Madrid for 
additional financing or blame Madrid for the region’s financial woes (in contrast to 
Catalonia). Like everywhere the Basque region has suffered during the crisis, but in 
comparative terms, it has fared significantly better than much of the rest of Spain 
(Zubiri 2015; see also Tables 3 and 4, p.10). This is both because the Concierto 
affords it relatively more resources than comparable regions under the common 
financing system, and because construction was not a major sector in the Basque 
region, so it was not hit by the crash of the construction boom that badly afflicted 
Spain elsewhere. All of these factors mean that securing a new status for the Basque 
Country has not been an immediate priority in recent years for many within Basque 
society nor indeed for many within the PNV itself. 
 
  
                                                
48 Personal interviews with some PNV members, 2014. 
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CDC’s evolving territorial agenda 
           In CDC’s case, a long period of a relatively stable, accommodationist 
approach came during the 23 years of Jordi Pujol’s role as Catalan president from the 
first regional elections in 1980 until 2003. Under Pujol’s leadership, CDC, as part of 
CiU, committed to seeking incremental gains in self-government within the 
framework of the Spanish Constitution and state of autonomies, achieving this via 
bilateral pacts and collaboration with central Spanish governments (Barrio and 
Barberà 2011; Dowling 2005, 2013). The party’s original statutes (CDC was 
founded in 1974) had included the objective of developing ‘full national 
sovereignty’, so in a limited sense, party members could claim that the party’s 
ultimate goal from the outset was to secure sovereignty as the culmination of 
incremental gains in autonomy (Gillespie 2015c). In practice, however, evidence of 
the party’s actual behaviour throughout the Transition and under Pujol’s Catalan 
regional premierships suggested that it wanted to be able to realise its ambitions for 
Catalonia via an accommodationist approach through a flexible interpretation of the 
Spanish Constitution, in a way which would enable Catalonia to play a leading role 
in Spain. Thus CDC did at this stage seem more genuinely pro-autonomy and less 
ambiguous in this regard than the PNV. An explicit shift within CDC towards a pro-
sovereignty agenda and alliances would not come until much later, from 2012 
onwards, presaged by developments from around 2008 onwards, as discussed below.  
           During the Transition, CDC representatives – especially Miquel Roca 
Junyent, one of the seven ‘founding fathers’ of the Spanish Constitution – gave their 
Spanish and Basque counterparts the clear impression that CDC wanted Catalonia to 
be a leading example for the Spanish transition and to play a leading role in 
designing the state of the autonomies, rather than to risk destabilising the system. 
Following the transition, the lack of a real competitor on the left in Catalonia in 
regional government elections throughout the eighties and most of the nineties 
contributed significantly to CDC’s ability, working together with UDC as part of the 
CiU coalition, to maintain control of the Catalan political scene for 23 years under 
Jordi Pujol and his ability to use ambiguity on the territorial question to strategic 
affect and modify the strength or tone of his nationalism depending on whether his 
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audience was Madrid or Catalonia (Dowling 2005, 2013).49 CiU’s privileging of an 
accommodationist approach was clear, as Pujol established close working relations 
with PSOE and PP politicians in Madrid and, when the opportunity arose, extracted 
decentralisation gains in returning for supporting the minority Spanish governments 
of Felipe González (PSOE, 1993-1996) and José María Aznar (PP, 1996-2000) (e.g. 
Dowling 2005: 107; Dowling 2009: 188). Like the PNV, CiU secured strong gains 
for Catalonia in particular when Aznar first gained power – this included CiU 
playing a significant role in negotiating a new reform of the common regional 
financing system in 1996. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, CiU often secured 
competences for Catalonia prior to the Basque region, since it preferred to secure a 
particular competence even without an optimal deal on the financing for it, with a 
view to subsequent further negotiations to improve the financing, whereas the PNV 
only accepted the competence in each case once it had reached agreement with 
Madrid on the valuation of the competence it wanted. This difference in approach 
was in part due to the different financing systems in each region – under the 
Concierto, the Basques would not easily be able to claim additional financing for a 
competence once the deal on its valuation had been reached, whereas for Catalonia it 
was in theory relatively more feasible to negotiate future improvements in financing 
under the common financing system.50 In practice, however, the Catalan approach 
risked leaving the region relatively under-financed in some respects, and complaints 
would later emerge that fundamental competences such as health and education had 
been transferred with a sizeable deficit (see Chapter 7).51  
           By the late 1990s, there were signs of emerging pressures on the continued 
viability of CiU’s accommodationist approach, although the party federation under 
Pujol remained committed to it at the time, notwithstanding the emergence of some 
degree of internal pressure from pro-sovereignty sectors within CDC (Gillespie 
2015c). There was a growing sense within Catalan society that the provisions of the 
existing Catalan autonomy statute were too limiting to enable Catalonia to be able to 
face new policy challenges such as rapidly increasing immigration, slow economic 
growth and deteriorating public services and infrastructures (Elias 2015). CiU had 
                                                
49 The PSC did nevertheless perform well in municipal and general elections, better than 
CiU (Barberà and Barrio 2006: 103). 
50 Personal interview with José Antonio Ardanza, 28 April 2014.  
51 Personal interviews with Germà Bel, 27 April 2015, and with Andreu Mas-Colell, 25 
January 2016. 
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lost its absolute majority of seats (achieved at three successive Catalan elections in 
1984, 1988 and 1992) to secure only a relative majority in 1995, and thereafter it 
started to face increased party competition within Catalonia with the rise of both 
ERC and the Catalan federation of the Socialist Party (PSC) as genuine competitors 
from the mid 1990s onwards, providing a left-wing alternative to CiU’s centre-right 
agenda (Dowling 2009; Wilson 2012: 135). From the mid 1990s, Pujol had brought 
some clearly pro-sovereignty figures into key positions in CDC and, with the support 
of pro-sovereignty forces, he resisted attempts by the clearly moderate UDC leader 
Duran to inherit the CiU leadership from him, as the question of who would succeed 
him came to the fore (Gillespie 2015c). Against a backdrop of the fall of the Berlin 
wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, pro-sovereignty theories had started to 
take shape within some sections of CDC (especially the younger generations), who 
wanted to push for sovereignty for Catalonia and adequate recognition of the 
Spanish state as multinational (Barberà and Barrio 1996: 114, 127). Still, such 
developments were only very tentative at this stage and were not indicative of a party 
shift towards a pro-sovereignty stance. At this stage moderate and accommodationist 
tendencies continued to prevail within CDC/CiU, which remained reluctant even to 
seek reform of the regional autonomy statute, despite the increasing pressure the 
party was under from ERC over the issue. During 1996-2000, Pujol prioritised 
instead providing parliamentary support to the PP government in Madrid in return 
for the PP’s support in the Catalan parliament back home (the PP had been the main 
beneficiary of CiU’s losses at the 1995 regional elections). This reliance on PP 
support in the Catalan parliament – which continued in 2000-2003, once the PP had 
an absolute majority in the Spanish parliament and no longer needed CiU there – 
significantly limited CiU’s room for manoeuvre.52 ERC did offer its support to CiU 
on a number of occasions, but CiU declined (Barberà and Barrio 2006: 131). When a 
parliamentary committee was created in 2001 to study improvements in self-
government for Catalonia, one of the objectives of the Pujol government at the time, 
the debate ended up being characterised by a divide between ERC, ICV and the PSC 
on the one hand, and the PP and CiU on the other. It was the former group who 
argued convincingly in favour of a statute reform to achieve improvements to 
Catalan autonomy, whereas CiU, under pressure from the PP, was reluctant to 
                                                
52 Personal interviews with Andreu Mas-Colell, 25 January 2016 and with Francesc Homs, 
28 January 2016. 
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commit to a statute reform, arguing instead that the necessary changes could be 
achieved within the context of the existing statute.53 This was in stark contrast to the 
situation in the Basque region at the time, where frustration with the limitations of 
the state of autonomies had by then contributed (among other factors) to the PNV’s 
breaking of its collaboration with statewide parties and turn towards pro-sovereignty 
alliances and projects.  
         CiU’s explicit alliance with Spain’s right-wing PP party, a centralist party with 
a strong unitary conception of the Spanish nation and profound ideological 
scepticism about decentralisation, emphasized the centre-right positioning of CiU, 
which in previous years had been able to span right and left dimensions relatively 
more easily.54 CiU’s privileging of this relation over any serious consideration of 
statute reform at the time alienated some CiU voters, who started to look to either the 
PSC or ERC as alternatives.55 The PSC, under the leadership of Pasqual Maragall 
from 2000 onwards, shifted towards a more ‘Catalanist’ agenda at the same time as 
ERC began to prioritise its efforts on what was more immediately possible (a reform 
of the Catalan autonomy statute, as well as improvements in social issues) rather 
than its long-term goal (independence).56 ERC representatives at the turn of the 
century also clearly perceived the PSC as a more viable potential partner than CiU, 
not only in terms of left-wing agendas but also territorial agendas, since the PSC, 
under the leadership of Pasqual Maragall, embraced the goal of a reform of the 
Catalan regional autonomy statute in the leadup to the 2003 Catalan elections more 
convincingly then CDC/CiU.57 Artur Mas, Pujol’s chosen successor and previously 
CDC secretary general, took a back seat on the issue in comparison, since the 
leadership change from Pujol to Mas was characterised, at least at first, by a 
continuation of moderate, accommodationist behaviour. Despite winning the 2003 
elections, CiU ended up in opposition to a left-wing tripartite coalition headed by the 
                                                
53 For example, ‘CiU y PP avisan de que la comisión del autogobierno no reformará el 
Estatut’, ABC, 02.02.01; ‘CiU y PP frenan las conclusiones de la comisión del 
autogobierno’, El País, 25.05.02. 
54 On CDC’s shifting positioning on the left-right spectrum, see, for example, Barberà and 
Barrio 2006: 116-117. 
55 Personal interviews with Agustí Colomines, 23 March 2015, and with Josep Huguet, 9 
June 2015. 
56 Personal interview with Josep Huguet, 9 June 2015. On the PSC and its Catalanism, see, 
for example, Roller and Van Houten 2003. 
57 Personal interview with Josep Huguet, 9 June 2015. 
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PSC and incorporating both ERC and ICV. They would be the parties to take 
forward statute reform in Catalonia from 2003 onwards.58  
         Throughout the statute reform process under the tripartite coalition 
government, CiU, from its position in opposition, would try to outbid ERC with 
more territorially ambitious proposals in order to reassert itself as the best defender 
of Catalan interests, leading to what has been described as an ‘outbidding 
competition’ resulting in a radicalisation of agendas (Barrio and Rodríguez-Teruel 
2014) (see Chapter 7). Although not in power in Catalonia, CiU would use its 
leverage in Madrid (where the PSOE minority government at the time often needed 
CiU support in the Spanish parliament) to ensure direct involvement in the final 
agreement over the text, in an attempt to reassert its role as the primary actor in 
Catalonia. After the Catalan parliament had approved its proposed reform of the 
statute of autonomy in September 2005 and this had been sent to the Spanish 
parliament for review, then prime minister Zapatero and Artur Mas reached an 
agreement in January 2006 to amend the most controversial aspects of the text – 
particularly in relation to the definition of Catalonia as a nation (which was now to 
be included in the preamble only) and a new financing agreement for Catalonia, in 
order to secure sufficient backing for it in the Spanish parliament. Mas’ acceptance 
of this deal, which involved a significant watering down of key parts of the statute 
(especially in relation to regional financing – see Chapter 7), showed that CiU was 
still at this stage willing to be flexible with its territorial goals, prioritising instead its 
aim to recuperate electoral support and a return to government (Barrio and Barberà 
2011: 93). In this case, this could best be achieved by compromising with the PSOE 
in order to be seen as the party responsible for striking the best possible deal in the 
circumstances with Madrid. Thus Artur Mas appeared in the final photo with 
Zapatero – much to the irritation of members of the tripartite Catalan coalition 
government, who felt this was fundamentally inappropriate of Zapatero in 
institutional and procedural terms, given that CiU was the opposition party in 
Catalonia. Some PSC representatives (including Antoni Castells) had already agreed 
with the PSOE behind the scenes most of what Zapatero and Mas announced, while 
ERC felt left out of the whole process.59  
                                                
58 On the background to the landmark change in the Catalan political landscape ushered in 
by the 2003 Catalan regional elections, see Davis (2004). 
59 Personal interviews with Antoni Castells, 25 March 2015, and Josep Huguet, 9 June 2015. 
82	
 
            Ahead of the 2010 regional election, CiU shifted its focus away from the 
statute reform and back to the economy in its campaign, in order capitalise on its 
reputation for strong economic management in a time of economic crisis (Barrio and 
Barberà 2011: 93; Elias 2015). And yet it still combined economic and territorial 
agendas, in that it focused on securing greater fiscal autonomy for Catalonia in its 
2010 regional election campaign as one way of addressing the economic crisis. Since 
tensions over the statute reform had eventually contributed to the breakdown of the 
tripartite coalition, CiU managed to return to power in 2010, by which time a pro-
independence movement was rapidly growing in the region, in a climate of 
increasing dissatisfaction among politicians and citizens alike, as attempts to secure 
both greater autonomy and recognition for Catalan identity had been met with 
rebuffs from Spanish political parties (especially the PP) and institutions. A 
particular catalyst was the Spanish Constitutional Court ruling in 2010, which 
declared totally or partly unconstitutional several articles of the new Catalan statute, 
in particular the recognition of Catalonia as a nation. This was the result of various 
appeals, some lodged by the PP, with the Constitutional Court against aspects of the 
statute considered by critics as unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court ruling 
came four years after the statute had been approved in the Spanish parliament in 
2006 as well as in a referendum in Catalonia that year. This, on top of the changes 
already made to the statute in 2006 to secure the Spanish parliament’s backing, 
finally put paid to Zapatero’s pledge years earlier to respect whatever statute was 
agreed in the Catalan parliament. Such developments coincided with the beginnings 
of political wrangling from 2010 onwards over the central government’s handling of 
Catalonia’s financial woes during the crisis and the extent of Catalonia’s 
indebtedness, which Catalan politicians could in part attribute to the overly 
redistributive nature of the common financing regime – a problem which the 2009 
reform of the common financing system quickly proved insufficient to resolve (see 
Chapters 3 and 7).  
           Once in power, however, CDC, which formed a minority government in 
Catalonia, reestablished a working relationship with the PP (then in power in Madrid 
from 2011), relying upon its support in the Catalan parliament in some fundamental 
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areas of legislation, for example its 2012 regional budget.60 It was not until 2012 that 
CDC would make an explicit break with alliances with statewide parties and an overt 
shift away from accommodationist politics towards a pro-sovereignty lexicon in 
2012. Caught unawares by the extent of the pro-independence march in the region on 
11th September 2012, Catalan national day, Mas chose to ride the wave, deciding to 
receive a delegation from the organisers, the Catalan National Assembly (Assemblea 
Nacional Catalana, ANC), at the end of the march. The march, which attracted an 
estimated 1.5 million participants according to estimates in press reports,61 had been 
organised by the then newly formed ANC, which would quickly become the leading 
pro-independence civil society organisation. About ten days later Mas travelled to 
Madrid to meet with prime minister Rajoy to make one last ditch attempt at securing 
a fiscal pact for Catalonia, almost certainly knowing that the request would be 
refused again, but also that this refusal could help to garner support for him to take 
matters to the next stage and lead a pro-sovereignty process going forward. 
Thereafter he called snap elections to be held in November 2012 with the ‘right to 
decide’ as the main feature of CiU’s electoral manifesto, thus stepping up his 
demands from greater fiscal autonomy to political sovereignty and hoping to secure a 
resounding majority for CiU. The timing of the elections also promised to give Mas 
the chance to secure a sufficient majority to avoid needing the support of the Catalan 
PP to pass his 2013 regional budget, which it had needed in 2012. And yet the early 
election plan backfired somewhat, since CiU, despite winning again, lost ground in 
the elections to the pro-independence party ERC, with which it subsequently formed 
an alliance to give it a working majority. The year 2012 thus marked a clear turning 
point in CiU’s strategy as Artur Mas explicitly started to advocate that the way 
forward for Catalonia involved achieving political sovereignty and some degree of 
statehood (the terminology used was deliberately ambiguous to embrace options 
short of full independence too). CiU then formed an alliance in parliament with a 
pro-independence party for the first time with the goal of working towards a 
referendum, and events would snowball thereafter. What factors explain this shift 
and the timing of it? 
                                                
60 In interviews held in 2016, CDC representatives nevertheless suggested that there was a 
strong feeling within the party against the alliances with the PP on this occasion, far more so 
than during the Pujol years of PP-CiU collaboration. 
61 For example, ‘Masiva manifestación por la independencia de Catalunya’, La Vanguardia, 
11.09.12. See also Crameri 2015: 105. 
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           It has often been suggested that Mas and his party were essentially overtaken 
by events, surprised by the extent of citizen mobilisation in favour of the ‘right to 
decide’ and independence that had been growing in Catalonia under the aegis of civil 
society groups – most notably the ANC established in early 2012 and, on a smaller 
scale, the cultural association Omnium Cultural, among others. The dominant view 
has tended to see the turn towards a pro-sovereignty agenda in Catalonia as a 
‘bottom-up’ process, in which CiU ended up turning towards a pro-sovereignty 
agenda in response to pressures from society itself. According to Guibernau (2014), 
for example, the nationalist movement is bottom-up, civic and ‘emancipatory’ in 
nature and thus Catalan calls for self-determination may be regarded as the ‘ultimate 
consequence’ of the notion of popular sovereignty inherent in democracy. This 
seems to provide a sharp contrast to the elite-led or ‘top-down’ process led by 
Ibarretxe in the Basque Country several years beforehand. In this context, Mas has 
frequently been accused in the media of political expediency in jumping on the pro-
sovereignty bandwagon, in an attempt to increase political support for both himself 
and CDC, and thereafter becoming constrained by his alliances with pro-
independence parties (e.g. The Economist 2014a and 2014b). Certainly, it seems that 
a degree of political expediency was involved, but black-and-white depictions of the 
civil pro-independence movement as a purely grassroots one which caught Artur 
Mas entirely unprepared nevertheless require nuance.  
           Grassroots mobilisation can be traced back in particular to 2007, when the 
first march in favour of the ‘right to decide’ was held in Barcelona in December to 
demonstrate against the poor investment by the Spanish government in Catalonia’s 
ageing local rail network, three lines of which had just been temporarily shut down 
due to problems at the time with the works to link Madrid and Barcelona by fast 
train (AVE).62 The demonstration, which was convened by the Platform for the 
Right to Decide and widely supported by civil society groups in Catalonia, attracted 
tens of thousands of citizens and politicians, who marched under the banner ‘We’re a 
nation. We have the right to decide on our infrastructure’. On 10 July 2010, an 
estimated one million people took to the streets, convened by civil society 
organisations, behind banners proclaiming ‘We are a nation, we decide!’ after 
Spain’s Constitutional Court had ruled against key aspects of the Catalan statute, 
                                                
62 Personal interview with Germà Bel, 27 April 2015. 
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including its designation as a nation in the preamble.63 The demonstration which 
would prove a real game-changer and turning point, forcing politicians to react 
decisively, was however the afore-mentioned march on 11 September 2012 – larger 
numbers would follow on the same day in 2013, 2014 and 2015. Traditional Catalan 
nationalists who had long fought for greater recognition for Catalonia’s language and 
culture were increasingly being joined by a new wave of disaffected Catalans who 
were not necessarily traditional nationalist party supporters, but had come to resent 
Catalonia’s economic treatment at the hands of the Spanish state and the austerity 
measures being imposed during the crisis, as well as the PP’s recentralisation 
measures in other areas such as education. 
           While Mas was indeed taken by surprise by the size of the 2012 
demonstration, as he himself has since acknowledged, his turn to a pro-sovereignty 
stance was not entirely unexpected nor did it come from nowhere, since it can be 
seen as the culmination of the process of moving towards a ‘national transition’, a 
project he had started working on around 2006/2007 (Hugh 2014). In 2007, Mas had 
announced a relaunch of the Fundació Catalanista Demòcrata Trias Fargas 
(CatDem), a foundation linked to CDC, appointing Agustí Colomines as its director 
to turn it into the ‘Casa Grande del Catalanismo’ (‘big house of Catalanism’). Aware 
that CDC’s electoral base was diminishing even though it was still winning elections 
(coalition politics rather than electoral loss that had put CiU in opposition in 2003 
and 2006), Mas designed this new initiative to increase the party’s social base and 
recover voters disenchanted with years of CiU-PP collaboration.64 The intention, as 
explained by Artur Mas himself in various declarations at the time, was to go beyond 
the party’s frontiers and reach out to civil society to refound Catalanism through 
collaborative efforts and reflections on how best to take Catalonia forward, though 
sceptics described it instead as a rather desperate attempt to regain popularity for a 
struggling CiU. 65 Academics, lawyers, economists and representatives of other 
liberal professions joined the project. Mas explicitly made clear he wanted the ‘casa’ 
to bring together all those interested in working on Catalonia’s future, from those in 
                                                
63 For example, ‘Masiva manifestación en Barcelona en apoyo al Estatut y contra el 
Constitucional’, El Mundo, 11.07.10. Also Crameri 2015: 104-105. 
64 Personal interview with Agustí Colomines, 23 March 2015. See also, for example, ‘CDC 
se prepara para el congreso que consagrará la “Gran Casa del Catalanismo”’, El Mundo, 
11.07.08. 
65 For example, ‘Mas propone a la desesperada crear una “gran casa del catalanismo” para 
acceder al poder’, Libertad digital, 03.09.07. 
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favour of more self-government through to those in favour of full independence, the 
idea being to join forces in a transversal project designed to rethink Catalanism and 
make it hegemonic. CDC under Artur Mas, via the ‘casa del catalanismo’, would 
gradually evolve towards a pro-sovereignty stance in a step-by-step process, moving 
on to a new phase each time one was thwarted by Madrid: first the idea of a bilateral 
financing pact specifically for Catalonia, then the ‘right to decide’, then ‘state 
structures’ (with ambiguity intended, leaving open the possibility of whether or not 
this would imply full independence from Spain or an alternative arrangement within 
Spain).66 The origins of Artur Mas’ change of stance towards a pro-sovereignty 
position in 2012 can thus be traced back to several years earlier. The unexpectedly 
high participation in the 2012 pro-independence march on Catalan’s national day 
certainly seems to have accelerated his plans to lead a pro-sovereignty agenda, but 
the seeds of this had been in the making for a while. After the experience of being 
forced into the backseat when the tripartite coalition took forward plans for a new 
Catalan statute of autonomy, Mas and his party were not going to miss the chance 
again to play the lead role in taking forward a national and territorial agenda for 
Catalonia. 
          There had also been a gradual generational change within CDC since the 
1990s, which contributed to the shift.67 Members of CDC’s youth organisation 
Catalonia’s Nationalist Youth (Joventut Nacionalista de Catalunya, JNC), as well as 
the Catalan National Federation of Students (Federació Nacional d’Estudiants de 
Catalunya, FNEC), had gradually been incorporated into CDC. From the mid 1990s, 
the JNC had pronounced itself clearly in favour of sovereignty for Catalonia, often 
articulating its own viewpoint in contradiction to Pujol’s accommodationist stance, 
but at the time, moderate tendencies within CDC itself had prevailed. Under Artur 
Mas, however, a gradual generational change took place, with the incorporation of 
an increasing number of party representatives that had originally been formed in the 
JNC and FNEC, who were more in favour of a pro-sovereignty agenda than their 
predecessors and also far less tolerant of the tradition of CiU-PP alliances, wanting 
CiU to adopt a more socially progressive agenda.  
                                                
66 Personal interview with Agustí Colomines, 23 March 2015.  
67 Personal interviews with Agustí Colomines, 23 March 2015; Lluís Corominas, 27 January 
2016; and Francesc Homs, 28 January 2016. See also Gillespie 2015c. 
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           The nature of the civil society movement also requires nuance, since black-
and-white depictions of the Catalan civil society movement as a purely bottom-up 
process do not adequately account for the complexity of the interplay between 
political and civil factors, and have thus come under scrutiny. Analyses of top-down 
nation-building activities and discourses by nationalist political elites over the 
decades, and the impact of these on citizen identity formation processes in Catalonia, 
have pointed to a complex picture, since some top-down, elite-led processes can be 
seen to some extent to have preceded and influenced the emergence of an apparently 
bottom-up movement. Catalan nationalists themselves acknowledge the importance 
of Pujol and the party in this regard. Long prior to the turn to secessionism in 
Catalonia, the 23 years of Catalan government under Pujol from 1980 to 2003 saw 
the Catalan president and his party consistently employ discourses to convince 
Catalans and others that Catalonia was a nation worthy of special treatment, 
contributing to a rise in survey respondents describing Catalonia as such (Crameri 
2015: 106 endnote 10). Fer país (‘making a country’) formed a central part of 
Catalan nationalism under Pujol (Dowling 2005: 109; Magone 2009: 236; Barberà 
and Barrio 2006: 127). While it was to be expected that Catalans would seek to bring 
Catalan heritage and history to the forefront again after decades of being suppressed 
under Franco, some aspects of such nation-building activities and discourses have 
nevertheless been subject to questioning given the inevitable risks of the use (and 
abuse) of history and culture for nationalist purposes. Crameri (2006), for example, 
explores CiU’s failure to reflect a plurality of views in the version of history given in 
the Catalan history museum, which it designed and conceived of for nation-building 
purposes. Using social data about citizens’ and politicians’ background and attitudes, 
some academics have gone further to interpret Catalan citizens’ evolving preferences 
on the national question in the 21st century as a consequence of the role played by 
political parties and political elites in a context of power relations and partisan 
struggles within Catalonia’ (Miley 2007: 3). Miley (2006, 2007, 2013 and 2014; De 
la Calle and Miley 2008), for example, uses data on social structures and public 
opinion to suggest that the strength of Catalan nationalism has been the result of an 
elite-led creation of ‘micro-nationalist ideological hegemony’ in the Catalan political 
sphere over the decades, which has in turn impacted and influenced society rather 
than reflecting any prior societal consensus (Miley 2014: 291). He contrasts this with 
the situation in the Basque Country where he suggests ‘the nation-building project 
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promoted by the regional authorities has consistently faced much higher levels of 
resistance among opposition parties’ and thus ‘the region’s representative institutions 
have been consistently more divided, responsive to the divergent preferences of 
different segments of Basque society’ (Miley 2014: 306). In a similar vein, Barrio 
and Rodríguez (2014) attribute the radicalisation of people’s demands on self-
government to the outbidding process by Catalan political parties during the statute 
reform process during the 2000s, in an atmosphere of increased party competition on 
the territorial axis (with CiU in opposition for the first time to a coalition led by PSC, 
which had ‘catalanised’ its agenda).  
           Interpretations of the evolution of Catalan territorial agendas have thus 
become strikingly polarised, with Miley’s view emblematic of one extreme (top-
down) and Guibernau’s of the other (bottom-up). Both interpretations have their 
limitations, with top-down approaches tending to rely heavily on survey data only, 
and bottom-up approaches showing clear signs of partisanship. In this context, 
Crameri (2014, 2015) offers a more nuanced interpretation which seems more 
appropriate to the evidence, reconceptualising the multidimensional relationship 
between political power and civil counterpower as one of ‘co-construction’ (2015: 
107). She also examines the complexity and multidimensionality of civil 
counterpower itself, given the extensive role of cultural and media elites within the 
civil pro-independence movement and its highly organised nature, which 
problematises bottom-up/top-down distinctions (2015: 109-11).   
           The alliance between CiU and ERC that was established following the 2012 
elections was necessitated by the fact that CiU fell short of the absolute majority it 
had hoped for, but nevertheless it was not unexpected, in the sense that CiU, ever 
since its experience in opposition to the tripartite coalition governments, had clearly 
sought to move away from the traditional CiU-PP alliance arrangements (despite 
briefly resurrecting these in 2010-2012) in an attempt to become the leading voice 
within the nationalist camp again. Its efforts such as the ‘Gran Casa del Catalanismo’ 
had showed that it wanted to bring an end to the division in Catalan politics at the 
time between left wing parties (the tripartite coalition) and right-wing parties (PP and 
CiU) in order to refocus on a Catalanist sphere in which it aimed to ensure its 
position as the dominant party. The alliance established with ERC in 2012 would, 
however, inevitably limit CiU’s room for manoeuvre, especially since ERC provided 
parliamentary support without entering into a formal coalition with CiU, which gave 
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it power to put pressure on CiU – pressure which was compounded by the high 
levels of mobilisation by civil society groups campaigning for the ‘right to decide’ 
and independence. From then onwards, confrontation with the PP Spanish 
government increased as the PP remained intransigent in term of its views on the 
existence of one Spanish nation only and sole Spanish sovereignty. On 23 January 
2013, the Catalan parliament approved a declaration recognising the sovereignty of 
the Catalan people and their right to determine their relationship with Spain. The 
following year, CiU and ERC passed a ‘Law on Consultations’ to seek to hold a 
consultation on 9 November 2014 to put two questions to Catalan society, offering 
the option of a federated Catalan state within Spain or full independence. Catalan 
nationalist politicians argued that it was an opinion-sounding vote, with no legal 
consequences, and thus within the competences assigned to it under the Catalan 
statute, while Spanish politicians interpreted it as a pseudo-referendum and therefore 
illegal (mirroring what had happened a few years earlier in the Basque Country with 
Ibarretxe’s proposed consultation law). The Constitutional Court sided with the 
Spanish government’s interpretation, but Catalan nationalist politicians, arguing that 
the Court is biased, still went ahead and held the consultation. The result reached 
80.8% in support of Catalonia’s secession from Spain, but turnout was only 35% 
(Elias 2015: 84), since the vast majority of those against secession saw it as a 
partisan pro-independence initiative and stayed at home. Surveys in recent years 
have consistently shown that a large majority of Catalan citizens are in favour of a 
referendum on independence, but whether or not a majority would vote for secession 
in such an instance has not been so clear since constitutional preferences have varied 
from poll to poll.68  
           CiU’s room for manoeuvre was by then very limited, given both the 
intransigence of Madrid and the continued pressure it faced from pro-independence 
parties and civil society groups in Catalonia. In the light of the Spanish 
government’s ongoing refusal to allow Catalonia to hold a referendum, Artur Mas’ 
next proposal was to call early elections again, this time as a plebiscite on 
independence, but only if ERC would join it in a common list, in part to avoid the 
risk of losing to the latter. Having maintained an ambiguous stance since 2012 in 
terms of whether CiU would seek full secession or rather a confederal arrangement 
                                                
68 According to opinion polls published by the Catalan Centre of Opinion Studies (Centre 
d’Estudis d’Opinió, CEO). 
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involving nationhood and a degree of statehood for Spain, CiU now had to define its 
stance more firmly. The issue led CiU to split in 2015, with the traditionally more 
moderate UDC rejecting the secessionist stance chosen by CDC and its ever closer 
alliance with the left-wing pro-independence party ERC.69 CDC ran for the early 
elections in September 2015 as part of a common list with ERC incorporating key 
figures from civil society too, named Junts pel Sí (‘Together for Yes’). Junts pel Sí 
won with 62 seats, short of the 68 needed for an absolute majority on its own, but the 
pro-independence camp overall did win an absolute majority if the anti-capitalist 
pro-independence CUP (10 seats) is included. It nevertheless still fell short of 50% 
of votes, reaching 47% in total. Junts pel Sí announced the pro-independence camp 
had secured an overwhelming majority (using seats as a measure) giving it the 
mandate to continue with its plans to create a new Catalan state, while the opposition 
decried the lack of democratic legitimacy for such action. In practice, the lack of 
support from the CUP to the investiture of Artur Mas, given its preference for a new 
figurehead for the independence movement not associated with austerity cuts and 
corruption, forced Artur Mas to step down at the last minute and be replaced by a 
figure of consensus in the form of Carles Puigdemont, until then mayor of Girona.  
 Notwithstanding such obstacles and difficulties, the prospect of CDC 
returning to an accommodationist stance in the near future, while not impossible, 
looked much less likely or feasible in early 2016 than it was for the PNV when 
Urkullu took over the reins from Ibarretxe. Most CDC politicians – albeit not all – 
are now very strongly in favour of independence, given the strength of feeling within 
the party that they have exhausted all other alternatives and that engagement with 
Madrid is no longer genuinely possible.70 The future for CDC remains uncertain, 
however, given that its attempt to ride the pro-independence wave has not resulted in 
growing support for the party itself in recent years, but rather in a gradual loss of 
support which has gone instead to left-wing pro-independence parties, namely ERC 
and the CUP. The rise in support for the ‘right to decide’ and pro-independence 
sentiment in Catalonia in recent years has not just been down to dissatisfaction with 
Spanish-Catalan relations. It has also been a form of response to the austerity cuts 
that ensued in particular from 2010 onwards in the wake of the financial crisis, 
                                                
69 UDC declined thereafter and failed to gain representation at the 2015 Catalan regional 
elections. 
70 Personal interviews with CDC representatives, 2016. 
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imposed by both the EU and member state governments; as well as to the political 
crisis in Spain in general, characterised by widespread disillusionment with existing 
institutions and actors, who have been associated with so many corruption scandals 
in the boom years that came to light when the economic bubble burst. As Shea Baird 
(2015) states, ‘For many in Catalonia, the “double crisis”, national and economic, is 
really one and the same: a crisis of popular sovereignty, whether it be in the face of 
“authoritarian” state institutions or the global financial markets.’ The win at the May 
2015 municipal elections for the new left-wing Barcelona En Comú alliance 
(initially Guanyem Barcelona), which incorporates Podemos in Catalonia, showed 
that the new type of left-wing politics in Spain, with its origins in anti-austerity 
movements and citizen platforms, was a strong feature of the Catalan political 
landscape too. This alliance then triumphed again in Catalonia at the December 2015 
Spanish elections. Left-wing pro-independence parties ERC and the CUP thus also 
face competition from a left-wing alliance of parties under Barcelona en Comú in 
favour of the ‘right to decide’ but ambiguous about independence.71 In many ways, 
CDC, given its traditional right-of-centre political orientation, its history of pacts and 
alliances with the PP and the PSOE, and its own involvement in corruption scandals 
(most notably, but not only, in relation to former president Jordi Pujol), is seen by 
the new wave of soberanistas as part of the old Spanish politics that they want to get 
away from. CDC has to some extent been able to disguise its decline through pacts 
and alliances and single lists with other left-wing pro-independence parties and 
independents, but only to an extent. Aware of the need to rebrand itself, the party 
presented itself under a new name (Democràcia i Llibertat) at the 2015 Spanish 
general elections, and Artur Mas, having stepped down from the role of Catalan 
president, has since been tasked with refounding the party anew. The new generation 
of the party wants it to take a more left-wing orientation, in line with current 
preferences in Catalan society,72 but it faces a challenge to do so to compete credibly 
with other the left-wing pro-independence actors already present.  
 
  
                                                
71 Barcelona En Comú has not yet presented a candidature at regional elections, since it has 
been focused on the municipal level of government, but leader Ada Colao suggested in 2016 
that the possibility was being studied. 
72 For example, personal interview with Lluís Corominas, 27 January 2016. 
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Conclusion 
 Both the Basque and Catalan cases have seen a rise and fall in 
accommodationist politics on the part of the PNV and CDC respectively, due to a 
combination of factors, including (but not limited to) declining opportunities for 
accommodationist practices due to the evolving political situation in Madrid; 
increasing Basque and Catalan demands for greater autonomy and indeed 
sovereignty, which go beyond what is feasible within the current Spanish 
constitution; and an array of factors within the home region which ultimately have a 
bearing on relations with the centre, such as party competition. The decline in 
accommodationism came first in the Basque case, with the PNV’s shift to the Lizarra 
Pact and then the Ibarretxe Plan, due first and foremost to the need to deal with the 
ongoing problem of terrorist violence in the region and to the increasing clash 
between Basque nationalism and Spanish nationalism that this created in the political 
sphere too, which spurred the PNV on to seek new alliances. In Catalonia, CDC’s 
shift away from accommodationism came later, but it has been more consistent so 
far. Unlike in the Basque case, where the thwarting of the Ibarretxe Plan led to a 
return to more accommodationist tactics under Ibarretxe’s successor Urkullu, in the 
Catalan case, continued rejections from Madrid of the attempts made by CDC and 
other Catalan parties to take steps towards independence – or at least the holding of a 
referendum – in recent years have so far not reduced their determination.  
 In this regard, the difference in societal and party dynamics in both regions 
has been a fundamental explanatory factor. In the Basque Country, the longstanding 
division both between parties and in society itself created by the problem of terrorist 
violence, and the heterogeneity of Basque society given the vastly different 
geographic and sociodemographic makeup of different areas within the Basque 
Country, resulted in insufficient societal or political backing for the Plan 
spearheaded by Ibarretxe. This left the PNV acting largely in isolation and gave it 
little option but to return to more accommodationist behaviour when the Ibarretxe 
Plan was thwarted. In recent years, the division between parties – not only between 
statewide and Basque nationalist parties, but also within the nationalist camp itself 
between the PNV and the izquierda abertzale – has continued. This, combined with 
other factors such as the need to focus first and foremost on the financial crisis, and 
indeed the recognition that the Basque Country has suffered less than most of Spain 
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due in part to a fiscal arrangement that gives it far more resources than other regions 
receive, has meant that securing a new status for the Basque Country has not been an 
immediate priority in recent years for many within Basque society nor indeed for 
many within the PNV itself. The PNV has still made clear its intentions to work 
more gradually towards a new political relationship with Madrid based on a more 
bilateral partnership of equals, involving the possibility of self-determination and co-
sovereignty, but this is combined with an acknowledgement within the party that it 
would first need to achieve a greater consensus among political parties in the Basque 
region (including the Basque federation of the Spanish Socialist party) in this regard, 
as well as stronger backing from society. The Catalan case is very different, as such 
a consensus among several political parties within the region, as well as a strong 
backing from society, already exists. The lack of history of violence in Catalonia has 
allowed for a more widespread Catalanist phenomenon to develop over the decades, 
and indeed centuries. From the late 1990s, this saw left-wing parties in Catalonia 
(both the Catalan Socialists and ICV) compete with the nationalists (ERC and CiU) 
in seeking recognition of Catalonia as a nation and/or its right to shape its own 
autonomy, and in more recent years it has also evolved to embrace a fluid 
relationship between nationalist and pro-independence parties and civil society 
organisations. In stark contrast to the PNV and its isolationism, CDC thus came 
under pressure to move from an accommodationist to a pro-sovereignty agenda, not 
only to outbid other parties in a context of increasing party competition, but also 
eventually to respond to demands from civil society. The decline in scope for 
accommodationist politics in Madrid has thus combined with intraregional pressures 
to push CDC to evolve in a certain direction.  
 While this chapter has alluded in places to the different regional financing 
systems in each region, this has not been a main focus, since the chapter has served 
instead to set the broader context in which the PNV and CDC have been operating 
and to provide an overview of the different dynamics and drivers affecting their 
territorial agendas. The rest of the thesis will now focus more specifically on the 
ways in which, within this broader context, the different financing arrangements of 
the two regions have contributed to shaping the evolution of the nationalist parties’ 
territorial strategies and behaviour, starting with a fuller explanation of the Basque 
and Catalan financing systems in Chapter 3.  
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Chapter 3 
Basque and Catalan financing: The fundamentals of the 
Concierto and the common system  
 
           This chapter is first and foremost technical in nature, for it is designed to 
explain how the Basque Concierto and the common financing system work, as a 
foundation for the analysis in subsequent chapters of the ways in which the different 
regional financing systems have contributed to shifts in Basque and Catalan 
territorial agendas and conceptions of sovereignty. The sections that follow explain 
first the Basque Concierto, in terms of both its fiscal and financial dimensions, and 
second the common financing system, focusing particularly on the problems inherent 
in the latter relevant to Catalonia. Finally, the third main section provides an analysis 
of the controversial debate over the Concierto versus the common system, 
concerning the question of whether the Basques contribute enough revenues to Spain 
compared to other comparably wealthy regions under the common system such as 
Catalonia.  
 
How the Concierto works 
           Under the Concierto, the three Basque provinces (otherwise known as 
‘historical territories’ or ‘foral territories’) are responsible both for collecting almost 
all taxes and for regulating the majority of them.73 The Basque regional government 
uses most of the tax revenues raised by the provinces to cover the costs of the policy 
competences the region has assumed (which include the most fundamental areas of 
public services such as health and education) and a smaller share to pay an annual 
quota (cupo) to the Spanish government towards the few remaining centralised or 
non-assumed competences for which the Spanish state remains responsible (e.g. 
                                                
73 For a comprehensive explanation of how the Concierto works, see Zubiri 2010. Given the 
relatively limited number of print sources explaining  the Concierto in depth, the subsections  
here explaining the fiscal and financial dimensions of the Concierto draw primarily upon the 
works of Zubiri (especially 2010, 2014a and 2015), in conjunction with analysis of the 
relevant legislation (Concierto and quota laws). This has been supplemented by further 
information gathered by the author in personal interviews with Basque provincial treasury 
representatives in 2014, who covered or clarified other issues that the print sources did not 
address. 
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foreign and defence policy) 
(see Figure 2). A relatively 
small share of the total tax 
revenues they raise is used to 
pay the quota, which in recent 
years has accounted for around 
7%-12% of the Basque budget 
(Zubiri 2015: 218). Of the 
remaining revenues, 
approximately 70% are passed 
upwards to the Basque regional 
government to cover its 
competences, while the rest are 
split between the provincial 
governments (diputaciones) 
and the local or municipal 
authorities (Zubiri 2010: 74; 
Zurutuza 2014). The internal 
organisation of the region is 
thus essentially confederal in 
nature.  
           The first Concierto of the democratic period was designed in 1980 and 
approved by law in 1981 (Law 12/1981, of 13 May). While the three Basque 
provinces retained their responsibility for tax collection, for the first time they would 
combine to pay one single Basque quota to Madrid following the creation of the 
autonomous community. The Concierto of 1981 marked a significant departure from 
its predecessors, most notably in the design of the quota. This size of this had 
previously been equal to the total estimated sum of taxes raised by each Basque 
province, following deductions to allow for Basque spending on competences 
covered by the central government elsewhere in Spain and some tax exemptions (e.g. 
some villages were exempt from taxes for having supported the liberals during the 
Carlist wars) (Zubiri 2010: 35; Uriarte 2015: Pt IV 86). Spain had originally 
conceded to the first such arrangement in 1878 primarily for practical reasons since 
the central state treasury did not immediately have the technical means or capacity to 
Figure 2: Basque revenue flows 
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collect taxes in the Basque provinces after the abolition of their fueros or legal 
charters in 1876 following the Basque defeat in the Third Carlist War.74  The 
agreement was originally intended to be a temporary one for a transitional period of 
eight years until the Basque provinces became fully integrated into the Spanish tax 
system, but instead ended up staying in force thereafter. 
          The Basque Concierto of 1981, which was set to expire on 31 December 2001, 
was updated in 2002 with a new permanent agreement (Law 12/2002, of 23 May). 
The Concierto comprises both a fiscal dimension (concerning the region’s tax-raising 
powers) and a financial dimension (concerning the financial flows between the 
Spanish and Basque governments, including most notably the quota), which 
constitute chapters I and II of the Concierto law of 2002 respectively. The following 
sections analyse these in more detail.75  
 
The fiscal dimension 
           The Concierto is dependent upon the Spanish tax structure and system in the 
sense that the Basque provincial governments cannot create their own taxes at will, 
but rather they must seek the authority to collect and regulate each Spanish tax in 
their own territory. Under the 2002 Concierto law, if Spain introduces a new tax or 
modifies an existing one, this calls for bilateral negotiations to be held between 
Spanish and Basque government delegations to agree whether to delegate the 
relevant tax-raising power to the Basque provinces and, if so, how. Fundamentally, 
this involves deciding whether they will only collect the tax (while remaining subject 
to Spanish legislation regarding the tax base and rates) or whether they will also be 
granted regulatory autonomy, within certain parameters.76 ‘Points of connection’ are 
established, which determine who will pay the tax in the Basque provinces and 
whether it will be according to Spanish legislation or Basque provincial legislation 
(Zubiri 2010: 49-51). Thereafter the tax becomes known as an ‘agreed tax’ (impuesto 
concertado) governed by these parameters. All the general taxes in Spain have 
sooner or later been agreed in this way over the decades since the 1981 Concierto 
law, granting the Basque provinces at the very least the power to collect each tax, 
and in most cases substantial legislative autonomy too. This makes the Basque 
                                                
74 On the origins of the Concierto, see Alonso Olea 1995. 
75 The third chapter of the Concierto law, on bilateral relations, is addressed in Chapter 4. 
76 Personal interviews with senior officials in the provincial treasury departments, 2014. 
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Country the only region in the world where the central government does not collect 
any tax revenues (aside from the minor exceptions detailed below) – in contrast even 
to the Swiss cantons, the US states and the province of Quebec, which have high 
levels of fiscal autonomy within their respective federations (Zubiri 2010: 49).  
           Under these agreements, beyond mere powers of tax collection, the Basque 
provinces have acquired regulatory powers to design the main direct taxes (personal 
income tax, corporation tax, non-residents tax, wealth tax, and inheritance and gift 
taxes) and the minor indirect taxes (capital transfer tax and stamp duty, and gaming 
duties).77 They only remain subject to Spanish legislation over the main indirect 
taxes (fundamentally VAT and excise duties, which account for around 90% of total 
indirect tax revenues), which are in turn circumscribed by EU legislation, since there 
is a large degree of tax harmonisation over indirect taxes at EU level. In the case of 
VAT, for example, the EU sets a standardised tax base, as well as a range of tax rates 
which member states must choose between, and it stipulates that each state can only 
charge one standard VAT rate, which cannot be varied at regional government level. 
Thus EU rules do not permit the full devolution of legislative competence over VAT 
to the substate level (Trench 2015).  
         Where the Basque provinces have legislative autonomy (fundamentally over 
direct taxes), they are still subject to some general harmonisation rules within the 
Spanish state, as follows: they must adhere to the international agreements signed by 
Spain; they must not distort competition among firms or free movement among 
Spanish regions; and fiscal pressure (tax to GDP ratio) in the historical territories 
should be ‘equivalent’ to that in the rest of Spain. The latter two of these principles 
are, however, inherently ambiguous and open to different interpretation, which has 
resulted in decades of conflicts with the Spanish state and also with neighbouring 
regions (e.g. De la Hucha Celador 2009: 727; Zubiri 2010: 53-54).78  
            There are only three minor exceptions where the relevant tax-raising 
authority has not been delegated to the Basque provinces (Zubiri 2010: 48). First, the 
Spanish government collects the taxes on the salaries of Spanish state (central 
government) employees such as civil servants in the Basque region. Second, it 
collects the taxes on the interest on debt and other interest-bearing assets issued by 
the state (or any other Spanish region or local authority). However, in both these 
                                                
77 Personal interviews with senior officials in the provincial treasury departments, 2014. 
78 The history of litigation is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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cases, the Basque provinces are compensated for the revenue loss since an estimation 
of the relevant taxes withheld on salaries and interest is deducted from the annual 
Basque quota payment to the Spanish government. Third and finally, the Spanish 
state collects the customs duties, but these in any case are almost all channelled to 
the EU for they constitute one of its resources.    
 
The financial dimension 
           The main financial transfers between the Basque region and the central 
government under the Concierto are: (1) the annual quota (cupo) paid by the Basque 
region to cover its share of the competences fulfilled by the Spanish state; and (2) the 
VAT adjustment paid by the central government to compensate for the difference 
between what the Basque provincial treasuries collect in VAT and what Basque 
residents pay, plus a few other smaller financial flows between the Spanish state to 
the Basque region (Zubiri 2010: 60-69). The following sections explain the quota 
and VAT adjustments more fully (see also Figure 3, p.102): 
 
(1) The quota 
           The annual quota, in basic terms, is designed to cover the Basque share of 
Spanish state expenditure on the competences fulfilled by the central government on 
behalf of the whole of Spain (the cargos no asumidos, i.e. ‘non-assumed charges’ or 
‘non-assumed competences’). Importantly, the value of the non-assumed 
competences in Spain is determined by subtracting state expenditure elsewhere in 
Spain on competences already assumed by the Basque region (the cargos asumidos) 
but not other regions, from total state expenditure in the Spanish budget (De la 
Fuente 2009: 4; Zubiri 2010: 62; López Labora 2006: 7-8; Monasterio Escudero 
2010: 64). More specifically, the Basques contribute to the expenditure on non-
assumed competences financed exclusively by central government tax revenues (not 
deficit) which are not covered by any revenues the central government collects in the 
Basque region (fundamentally, the few non agreed taxes detailed in the previous 
section). The quota does not include a contribution towards the part of state 
expenditure on non-assumed competences that is financed by deficit because that 
would require the Basque region to use revenues to pay upfront for expenditure that 
the central government is deferring by issuing debt (bonds and loans) (De la Fuente 
2009: 5; Zubiri 2010: 61-62). Instead, the interest on and repayments of the debt 
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incurred by the state to finance the deficit spending become a non-assumed 
competence to which the Basques contribute their share via the quota in future years 
(De la Fuente 2009: 5; Zubiri 2010: 61-62).  
           The Concierto legislation stipulates that the Basque share of the relevant 
expenditure should basically reflect the region’s share of Spanish GDP, determined 
by a percentage known as the ‘imputation index’. The exact logic of the choice of 
6.24% for the imputation index under the 1981 Concierto agreement was unknown 
until very recently, since the figure was agreed privately between the heads of the 
Spanish and Basque delegations at the time. It was generally assumed to have been a 
compromise between the Basque position (that the imputation index should reflect 
the Basque share of Spanish population) and the Spanish position (that it should 
reflect the Basque share of Spanish GDP), since the figure was more or less halfway 
between the two at the time: 5.66% and 7.50% respectively in 1981, according to 
approximate figures from the Spanish National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística, INE) (Zubiri 2010: 65). Only in 2015 did Pedro Luis Uriarte, head of 
the Basque delegation that negotiated the Concierto of 1981, finally clarify the logic 
behind the 6.24% figure in a book recounting his experiences of the 1980 
negotiations. He and the then Spanish Treasury Minister, Jaime García Añoveros, 
had agreed to base the imputation index at the time on relative Basque GDP 
measured at factor cost (rather than market prices, the more usual method), with a 
slight reduction as a concession to the Basque Country given the depth of the 
economic crisis the region was in, and also the unreliability of official figures at the 
time (Uriarte 2015: Pt VIII, 423-4). The decision was thus a political compromise. 
The imputation index has never been changed since it was first set at 6.24% in the 
Concierto law of 1981. Thus it has broadly rather than exactly reflected the region’s 
relative GDP, which has declined from 7.5% in 1981 to approximately 6.2% in the 
present day, due first and foremost to the decline in Basque population relative to 
that of Spain (Zubiri 2015: 211).  
           Following the calculation of the Basque share of the relevant expenditure, 
some deductions are then applied to the resulting quota to cover other transfers and 
compensations paid by the Spanish state to the Basque region (Monasterio Escudero 
2010: 65; Zubiri 2010: 63). For example, on occasions where the central government 
has provided additional financing to the regions for certain competences to improve 
the provision of services, the relevant Basque share of the funds has usually been 
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deducted from the quota. Most notably, in the Basque case, since 1981 there has 
always been a deduction to compensate the Basques for the fact that the Basque 
police force (Ertzaintza) costs significantly more to run than the police elsewhere in 
Spain (due in large part to the history of terrorism).  
             Since 1981 the Concierto legislation has stipulated that the quota should be 
governed by five-yearly quota laws negotiated bilaterally between Spanish and 
Basque delegations (see Bilbao 2002). Under this system, the net quota is not 
calculated from scratch each year but rather for the first year (or ‘base year’) of each 
five-year period. The net quota payable for the following four years is calculated by 
applying an ‘updating index’ (índice de actualización) to the net quota of the base 
year and then deducting the relevant compensations, which are agreed during the 
quota law negotiations. The updating index is based on the rate of increase (or 
decrease) in the state collection of the agreed taxes covered by the Concierto in the 
rest of Spain relative to the base year (i.e. the tax revenues of the state that have not 
been ceded to the regions). Since the Spanish budget is used to calculate the non-
assumed charges for the base year, the quota is based on the projected cost of 
competences, in contrast to the common financing system where financing levels are 
calculated on the basis of the real cost of competences. The base year quota 
including all its components (the imputation index, the compensations, etc.) and the 
updating index are all subject to bilateral agreement during the quota law 
negotiations. 
 
(2) The VAT adjustment 
           In 1985, the responsibility for collecting VAT in the Basque region was 
transferred to the Basque provincial treasuries (Atxabal and Muguruza 2006: 26). 
From then on this would necessitate an adjustment to compensate for the difference 
between how much the Basque provincial treasuries collect and how much they are 
owed, since VAT is a tax on individual consumption but collected through a tax on 
corporate production (Monasterio Escudero 2010: 67; Zubiri 2010: 67-68). The aim 
is to ensure that the final VAT resources of the Basque region are relative to its 
weight in Spain’s total consumption. Therefore, there are two dimensions to the 
VAT adjustment: first, an adjustment for imported goods from outside the EU 
whereby the Spanish state, which collects the VAT on such goods, gives the Basque 
region a share relative to the consumption of Basque residents; and second, an 
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adjustment for the internal market, to reconcile the difference between the VAT the 
Basque treasuries collect on the value added of firms in the Basque region and the 
VAT paid by Basque residents on purchases of goods produced in the EU (Zubiri 
2010: 127-128). The second component of the adjustment could theoretically imply 
a transfer in either direction between the Basque region and the Spanish state but in 
practice the Basque region has consistently been the recipient since it is a net 
importer from the rest of Spain (i.e. the consumption of Basque residents is greater 
than the value added of Basque firms). Under the Concierto legislation, both the 
relative rate of Basque consumption and the relative rate of Basque VAT collection 
capacity are prescribed by the quota law and thus subject to revision every five 
years. In practice, both rates have remained unchanged since they were first set in 
1985: 6.875% and 5.765% respectively (Zubiri 2010: 128).  
           While the VAT adjustment involves a far more sizeable transfer of funds, a 
similar adjustment procedure also applies to excise duties (on alcohol and alcoholic 
beverages, intermediate products, beer, mineral oils and manufactured tobacco) – the 
other main source of indirect taxation which the Basque provincial treasuries have 
been responsible for collecting since 1997 (Monasterio Escudero 2010: 68). In this 
case, however, the Spanish state is the overall beneficiary of the sum of all excise 
adjustments. Other smaller financial flows also include some other transfers and 
compensations from the Spanish state to the Basque region. In relation to excise 
duties, for example, it was agreed that the transfer in 1997 of the responsibility for 
collecting the duties should not have a positive or negative impact on total Basque 
resources, which in practice resulted thereafter in a compensation from the Spanish 
state to the Basque provinces. Another transfer relates to the share of the Basque 
municipal or local councils in Spanish state revenues. The municipalities in Spain 
are in part financed by a share of Spanish tax revenues. In the Basque region, it is the 
responsibility of the Basque provincial governments to pay the respective share of 
the agreed taxes which it collects, but the state still makes a small transfer to the 
Basque municipalities for their share of the reduced number of taxes collected 
centrally (Zubiri 2010: 68).  
 
          The final balance of financial flows is more or less equal, since the quota 
payment that the Basque region pays to the Spanish state each year comes to 
approximately the same amount as the sum the Spanish state pays to the Basque 
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region for the VAT adjustment (Zubiri 2010: 69; Monsterio Escudero 2010: 70).  
The Basque government pays three provisional instalments per year to cover the 
quota (in May, October and December) calculated on the basis of the figures in the 
Spanish budget – payments which are then reconciled the following year when the 
final budgetary figures are known – while the Spanish state makes quarterly 
payments to the Basque region to cover the VAT adjustment. The fact that the final 
balance of flows is more or less equal is very significant: when there are political 
disputes between Spanish and Basque governments over issues such as the final 
amount owed under the quota payment, both sides have almost equal power to 
withhold money from each other until an agreement is reached.79   
 
Figure 3: Spanish-Basque fiscal and financial flows  
 
 
  
                                                
79 Personal interviews with senior officials in the Guipúzcoan provincial treasury 
department, 2014.  
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How the common financing system works 
           Aside from the Basque Country and Navarre, the remaining fifteen of Spain’s 
regions conform to the common financing regime (régimen común de financiación), 
a revenue-sharing model under which the regions receive revenue transfers from the 
central government and obtain some additional resources via more limited regional 
taxation powers and local charges for services. The model was first regulated by the 
1980 regional financing law (Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las Comunidades 
Autónomas, LOFCA) and was subject to five-yearly revisions from 1986 until 2001, 
at which stage the five-yearly requirement for a reform was removed (Blöchlinger 
and Vammalle 2012: 114; López Laborda 2006: 2-3). The next reform took place in 
2009 and was motivated first and foremost by the fact the new Catalan autonomy 
statute of 2006 had necessitated a reform of the LOFCA, though other regions had 
also approved new statutes in those years in ways which called for a new reform too 
(Blöchlinger and Vammalle 2012: 117; Bosch 2010: 1). At the time of writing, a 
new reform is considered long overdue and is expected to take place under the new 
government due to be formed in 2016.  
            Unlike the Basque Concierto and the Navarran Convenio, where resource 
levels per capita are based fundamentally on each region’s own fiscal capacity, the 
common financing system is primarily a needs-based system (e.g. López Labora 
2006: 7). The final resource levels afforded to each region by the central government 
are based first and foremost on estimates of what each region needs to fulfil its 
competences, calculated in a way which is meant to respect the principles of 
sufficiency and solidarity. In other words, each relevant administration should have 
appropriate revenues to provide a similar level of basic services, thereby ensuring 
equality among Spaniards. Articles 156 and 157 of the Spanish Constitution outline 
the basic principles to inform the regional financing system, establishing that the 
fifteen regions under the system will obtain resources primarily from two main 
revenue sources: (1) taxes which are fully or partially ceded to the regions and (2) a 
contribution derived from non-ceded tax revenues. Some additional, limited funds 
are raised via regional taxes in the few cases where their creation at regional level is 
permitted by the central government, in instances where there is no overlap with 
state taxes (though in practice any such taxes are often faced with legal challenges 
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from the Spanish government). Additional resources also come from local charges 
for services and debt issuances.  
           These basic principles established in the Constitution were fleshed out and 
developed into a regional financing system regulated by the LOFCA of 1980. While 
there was some parliamentary debate and discussion at the time regarding the need 
and desirability for the regions to have some tax-raising powers of their own rather 
than being entirely dependent on revenue transfers from the central government, the 
LOFCA of 1980 afforded very little in the way of genuine fiscal competences to the 
regions and emphasis was placed instead on ensuring sufficiency and solidarity in 
the final distribution of resources (Alonso Olea 2014: 80-82). Fiscal co-
responsibility, which required a meaningful increase in regional fiscal competences, 
would not properly start to be introduced in the model until the major reform of 
1996, increasing further in the subsequent reforms of 2001 and 2009 (Alonso Olea 
2014: 71; Ordóñez and Rivas 2007). This was gradually achieved by increasing the 
legislative competences of the regions by devolving or ‘ceding’ a greater share of 
taxes to the regions. This was done under the provisions of the LOFCA and the 
related Law 30/1983 regulating the Cession of Taxes from the State to the 
Autonomous Communities, which was later updated in 1996 (Mora Lorente 2004: 
109-110). Taxes are ‘partially ceded’ in the case where some but not all taxable 
events related to that tax are ceded to the regions. Over the decades, since the first 
cession of 15% of IRPF (impuesto sobre la renta de las personas físicas, income tax) 
in 1993, the share of taxes ceded to the regions has gradually increased (as have their 
legislative and administrative powers over these taxes) (see also Chapter 7). This has 
led to a proportional reduction in the share of revenue transfers to the regions derived 
from non-ceded tax revenues. By 2009, under the reform of that year, the share of 
IRPF ceded to the regions had increased to 50% (Blöchlinger and Vammalle 2012: 
115). Other ‘partially ceded’ taxes under that reform include VAT (50%) and excise 
taxes (58%), though as indirect taxes the regions do not have any legislative 
autonomy over these shares but rather are subject to Spanish legislation. The fully 
ceded taxes are generally relatively more minor taxes, including taxes on wealth, 
inheritance and donations, capital transfers and documented legal acts, gambling, 
certain modes of transport, electricity, and the retail sale of certain hydrocarbons. 
Importantly, only the fully ceded taxes are collected by the regions themselves, while 
the central government remains responsible for collecting the partially ceded taxes in 
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their entirely (as well as non-ceded taxes), with the requisite revenues then being 
transferred to the regions as part of the transfers from the central government.80 The 
regions are thus heavily dependent on the revenue transfers. 
          A key feature of the model is an equalisation mechanism to redistribute wealth 
to ensure each region has more or less the same financing per unit of need. Prior to 
2009, this was achieved via the so-called Sufficiency Fund (Fondo de suficiencia) 
(Bosch 2010: 5). The Sufficiency Fund provided resources to each region to the 
value of its estimated expenditure needs to cover three areas of basic services 
(common, healthcare and social), minus the volume of resources collected in the 
regions themselves from the fully ceded taxes. Under the 2001 reform, the base year 
used to calculate the Sufficiency Fund transfers required for each region was 1999, 
and the growth rate of the non-ceded tax revenues was defined as the adjustment rate 
for subsequent years. The 2009 reform of the LOFCA then sought to improve the 
equalisation mechanism via the creation of three new Funds in addition to a revised 
Sufficiency Fund (see Bosch 2010: 13-16; Blöchlinger and Vammalle 2012: 115), 
the details of which are given in Table 7. Since 2009, the majority of the resources 
within the system have been pooled instead into what is known as the Fund for the 
Guarantee of Fundamental Public Services (Fondo de Garantía de Servicios 
Públicos Fundamentales), which has replaced the previous Sufficiency Fund as the 
main vehicle of redistribution and solidarity in the common system.  
 
Table 7 – The funds to distribute resources under the common system (2009 
reform) 
Fund for the Guarantee 
of Fundamental Public 
Services 
(Fondo de Garantía de 
Servicios Públicos 
Fundamentales) 
The largest Fund, which distributes approximately 80% 
of the revenues due to the regions (75% of ceded tax 
revenues plus 5% from central government transfers 
derived from non-ceded taxes). This Fund divides the 
resources among the regions to ensure that they each 
have the same level of resources per ‘unit of need’ to 
provide essential public services (education, health and 
social services) to their citizens. These ‘needs’ are 
                                                
80 This point was raised by several interviewees in Catalonia of different political affiliations 
(CDC, PSC, ERC) as a source of considerable grievance. 
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determined according to each region’s ‘adjusted 
population’, calculated via a formula to take into account 
various demographic and geographical weightings (such 
as population size, proportion of over 65s, surface area, 
dispersion and insularity). 
Global Sufficiency Fund  
(Fondo de Suficiencia 
Global) 
Designed to ensure the regions have sufficient resources 
for the remainder of their devolved competences (i.e. 
beyond the essential services) and are net winners with 
the change of model in 2009. 
Two regional 
convergence funds: 
Competitiveness Fund 
(Fondo de 
Competitividad) and 
Cooperation Fund 
(Fondo de Cooperación) 
The smallest Funds, together distributing less than 5% of 
resources in the system. The Competitiveness Fund 
compensates the usually richer regions with typically 
higher population growth (e.g. Catalonia and Madrid) if 
the outturn figures go against them, in an attempt to 
reduce the anomaly whereby their financing had often 
ended up below average under the previous model. The 
Cooperation Fund is aimed at increasing resources in the 
poorer regions with lower per capita incomes and/or 
negative population dynamics (ageing or declining 
populations). 
 
Despite the frequency with which the system has been reformed, it has long 
been criticised by economists for its technical flaws that successive reforms have 
failed to resolve (e.g. Bosch 2010, León 2010, De la Fuente 2013a, Paluzie 2010), as 
well as by politicians in the regions which have been disadvantaged by the system. 
The main complaint comes from the relatively richer regions who contribute most to 
the system, and yet often end up with below-average per capita resource levels post-
equalisation, due to over-redistribution: the three regions most affected in this way 
are usually Madrid, the Balearics and Catalonia (see, for example De la Fuente 
2012b and 2013a). In the case of Catalonia, it is usually the third largest contributor 
to the system in terms of tax revenues per capita (after Madrid and the Balearics), but 
ends up approximately ninth in the final list of resources per capita post-equalisation 
(see, for example, Castells 2014: 285). Each reform has always been fraught with 
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political tension since all the regions have always fought to ensure their respective 
status quo would improve with each reform, making it politically very difficult to 
correct the arbitrary effects of the equalisation mechanism (Bosch and Durán 2008; 
Borraz and Cantalapiedra 2010; Blöchlinger and Vammalle 2012: 113-121).  
         While the common financing system is an inter-regional system which is 
negotiated at the inter-regional Fiscal and Financial Policy Council (Consejo de 
Política Fiscal y Financiera, CPFF), there is also a bilateral dimension to it between 
the central government and each region, since the central government has usually 
also negotiated individually with each region to ensure it will accept the relevant 
reform. This is because each reform of the LOFCA must be approved in each 
regional parliament for it to be applied in that region. Notably, Spanish-Catalan 
bilateral negotiations have in particular played a leading role in shaping each reform 
of the LOFCA and each reform has been approved by the Catalan government and 
parliament, and yet each has proved a stopgap rather than a long-term solution, due 
to the conflict between the nature of some Catalan demands and wider inter-regional 
considerations that have needed to be taken into account by the central government.81 
The main complaints regarding the system from both Catalonia and other regions 
disadvantaged by the existing system have centred on (1) the arbitrary outcomes of 
the fiscal equalisation mechanism, which proves overly redistributive in some cases; 
and (2) the fact that the system affords only very limited fiscal powers to the regional 
governments, which reduces their autonomy and their control over the taxes raised in 
their territory. This also reduces incentives for good fiscal management, thus running 
the risk that poorer regions become too reliant on generous hand-outs funded by 
relatively richer regions. The following paragraphs address these complaints in more 
detail.  
          The common financing model was given a very complex design under the 
2009 reform in order to straddle the demands of different regions, and the central 
government promised an increase in its own contribution to help achieve consensus 
(Blöchlinger and Vammalle 2012: 120-121). Nevertheless, progress towards solving 
the longstanding problem of the arbitrary effects of the equalisation mechanism has 
proved limited (e.g. De la Fuente 2012b, 2012c and 2013a). The equalisation 
mechanism seeks to provide equal resources per unit of need (i.e. based on adjusted 
                                                
81 Personal interviews with current and former PSC and CDC Catalan government 
representatives, 2015 and 2016. 
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population rather than actual population), but the way in which ‘need’ is measured 
tends to respond more to political rather than economic factors (e.g. Zubiri 2015: 
216). Moreover, the mechanism should ideally bring each region as close as possible 
to the mean in terms of level of financing per adjusted capita, but it still proves either 
overly or insufficiently redistributive in some cases. This flaw has persisted over the 
years largely because all the regions have always fought to ensure their respective 
status quo would be maintained or improve with each reform, and the central 
government has repeatedly obliged since it would be politically costly for it to do 
otherwise (León 2009, 1010; De La Fuente 2012b; López Laborda 2006: 10). 
Political considerations have thus taken precedence over technical optimality. Blame 
for the failure of the 2009 reform to address the longstanding problems with the 
equalisation mechanism, for example, has been attributed in part to the fact that the 
design of the Guarantee Fund was then complicated by other smaller funds designed 
to appease individual regions and ensure they would not end up prejudiced relative 
to their status quo – a problem which was then exacerbated further by other 
unexpected factors such as the extent of the economic crisis, as well as the central 
government’s delays in making payments from the Competitiveness Fund (see 
Chapter 7). The new system was implemented in 2009 with some one-off effects 
specific to that year only which gave the impression of a significantly improved 
equalisation mechanism, but much of that apparent progress was reversed from the 
first year of full implementation in 2010 onwards (De la Fuente 2012b, chapter 4). 
Central government transfers of the funds due to the regions (known as entregas a 
cuenta) are made throughout the relevant year based on initial revenue estimates, 
before being revised when the outturn revenue figures are confirmed and the regional 
financing system is finally settled (liquidado) 18 months after year-end. Thus it was 
not until mid 2012 that the full impact of the new model applied in 2010 came to 
light.82 The results show that the regions of Madrid and Catalonia, for example, 
remained among the top three contributors to the common financing model in terms 
of per capita tax revenues, and yet both ended up ranked below average for the 15 
                                                
82 The annual final settlement (liquidación) statements for the common financing regime are 
published by the Spanish Ministry of the Treasury and Public Administration. Available 
here: http://www.minhap.gob.es/es-
ES/Areas%20Tematicas/Financiacion%20Autonomica/Paginas/Informes%20financiacion%
20comunidades%20autonomas2.aspx  
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regions in 2010 in terms of total financing per adjusted capita post-equalization.83 In 
contrast, some of the regions that benefitted disproportionately from the 2001 model 
continued to do so. Extremadura, for example, one of the lowest tax revenue 
contributors per capita, maintained its third position out of the 15 regions post-
equalisation in 2010. Meanwhile, since the system is inconsistent and not overly 
redistributive in all cases, some of the relatively richer regions in per capita tax 
revenues remained relatively richer post-equalisation (e.g. Cantabria and La Rioja) 
and some of the relatively poorer ones ended up equally poor or poorer still (e.g. 
Valencia, Murcia, Andalusia and Castilla-La Mancha). Similarly disparate outcomes 
emerged again in the final settlement of the 2011 regional financing system 
published in July 2013 and others thereafter.84 These longstanding shortcomings of 
the equalisation mechanism, and the exemption of the Basque Country and Navarre 
from contributing to it, have created ample fuel for political divisions between the 
regional and central governments over the years, with Catalonia voicing the most 
grievances.  
           Complaints about the flaws of the equalisation mechanism are combined with 
criticism from the relatively richer regions such as Catalonia of the lack of regional 
tax autonomy within the system (e.g. Bosch 2010: 4). Although the share of the 
partially ceded taxes granted to the regions over the years has gradually increased, 
and in some cases so too have their legislative powers over those taxes, the fact 
remains that the central government still collects all of the partially ceded taxes. 
Rather than giving their respective shares to each of the regions, it pools most of 
these (around 80%) into the Guarantee Fund and the other smaller funds within the 
system, in order then to redistribute the resources throughout Spain, primarily 
according to unit of need. The apparent increase in regional fiscal powers due to 
their increase in their share of the partially ceded taxes is thus somewhat deceptive to 
a degree, since the regions receive only a small part of the benefit from their 
increased fiscal effort or their tax decisions.  
           Other problems include the fact that the revenue transfers from the central 
government to the regions are based on revenue estimates made by the central 
                                                
83 For a detailed analysis of the outcomes of the new regional financing system for each 
autonomous community in 2009 and 2010, see De la Fuente 2012b and 2013a. 
84 For example, ‘Cataluña es la tercera comunidad que más recauda pero la décima en 
recibir’, El País, 10.07.13. 
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government, which are not revised until the outturn revenue figures are confirmed 18 
months after the end of the year in question, which also makes it difficult for the 
regions to balance their finances if there is a sharp discrepancy between the initial 
estimates and the final outturn figures. This occurred, for example, in 2008 and 
especially 2009. In those years, the initial revenue projections on which the central 
government transfers to the regions were based were much greater than the final 
outturn revenue figures, since the government had not anticipated the extent of the 
effect of the crisis. Overall the regional governments were due to repay the central 
government in 2010 and 2011 for total windfall gains of EUR 5.514bn received in 
2008 and a particularly substantial EUR 18.736bn in 2009 (in contrast, the 
liquidations of the 2010 and 2011 financing systems went in the regions’ favour, 
showing the central government owed them EUR 5.102bn and EUR 4.358bn, 
respectively). Ultimately, due to the regions’ inability to repay these windfall gains 
in full in 2010 and 2011, a repayment schedule was set up over a ten-year period. 
           In addition to the very different levels of fiscal and financial autonomy at 
regional level, another significant difference between the foral and common systems 
concerns local financing: how funds are allocated to the provincial authorities 
(diputaciones) and town halls (ayuntamientos). In contrast to the Concierto, where 
the Basque provincial authorities raise their own taxes and thus are responsible for 
providing funds to provincial and local authorities as well as the regional authorities, 
the common financing system governs the provision of resources to the regional 
governments only. Financing to the local authorities within the common regime 
regions is a completely separate system, the control of which is centralised in the 
hands of the Spanish government. In other words, the central government provides 
funds directly to the provincial level, bypassing the regional governments.  
  
The Concierto versus the common financing system: The debate 
over whether the Basques contribute enough revenues to Spain  
            Under the general principles governing both taxation and financial relations, 
the Concierto law states explicitly that the model must respect the principle of 
solidarity in the terms envisioned in the Spanish Constitution and the Basque 
autonomy statute. Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution guarantees the right to 
solidarity among the nationalities and regions that constitute the Spanish nation, a 
111	
 
principle then expounded in Articles 138 and 156. Article 138 prescribes the 
implementation of such solidarity in practice – the Spanish state must oversee the 
establishment of an appropriate and fair economic balance between the different 
parts of the Spanish territory and ensure that different regional statutes by no means 
imply economic or social privileges. Article 156 – the first of three (156-158) 
prescribing the main principles of the regional financing system – stipulates that the 
financial autonomy enjoyed by the regions to develop and implement their 
competences must comply with the principle of solidarity among all Spaniards. In 
turn, Article 41.2f of the Basque autonomy statute states that the Concierto will be 
applied in accordance with the principle of solidarity referred to in Articles 138 and 
156 of the Spanish Constitution. 
          Whether or not the Concierto contributes sufficiently to solidarity with the rest 
of Spain has nevertheless become subject to fierce debate since the model provides 
the Basques with significantly greater resources than other regions receive. The 
Concierto affords the Basques a level of per capita financing in the region of 60%-
75% higher than the average received by the fifteen regions under the common 
financing regime, according to figures for 2007 (De la Fuente 2012a: 5; Zubiri 2015: 
217). The difference increased further following the financial crisis, reaching up to 
100% in 2011, since Basque tax revenues fell less than revenues in Spain as a whole 
(Zubiri 2015: 217). When measured as a percentage of GDP instead of per capita, the 
difference is smaller but still substantial, with the Basque resources reaching 45% 
more than the average of the regions under the common financing system in 2011 
(equivalent to 5.6% of GDP) (Zubiri 2015: 217). This is primarily because the 
Concierto is a system based on the region’s own fiscal capacity, which has proven 
very beneficial to it, since it has been one of the relatively richer regions in Spain 
since the late 1990s, and the richest since 2008 (Zubiri 2015: 211). The Concierto 
involves a lower contribution to inter-regional solidarity than that made by other 
comparatively wealthy regions in Spain under the common financing system, which 
is redistributive in nature and provides resource levels based on each region’s 
estimated needs rather than fiscal capacity. It has also been suggested in a number of 
economic studies that some aspects of the Concierto are calculated in a way that is 
favourable to the Basque region, such as the valuation of assumed competences and 
the calculation of the VAT adjustment (e.g. De la Fuente 2012a: 4-5; Monasterio 
Escudero 2010) (see further details below). Such problems have generally been 
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attributed to the frequent influence of politics over economics in bilateral 
negotiations over the Concierto, which has at times enabled Basque governments to 
secure beneficial financing deals in return for lending support to Spanish 
governments in other areas. 
          Ultimately, it is certainly clear that the Basque region obtains more resources 
than it would were it under the common financing system. Nevertheless, Basque 
officials vigorously dismiss accusations that the Concierto is a ‘privilege’ or entails a 
lack of solidarity, arguing that the question of solidarity is one of degree and that 
there is another side to the coin in that fiscal autonomy encourages greater fiscal 
responsibility.85 Thus they argue that the healthier position of Basque finances and 
higher resources per capita enjoyed by Basque residents is in large part attributable 
to the better financial management encouraged by the responsibilities that a model of 
fiscal autonomy entails. The unilateral risk which the fiscal model involves for the 
Basque region and the lack of any guaranteed minimum revenue from the central 
government encourages accountability and responsibility. The size of the quota does 
not depend on what the Basque provincial treasuries collect but rather on the size of 
the Spanish state budget for non-assumed competences, which encourages efficiency 
since the Basque region loses out if its own tax collection increases more slowly (or 
decreases more quickly) than that of the Spanish state (Zubiri 2015: 70-71). This 
contrasts with the convoluted revenue-sharing arrangements under the common 
regime, in which the regions have greater spending than revenue-raising 
competences – a form of fiscal decentralisation which creates an accountability gap 
and can encourage substate governments to seek further funds from the central 
government if they over spend.86  
           In the context of the recent financial crisis, clashes between these 
interpretations of the Concierto and the resources it provides reached new heights. 
The Basque region’s comparative advantage in terms of resource levels relative to 
other regions in Spain actually increased further during the financial crisis and its 
aftermath, since tax collection in Spain as a whole dropped more rapidly then in the 
Basque region. Whereas the Basques had previously spent around 10%-12% of their 
revenues on the quota payment to Spain prior to the crisis, this fell to around 7%-8% 
                                                
85 Personal interviews with senior officials in the provincial treasury departments and PNV 
representatives, 2014. 
86 On this theory, see Rodden 2006. 
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in the wake of the crisis (Zubiri 2015: 218). The Basque region weathered the crisis 
far better than most other regions in Spain due to a number of factors, including the 
fact that it had prioritised developing an industry-based economy centred on exports 
in recent decades and avoided the domestic-focused construction boom that 
prevailed elsewhere in Spain before collapsing. The accountability the model fosters 
also discouraged overspending in the boom years, unlike in many regions under the 
common regime where spending increased drastically, current income was 
insufficient to cover current expenditure, and the regional authorities would look to 
the central government for extra funds and the regional savings banks (cajas de 
ahorros) for loans to cover the gap – until the crisis hit, the central government was 
no longer so forthcoming with funds, and many of the savings banks collapsed. 
While the central government had to set up various mechanisms from 2012 onwards 
to lend money under strict budgetary compliance conditions to numerous cash-
strapped regions under the common regime unable to cover their needs or access any 
other financing sources, the Basque region remained self-sufficient. 
           There is little common ground between those who attribute this relatively 
healthier financial position of the Basque region fundamentally to better economic 
decisions and financial management by the Basque institutions under the Concierto 
in comparison with the behaviour of some of the regions under the common regime, 
and those who suggest the Basques unfairly receive surplus financing through the 
Concierto in comparison to other comparable regions under the common regime.87 
The reality would in fact seem a complex combination of both sides of the argument: 
the fiscal accountability that fiscal autonomy entails does encourage good financial 
management, but at the same time the Basques contribute very little to inter-regional 
solidarity compared to other comparatively wealthy regions in Spain under the 
common financing system. As stated, accusations of surplus financing in the Basque 
case not only relate to the lack of contribution to the equalisation mechanism for 
financing public services included in the common financing system, but also to other 
features such as the valuation of non-assumed competences and the VAT adjustment 
rate, both of which are interpreted by critics as overly favourable to the Basque 
region. The following sections analyse the most problematic areas of the Concierto 
in this regard, before the final section addresses the different political perspectives 
                                                
87 Perspectives gained through a range of personal interviews with Basque and Catalan 
politicians of different political affiliations, 2014-2015. 
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that make it very difficult to reach any sort of Spanish-Basque consensus or 
resolution over the matter. 
 
Problematic areas of the Concierto system and quota payment 
 
(a) Inter-regional redistribution mechanisms 
            One of the main criticisms of the Basque Concierto is that it involves a lower 
contribution to inter-regional income redistribution in Spain than that made by 
comparatively wealthy regions under the common system. This is first and foremost 
because the Basque model does not incorporate a contribution to the equalisation 
mechanism for financing public services included in the common regime (primarily 
via the Fund for the Guarantee of Fundamental Public Services under the 2009 
reform), which reduces the Basque contribution to inter-regional redistribution. The 
resources the Basque region receives are based on its regional fiscal capacity since, 
broadly speaking, it keeps all its tax revenues except for those used to pay the quota 
to the central government to cover the Basque share of the few competences which 
the region has not assumed. The quota only uses a very small share of Basque tax 
revenues (around 7%-12% in recent years), with the rest staying in the region itself. 
Since the Basque Country and Navarre are relatively rich regions whose GDP per 
capita is among the highest in Spain, a system in which their resources are based on 
their own fiscal capacity rather than estimated needs (as in the common regime) 
gives them greater resources (Zubiri 2010: 112). One of the required harmonisation 
rules with Spanish tax legislation stipulates that overall Basque fiscal pressure (tax to 
GDP ratio) must be equivalent to that in the rest of Spain (in the 15 regions under the 
common financing system). And yet since the Basque Country is a relatively rich 
region, it can maintain an equivalent or even slightly higher fiscal pressure and raise 
significantly more resources than the regions under the common system, even when 
the rates of the main taxes it raises (e.g. personal income tax, corporation tax) are 
usually lower than in the latter regions (Zubiri 2015: 207). 
            The main reason why this problem has arisen is due to the shift in the 
primary means by which inter-regional solidarity has been achieved in Spain since 
the Transition, from the Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund (to which the Basques 
do contribute) to the fiscal equalisation mechanisms in the common financing regime 
(to which the Basques do not contribute). The quota includes a 6.24% contribution to 
115	
 
the Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund (a non-assumed competence), which is 
designed ultimately to achieve inter-regional income redistribution by promoting 
development in less prosperous regions. This was originally envisaged during the 
transition to democracy as the main means of inter-regional solidarity, as explicitly 
indicated in Article 158 of the Spanish Constitution: ‘In order to correct inter-
territorial economic imbalances and put into practice the principle of solidarity, a 
Compensation Fund will be created, intended for investment expenditure, the 
resources of which will be distributed by the Spanish parliament among the 
autonomous communities and provinces, where appropriate.’ Nevertheless, the 
purpose of the Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund was largely taken over by 
European structural and cohesion funds to Spain particularly in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s (Álvarez et el. 2004). The Fund also ended up acquiring a much more 
secondary role in terms of inter-regional redistribution compared to the financial 
flows involved in the equalisation mechanism for financing public services (via the 
redistribution of tax revenues) included in the common regime, to which the Basques 
do not contribute. Thus, while the Basques would continue to pay into the ever 
diminishing Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund for inter-regional solidarity via 
investment expenditure designed to promote income redistribution, they would not 
contribute to the much more sizeable inter-regional redistribution mechanism 
included in the common regime for financing public services. De la Fuente (2012a: 
4) suggests this reduces the Basque contribution to the state coffers by 
approximately EUR 1.79bn per year, according to figures for 2007. Representatives 
of the Basque institutions argue that such calculations are hypothetical and therefore 
unreliable,88 but regardless of the exact figure, it can be safely concluded that it 
would be a substantial one. Matters became more complicated still following the 
reform of the common financing regime in 2009, which included the creation of a 
small Cooperation Fund which fulfils a similar purpose to the Inter-Territorial 
Compensation Fund (Fernández Llera and Delgado Rivero 2010).  
         All in all, what is clear is that most of the mechanisms to achieve inter-regional 
solidarity, a concept which is now generally understood to apply to public service 
provision as well as to income redistribution, have come to be included in the 
                                                
88 Personal interviews with Basque officials in the Vizcayan treasury department, 2014. 
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common financing regime, rather than being articulated via the Inter-Territorial 
Compensation Fund, as initially envisaged during the Transition.  
 
(b) Imputation index in the quota 
           The quota, although it only accounts for a small proportion of Basque tax 
revenues (7%-12% of Basque revenues in recent years), is often interpreted as 
fulfilling a redistributive purpose since the imputation index which determines the 
Basque contribution towards non-assumed competences is broadly in line with its 
share of Spain’s GDP (6%-7%) rather than population (4%-5%). This is a standard 
line of defence used by Basque politicians to justify that the Concierto does show 
solidarity beyond the 6.24% contribution specifically to the Inter-Territorial 
Compensation Fund, particularly whenever the Concierto comes under political 
attack.89 This nevertheless risks simplifying a more complex reality that requires 
clarification and nuance.  
           The Concierto agreement itself stipulated that the imputation index should 
reflect the Basque region’s relative income. One of the many discrepancies between 
Basque and Spanish delegations in the years that immediately followed the choice of 
the 6.24% figure in 1980 was the Spanish desire to raise the imputation index (closer 
to the relative GDP figure), before a political pact between the Spanish and Basque 
governments in 1987 resulted in the PNV winning the argument to keep the index 
stable (see Chapter 4). Over the decade from 1981 to 1991 Basque relative GDP 
declined from approximately 7.50% to 6.25%, and ever since then has stayed in the 
region of 6.1%-6.3%. This means that the 6.24% figure – which has never been 
changed since it was first established in 1981 – has by chance become a closer 
representation of Basque relative GDP, even exceeding it slightly in recent years. 
Nevertheless, the Basque relative population has shown a more consistent, gradual 
decline since 1981, from around 5.7% of Spanish population in that year to around 
4.6% in 2015. The consistent decline of relative population combined with a more 
constant level of relative income since the early 1990s has in turn led to an increase 
in Basque relative GDP per capita in that period, since relative population has 
                                                
89 As seen, for example, in lehendakari Iñigo Urkullu’s response defending the Concierto 
against accusations of ‘privilege’ in his interview with El País on 2 October 2014, 
http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2014/10/02/actualidad/1412266786_167452.html  
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declined more quickly than relative GDP (Zubiri 2010: 66; 2015: 211). This, in turn, 
has increased the Basque region’s comparative advantage relative to the regions 
under the common regime in terms of resources per capita. 
              As competences have gradually been transferred to the Basque region over 
the decades, the Basques have ceased to pay the 6.24% share of each of those 
competences to Madrid, which is why the quota payment now only accounts for a 
very small share of Basque revenues. For the Basques, this inevitably means they 
keep more of their revenues for themselves, since when competences were still 
centralised, Madrid often did not invest the full 6.24% paid by the Basques back in 
the Basque region. In some cases, however, the Basques do still pay 6.24% towards 
a centralised competence where they secure little direct benefit themselves, for 
example they have paid 6.24% towards the costs of building Spain’s high speed rail 
lines (the AVE) over the years, even though no line to the Basque Country has been 
built yet. In areas such as infrastructure spending, Madrid has often spent a much 
smaller sum in the Basque region than the 6.24% the Basques have paid to Madrid. 
Thus, in seeking to justify the claim that the Basques contribute more than an ample 
amount to Spain, it is often argued that the Basques pay much more via the quota to 
Spain than what is actually spent by the Spanish state in the Basque region (Uriarte 
2015: Pt VIII, 123, 128, 216). While this is certainly true in the case of some 
competences, such calculations are nevertheless problematic to a degree, since they 
do not take into account Spanish government expenditure designed to benefit all 
Spaniards including the Basques, which is not necessarily spent in Basque territory 
itself (the same problem that occurs with fiscal balances calculated under the 
monetary flow method). Most of the competences that remain centralised to which 
the Basques contribute a 6.24% share are matters such as foreign affairs, defence, the 
monarchy, etc. In such cases, Spanish government expenditure may not be spent 
directly in the Basque region, but it is nevertheless designed to benefit all Spaniards 
including the Basques: for example, any Basque citizen in difficulties abroad would 
be able to use the Spanish network of embassies and consulates.  
             Furthermore, it is often overlooked that the imputation index applies to 
financial flows in both directions (from the Basque Country to the Spanish state but 
also vice versa), thus sometimes the fact that it is designed to reflect relative GDP 
118	
 
rather than relative population benefits the Basque Country.90 For example, the 
6.24% figure applies not only to the Basque share of non-assumed competences 
when calculating the quota, but also to the Basque share of central government tax 
revenues and deficit that is subtracted from that value. Moreover, it also usually 
applies to the valuation of the assumed competences used in the quota calculation – 
in other words, Basque expenditure on its own competences is usually valued at 
6.24% of what Spain spends elsewhere in the country on the same competences (or 
in some cases even more – see section (c) below) (Zubiri 2015: 212). PNV-led 
Basque governments have consistently maintained since the 1980s that the 6.24% 
should apply to financial flows in both directions under the ‘quota system’ – not only 
to the Basque contribution to the competences fulfilled by the Spanish state, but also 
to both the valuation of Basque assumed competences (incorporated in the quota 
calculation) and to the Basque share of any additional funds from the Spanish state 
to fulfil specific competences (often deducted from the quota).91 This problematises 
suggestions that the 6.24% incorporates a solidarity contribution to Spain on the 
grounds that it reflects relative income rather than population. Representatives of the 
PNV and senior officials in the Basque provincial treasury departments justify their 
stance by arguing that it is ‘logical’ that if the Basques contribute a 6.24% to 
competences carried out centrally, they should also receive a 6.24% share for 
competences carried out by the region.92 In this regard, they also argue that the 
imputation index first agreed in 1981 was never explicitly designed to incorporate a 
solidarity component and that solidarity is achieved via the Inter-Territorial 
Compensation Fund instead.  
           A number of Concierto-related debates between Spanish and Basque 
governments since the 1980s have reflected discrepancies over this matter in cases 
where the Basques have sought a 6.24% of funds, while the Spanish government has 
argued they should instead receive a share in line with their population size. This 
occurred in the 1980s, for example, when the PNV secured a 6.24% share of Spanish 
social security funds for health and social services at a time when these were still 
funded by centralised social security contributions rather than taxes (Larrea Jiménez 
                                                
90 Personal interview with Carlos Aguirre (PSE), 13 October 2014. 
91 Personal interviews with Pedro Azpiazu (PNV) and with senior officials in Basque 
provincial treasury departments, September-October 2014. 
92 Personal interviews with Pedro Azpiazu (PNV) and with senior officials in Basque 
provincial treasury departments, September-October 2014. 
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1989). More recently, a similar situation occurred under the PSOE minority 
governments from 2004 to 2011 when a dispute emerged as to how much the Basque 
government should receive of the funds provided by the Spanish government to 
other regions for (1) extraordinary financing for the health system; (2) a new law 
governing education for children aged under three; and (3) a new dependency law. 
Again, the PNV won its argument for a 6.24% share of the funds in agreements 
reached in 2005 and 2007,93 though dispute over the matter continued thereafter.  
 
(c) Valuation of the non-assumed competences in the quota calculation                 
           Aside from the imputation index, another of the most criticised aspects of the 
quota methodology is the valuation of the non-assumed competences to which the 
Basques contribute a 6.24% share. As stated earlier, the valuation of the non-
assumed competences is not calculated directly, but rather it is determined by 
subtracting state expenditure on competences already assumed by the Basque region 
(the ‘assumed charges’) from total state expenditure on those competences in other 
regions in the Spanish annual budget. All regions in Spain have extensive spending 
competences but the Basque (and Navarran) regions have yet more than most. The 
‘assumed charges’ are essentially competences which have been devolved to the 
Basque region but not other regions in Spain (or at least not to the same extent), thus 
expenditure on those competences elsewhere in Spain still features in the Spanish 
budget. Critics suggest that the Basque share of the assumed competences is 
significantly over-valued, and thus the non-assumed competences are significantly 
under-estimated in the figures used to calculate the Basque quota (e.g. De la Fuente 
2009: 11-19; Zubiri 2015: 212; Sevilla 2001: 149; JCyL 2008: 8-10; Monasterio 
Escudero 2010: 71-75). For example, according to the value of the non-assumed 
competences given in the quota laws for the base year quotas for 2002 and 2007, 
only approximately a quarter of the central government’s non-financial expenditure 
corresponds to competences not assumed by the Basque region and thus to which it 
must contribute a 6.24% share. De la Fuente (2009: 11-19) argues the figure should 
be much higher than a quarter since fundamental competences (such as health and 
education) had been assumed by all of the regions in Spain at least by 2007, and thus 
                                                
93 For the agreements reached, see Informe Anual Integrado de la Hacienda Vasca 2011, 
http://www.ogasun.ejgv.euskadi.net/contenidos/informe_estudio/iai/es_iai_2011/adjuntos/20
11%20IAI.pdf, pp. 204-205. 
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expenditure on those competences no longer features in the Spanish budget (with the 
small exception of any additional state contributions) but rather in the respective 
regional budgets. This, he argues, leaves the central government primarily in charge 
of providing and budgeting for nationwide services, most of which the Basques 
should contribute to. 
           The lack of transparency regarding the calculation of the value of the non-  
assumed competences is a fundamental problem here, therefore any estimates of 
what the figure should be are provisional at best and can only be used to give a 
general idea, as De la Fuente himself acknowledges (2009: 13-14). Neither the five-
yearly quota laws nor any other publicly available legislation or documentation 
provide details as to exactly which of the chapters (part or whole) in the Spanish 
budget are considered assumed or non-assumed by the Basque region. Neither is the 
valuation of each assumed competence available publicly (De la Fuente 2009: 6; 
JCyL 2008: 8). Only the final value of the total non-assumed competences to which 
the Basques contribute a 6.24% share is given in an Appendix to the quota law, 
without any breakdown in figures to show how this is reached (with the exception of 
the calculation for the financing of the Basque regional police, an assumed 
competence which is described in more detail). The Spanish budget does not provide 
a functional or geographical breakdown for each item either. Thus there are a lot of 
grey areas, for example in the case of some competences which have been assumed 
by the Basque region to a greater degree than in other regions, or indeed fully 
assumed by almost all and yet the Spanish state still provides some level of funding 
to all regions to maintain programmes of general statewide interest. To what extent 
does the Basque region benefit from state spending in such areas or not?  
           To err on the side of caution, when in doubt De la Fuente (2009) considers a 
competence fully assumed by the Basque region and thus excludes any spending on 
this competence in the Spanish budget from the non-assumed competences to which 
the Basques should contribute. Even so, he still estimates that the Basque region 
should have contributed to 60% of the state’s non financial expenditure in 2002 and 
67% in 2007 rather than the actual 24% and 26% figures respectively under the 
quota laws (De la Fuente 2009: 16). One sizeable debatable inclusion here in the 
non-assumed competences as calculated by De la Fuente is the regional equalisation 
funds (he includes the value of the equalisation mechanism in the common financing 
regime as a non-assumed competence, since the Basque region does not contribute to 
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this equalisation mechanism via the Concierto). If these are excluded, the amount of 
the state’s financial expenditure the Basques should have contributed to comes to 
41% and 46%, still more than the amount included in the quota laws, resulting in an 
estimated shortfall not paid by the Basque Country of EUR 1.065bn and EUR 
1.756bn respectively (De la Fuente 2009: 17).  
           Basque officials dispute Angel de la Fuente’s figures, arguing that his 
calculations are based on approximations only and thus unreliable, since the 
breakdown of figures is not publicly available. And they suspect a degree of political 
intent in his calculations.94 A fundamental problem, however, lies in the fact that 
neither Spanish nor Basque officials provide alternative official figures either to 
clarify matters. Uriarte (2015), who addresses De la Fuente’s criticisms, refutes the 
latter’s calculations as based on estimated figures, but does not provide any 
alternatives, stating instead that ‘the determination of the base of the calculation of 
the gross quota, due to its complexity, is only known to the negotiators of the 
Spanish state and the Basque autonomous community who prepare the Annex that 
accompanies the five-yearly quota laws’ (Uriarte 2015: Pt VIII, 539). This 
fundamental lack of transparency as to the figures used to calculate the quota only 
serves to fuel speculation that Spanish-Basque political deals behind-the-scenes have 
influenced many of the valuations of competences reached over those years, rather 
than technical arguments. Every time a competence has been transferred to the 
Basque region over the decades, bilateral Spanish-Basque negotiations have taken 
place to determine the valuation of that competence, with political factors often 
influencing the final agreements reached, beyond merely technical and economic 
considerations.  
 
(d) The VAT adjustment  
          Critics also suggest the VAT adjustment has become overly favourable to the 
Basque region. While the logic of the adjustment is in itself correct, it has been 
argued that the failure to update the main coefficients prescribed in successive quota 
laws to calculate it has led to significant inaccuracies. None of the main indices used 
                                                
94 Personal interviews with Pedro Luis Uriarte and with Basque provincial treasury 
representatives, 2014. Carlos de la Fuente has been the most vocal and published the most 
on this subject, however, several other authors share his view that the non-assumed 
competences are under-valued in the quota calculations (e.g. Monasterio Escudero 2010: 71-
75).   
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to calculate certain variables in the Concierto have ever been changed since they 
were first established (in most cases in the 1980s) since the dominance of politics 
over technicalities has impeded proper negotiation and led to a mutual atmosphere of 
distrust of the other side’s motives for suggesting particular changes. Thus the 
imputation index and the main coefficients used in the VAT adjustment rate have 
never been changed since they were first agreed in 1980 and 1986 respectively. By 
chance, the Basque relative income has remained broadly stable at just above or 
below 6.24% since the 1990s, which has avoided any pressing need to change the 
imputation index, but it is argued that the VAT adjustment rate is now favourable to 
the Basque Country (e.g. Zubiri 2014a: 156; Monasterio Escudero 2010: 84). The 
main error is attributed to the coefficients used to calculate the adjustment for the 
internal market (see above), which adjusts for the difference between (a) Basque 
consumption relative to that of all Spain and (b) Basque VAT collection capacity 
relative to that of all Spain. Both (a) and (b) have remained unchanged since they 
were first set in the mid 1980s: 6.875% and 5.765% respectively. It has been 
suggested that the quota laws now significantly underestimate (a) and partially 
underestimate (b). Again, there is however no consensus on the matter. 
 
An eternal stalemate? 
           Overall, combining both the under-estimation of the quota (which comprises 
both the under-estimation of the non-assumed competences and the insubstantial 
contribution to regional equalisation) and the over-estimation of the VAT 
adjustment, De la Fuente estimates, using the years 2002 and 2007 as examples, that 
the Basque region has frequently paid less than it should have to the Spanish state by 
an amount equivalent to around 6% of its GDP. The Basque and Navarran regions 
are the only regions in Spain with relatively high per capita incomes that have a 
positive fiscal balance with the Spanish state while the other regions with similar 
GDP per capita levels (Catalonia, the Balearics and Madrid) have a negative fiscal 
balance, contributing between 5% and 12% of their GDP to the Spanish state (De la 
Fuente 2009: 21-22). As stated, such figures are refuted by senior Basque officials as 
unreliable since they are based on estimations. And yet the lack of transparency 
inherent in the fact that a number of figures used in calculating the quota are not 
made publicly available is itself problematic, making estimations the only option 
available. Uriarte (2015) seeks to counter De la Fuente and other critics by 
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calculating how much the Basques have contributed to the Spanish state via the 
quota over the decades and comparing this with the amount spent by the Spanish 
state in the Basque region in the same period, showing that the Basques have paid 
more than they have received. As stated above, however, this too is problematic to 
some extent, since much of the Spanish state spending to which the Basques have 
contributed may not have been spent directly in the Basque region, but has 
nevertheless been designed to benefit all Spaniards including the Basques. 
Ultimately, while it is unanimously recognised that per capita financing levels are far 
higher in the Basque region than in all the regions under the common financing 
system, there is a seemingly irreconcilable discrepancy in perspectives as to the 
reasons for the discrepancy, and therefore whether the Basques pay enough to Spain.  
           In the wake of the financial crisis, given the increased pressure on resources, 
the issue has become increasingly politicised. At the political level, attacks against 
the Concierto’s perceived lack of sufficient contribution to Spain have at times been 
voiced by PP and PSOE politicians in other regions (especially Catalonia). Among 
relatively newer parties, the centralist party Union Progress and Democracy (Unión 
Progreso y Democracia, UPyD) founded in 2007 became the first statewide party 
actively to oppose the Concierto even in the Basque Country.95 Its influence in 
Spanish politics declined rapidly, but a similar stance was also taken up by the 
centre-right Citizens’ party (Ciudadanos), founded in Catalonia in 2006, which 
subsequently became a statewide party and gained traction in particular in 2015 
ahead of the Spanish general election that year, at which it came fourth. Criticisms of 
the model from politicians elsewhere in Spain are sometimes directed at the very 
existence of the Concierto system itself, as in the case of UPyD and Ciudadanos. 
This is first and foremost because the model is not easily generalisable to other parts 
of Spain, and thus it is perceived as a ‘privilege’ in comparison with the common 
financing system. Often, however, it is not so much the Concierto itself which is 
criticised, but rather its design and application in practice, with suggestions that the 
annual quota payment ought to be increased in order to bring final per capita 
financing in the Basque region more into line with the resources of comparable 
                                                
95 Mikel Buesa, Economics professor at the Complutense University of Madrid and founding 
member of UPyD in 2007-2009, coined the term ‘el pufo vasco’ (‘the Basque swindle’) in a 
study by the same name he published in 2007 criticising the methodology used to calculate 
the Basque contribution to the Spanish state via the quota (see Buesa 2007). 
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regions under the common financing system. The PP and the PSOE, for example, 
uphold the model of the Concierto itself, but some party representatives have 
indicated they support a review of the size of the quota. 
           In theory, if the Basque contribution to Spain were universally considered 
insufficient, part of the problem could be dealt with by adapting the Concierto 
accordingly, without any need to call into question the essence of the Concierto itself 
and the fiscal autonomy it affords the Basque region. Economists suggest one way 
could be to adapt the Concierto (and Convenio) legislation to incorporate a 
contribution to the equalisation mechanism for financing services in the common 
system; or indeed to remove the equalisation mechanism from the common financing 
system (where it is currently included primarily in the Fund for the Guarantee of 
Fundamental Public Services and also to a lesser extent in the Sufficiency Fund, 
since the 2009 reform) and either make it an entirely separate fund or incorporate it 
into the Interterritorial Compensation Fund (e.g. Bosch 2010: 17; Zubiri 2015: 221; 
López Labora 2006: 18-19). The Basques would then contribute 6.24% of the 
resources, as they do for other non-assumed competences. In theory, the Spanish 
authorities could do so, since it is within their remit to establish the solidarity funds 
they deem appropriate (since this is a non-assumed competence). In practice, 
however, this would almost certainly prove politically very difficult, since it would 
require the Basques to accept a reduction in their resource levels. Any suggestions 
from Madrid that the quota should be revised upwards are generally rejected by 
Basque officials as an imposition and a unilateral attack on the Concierto system, 
exacerbating Spanish-Basque tensions, since the Basque nationalist authorities do 
not agree that the Basque region should pay more to the Spanish state.96 Both sides 
(Spanish and Basque) are mutually suspicious of each other’s intentions when it 
comes to any revisions to the quota payments and neither readily accepts the other’s 
figures, even for matters such as calculations of GDP levels.97 Rather than reducing 
the Basque level of resources, current and former Basque officials tend to suggest the 
focus should instead be on increasing accountability in the common financing 
system to encourage better financial management by other regions, and also 
increasing the level of resources provided to the regions under the common financing 
                                                
96 For example, ‘El Parlamento advierte contra cualquier intento de revisión “unilateral” del 
Cupo’), Deia, 11.04.14.  
97 Personal interviews with Basque provincial treasury representatives, 2014.  
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system, many of which are under-financed (e.g. Uriarte 2015: Pt VIII 504). Basque 
officials also reject direct comparisons of the economic results of the Concierto and 
the common financing system in any case, arguing that the two systems are different 
and thus cannot be expected to produce the same economic outcomes.98 Other 
regions with comparable GDP levels to the Basque Country will, however, almost 
inevitably continue to desire a system that gives them similar resource levels to the 
Basque Country, and Spain is clearly unable to afford to provide a similar amount of 
per capita financing to comparably wealthy regions under the common financing 
system as that enjoyed by the Basque region. The stalemate thus looks set to 
continue. For the PNV, the increased attacks on the perceived lack of solidarity of 
the Concierto by politicians elsewhere in Spain, in particular in the wake of the 
financial crisis of 2007-2008, have put the party on the defensive. The situation has 
led party representatives to vigorously reassert their claims of a right to a separate 
financing system and to argue that such a bilateral system should not only be 
protected, but also extended to wider Spanish-Basque political relations.  
 
  
                                                
98 Personal interviews with Basque provincial treasury representatives, 2014. 
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Chapter 4 
Shaping the PNV’s conception of sovereignty (1):  
Bilateral Spanish-Basque relations over the Concierto 
 
            The fact that the Concierto has given the Basque region greater control over 
its finances and has proved comparatively favourable to it in terms of resources per 
capita, as well as being based on strictly bilateral relations with Madrid without 
inter-regional negotiations, explains why regional financing in the Basque case has 
not become a strong point of contention as in Catalonia. The bilateral nature of the 
Concierto has nevertheless still influenced the PNV’s territorial agenda in other 
ways, for example by shaping the conception of sovereignty that it seeks for the 
Basque region. The aim of this chapter is therefore to investigate what the 
implications of the bilateral nature of the Concierto have been for the PNV’s 
territorial agenda. The predominant focus in both the media and academia on the 
politicised debate over whether or not the Concierto is a ‘privilege’ in comparison 
with the common financing system has neglected a fuller analysis of how bilateral 
relations between Madrid and the Basque region over the Concierto have played out 
in recent decades, which this chapter investigates.   
           The bilateral dimension of the Concierto, which gives both Spanish and 
Basque delegations equal veto power, makes it the closest current equivalent to the 
form of ‘bilateral relationship between equals’ that the PNV seeks in wider Spanish-
Basque political relations, under the party’s latest iteration of its longstanding desire 
to seek a new political relationship with Madrid based on a more confederal model 
involving self-determination and co-sovereignty. However, while the bilateral nature 
of the Concierto is much valued by the PNV since it prevents the Spanish authorities 
from taking unilateral decisions, this does not mean that the Concierto has produced 
consensus over fiscal and financial matters between Spanish and Basque 
governments. Notwithstanding the PNV’s underlying satisfaction with the Concierto 
framework, the model has often resulted in clashes with Madrid over the detailed 
workings of the arrangement. And yet bilateral relations over the Concierto have 
offered scope for deals and pay offs to resolve such disagreements, as well as for 
frustration and conflict. Hence, the main questions posed in this chapter are: Why 
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have bilateral fiscal and financial relations over the Concierto often been 
characterised by more discord than harmony since the 1980s? How have the 
differences been resolved? And what have been the implications for the PNV’s 
territorial agenda?  
             The chapter will start with an analysis of the bilateral mechanisms 
concerning the Concierto, examining why this underlying bilateral framework is 
satisfactory to the PNV. The subsequent sections will then investigate different key 
bilateral negotiations relative to the Concierto from the 1980s to the present, in order 
to identify the discrepancies that there have been over both (1) the finances of the 
Concierto (in terms of calculations of the numbers) and  (2) how to develop the 
model (in terms of its scope and framework, to give the Basques greater fiscal 
authority). The chapter then considers the implications of the growing difficulties in 
reaching bilateral agreements over the Concierto for Spanish-Basque fiscal, financial 
and wider territorial relations.  
 
The bilateral nature of the Concierto 
           The Concierto law and other legislation deriving from it (fundamentally the 
five-yearly quota laws governing the Basque contribution to the Spanish state) 
require mutual agreement between Basque and Spanish government delegations. The 
bilaterally agreed legislation is then always presented to the Spanish parliament as a 
single act, thus it can only be accepted or rejected following parliamentary debate (in 
practice it has always been accepted), without being subject to the potential 
amendment of individual articles. The main body which exists to ensure the bilateral 
nature of the Concierto is the Mixed Commission (Comisión Mixta), which involves 
a six-strong Spanish delegation and a six-strong Basque delegation.99 The Spanish 
delegation usually includes the Minister of the Treasury and Public Administration, 
the State Secretary of the Treasury and the General Secretary of Public 
Administration plus three others. The Basque delegation comprises three 
representatives of the Basque government (again, usually including the highest 
representatives of the treasury and the public administration) and one from each of 
                                                
99 The understanding of bilateral relations over the Concierto expressed in this chapter is 
informed first and foremost by personal interviews in 2014 with Basque provincial treasury 
officials (representing the three provincial treasuries) and current and former political 
representatives (PNV and PSE) with direct experience of bilateral negotiations.  
128	
 
the three provinces (usually the head of the provincial government, the diputado 
general). The Mixed Commission is responsible for agreeing any changes to the 
Concierto law, commitments in terms of collaboration and coordination over 
budgetary stability, and the methodology for each five-yearly quota law. The latter 
includes agreeing the calculation of the base year quota, the updating index and all 
relevant indices (such as the imputation index and the indices involved in the 
adjustment rates for the indirect taxes), as well as determining the relevant 
compensations from the Spanish state to the Basque region to be deducted from the 
quota.100  
           All of the areas subject to agreement by the Mixed Commission require the 
unanimous approval of all twelve members, with each holding veto power. Many of 
the preliminary negotiations prior to meetings of the Mixed Commission 
nevertheless take place between the Basque and Spanish governments without 
necessarily involving the representatives of the Basque provinces.101 Thus the Mixed 
Commission meets infrequently, usually only when the main lines of an agreement 
have already been sketched out through preliminary negotiations. Relatively more 
mundane matters such as the settlement of the annual quotas once the final budget 
figures are known are also dealt with directly between Basque and Spanish 
governments.  
           The bilateral nature of the Concierto was consolidated in the 2002 law, 
building on the steps taken by the Basque delegation in the 1980 negotiations for the 
1981 law to ensure that the Concierto would thereafter continue to be negotiated and 
thus prevent the Spanish government from unilaterally imposing new taxes or 
changes in the Basque region in the future. For example, while the 1981 Agreement 
established (under the Second Additional Disposition) that future changes to Spanish 
tax legislation that affected any of the taxes already devolved to the Basque region 
would necessitate bilateral negotiations to adapt these taxes as required, this 
provision was expanded under the 2002 agreement to make bilateral negotiations 
obligatory if the Spanish government introduced any new taxes too. Henceforth, if 
the Spanish government introduced any new taxes, it would be obliged to negotiate 
                                                
100 See Chapter 3 pp.96-102 for definitions of the imputation index, VAT adjustment, 
compensations, etc. 
101 Personal interviews with senior officials in the Guipúzcoan provincial treasury 
department, 2014. 
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the delegation of the relevant tax-raising authority to the Basque provinces. Aside 
from the Mixed Commission, the Concierto legislation of 2002 also provides for two 
further bilateral committees, a Normative Coordination and Evaluation Commission 
(Comisión de Coordinación y Evaluación Normativa) and an Arbitration Board 
(Junta Arbitral) (e.g. Rubí Cassinello 2003: 36-37). Both were designed to facilitate 
and encourage bilateral discussion over Basque tax measures to resolve possible 
discrepancies with the Spanish state before the Basque legislation is passed (in the 
case of the Commission) or before any disputes reach the courts (in the case of the 
Board), in an attempt to reduce litigation. The creation of these bodies was a 
significant development, since the Spanish authorities’ frequent recourse to the 
courts to challenge Basque tax measures in the 1980s and 1990s was perceived by 
the Basques as an attack on Basque fiscal autonomy, putting Spanish-Basque fiscal 
relations under intense pressure.102  
             Overall, these bilateral features of the Concierto give both Spanish and 
Basque delegations equal veto power in key negotiations relating to the Concierto, 
preventing unilateral decisions taken by the central Spanish government. This makes 
the Concierto the closest current equivalent to the form of ‘bilateral relationship 
between equals’ that the PNV seeks in wider Spanish-Basque political relations, 
under the party’s latest iteration of its longstanding desire to seek a new political 
relationship with Madrid based on a more confederal model involving self-
determination and co-sovereignty. Following the PNV’s frustrated attempt under 
former lehendakari Juan José Ibarretxe to revise the Basque regional autonomy 
statute to turn the region into a semi-independent associated state of Spain, this 
notion of co-sovereignty has since been reconceptualised under lehendakari Iñigo 
Urkullu to envisage an extension of the bilateral nature of the economic Concierto to 
wider political relations, with explicit calls made by PNV party leaders for a 
‘political Concierto’ (Chapter 2, p.75). The bilateral nature of the Concierto has thus 
had a significant influence in shaping the PNV’s conception of the political 
sovereignty that it seeks for the Basque region.  
           Nevertheless, bilateral negotiations over the Concierto have often been 
characterised by more discord than agreement. The Concierto receives cross-party 
support from the two main statewide parties, the PP and the PSOE, as well as the 
                                                
102 On the history of litigation in relation to Basque tax measures, see Chapter 5. 
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PNV, but this does not mean that they all always agree on the exact finances of the 
model or how it should be developed. There have been frequent disagreements 
between Spanish and Basque authorities over technical issues concerning the exact 
numbers and finances of the model over the years, including matters such as what 
the imputation index should be, the valuations of transferred competences and their 
impact on the quota, and what bases to use for the annual updating index of the 
quota. Beyond such technicalities concerning the numbers themselves, there have 
also been substantial disagreements over how much fiscal autonomy the Concierto 
gives the Basques (with a long history of disputes over matters such as the degree of 
harmonisation required with Spanish tax legislation), and how to update the 
Concierto to continue to develop Basque fiscal autonomy.  
            In terms of its development, the Concierto has proved surprisingly adaptable 
to the times, and yet developments over time have also led to somewhat different 
perspectives on what the model can and should be, even within the self-proclaimed 
pro-Concierto camp: where some continue to see a taxation model subject to and 
adapted to Spanish legislation, others now envisage more fully-fledged fiscal 
authority, in which the Basque provinces would be sovereign in fiscal matters within 
Europe to more or less the same degree as the Spanish state, rather than being 
subordinate to it.103 From the turn of the century in particular, there emerged a 
growing rift in perspectives as to how the Concierto should be developed in a 
changing regulatory context with the addition of the supranational European sphere, 
which had not featured when the Concierto of 1981 was negotiated. Discrepancies in 
the views of Spanish and Basque governments have fed into the broader clash in 
views over the degree of autonomy that the Basque Country should be afforded 
within the Spanish state.  
Usually, the Basque PP and PSE share the same or similar views as the PNV 
regarding the finances and development of the Concierto, and thus the clashes over 
the model tend to be between the Spanish authorities and the Basque parties, rather 
than among parties within the Basque region itself.104 Thus, the Basque branches of 
the PP and the PSOE almost always support measures pertaining to the Concierto in 
                                                
103 Personal interviews with PNV politicians and senior officials in the Vizcayan provincial 
treasury department, 2014.  
104 The izquierda abertzale, however, has always rejected the Concierto as an insufficient 
basis for Basque sovereignty. See Olano 2002.  
131	
 
the Basque parliament, yet at times these are then rejected by their colleagues in 
Madrid due to wider implications for other regions in Spain, which can cause 
internal party contradictions between the Spanish headquarters and Basque branches 
of the parties. This occurred, for example, in the case of the ‘Shield Law’ (Ley de 
Blindaje) designed to upgrade Basque provincial tax regulations to afford them the 
same legal status as legislation passed by regional or central Spanish governments, a 
measure which was supported by the Basque PP but not by the party in Madrid, 
which voted against the law approved by the PSOE in 2009 (see Chapter 5, p.156). 
However, clashes in views over how the Concierto should be developed have 
also taken place occasionally between the different political parties operating within 
the Basque region itself, not all of which share exactly the same conceptualisation 
and vision of the Concierto. Most notably, while the PNV presents itself as the only 
true defender of the Concierto, the Basque PP has argued that the PNV 
‘misappropriates’ it as a nationalist instrument of fiscal sovereignty for the Basque 
Country.105 The Basque PP and the PNV each consider themselves the strongest 
defenders of the Concierto,106 but they conceive of it differently in some respects. 
The Basque PP shares the same view as the party’s headquarters in Madrid in 
interpreting the Concierto as a fiscal model subject to and subordinate to the Spanish 
tax system, since the Basque provinces cannot simply create their own taxes and are 
subject to harmonisation rules with Spanish tax legislation. In consequence, the 
Basque PP also considers it appropriate that the Spanish government alone should 
represent the Basques in fiscal matters at European and international level. In 
contrast, the PNV has come to envisage the Concierto as an instrument of fiscal 
sovereignty in its own right, which gives the Basques almost the same fiscal powers 
as Spain or any other EU member state. Ironically, the izquierda abertzale shares to 
some extent the view of the PP, in the sense that it also considers Basque tax 
legislation strongly subordinate to Spanish legislation, but precisely for this reason it 
is vehemently against the Concierto, considering the model – and the PNV’s 
allegiance to it – a hindrance to the fullest development of sovereignty that it seeks 
for the Basque Country (see Olano 2002; also Chapter 6). 
                                                
105 Personal interviews with Antón Damborenea, head of the Basque PP in Vizcaya, 9 July 
2014; and Aitor Uribesalgo, PP treasury minister of the provincial government of Álava, 10 
October 2014. 
106 In the case of the Basque PP, this is due to the historical association between the Spanish 
right and the Concierto. 
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The roots of these discrepancies in views can be seen to date back to the 
origins of the Concierto itself. While the PP generally takes the starting point of the 
Concierto as the first such agreement of 1878 with the Basque provinces 
spearheaded by their predecessors among the liberal elites and in Álava in particular 
(a historical stronghold of the Spanish right), the PNV tends to look further back, 
remembering the first Concierto arrangement as the last vestige of what had 
originally been a wider set of political rights based on mutual equality governing the 
relationship between Spain (or previously Castile) and the Basque provinces. While 
the first economic agreement of 1878 did not imply a bilateral pact between equals, 
the notion of a ‘pact’ would start to be associated with the Concierto from 1886 
onwards and would evolve gradually thereafter, echoing the spirit of the original 
Basque fueros.107 In opposition to the PNV’s conception of the Concierto as an 
instrument of fiscal sovereignty for the Basque region as a whole (albeit respecting 
the role of the provinces as home to the treasuries), the PP issues a reminder that the 
three Basque provinces have only shared a Concierto agreement involving one joint 
quota payment since 1981, which in itself was facilitated by the fact that the 
Concierto had never been abolished in Álava. Even among the parties who consider 
themselves supporters of the Concierto, conceptions of the model and its ultimate 
aim and purpose thus differ somewhat.  
           In this context, the rest of this chapter analyses examples of different key 
negotiations relative to the Concierto from the 1980s to the present, in order to 
identify the different political and contextual factors that have either facilitated or 
impeded Basque-Spanish agreements over both (1) the finances of the Concierto (in 
terms of calculations of the numbers) and  (2) how to develop the model (in terms of 
its scope and framework, to give the Basques greater fiscal and financial autonomy). 
It then considers the implications of the growing difficulties in reaching bilateral 
agreements over the Concierto for Spanish-Basque fiscal, financial and wider 
territorial relations. Instances where substantial differences of opinion over the 
finances and/or development of the Concierto have been resolved using technical 
arguments first and foremost, without one side ceding ground to the other in light of 
other contextual or political factors, have been relatively rare in the decades since the 
Concierto of 1981 was approved. Such agreements have only tended to be reached 
                                                
107 On the origins of the Concierto and the concept of a ‘pact’, see Alonso Olea 1995. 
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on relatively minor issues, or on the few more substantial issues where both sides 
have held a very similar position from the outset of negotiations, as in the case of the 
decision taken by the Aznar-led Spanish government and the PNV-led Basque 
government to make the Concierto a permanent rather than time-limited agreement 
for the first time under the 2002 law. Differences in views between the Basque and 
Spanish delegations have often (though not always) made it difficult to find a 
common middle ground and thus prevented agreements until if and when other 
contextual factors (usually political support or alliance arrangements) have led the 
Spanish government to accept the Basque government’s proposals, as seen in several 
of the following examples. 
 
Key negotiations over the Concierto 
 
(1) Debating the Concierto’s figures and finances  
           After the Concierto law had been approved in 1981, significant Basque-
Spanish differences over the finances of the model set in almost immediately. The 
Concierto legislation had set a provisional quota for the first year of its application 
(1981) and the rules for its final settlement (liquidación) at year end, but stipulated 
that the Joint Commission should agree a five-yearly quota law thereafter to 
prescribe the methodology for calculating the quota. This would involve specifying 
both a base year quota (the result of multiplying the imputation index by the total 
non-assumed charges, plus some adjustments) and a rate to update this (índice de 
actualización) over the subsequent four years. A draft law for the first five-year 
period (1982-1986) was meant to be presented by July 1981, but no agreement was 
reached then or in the following years due to Spanish-Basque discrepancies over 
both the imputation index (6.24%) and the valuation of the competences the region 
was due to assume (such as health and social services), among other issues (Larrea 
Jiménez 1989). This latter dimension was inflated by decisions taken in Madrid 
during the climate of nervousness and instability following the attempted coup of 
23rd February 1981, following which new Spanish prime minister Leopoldo Calvo-
Sotelo and PSOE leader Felipe González agreed the Autonomy Pacts (Pactos 
Autonómicos) and subsequently approved the Organic Law on the Harmonisation of 
the Autonomy Process (Ley Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico, 
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LOAPA) in 1982 to re-orientate and slow down the process of regional devolution. 
In this context, the Spanish government decided to try to retain control over the cost 
of regional competences by not devolving responsibility to the regions for the 
following budgetary chapters: Current Transfers (Chapter IV), New Investment (part 
of Chapter VI) and Capital Transfers (Chapter VII). This would directly affect the 
valuation of competences the Basques were due to assume, but was rejected by the 
Basque government since it went against what had already been agreed in the 
Concierto law (Larrea Jiménez 1989). As disputes over these matters prevailed, 
provisional rules kicked in (as per Transitional Provision Five) to set provisional 
quotas for the years 1982 to 1986 which were broadly based on the 1981 quota, but 
none of these were finally settled (liquidados) due to Spanish-Basque disagreements 
over the amount due.  
           By late 1986, amidst broader political uncertainty following the split within 
the PNV and its setback at the 1986 regional elections, none of the provisional 
quotas from 1981 onwards had been finalised, and the transfer of competences was 
frozen due to disputes over their valuation. No quota law had ever been approved for 
the period 1982-1986, and no new quota law agreement was on the table for the next 
five-year period 1987-1991. And yet all of these issues would be resolved in 1987 
when the PSE formed a coalition government with the PNV in February that year. 
As part of the arrangement, the government in Madrid conceded to the PNV’s wishes 
in relation to the Concierto then and in subsequent months, accepting the valuations 
and methods of calculation proposed by the PNV. The deals were largely political 
and struck directly by Ardanza with prime minister Felipe González, effectively 
bypassing his treasury minister Carlos Solchaga. By compromising on the Concierto 
and the quota, the Socialists could ensure the stability of the PSE-PNV Basque 
coalition, bring the PNV into the fold of Spanish state governance and emphasise 
their achievement of a Basque-Spanish understanding that had not been possible 
under a one-party PNV government.108 
             The main details of the arrangement were as follows. Although the Basques 
already collected most taxes in their territory under the Concierto (albeit without 
                                                
108 Impressions of these negotiations are based primarily on personal interviews with former 
lehendakari José Antonio Ardanza (PNV), 28 April 2014; Gonzalo Múgica (PSE), legal 
adviser to former deputy lehendakari Ramón Jáuregui, 18 July 2014; and Carlos Aguirre 
(PSE), then Economic Planning Director of the Basque government, 13 October 2014. On 
the technical specifics of the dispute, see Larrea Jiménez 1989. 
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legislative autonomy over a number of taxes at this stage), at the time, some key 
competences, most notably health and social services, were still financed by social 
security contributions paid into a single statewide fund (the General Social Security 
Treasury), rather than general taxation. Agreements over the transfer of these 
competences thus inevitably involved agreeing what share of the social security 
quotas the Basques would receive to cover the competences. The deal struck 
between the PNV and the Socialists enabled the pending transfer of the fundamental 
competences of health and social services from the Spanish to the Basque 
government under a financing method and terms in accordance with the Basque 
proposal: while the Basque population at the time was about 5.2% of the Spanish 
population, it was decided instead to give the Basques a 6.24% share to ensure their 
acceptance of the deal, matching the level of their contribution via the quota to non-
assumed competences. Importantly, the afore-mentioned budgetary chapters in 
dispute (IV, VI and VII) were included in the transfer and valuation of the 
competences. A few months later, after the summer break, lehendakari José Antonio 
Ardanza tackled the pending issue of how to reconcile the outstanding quotas since 
1981, given the substantial discrepancy in figures between the Spanish and Basque 
authorities. He proposed that the final quotas for that period should simply more or 
less match the provisional quotas paid, and struck the broad lines of an agreement to 
this effect with Felipe González. This was then entrusted to their respective technical 
teams under treasury ministers Carlos Solchaga (Spanish) and Fernando Spagnolo 
(Basque) to draw up and implement (Ardanza 2011: 236-237). At the Joint 
Commission meeting on 4 December 1987, a Quota Law for 1982-1986 was finally 
approved retrospectively and the quotas from 1981 to 1986 were settled in 
accordance with Spagnolo’s criteria, resulting in the Basque government paying a 
final sum (to settle the difference between provisional and final quotas) much lower 
than the Spanish side had initially expected (Ardanza 2011: 237; Larrea Jiménez 
1989).  
           In recent years, similar debates over the finances of the Concierto – in terms 
of disputes over the valuation of competences, the imputation index, the final 
settlement (liquidación) of quota payments, among other matters – have once again 
beset Spanish-Basque fiscal and financial relations. As of late 2015, none of the 
provisional quotas since 2007 had been settled due to continuing Basque-Spanish 
government discrepancies over the amount due to be paid by the Basque region, and 
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no agreement had been reached on a new quota law for the period from 2012 
onwards (the 2007-2011 quota law was simply rolled over). Even in 2009-2011, a 
period when the Basque Socialists were in power in the Basque government at the 
same time as their PSOE colleagues were in power in Madrid (and reliant there upon 
the parliamentary support of the PNV to give them a working majority), an 
agreement could not be reached to settle differences over the quota law. By the time 
the PNV returned to power in the Basque region in 2012, the PP had returned to 
power in Madrid with an absolute majority. Ahead of the Spanish elections of 
December 2015, Basque officials were hoping for an outcome that might increase 
the PNV’s bargaining power in Madrid again to reach an agreement.109 
             One major source of discrepancy which has contributed to the longstanding 
stalemate over the settlement of quotas since 2007 and the lack of a new quota law 
for the period 2012-2016 has concerned Basque calls to revise the methodology to 
calculate the rate to update the quota (índice de actualización).110 Each five-yearly 
quota law establishes a base year quota and a rate to update it thereafter based on the 
increase (or decrease) in the state collection of taxes covered by the Concierto 
agreement elsewhere in Spain. The 2007-2011 quota law stipulated that the rate 
would be subject to revision following the reform of the common financing regime 
in 2009 since this could affect it, but the Spanish government was reluctant to 
respond to Basque requests for negotiation in this regard, due to its reluctance to 
undertake negotiations that might result in a reduction of the quota. Other matters 
which have caused discrepancies over the quota law and quota payments in recent 
years include discrepancies over the VAT adjustment rate and also valuations of 
certain competences. For example, as mentioned in Chapter 3 (p.118-9), when the 
2007-2011 quota law was designed, a dispute emerged as to how much the Basque 
government should receive of the funding provided by the Spanish government to 
regions under the common financing system for (1) extraordinary financing (i.e. 
beyond the original budget allocation) for the health system; (2) extraordinary 
financing to develop the Education Law (in this case, in relation to children aged 
under three); and (3) a new dependency law (governing the provisions for persons 
incapacitated to some degree by age or disability). The debate was further 
complicated by opposition from some sectors, most notably the PP (including the 
                                                
109 Personal interviews with PNV representatives, 2014. 
110 Personal interviews wih senior officials in the provincial treasury departments, 2014. 
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Basque PP), to giving the Basques any share of the extraordinary financing for 
competences already transferred since they usually pay for such competences with 
their own taxes. Echoing the debates in the 1980s over the valuation of the Basque 
share of health and social services, the PSOE government argued the Basque region 
should receive an amount of funding in proportion to its population size rather than 
the 6.24% share (matching the imputation index in the quota) proposed by the 
Basque delegation, but the PNV won the argument since the PSOE needed their 
support in the Spanish parliament at the time. The PSOE nevertheless backtracked 
on the 6.24% agreement afterwards, and debate on this subject dragged on thereafter, 
continuing under the subsequent PP government that came into power in 2011.  
 
(2) Debating the Concierto’s scope and framework  
            Aside from questions concerning the calculation of the finances involved in 
the Concierto, there have also been considerable debates regarding how to develop it 
as a model of fiscal autonomy. The negotiations to devolve the competence to collect 
VAT in 1985 were one of the first tests of the new Concierto’s adaptability to a 
changing regulatory context through bilateral negotiations: the Spanish treasury was 
initially opposed to the Basque request to transfer the responsibility for VAT 
collection to the Basque provinces citing technical difficulties, but it came to accept 
the Basque proposal including their suggested adjustment rate. 111  From then 
onwards, VAT (and later excise duties too) in the Basque region would be collected 
by the Basque provincial treasuries and then undergo an adjustment to compensate 
for the difference between how much they actually collect (i.e. the VAT on the value 
added of firms in the Basque region) and how much they should collect (i.e. the 
VAT on the consumption of individuals in the Basque region), since VAT is a tax on 
consumption but collected through a tax on production.        
           The most significant developments to the Concierto law of 1981 took place in 
the 1990s under the reform of 1997 (Atxabal and Muguruza 2006: 28-30; Zubiri 
1997). Following the years of Socialist government in Madrid, the PNV made rapid 
progress in developing the Concierto once the PP had won power for the first time in 
1996 but lacked an absolute majority. Under an agreement in May 1997, the 
                                                
111 Personal interview with Pedro Larrea, former Basque government deputy treasury minister in the 
mid 1980s responsible on the Basque side for the VAT negotiations, 20 June 2014. See also Atxabal 
and Muguruza 2006: 26. 
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authority to collect excise duties and non-resident taxes was devolved to the Basque 
provinces for the first time and they were also granted significant regulatory 
autonomy over some other taxes – most notably income tax (impuesto sobre la renta 
de las personas físicas, IRPF), as well as the wealth tax (impuesto sobre el 
patrimonio) – which they had previously only collected. These agreements 
substantially increased the fiscal autonomy afforded to the Basques under the 
Concierto. These developments formed a crucial part of the package of measures that 
the PNV agreed with the PP, in return for which the PNV supported the investiture 
of José María Aznar and promised to provide legislative support for his minority 
government in the Spanish parliament thereafter. The provisional lines of an 
agreement over the Concierto were reached in 1996 before the final deal was signed 
and sealed in May 1997. This, combined with agreements to enhance the Basque 
level of self-government in other spheres governed by the Basque autonomy statute, 
gave rise to the oft-cited comment by the then Basque president Xabier Arzalluz that 
the PP had done more for Basque autonomy in 14 days than the PSOE in 13 years.112 
            The PP’s support for these changes has been attributed first and foremost to 
the fact that it needed PNV legislative support in the Spanish parliament. In this 
vein, for example, it has been argued that the need for legislative support facilitated 
such an extensive agreement despite the fact that the only technical reason which 
required the Basque and Spanish sides to negotiate a small modification to the 
Concierto at the time was the need to agree the new tax on insurance premiums 
introduced in the 1996 Spanish tax measures law (Atzabal and Muguruza 2006: 28). 
Similarly, it has been argued that the need for legislative support enabled potential 
obstacles to be overcome where otherwise there might not have been the political 
will to do so: thus the possible legal hurdles involved in granting the Basque 
treasuries levying capacity for the special tax on alcohol when the 1981 agreement 
had expressly prohibited this were overcome by justifying the move as a ‘second 
assignment’ (segunda concertación) of taxes in the 1997 law (Ley 38/1997) (Atzabal 
and Muguruza 2006: 29-30). 
           Certainly, reasons of political expediency (Aznar’s desire to secure the PNV’s 
support) played a very significant role in facilitating the agreement. PP members 
nevertheless argue that the decision to give the Basques a significant degree of 
                                                
112 For example, ‘Arzalluz: “Logré más de Aznar que del PSOE”’, El País, 19.10.10. 
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regulatory autonomy over IRPF in particular also reflected the PP’s support at the 
time for the hypothesis that fiscal co-responsibility encourages fiscal discipline.113 
Under the previous Socialist government, a white paper on fiscal co-responsibility 
had been commissioned and presented by a technical delegation in 1995, in response 
to calls from some regions (most fundamentally Catalonia) with a view to reforming 
the common financing regime. In response, the new PP government proposed to start 
by sharing IRPF with the regions first. In 1996 it granted some regulatory autonomy 
over IRPF to the regions under a reform of the common financing regime, while the 
agreement with the Basques over the Concierto followed in 1997. Only the PSOE 
genuinely did not agree with the move and attempted to block it, arguing that 
different income tax rates in different regions of Spain threatened equality and 
efficiency.  
           The assignment of the excise duties to the Basque treasuries under the 1997 
reform was also considered advisable for technical reasons in order to stop the 
annual Basque quota paid to the Spanish state from becoming negative. The quota 
paid is 6.24% of the total amount remaining when the amount the state collects in 
non-assumed taxes is subtracted from the amount of taxes it spends on non-assumed 
competences (i.e. not including the part of the non-assumed competences financed 
by deficit). The increase in the transfer of resource-intensive competences to the 
Basque region (and thus the decrease in non-assumed competences) over the years 
following the Transition, combined with strong tax collection by the Spanish state in 
the non-assumed taxes (which included, most notably, the excise duties), had 
resulted in a rapid reduction in the size of the quota, to the extent that by 1996 it had 
almost reached zero and would have ended up becoming negative in subsequent 
years, which risked being conceptually misleading.  
           By the time the Basque and Spanish delegations were due to negotiate a new 
Concierto law in 2001 (with the 1981 agreement set to expire at year end), the PP 
under Aznar had an absolute majority in the Spanish parliament. The law eventually 
passed in 2002 to renew and update the Concierto was welcomed by the PNV 
regional government and perceived by both it and the Basque provincial authorities 
                                                
113 Personal interviews with Basque PP representatives, 2014.  
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as a very good outcome overall in terms of both technicalities and competences.114 
Most notably, it made the Concierto a permanent rather than time-limited agreement 
for the first time. As explained above (p.128), it also consolidated the bilateral nature 
of the Concierto: thereafter, if the Spanish government introduced any new taxes, it 
would be obliged to negotiate with the Basque delegation how to delegate the 
relevant tax-raising authority to the Basque provinces (previously it had only been 
obliged to negotiate bilaterally over changes to taxes already devolved to the 
Basques). As also explained above (p.129), the Concierto of 2002 also provided for 
the creation of two new bilateral committees, a Normative Coordination and 
Evaluation Commission and an Arbitration Board. This was to provide specific 
bilateral forums for addressing Spanish-Basque discrepancies over Basque tax 
measures, in an attempt to resolve potential disputes via political channels and 
thereby reduce Spain’s recourse to the courts. In another important development, the 
Concierto of 2002 incorporated new provisions in terms of coordination and 
collaboration on budgetary matters between the Spanish and Basque authorities 
(Rubí Cassinello 2003: 35). One of the longstanding Basque complaints at the time 
had been that the Concierto was focused almost exclusively on fiscal matters (i.e. 
taxation), while the financial dimension was under-developed in comparison (see 
Larrazábal Basáñez 2002). Apart from regulating the quota payment, the Concierto 
of 1981 contained no provisions for Spanish-Basque coordination over other 
financial matters, such as budgets and indebtedness, which meant the Basque 
treasuries were subject to Spanish legislation where relevant in these spheres. Under 
the Concierto of 2002, the first steps were taken towards changing this situation, for 
example by authorising the Mixed Commission to draw up bilateral agreements 
concerning collaboration and coordination over relevant budgetary matters (Rubí 
Cassinello 2003: 35). At a time of absolute majority PP government, reaching such 
substantial agreements to update the Concierto was no mean feat.  
           Nevertheless, the Spanish PP government’s reluctance to develop the 
Concierto in line with the wishes of the PNV in some areas was also clear. 
Discrepancies in the vision of the two parties as to how the Concierto should evolve 
began to become evident, particularly in terms of how to adapt the model to the 
                                                
114 Personal interviews with representatives of Basque regional and provincial 
administrations, 2014. For a review of the negotiations and outcome from the Basque 
perspective, see Rubí Cassinello 2003.  
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regulatory context of Europe.115 In this regard, the main source of discrepancy 
between the Basque and Spanish delegations at the 2001 negotiations was the 
Basque desire to ensure the participation of the Basque treasuries in the Spanish 
delegation in international (especially European) decision-making bodies addressing 
fiscal matters that impact the Concierto (Atxabal and Muguruza 2006: 31; Lucas 
Murillo 2005: 97-131; see also Chapter 5). The lack of agreement between the two 
sides on this issue led the Spanish government to extend the existing Concierto 
(approaching its expiry date) on 27 December 2001 while negotiations continued. 
This sparked criticism from the Basque negotiators on account of the unilateral 
nature of the decision, while the PP itself defended the measure as a means to save 
the Concierto, since otherwise it would technically have ceased to exist on its expiry 
date in the absence of a new agreement. Ultimately it was the Basque side that 
conceded temporary defeat on the issue of representation in Europe. The Basques 
nevertheless still requested that the Joint Commission on the Concierto should reach 
a bilateral agreement within six months to establish the effective participation of the 
Basque institutions in all spheres which impact the Concierto. This would 
nevertheless not be achieved until almost nine years later, as part of a package of 
transfers from the central to the Basque governments agreed in mid 2010 as a quid 
pro quo when the minority Socialist government of Zapatero needed the PNV to 
support its 2011 budget. From 2011, Basque representatives would start to 
participate alongside their Spanish state counterparts in the key Ecofin working 
groups addressing questions that impact the Concierto (Martínez Bárbara 2014a: 
214-215; see also Chapter 5).  
           This has been interpreted by some Basque officials as an indication that the 
Basque government only gains proper negotiating power at times when the party in 
power in Madrid has a minority and needs legislative support from the PNV in the 
Spanish parliament – which, for the PNV, suggests that the Spanish governments do 
not always fully respect the bilateral nature of the fiscal relationship. While clearly 
important, the degree of leverage the PNV has in the Spanish parliament is, however, 
not the only issue at stake. As stated, an equally important and interrelated issue that 
has affected the development of the Concierto since the turn of the century has been 
the discrepancy in the views of the PP and the PNV as to what the model should be: 
                                                
115 Personal interviews with PNV representatives in the regional government and senior 
officials in the Vizcayan provincial treasury department, 2014. 
142	
 
a Basque taxation system subject to and adapted to Spanish legislation, as it has been 
traditionally, or an instrument of more fully-fledged fiscal sovereignty, as the PNV 
now envisages it.  
            Under the PP’s subsequent term in government from 2011-2015, the Mixed 
Commission reached an agreement over the Concierto in January 2014: collection 
powers (and in some cases, legislative autonomy) over a series of minor taxes were 
transferred to the Basques (including the taxes on gaming activities, on deposits in 
credit entities, on the value of electrical energy production, on nuclear waste, and on 
greenhouse gases).116 Under the terms of the Concierto of 2002, bilateral negotiations 
are required to agree the transfer of tax-raising powers to the Basque authorities 
every time the Spanish authorities introduce a tax, thus the agreement reached in 
January 2014 was necessitated by the provisions of the Concierto itself. The PNV 
welcomed the agreement, and it clearly showed the benefits of the bilateral nature of 
the Concierto: even if the central Spanish government has an absolute majority and 
does not need PNV support, there are instances where it is obliged to sit down and 
negotiate developments to the Concierto law. Despite the overall satisfaction that an 
agreement was reached, however, some officials on the technical side complain 
behind the scenes that it has been impossible to get the PP to negotiate anything 
beyond the absolutely essential developments during its 2011-2015 term, and 
suggest that the Spanish authorities had the upper hand in the 2014 agreement, only 
granting the Basques collection powers but not legislative autonomy over some of 
the taxes under question.117  
 
An evolution in bilateral relations? 
           Support arrangements between statewide parties and the PNV have proven the 
primary facilitator of agreements over the Concierto since the 1980s, enabling the 
PNV to secure their proposed figures and develop the model as desired in return for 
supporting other statewide party policies or goals. In particular, as seen above, major 
agreements were reached with the PSOE majority Spanish government in 1987 as 
part of a deal to enable the PSE to form a Basque coalition government with the 
PNV, and subsequently with the PP minority Spanish government in 1996 and the 
                                                
116 Nota de prensa (Press release), Comisión Mixta del Concierto Económico, ‘La Comisión 
Mixta del Concierto Acuerda la Concertación de Nuevos Impuestos’, 16 January 2014. 
117 Personal interviews with provincial treasury officials, 2014. 
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PSOE minority Spanish government in 2010, when the statewide parties needed the 
PNV’s support in the Spanish parliament. In contrast, the occurrence of two absolute 
majority PP governments since 2000 has reduced the PNV’s bargaining power over 
the Concierto relative to previous decades – crucial deals have still been reached in 
relation to the Concierto in those periods, including the new Concierto agreement of 
2002, but there have also been more stalemates on certain issues. Nevertheless, the 
failure to resolve differences over the 2007-2011 quota law under the PSOE-led 
minority government before the PP returned to power in 2011 would suggest that 
resolving differences over the Concierto is not always feasible even under minority 
Spanish governments seeking PNV support in parliament. Of course, the contrast 
between majority and minority governments is not a straightforward one, for at 
times, minority governments have had other potential sources of support in the 
Madrid parliament, while at others they have relied more heavily on the PNV and 
therefore had less room for manoeuvre.118 Beyond the question of parliamentary 
alliances, however, agreeing the finances and development of the Concierto has 
arguably become more problematic in recent years due to the emergence of other 
exacerbating factors too.  
            The PNV and Basque technical experts involved in Concierto-related 
negotiations argue that they face essentially the same levels of opposition from both 
PP- and PSOE-led Spanish governments towards proposals to update the Concierto 
to give the Basques growing fiscal autonomy and sovereignty within Europe, unless 
the PNV has political bargaining power.119 From this perspective, both statewide 
parties are accused of sharing the same politically centralist ideology regarding the 
role of the Spanish state in international affairs, an issue which has become an 
increasing source of Spanish-Basque conflict as the EU context has developed. In 
terms of economic ideology, however, differences between the PSOE and PP have 
historically impacted the development of the Concierto. As stated, the afore-
mentioned agreement in 1997 to give the Basques a significant degree of regulatory 
autonomy over IRPF was not only for politically expedient reasons but also reflected 
the PP’s support at the time for the hypothesis that fiscal co-responsibility 
                                                
118 For an in-depth analysis of the alliance behaviour of minority governments in Spain, see 
Field 2016.   
119 Personal interviews with Basque officials that have been involved in negotiations with 
their Spanish counterparts, 2014. 
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encourages fiscal discipline. And yet the PP has since taken a u-turn to become more 
centralist in economic affairs (as well as other policy areas such as education), 
advocating recentralisation as a form of rationalisation (Bosch and Solé-Ollé 2013). 
This has been largely in response to the poor fiscal discipline of many regions under 
the common financing regime that became apparent during the financial crisis, and 
given the need to comply with EU budgetary targets (see Chapter 7). At the same 
time, the PNV has sought ever increasing fiscal autonomy verging on sovereignty. 
Comparisons between the decisions taken by the PNV and the PP before and after 
the turn of the century reveal how both have increasingly moved towards opposite 
ends of the centralist-autonomist spectrum in their attitudes towards fiscal matters, 
which in turn reduces the possibilities for agreement over the Concierto’s 
development. While the PNV originally sought the ability to collect (rather than also 
to regulate) the main indirect taxes (as seen in the VAT negotiations of the 1980s), it 
now aspires to the greatest regulatory autonomy possible in both direct and indirect 
taxes. Meanwhile, the PP has moved from advocating the sharing of taxation powers 
with the regions back in the 1990s to looking to recentralise fiscal control in some 
respects under a new drive for ‘rationalisation’, for example by proposing to take 
away the power of regional governments to create their own taxes (a power already 
limited in practice by legal challenges presented by the Spanish state towards any 
such taxes created). 
            This ideological shift on the part of the PP has coincided with the growing 
criticism from other regional governments in Spain and from newer Spanish parties 
(first UPyD and then Ciudadanos) towards the Concierto. Although the Concierto is 
bilateral in nature, it is far from immune to wider inter-regional pressures and 
tensions. For most of the 1980s and 1990s the Concierto was the subject of relatively 
little attention and even less envy from other regions given the level of responsibility 
that tax collection entails, which helped to create the conditions for purely Basque-
Spanish bilateral agreements. For example, at the brief parliamentary debate in 1981 
prior to the approval of the Concierto law drafted by the Spanish and Basque 
delegations, some parliamentarians raised concerns about whether the Basque model 
would be equitable and whether calculations of the cost of assumed competences and 
the imputation index were appropriate, but these concerns at the time did not prove a 
serious source of resistance (Eduardo Alonso Olea 2012). This situation would 
however start to change from the late 1990s onwards, as reports on the fiscal 
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balances of the regions with the Spanish state emerged suggesting many regions 
under the common regime were getting a poor deal, and as Catalonia began to raise 
demands for a bilateral financing arrangement. During the economic boom years 
when the central government had sufficient funds to do so, it could partly keep 
tensions at bay by reforming the common financing regime in ways which 
consistently promised to increase each region’s resources beyond the status quo 
(León 2009). The last such reform in 2009, however, proved immediately 
insufficient as the financial crisis fully set in (see Chapter 7). The severe strain the 
common financing regime came under only served to increase long-standing 
criticism from other regions towards the ‘exceptionalism’ of the Basque and 
Navarran economic agreements, which give them far higher resources per capita than 
other regions (see Chapter 3). This climate has compounded the reluctance of 
Spanish governments regardless of their political colour to develop the Concierto 
any further and to allow for any change that might result in a reduction of the quota.  
 
Conclusion 
           Overall, the bilateral relationship governing Spanish-Basque fiscal relations is 
much valued by the PNV since it prevents any decisions taken unilaterally by 
Madrid, even at times when the PP has had an absolute majority in the Spanish 
parliament. The bilateral relationship has been characterised by significant 
disagreements over the years, and yet it has also offered considerable scope for deals 
and payoffs to resolve such disagreements. This, in turn, has helped to encourage the 
PNV’s moderation and pragmatism in its relationship with Madrid and allowed 
accommodationist attitudes within the PNV to persist for longer than in the case of 
CDC in Catalonia (see Chapter 7). As recently as 2015, ahead of the Spanish 
elections of December that year, the PNV was still hopeful of an outcome that would 
give it some bargaining power to negotiate a deal to resolve the discrepancies over 
the quota law that have been ongoing since 2007.   
           Nevertheless, Spanish-Basque conflict in relation to the Concierto has 
increased over the decades. During much of the 1980s and 1990s the Concierto was 
developed extensively and disagreements with Spanish governments over the 
model’s evolution and annual quota payments tended eventually to be resolved in a 
way which aligned with the PNV’s proposals. Since then, however, the behaviour of 
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both the PP and the PSOE has gradually come to suggest that they consider the 
development of the Concierto to have gone far enough, albeit still with some 
occasional concessions to the Basques (e.g, under the Zapatero minority 
governments). This is in contrast to the PNV which sees the growth and 
consolidation of the EU regulatory context as a prime opportunity to develop the 
Concierto further as a tool of fiscal sovereignty within Europe. This scenario has fed 
into a growing clash between the PNV’s strategic territorial agenda and the vision of 
successive central governments of the Basque relationship with Spain.  
            Political pacts and alliance arrangements between the PNV and the Spanish 
statewide parties became the main facilitator of agreements over the Concierto from 
the 1980s onwards, but they have become increasingly difficult to secure in the face 
of other exacerbating factors such as the PP’s ideological shift towards 
recentralisation, inter-regional competition for resources and the financial crisis. The 
mere fact of a bilateral relationship, while understandably preferable from the 
Basque perspective to the alternative of a relationship determined unilaterally by 
Madrid or subject to inter-regional agreement, has not in itself always been able to 
reconcile disputes over how much the Basques owe Madrid or over the level of fiscal 
autonomy or sovereignty the Concierto affords the Basque region – a problem 
exacerbated by the absence of any consensus over the wider question of the degree 
of autonomy or even sovereignty to afford the Basque region in a political sense. 
These different conceptions cannot easily co-exist in a loose relationship of mutual 
tolerance between Spanish and Basque governments. The development of the 
Concierto necessarily involves phases of renegotiation or changes de facto as a result 
of extraneous developments, which has inevitably brought different conceptions of it 
into conflict. In this light, the next chapter looks in more detail at the opportunities 
and obstacles the EU framework has posed to the development of substate fiscal 
authority in the Basque case and the discrepancies in Spanish-Basque political 
perspectives in this regard.  
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Chapter 5 
Shaping the PNV’s conception of sovereignty (2): 
The EU and the development of Basque fiscal autonomy 
 
           Through a study of the development of the Concierto in the EU context, this 
chapter investigates the opportunities and obstacles that the EU framework has posed 
to the development of fiscal autonomy verging on sovereignty in the Basque region 
and the implications for the PNV’s territorial agenda. The trajectory taken by the 
PNV since the 1990s to encourage understanding of the Concierto at EU level and to 
address how to adapt it to the evolving EU context has been marked by difficulties in 
both Spain and Europe. Within Spain, relatively different perspectives held by 
statewide Spanish parties and the PNV respectively on the degree of fiscal autonomy 
or even sovereignty that the Concierto affords the Basques have, in turn, influenced 
views as to how the model should be developed within the EU context. In the 1990s, 
such Basque-Spanish disputes centred on discrepancies over the extent to which the 
Basque treasuries could set different corporation tax rates, deductions and other 
incentives from the Spanish treasury – disputes which spilled over into the EU 
sphere and resulted in legal challenges against Basque tax measures at EU level. 
Since the turn of the century, attention has turned towards the representation of the 
Basque authorities in EU decision-making bodies concerning fiscal matters. As 
Basque governments and provincial treasuries have aspired to develop the model to 
give the region almost the same fiscal powers as Spain itself, they have sought 
representation within the Spanish delegation in relevant working groups and 
meetings of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin) in recognition of 
Basque fiscal competences. And yet successive Spanish governments have seen the 
Concierto as remaining clearly subordinate to Spanish legislation and representation, 
at least until recently considering Basque representation in Europe unnecessary given 
that Basque tax regulations are subject to wider harmonisation rules with Spain.  
           In Chapter 4, I outlined the relatively different political conceptions of the 
Concierto in Spain – a model of near fiscal sovereignty versus one of fiscal 
decentralisation subordinate to Spanish legislation – and their impact on Spanish-
Basque bilateral fiscal relations. The aim here is to extend this analysis to focus in 
more detail on the discrepancies over the Concierto’s fit within the EU context, 
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going beyond the purely domestic Spanish context to consider also the opportunities 
or obstacles at EU level that impact the development of the Concierto. Nevertheless, 
the line between the domestic and the European is not clear cut, since conceptions of 
the Concierto within Spain inevitably influence how the model is adapted to the EU 
context. Current and former Basque government representatives, and also technical 
experts within the Basque treasuries involved in negotiations with their Spanish 
counterparts over the development of the Concierto, are clear in their view that the 
difficulty of achieving proper understanding of the Basque Concierto at EU level has 
been hindered by continual challenges from Spanish authorities to Basque fiscal 
autonomy.120 They suggest that repeated opposition from Spanish governments to 
Basque corporation tax measures, and later to the participation of Basque 
representatives in Ecofin, responded to primarily political motives – namely, a 
centralist attitude to the role of the Spanish government both within the Spanish state 
and in European affairs, as well as its reluctance to accept the asymmetry which the 
Concierto and the Convenio entail for the Spanish state. At the same time, they 
recognise that there have been a number of instances where collaboration at a 
technical level between Basque and Spanish authorities over the defence of Basque 
fiscal autonomy at EU level (for example, over the defence of Basque corporation 
tax measures in the EU courts against EU challenges) has worked well despite 
adverse politicisation and judicialisation pitting the Spanish against the Basque 
authorities over the same issues back at home.  
           These circumstances raise a number of questions which this chapter seeks to 
address: What have been the legal and technical obstacles within both Spain and the 
EU that have problematised Basque attempts to seek representation in fiscal matters 
at EU level alongside their Spanish counterparts? Or have the problems been more 
political in nature? To what extent have Basque-Spanish relations at home impacted 
the development of the Concierto in the European sphere, or is the EU framework 
itself the main determinant? And what have been the implications of these debates 
for the PNV’s attitudes towards the place of the Basque Country in Europe? 
 In terms of party attitudes towards the EU in general, despite the fact that 
notions of a ‘Europe of the regions’ have disappointed and the EU has remained 
heavily member state centric, the PNV remains resolutely pro-European. It has a 
                                                
120 Personal interviews with PNV representatives and Vizcayan provincial treasury 
representatives, 2014. 
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long tradition of involvement in the European project and continues to advocate the 
idea of a federal Europe involving the co-existence of different sovereignties based 
first and foremost on Europe’s constituent nations, echoing the still influential vision 
of the historical leader of the PNV Manuel Irujo, minister under the Second Republic 
(Gillespie 2015b). At key moments of direct debate on the design of Europe, such as 
the draft Constitutional Treaty, the PNV has contributed actively with clear 
proposals for the empowerment of nations over the state level (Gillespie 2015b). The 
debates concerning the place of the Concierto in the EU context analysed in this 
chapter are usually much more technical in nature and tend to take place between the 
elite of the party and members of the Basque administration in technical positions in 
the Basque regional and provincial treasuries, rather than being used as a more 
general issue by the PNV to galvanise public support for the party. Indeed, at times, 
it is the senior technical officers within the administrations pushing the party for a 
better deal, rather than vice versa. Possibly in consequence, the detailed ins and outs 
of Spanish-Basque disputes over issues such as whether the Basques require 
representation in EU Council working groups on fiscal matters have not featured in 
other studies which address the question of the PNV and its attitudes towards Europe 
more generally (e.g. Gillespie 2015b, Pérez-Nievas 2006, Keating and Bray 2006). 
Nevertheless, these technical discussions are important, for the gradualist steps taken 
by the PNV since the late 1990s to obtain some degree of representation in EU fiscal 
decision-making bodies (mainly Ecofin) provide a key insight into the incrementalist 
approach used by the party towards its goal for the Basque Country to be treated as 
an equal to Spain in Europe in fiscal matters and beyond, and importantly, the 
discrepancies with Spanish authorities in this regard. 
           The rest of the chapter is structured to consider the two main problematic 
areas regarding the application of the Concierto in the EU context since the 1990s: 
(1) disputes over the use of corporation tax by a region with fiscal autonomy within a 
member state; and (2) how such a region should participate in EU harmonisation 
processes concerning taxation. The first of these areas received much attention in the 
1990s when the Basque region was accused of implementing regionally selective 
‘state aids’ through a series of ‘tax holidays’ for new firms in the Basque provinces, 
but the Azores ruling of 2006 helped significantly to resolve the debate by clarifying 
that a region fulfilling specific requirements of procedural, institutional and 
economic autonomy could set different tax rates from the central state. However, the 
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second area has been the subject of less attention and is still very much a work in 
progress, both for the EU itself as well as for the researcher. The Spanish 
government is the only valid interlocutor for the whole of Spain before the EU, and 
yet the Basque provinces have almost exclusive competence over certain fiscal 
matters in their territory. In these circumstances, in what ways is it appropriate for 
the Basque provincial treasury departments to participate in the negotiation and 
subsequent implementation of EU harmonisation measures concerning both indirect 
and direct taxation?  
 
Basque corporation tax: conflicts with Spain and the EU 
           In 1985, the Concierto of 1981 needed to be adapted to take account of 
Spain’s imminent joining of the European Community on 1 January 1986. At this 
stage, however, only the most urgent change to fit the Concierto to the European 
context was dealt with: namely, the agreement that the Basques would collect VAT 
in their territory but be subject to the relevant tax legislation set by the Spanish 
treasury, following the replacement in Spain of a range of indirect taxes with the new 
Value-Added Tax (VAT) (also Chapter 4, p.137). Other potential problems 
regarding the Concierto’s fit within the European Community – which were perhaps 
inevitable, given that there was no prior precedent of such a fiscal model at substate 
level in any other European member state – would begin to be dealt with in 
subsequent years as they emerged (Alonso Arce 2010: 31). It would soon become 
clear that by far the most significant issues would relate to the Basque treasuries’ use 
of their legislative powers over corporation tax. One of the main areas of controversy 
within Spain itself over the Concierto would become the fine line between 
harmonisation and uniformity in relation to corporation tax, with the Spanish 
authorities (and entities in regions bordering the Basque Country) interpreting 
harmonisation more restrictively than their Basque counterparts. The internal debate 
within Spain would soon become enmeshed and intertwined with debates at EU level 
as the Commission started to raise questions about the compatibility of aspects of 
Basque provincial corporation tax regulations with the rules of the common market. 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, then, the Basque authorities would face technical 
as well as political challenges both within Spain and at EU level. And the two 
dimensions would feed into each other in a series of striking dynamics.  
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           Legal challenges from the Attorney General for Spain against Basque tax 
decisions, alleging that these infringed the internal rules for harmonisation with 
Spanish tax legislation, became a regular occurrence as soon as the Basque 
provincial treasuries started to make full use of their regulatory powers over 
corporation tax to introduce a series of tax exemptions, deductions and other 
incentives for businesses in 1988, 1993 and 1995. These were also followed by a 
comprehensive reform of Basque corporation tax in 1996, which involved a 2.5% cut 
in the corporation tax rate compared to elsewhere in Spain – to 32.5% instead of 
35% – as well as other incentives (Carrera Poncela 2000: 5). This created more 
favourable tax conditions for businesses in the Basque provinces than elsewhere in 
Spain. Basque corporation tax measures were not only challenged in court by the 
Spanish state, but also by entities (such as business associations, trade unions) in 
other Spanish regions bordering the Basque one. Under the Spanish Constitution, 
legislative measures passed by provincial parliaments or assemblies have the force of 
regulations (reglamentos) while regional parliaments and the Spanish parliament 
pass laws (leyes). While regulations can be challenged in administrative courts by 
any natural or legal person whose interests the regulation affects, laws can only be 
challenged in Spain’s Constitutional Court by the limited number of institutions and 
officials listed in Article 162 of the Spanish Constitution. In large part due to this 
situation, fiscal and tax rules passed by the Basque provincial parliaments, which at 
the time only had the status of ‘reglamentos’, became subject to continuous litigation 
in the administrative courts on the grounds of unfair competition. And yet the tax 
legislation passed by neighbouring Navarre was free from such litigation since the 
province coincides with the region of the same name and thus its legislation has the 
force of law. This context of constant litigation in the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s 
became known as the ‘judicialisation of the Concierto’, and the Basque authorities 
were heavily critical of the Spanish authorities for having recourse to the courts so 
extensively rather seeking to resolve disputes via political channels.  
           Meanwhile, the first hurdle to surmount at EU level would also be almost 
immediate once the Basques had started to make use of their regulatory autonomy 
over corporation tax. A challenge from the European Commission was lodged 
against the 1988 Basque tax incentives, at a time when the Commission was starting 
to contact member states to request changes to their tax regulations which did not 
comply with the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Treaty (see Alonso Arce 
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2010: 71-80; Zubiri 2000: 191-192). In 1993, the Commission alerted Spain to the 
fact that tax payers non resident in Spain, but resident in other EU member states, 
who operated in the Basque provinces could not apply the Basque provincial 
corporation tax rates in the same way as  tax payers resident in Spain, warning that 
this constituted a restriction on the freedom of establishment enshrined in the Treaty 
under Article 43 (Alonso Arce 2010: 72; Zubiri 2000: 191-192). Under the Concierto 
agreement in force at the time, the Spanish state had the exclusive competence to 
regulate the taxes paid by non residents. Thus it was not the tax incentive itself that 
was against EU legislation, but rather the fact that Basque provincial tax rules could 
not be applied to non residents, due to the way the ‘points of connection’ regarding 
residents and non residents had been drawn up under the Concierto. A solution 
needed to be found relatively quickly to fulfil EU requirements. Following bilateral 
Spanish-Basque negotiations, the Law on Fiscal, Administrative and Social Order 
Measures of December 1994, which was passed as an ‘accompanying law’ to the 
1995 Spanish budget, included an additional disposition stipulating that the Spanish 
government would provide the requisite financial compensation to EU-based entities 
non resident in Spain but resident in other member states, who were thus unable to 
apply the Basque corporation tax regulations (Alonso Arce 2010: 75). The Spanish 
state administration would reimburse the non resident entity for the difference 
between the Basque and Spanish corporation tax legislation, a solution which 
satisfied the European Commission. Later, under the 1997 reform of the Concierto 
(the first major reform of the 1981 legislation), the problem would be resolved more 
comprehensively by changing the relevant points of connection so that non residents 
would become eligible to apply the Basque tax legislation directly (Zubiri 2000: 
192).  
            The first fundamental technical hurdle concerning the fit of the Basque 
Concierto agreement with the EU Treaty could thus be resolved relatively easily, but 
the outcome ended up further complicating Spanish-Basque internal political debates 
over the Concierto’s fit within Spain. The neighbouring region of La Rioja lodged a 
constitutional challenge before the Spanish Constitutional Court against the relevant 
additional disposition of the afore-mentioned Accompanying Law approved in 1994, 
arguing that it did not respect the constitutional principles (Alonso Arce 2010: 76). 
Eight years later, in April 2002, the Constitutional Court, in sentence 96/2002 of 26 
April, sided with the complainant and declared the compensation for non residents 
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incompatible with the Spanish Constitution, on the grounds that the additional 
disposition generated a new discrimination against tax payers resident in the rest of 
Spain who could not apply the Basque legislation either (Alonso Arce 2010: 77). In 
practice, the sentence of the Constitutional Court did not ultimately take effect, since 
by then the Concierto had already been reformed in 1997 to update the points of 
connection to equate residents and non residents. The sentence of the Constitutional 
Court nevertheless did have ongoing ramifications in that it instilled the idea in 
certain sectors that the same parameters for analysing restrictions of freedoms in the 
EU could also be applied to the analysis of freedom of movement in Spain under 
Article 3 of the Concierto – a conflation of EU and Spanish law strongly disputed by 
the Basque authorities (Alonso Arce 2010: 79-80).  
           Spanish legal challenges against Basque tax legislation acquired a new 
dimension when for the first time the Spanish Attorney General challenged the 
Basque tax incentives of 1993 (including the ‘tax holidays’, which offered total 
exemption from corporation tax to new companies in the Basque provinces for the 
first ten years) on the grounds not only that they infringed internal Spanish 
harmonisation requirements, but also Articles 52 (on the freedom of people and 
companies) and 92 (on the freedom of competition) of the EU Treaty. Faced with 
this challenge, the Supreme Court of Justice of the Basque Country referred the 
matter to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling (see Chacón 1999; 
Rubí Cassinello 1999; Zubiri 2000: 192-193). It sought clarification on whether the 
1993 Basque tax incentives were compatible with the EU Treaty in two respects: (1) 
whether the Basque rules on corporation tax were compatible with article 52 of the 
European Treaty on free movement within the Union (given that non residents 
operating in the Basque region were subject to Spanish rather than Basque tax 
legislation); and (2) whether the Basque rules on corporation tax were compatible 
with article 92.1 of the Treaty (on the prohibition of state aids that could falsify 
competition by favouring certain companies) given that companies operating 
elsewhere in Spain were not eligible to be subject to Basque tax regulations. The first 
of these matters was quickly resolved: the Commission, in its observations, 
maintained coherence with its previous decision on the 1988 state aids, declaring the 
question resolved with the 8th Additional Disposition of Law 42/94 on the State 
General Budget for 1995 (Rubí Cassinello 1999). However, the shock for the Basque 
authorities would come in relation to the second dimension, when Advocate General 
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Saggio concluded in 1999 that such measures could be considered a territorially 
selective state aid since they only applied to one region (the Basque Country) within 
a wider state (Spain). This threatened the capacity of the Basque provinces to set any 
corporation tax rates or incentives even minimally different from those of the 
Spanish state.121  
             A distinct irony emerged throughout this process as it was the Spanish 
Attorney General that had taken the Basque provincial authorities to court in Spain 
accusing them of infringing the EU Treaty, and yet at EU level it ended up defending 
the Basque fiscal measures against the idea that they infringed the Treaty, since the 
Spanish government is the sole interlocutor at EU level for the whole Spanish state 
and thus it was required to represent Basque interests in this instance (Chacón 1999: 
8; Rubí Cassinello 1999). According to technical teams in the Basque treasuries, 
collaboration between the Basque and Spanish authorities over the Basque defence at 
EU level worked well and the Spanish Attorney General defended Basque interests 
appropriately, despite the ongoing judicialisation back at home in Spain.122 Given the 
threat that Saggio’s preliminary ruling posed to the Concierto as well as the 
unsustainable level of permanent judicialisation back at home in Spain, in January 
2000 the Spanish and Basque delegations reached a ‘fiscal peace’ agreement (paz 
fiscal) under which the Spanish authorities agreed to withdraw all ongoing 
challenges against Basque tax legislation and the Basques would, in return, 
participate in a new a mechanism for prior exchange of information on proposed tax 
measures.123 The agreement meant the Spanish Attorney General would cease his 
challenge against the 1993 tax incentives within Spain and the question referred to 
the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling would be archived.  
While the agreement helped to reduce litigation by the Spanish Attorney 
General against Basque tax measures, entities in other regions in Spain continued to 
challenge Basque fiscal rules. And the surrounding Spanish regions and the Spanish 
Supreme and Constitutional courts had now acquired a new weapon in their armoury 
in the form of Saggio’s preliminary ruling of 1999. In 1996, the business federation 
                                                
121 Personal interviews with senior officials in the Vizcayan treasury department, 2014. 
122 Personal interviews with senior officials in the Vizcayan treasury department, 2014. 
123 For example, ‘La “paz fiscal” sellada entre los Gobiernos central y vasco caduca dentro 
de dos años’, El País, 19.01.00. This temporary agreement was however than replaced in the 
new Concierto agreement of 2002 with a committee designed resolved to resolve Spanish-
Basque disputes before they reached the courts (see Chapter 4 p.140). See also Alonso Arce 
2010: 82-83 and Martínez Bárbara 2012b: 67-69. 
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of La Rioja had presented a challenge to the Supreme Court of Justice of the Basque 
Country against the Basque 1996 corporation tax reform, accusing the Basque 
authorities of (1) infringing the harmonisation rules in Spain and (2) infringing EU 
rules on state aids (Alonso Arce 2010). In 1999, the Supreme Court of Justice of the 
Basque Country responded by only abolishing one provision of the 1996 reform, the 
mini tax holidays (since by then the European Commission had declared these 
unacceptable state aids) (Alonso Arce 2010: 96). The Basque court dismissed the 
rest of the challenge as inadmissible, arguing that there was no question of 
selectivity. Nevertheless, when the business federation of La Rioja lodged an appeal 
to Spain’s Supreme Court against the Basque court’s decision, the tables would turn. 
The Supreme Court sentence of 9 December 2004, by which time Advocate General 
Saggio’s preliminary ruling of 1999 was also known, overruled 13 provisions of the 
Basque regulations on corporation tax, considering that many of these constituted 
state aids. For the Basque authorities, this was the biggest blow the Concierto had 
ever received, since it challenged the right of the Basque provincial treasuries to set 
any corporation tax rates or incentives even minimally different to those of the 
Spanish state (Alonso Arce 2010: 107-150). 
          The tables would eventually turn with the Azores tax ruling of 2006, which 
had clear implications for the Basque provinces in that it asserted the right of a 
region within a wider member state in Europe to set different tax rates from said 
member state if the region fulfilled specific requirements of procedural, institutional 
and economic autonomy, thus contradicting Saggio’s previous preliminary ruling 
about regional selectivity (see, for example, Bengoetxea Caballero 2010). 
Essentially, the Azores ruling decreed that legislative autonomy over corporation tax 
could only be devolved in the case of regions which bore the full risk of their own 
revenue-raising and were not in receipt of any fiscal equalisation payments that 
could be construed as a compensation from the state in the event of a shortfall in 
regional tax collection – criteria with which the Basque region was considered 
compliant. After years of uncertainty, the Azores ruling thus finally clarified that 
Basque treasuries could set different corporation tax rates and incentives from the 
Spanish treasury without these being considered regionally selective. The EU rulings 
against the Basque tax holidays of the 1990s nevertheless still stood, but because the 
incentives were deemed incompatible with fair competition in the common market 
for reasons other than regional selectivity.  
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           The Azores ruling also drastically reduced litigation from the surrounding 
regions in Spain, since many of their challenges against Basque corporation tax 
measures would become less admissible thereafter, once they could no longer use 
Saggio’s preliminary conclusion about regional selectivity in their defence. Basque 
provincial tax legislation was also bolstered shortly afterwards in Spain by the Ley 
de Blindaje (‘Shield Law’), which upgraded Basque provincial tax legislation to the 
same legal status as regional laws for the first time, thus making it harder for said 
legislation to be challenged (Erkoreka 2009; Martínez Etxeberría 2014). The PNV-
led Basque government had presented a draft bill to the Spanish parliament, 
following unanimous cross-party approval in the Basque parliament in June 2007, 
aiming to secure legal status and protection for the tax rules adopted by the Basque 
provincial assemblies. This is what became known as the Ley de Blindaje (‘Shield 
Law’) (see also Chapter 4, p.131). The idea was to consolidate the legislative 
autonomy of the Basque provinces in fiscal matters. It was originally the Basque PP 
that had been in favour of seeking legal status for Basque provincial tax and fiscal 
rules during the Transition, whereas the PNV at the time had been seeking to build 
the new regional level of government and only wanted the Basque government to be 
granted the ability to pass laws, as was thus included under Article 6 of Law 27/1983 
of 25 November on the Historical Territories. By the time the PNV came later to 
seek protection for Basque tax rules, however, the PP in Madrid was faced with 
conflicting stances within its own party, since the PP-led government of La Rioja 
was opposed to the measure while the Basque PP supported it. Both the PP and the 
PSOE in Madrid opposed PNV approaches on the subject from 2005 onwards due to 
the implications for other regions in Spain, despite the full support of their respective 
Basque delegations for such a measure. It was only when the minority PSOE 
government needed PNV support for its 2010 budget that it finally changed its stance 
and supported the proposed Ley de Blindaje in return. The Law was swiftly pushed 
through and passed on 19 February 2010, with the PP (along with UPyD) still voting 
against it, while their Basque colleagues in both the Spanish Parliament and Senate 
left when the respective votes took place so as not to have to vote against a measure 
they themselves had supported in the Basque parliament.  
           Overall, the afore-described trajectory towards EU recognition of Basque 
fiscal autonomy over corporation tax thus involved some strictly technical hurdles 
that could be overcome with relatively simple changes in legislation – most notably, 
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the need to equate residents and non residents. Slower to overcome, however, were 
the political hurdles at both Spanish and European levels. The Azores ruling did 
much to clarify and stabilise the position of the Concierto in Europe, but in reality 
the political differences over the Concierto within Spain itself which fuelled conflicts 
over Basque corporation tax measures still persist to a large degree today, and shape 
new debates that have since become dominant over the Concierto’s development in 
the EU context. There remains a lack of consensus not only between the PNV and 
Spanish authorities in Madrid, but also between different parties in the Basque 
region itself, as to the exact attribution of blame for the political disputes over 
Basque corporation tax from the late 1980s onwards.124 PNV interpretations of what 
happened tend to regard the corporation tax decisions that were made in the 
particularly conflictive decade of the 1990s as fair and appropriate given the Basques 
provincial authorities’ regulatory competence over corporation tax in the region. 
They suggest that they were the victims of adverse politicisation from both Spanish 
governments and EU authorities, both of which were reluctant, albeit each for 
different reasons, to allow for significant differences in corporation tax between state 
and regional level. According to this viewpoint, the views and conclusions 
detrimental to recognition of the extent of Basque fiscal autonomy that were voiced 
from Europe in the years prior to the Azores ruling – most notably, Saggio’s 1999 
preliminary ruling – were often politically motivated in the sense that they reflected 
the Commission’s determination at the time to avoid any risk that member states 
might start to abuse fiscal decentralisation as a means to give state aids (Alonso Arce 
2009: 104). And this was exacerbated by opposition within Spain to the Basques 
making extensive use of their fiscal autonomy. Although the Basque authorities were 
represented at EU level by the Spanish authorities and acknowledge that the 
collaboration at a technical level in this regard worked well, there is still a strong 
feeling within the PNV and indeed among more technical officials in Basque 
treasury departments that the lack of strictly Basque representation ran the risk of an 
inadequate defence of their interests (e.g. Martínez Bárbara 2014a: 216).  
           On the other hand, however, political opponents of the PNV argue that the 
Basque institutions themselves are first and foremost to blame, suggesting that they 
exacerbated tensions by being too aggressive in their use of corporation tax. The 
                                                
124 Personal interviews with PNV, PSE, PP and Bildu representatives in the Basque Country, 
2014. 
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Basque provinces repeatedly introduced rates, deductions and incentives that created 
more favourable conditions for businesses in the Basque region than elsewhere in 
Spain – often seeming to wait until Spain had introduced its own legislation only 
then to introduce a better deal in the Basque provinces. These discrepancies in views 
over the level of fiscal autonomy or sovereignty that the Basque Concierto provides, 
and thus the degree of subordination Basque tax decisions should or should not have 
to Spanish legislation, continue to impact the adaptation of the Concierto to the EU 
context today – especially in terms of the question of whether the Basque authorities 
should have direct representation in Europe within the Spanish delegation given their 
fiscal competences over direct taxation.  
 
The quest for Basque representation at EU level in fiscal 
negotiations 
           Since the turn of the century, one of the biggest debates in Spain over the 
development of the Concierto has become whether the Basques should have a role in 
EU decision-making bodies debating fiscal matters, particularly those debating tax 
harmonisation between EU member states. The requirement in the Concierto of 1981 
(as updated in 1997) that the Basque treasury departments adhere to any international 
treaties or other agreements signed by Spain was elaborated upon further in Article 
2.1.5 of the Concierto of 2002 to state expressly that they must adhere to the relevant 
provisions to avoid double taxation and the rules for fiscal harmonisation in the EU 
(Martínez Bárbara 2012a: 72). Where discrepancies in views occur is over the extent 
to which the Basque authorities should remain subordinate to Spanish legislation in 
the implementation of EU directives and guidance for fiscal harmonisation, or 
whether they should have a more direct voice and participation in EU fiscal decision-
making bodies, becoming active players and negotiators in EU tax harmonisation 
processes.125 What have been the main obstacles to securing Basque participation at 
EU level? To what extent have the obstacles been practical and technical in nature? 
Or have they been heavily influenced by political agendas? 
           Taxation is one of the areas where EU member states still retain a large 
degree of sovereignty, since fiscal harmonisation in itself is not one of the objectives 
                                                
125 My perceptions of these discrepancies are informed first and foremost by interviews with 
PNV, PSE and PP representatives, as well as senior officials in the Vizcayan treasury 
department, 2014.  
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of the European Union (Martínez Bárbara 2012a: 70). Relevant steps have 
nevertheless been taken to prevent discrepancies in tax systems where these might 
hinder the functioning of the single market. Thus EU member states transferred 
sovereignty over customs duties to the EU authorities and also over some significant 
aspects of indirect taxation, to ensure harmonisation in these spheres (Trench 2015). 
Regarding VAT, the most important indirect tax, the EU sets a standardised tax base, 
though beyond this member states still have a degree of freedom to choose between a 
range of tax rates. EU legislation includes specific directives for the harmonisation 
of indirect taxes under the provisions of Article 113 of the EU Treaty (Martínez 
Bárbara 2012a: 71). In the case of direct taxes (which include corporation tax), any 
harmonisation measures are taken instead under the provisions of Article 115 
(Martínez Bárbara 2012a: 71). Nevertheless, since member state tax legislation over 
direct taxes does not generally affect the EU’s own competences in relation to 
fundamental freedoms or the single market and member states are very reluctant to 
lose sovereignty over direct taxation, steps towards harmonisation in this regard have 
been far more limited than over indirect taxation. A very small number of directives 
have been approved in relation to corporate taxation, for example, regarding 
relations between company headquarters and their branches in different member 
states, or business restructuring operations, mergers, takeovers within the EU. More 
often, however, harmonisation measures over direct taxes – particularly in the sphere 
of corporate taxation – have taken the form of recommendations or soft law 
(Martínez Bárbara 2012a: 71-72). Such ‘soft law’ measures have become known in 
the literature as ‘negative harmonisation’, in contrast to ‘positive harmonisation’ in 
the form of more concrete and legally-binding directives. 
              Under the Concierto, the Basque provincial treasuries do not have 
regulatory autonomy over the main indirect taxes (VAT, the excise duties, and the 
tax on company operations) but rather they must apply the relevant Spanish 
legislation regarding tax bases and rates. The PNV and some officials working in the 
Basque treasuries argue that that they ought to have the right to regulatory autonomy 
over indirect as well as direct taxes,126 but in the absence of such autonomy they 
approve provincial laws (normas forales) to adapt the Basque tax systems to EU 
directives where necessary under identical terms to the way in which Spain has done 
                                                
126 Personal interviews with Pedro Azpiazu (PNV) and with certain provincial treasury 
representatives, 2014. 
160	
 
so. EU rules allow for the devolution of authority over direct taxes to the substate 
level but they seriously limit it in the case of indirect taxes (Trench 2015). Most 
notably, each state can only apply one VAT rate system, which can be collected but 
not varied at the regional government level (as occurs in the Basque case). 
           In the case of direct taxation where the Basques have regulatory autonomy, on 
the very few occasions where EU directives are approved with a view to 
harmonisation in this sphere, there is some discrepancy (particularly between rulings 
of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Basque Country on the one hand, and the 
Spanish Supreme Court on the other) as to whether the Basque provinces can 
approve their own provincial laws to apply the relevant directive rather than copying 
verbatim the Spanish legislation, provided that they respect the framework of the 
Concierto in terms of the rules regarding harmonisation and fiscal coordination 
between the Basque region and the Spanish government (Martínez Bárbara 2012a: 
73-74). Since EU directives regarding direct taxation are rare, however, the main 
disputes between Spanish and Basque delegations have instead occurred over the 
potential for Basque participation in EU decision-making bodies aimed at 
negotiating ‘soft law’ measures to encourage a degree of fiscal harmonisation, 
especially regarding corporation tax.127 
           Steps taken by the Basque delegation towards securing Basque representation 
at EU level over fiscal matters date back to the late 1990s. The Basque provincial 
treasuries are required to respect all international agreements signed by Spain and the 
beginnings of steps towards collaboration between Spanish and Basque authorities 
over Basque participation in such international agreements began with the 1997 
reform of the Concierto of 1981, when a clause (Article 5.3) was introduced 
specifically establishing that the Spanish state would arrange mechanisms to enable 
the institutions of the Basque Country to ‘collaborate’ in the international 
agreements that may have an impact on the application of the Concierto (Martínez 
Bárbara 2012b: 58). However, no such mechanisms were arranged, leading the 
Basque delegation to request their explicit creation and inclusion at the 2001 
negotiations for a new Concierto agreement (to replace the 1981 legislation set to 
expire that year) (Martínez Bárbara 2012b: 58; Rubí Cassinello 2003: 38). This 
                                                
127 Personal interviews with senior officials in the provincial treasury departments, 2014. 
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became one of the most controversial topics of the reform process (Rubí Cassinello 
2003: 37; Lucas Murillo 2005: 97).128  
           The Basque delegation had proposed that the Basque institutions should 
participate in Spain’s preparatory meetings for Ecofin and the Spanish delegation to 
the Ecofin working groups and meetings.129 The Spanish negotiating team under the 
then Spanish treasury minister Cristóbal Montoro, however, wanted instead to 
include the Basque participation within the general framework for the participation 
of the regions in EU matters, through the Sectoral Conference designated for that 
purpose (established in Law 2/1997 of 15 March), which gives the regions a weaker 
legal status and no direct representation in Europe (Lucas Murillo 2005: 110). 
Ultimately it was the Basque side that had to back down temporarily to enable the 
new Concierto to be approved belatedly in May 2002 under Law 12/2002. On 30 
December, the same relevant section of the text (Article 5.3) from the 1981 
Concierto law, as modified in 1997, was approved under Article 4.2 of the new 
Concierto in May 2002 under Law 12/2002.  
             At the Basque delegation’s request, it was nevertheless still requested that 
the Joint Commission on the Concierto should reach a bilateral agreement within six 
months to establish the effective participation of the Basque institutions in all 
spheres which impact the Concierto. This would not start to be achieved, however, 
until almost nine years later, as part of a package of transfers from the central to the 
Basque governments agreed in mid 2010 as a quid pro quo when the minority 
Socialist government of Zapatero needed the PNV to support its 2011 budget 
(Martínez Bárbara 2012b: 58; Martínez Bárbara 2014a: 219). From April 2011, 
Basque provincial treasury representatives would start to participate alongside their 
Spanish state counterparts in three key Ecofin working parties addressing fiscal 
questions relevant to the competences afforded to the Basque provinces by the 
Concierto: D4 on Tax Issues; D5 on the Code of Conduct; and D8 on the Fight 
Against Fraud (Martínez Bárbara 2012b: 58; Martínez Bárbara 2014a: 219). In each 
of these groups, the Spanish state representative would still be the one to express the 
Spanish position, but a Basque representative would be allowed to attend as part of 
                                                
128 Personal interviews with senior officials in the Vizcayan provincial treasury department, 
2014. 
129 For a full account of the Basque proposals for participation in Ecofin at the negotiations 
for the 2002 reform of the Concierto, see Lucas Murillo 2005: 97-132. 
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the Spanish delegation. Within the Basque internal tax coordination committee, it 
was agreed that a representative from each of the three provincial treasuries would 
participate in one each of the three working parties, but in practice the provincial 
governments of Álava and Guipúzcoa delegated their respective representation to 
Vizcaya, thus it represents the Basque perspective in all three (Martínez Bárbara 
2012b: 59).130  
           The measures taken in these working groups primarily affect corporate taxes. 
For example, the Code of Conduct group (on corporate taxation) dates back to 1 
December 1997, when an Ecofin resolution approved to create such a group to 
evaluate corporate tax measures that provoke harmful competition between member 
states, as one of various measures to reduce such practices. The resolution was not 
legally binding (since sovereignty for direct taxation over companies lies with the 
member states), but nevertheless it was a formal political commitment entered into 
by member state governments. In late 1999, the group’s first final report about 
potentially harmful measures (with 66 identified in the EU in total) included 
reference to one Basque tax measure (Martínez Bárbara 2014a: 223). The working 
party has remained in operation since then, with Basque representatives joining the 
Spanish delegation for the first time in April 2011. One of the most significant 
efforts underway within the EU towards some degree of harmonisation or at least 
consolidation over corporate taxes, in which the Basque treasury representatives now 
participate via working party D4 (on Tax Issues), is the work towards a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), which would create a new tax code for 
the EU (in addition to the already existing 27 national tax codes) (Martínez Bárbara 
2014a: 226-229). EU member states would retain their national competence over 
setting corporation tax rates, but they would develop a set of common rules to 
determine the tax base of companies with operations in several member states.  
The Basque provincial treasury representatives who participate in these 
Ecofin working groups as part of the Spanish delegation see this as a significant step 
forward in securing proper recognition at EU level of the fact that the Basques have 
their own treasuries and design their own legislation on direct taxes, almost to the 
same extent as any EU member state. They regard it as an opportunity to ensure that 
such fiscal autonomy at regional level as well as state level should be properly 
                                                
130 Personal interviews with senior officials in the Vizcayan provincial treasury department, 
2014. 
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reflected in relevant tax harmonisation processes (Martínez Bárbara 2014a: 228). 
Basque provincial treasury representatives suggest that the Spanish authorities – in 
contrast to their German, Belgian and Austrian counterparts – have not taken 
advantage of changes to the EU treaties and legislation that have gradually been 
made over the years to make it easier for regions to be represented within the 
member state delegation within formations of the Council of the European Union, 
where relevant to their competences (Martínez Bárbara 2014b: 99-100; Lucas 
Murillo 2005: 109-116). Since Maastricht, national community rules rather than EU 
law govern the choice of ministerial representation in the Council (Burrows 2007: 
218). Article 146 of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 introduced the principle of 
subsidiarity (that actions should be taken at the most effective level – be it Union, 
national, regional or local) and opened the door to the possibility of member state 
representatives not necessarily belonging to the central government taking part in the 
state’s ministerial representation within formations of the Council, provided the 
chosen representative be ‘authorized to commit the government of that Member 
State’. This was, however, the mere start of a long trajectory, and it was not until the 
Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 that major steps were taken towards recognising the 
importance of local and regional government in the Union and enshrining means for 
their participation in formations of the Council under the subsidiarity principle.  
           Throughout those years from Maastricht to Lisbon, three federal states in 
Europe – Germany, Belgium and Austria – took steps in the 1990s to modify their 
constitutions where necessary to introduce mechanisms to ensure that the common 
position of substate levels of government with relevant legislative competences be 
taken into account by the state delegation (Martínez Bárbara 2014b: 99-100). All 
three federal states also signed a declaration on subsidiarity as part of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam of 1997 to explicitly acknowledge their support for the possibility of 
regional and local involvement in key decisions at EU level where the national 
constitutional structure provides for a division of competences. Germany made the 
relevant changes to its Constitution in 1992 and Austria just prior to joining the EU 
in 1995, while in Belgium the 1994 Cooperation Agreement between the federal 
government and the regions would govern the determination and representation of 
the Belgian position (including representation of substate level interests) in the 
Council. In some cases, these provisions also allow for regional representatives to 
participate in the state delegation (rather than the central government representation 
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simply being obliged to reflect the common position reached previously by the 
regions): the Austrian constitution provides for the possibility that the Länder take 
part in the Council as co-participants with the federal state representative, while the 
Belgian Cooperation Agreement foresees regional representatives acting as 
‘assessors’ to the federal spokesperson in Council formations on subjects where they 
have some competence, or even a regional spokesperson advised by a federal 
assessor in the case of mainly regional competences (Martínez Bárbara 2014b: 99-
100). In non federal but decentralised states too, such provisions have proved 
possible: Scottish ministers have on occasion attended Council meetings as part of 
the UK ministerial team when devolved matters have been under discussion, 
especially the Fisheries Council or the Justice and Home Affairs Council. 
           From 2004, Spain would make provisions to allow the participation of 
regional representatives in EU Council meetings under some of its formations, thus 
starting to follow the example of Germany, Belgium, Austria and the UK (Ramon i 
Sumoy 2005). At the Conference on Matters Related with the European 
Communities (Conferencia de Asuntos Relacionados con las Comunidades 
Europeas, CARCE), which brought together the ministers responsible for European 
affairs of each of the 17 regions with the Spanish minister of Public Administration, 
it was agreed that regional government representatives would start to participate in 
the Spanish delegation at meetings of four out of the nine EU Council formations. 
These would be ‘Agriculture and Fisheries’, ‘Environment’, ‘Employment and 
Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs’ and ‘Education, Youth and Culture’. 
The decision as to which region the representative would come from would be taken 
on an ad hoc basis in the case of Agriculture and Fisheries (depending on the issue 
being discussed, since some are more relevant to some regions than others), but on a 
predetermined rotational basis in the case of the other three – in line with the 
procedures used by the afore-mentioned federal states (Ramon i Sumoy 2005).  
          No agreement, however, was reached at the same time in 2004 on the potential 
for Basque and Navarran participation in the Ecofin Council. Basque treasury 
representatives attribute the Spanish authorities’ reluctance to allow regional 
representatives to participate in the Spanish delegation in Ecofin in part to their 
reluctance to accept the asymmetry which the Concierto and the Convenio entail for 
the Spanish state. The four EU Council formations to which the Spanish government 
did agree to regional participation from 2004 are relevant to the competences of all 
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the regions, whereas only the Basque and Navarran regions have sufficient fiscal 
competences to seek representation in Ecofin. Only when a minority Spanish 
government needed the support of the PNV did it finally agree to Basque 
participation in certain Ecofin working groups relevant to Basque competences, 
though at the time of writing agreement has not yet been reached to officially reflect 
this in the Concierto legislation. Legal and technical experts in the provincial 
treasuries ultimately aspire to go further and achieve co-representation with the 
Spanish state representative within the Spanish delegation at Ecofin meetings, rather 
than solely the working groups. They nevertheless recognise that the markedly 
political character of the Council meetings makes it highly unlikely that the Spanish 
authorities would agree to such a proposal in the foreseeable future (Martínez 
Bárbara 2014a: 231).  
            Meanwhile, political opponents of the PNV still suggest that the desire of 
nationalist-led Basque institutions to participate in Ecofin meetings is motivated to a 
significant extent by political considerations – the desire for a degree of Basque 
protagonism in Europe – rather than strict technical necessity.131 They also argue that 
the majority of the matters that the Ecofin Council meetings deal with concern policy 
areas beyond the Basque regional and provincial governments’ remit. Taxation 
issues, where the Basques do have significant competences, are the only one of the 
many matters that Ecofin addresses; others include economic policy coordination, 
oversight of member states’ budgetary policies and public finances, financial 
services and markets, the single currency, and the coordination of EU positions for 
international meetings (e.g. IMF). These matters do not correspond to the Basque 
region since the Concierto agreement governs the raising of taxes and the payment of 
the Basque annual quota to Madrid only. When it comes to other financial matters 
such as budgetary stability and debt issuances and deficit targets, the Basque region 
must conform to the same rules set by Spain for the rest of the country’s autonomous 
communities, though the Concierto of 2002 did make preliminary steps to start to 
introduce provisions for bilateral Spanish-Basque coordination over some such 
matters (see Chapter 4, p.140). 
          This stalemate makes it difficult to reconcile perspectives on the potential for 
Basque participation in Ecofin. Beyond the question of political will and consensus 
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within Spain itself, however, the primarily state-centric nature of the EU framework 
still poses considerable obstacles to the fullest development of substate fiscal 
autonomy such as that sought by Basque nationalist authorities. As already 
discussed, for example, the EU framework limits the possibilities for legislative 
autonomy over indirect taxation at substate level. With regard to regional 
participation in Council formations, if the regional minister does attend the Council, 
he/she must represent the view of the state as a whole and not a regional interest. 
Agreement between regional and state ministers over national positions must thus be 
reached prior to Council meetings, as the Council is not the appropriate forum to 
reflect internal territorial interests or differences within member states. The heavily 
politicised nature of many of the disputes between Spanish and Basque authorities 
internally within Spain over Basque fiscal decisions could risk having a negative 
impact on their ability to reach agreements over the national position to be reflected 
in Council formations. Moreover, it is not clear whether such a system in which 
regional interests may be taken into account when the state delegation forms its 
position, but nevertheless must ultimately be subordinate to the position of the state 
as a whole, can suffice to satisfy the PNV’s view of the Basque treasuries as almost 
equally sovereign in matters of direct taxation as the Spanish treasury. At the 
moment, only the Basque and Navarran treasuries have fiscal autonomy in Spain, 
thus they alone have sufficient grounds to request representation in Ecofin. But if 
other autonomous communities in Spain were to acquire more extensive fiscal 
powers in future, the Basques would in that case likely need to accept that any 
representation they might achieve in Ecofin working groups or meetings might 
become on a strictly rotational basis with other regions – as occurs in other matters 
and in the above-mentioned federal states such as Austria and Germany, who have 
regulated the participation of their regions under the subsidiarity principle. Would 
this suffice to satisfy the PNV when it sees the Concierto as a form of fiscal 
sovereignty in Europe which grants its treasuries almost the same level of fiscal 
powers as member state treasuries? 
 
Conclusion 
           Throughout the 1990s and first few years of the 2000s, after the Basque 
provincial treasuries had started to make full use of their legislative powers over 
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corporation tax from 1988 onwards, they faced various technical hurdles to secure 
recognition of the Concierto at EU level and its fit within the EU context. The EU 
required one fairly straightforward change to be made to the Concierto legislation – 
to ensure that residents elsewhere in Spain and residents elsewhere in the EU, but 
operating in the Basque provinces, would both be equally eligible to apply Basque 
corporation tax legislation. More complex, however, was the task of securing EU 
understanding of the Basque treasuries’ right to set different corporation tax rates 
and incentives from the Spanish state without these being considered regionally 
selective state aids. In this regard, political factors both at EU level and at home in 
Spain did not help matters: EU officials seeking greater tax centralisation were 
inevitably influenced to some degree by their concerns that member states might use 
tax decentralisation as a means to give state aids, while internal disputes reigned 
within Spain between Spanish and Basque authorities over the extent to which 
Basque provincial corporation tax legislation could differ from Spanish legislation 
given the requirement for ‘harmonisation’ with the latter. At this stage, then, the EU 
posed both technical and political obstacles to the Basque Concierto, which were 
further exacerbated by political differences back home in Spain over the model. 
           Since the Azores tax ruling of 2006 confirmed the right of the Basque 
treasuries to set different corporation tax legislation from Spain without this being 
considered regionally selective, the Concierto’s position within the EU has been 
safeguarded and strengthened. This, combined with gradual changes to the EU 
Treaty over the years to allow for the participation of regional representatives within 
state delegations under the principle of subsidiarity where relevant to their 
competences, has led members of the PNV and some senior officials in the 
provincial treasury departments to argue that the EU itself no longer poses an 
obstacle to the development of the Concierto in the EU context. Rather, they suggest 
the main obstacle to representation of the Basque perspective on fiscal matters in EU 
decision-making bodies is now resolutely political opposition from the Spanish 
authorities, rather than technical or legal obstacles at the EU or Spanish levels. 
Certainly, Spanish-Basque discrepancies in political perspectives on the Concierto, 
especially on the degree of fiscal autonomy or even sovereignty that it affords, limit 
the ability of the Basque authorities to secure representation in the Spanish 
delegation in relevant decision-making bodies and develop the Concierto as a model 
of fiscal sovereignty in Europe to the extent that they would wish. At the same time, 
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however, obstacles to such development – even if the Spanish state were to agree to 
it without reservation – still persist at EU level. The principle of subsidiarity in force 
encourages state delegations to take into account regional interests where relevant 
when forming their position, but nevertheless the Council is not the place for 
reflecting internal territorial discrepancies within a member state. This would not be 
possible for practical reasons, thus individual regional interests ultimately remain 
subordinate to the position of the state in its entirety. If the PNV seeks to use the 
bilateral nature of the Concierto to create a partnership of ‘equals’ (and indeed 
extend this to other areas of Basque-Spanish relations beyond the Concierto), it is 
not clear how exactly this could be accommodated in the current EU framework.  
             The EU thus offers some opportunities but also continues to pose a number 
of obstacles to the development of substate fiscal autonomy verging on sovereignty 
in EU member states. Importantly, however, the fact that the PNV focuses on the 
Spanish state as the main obstacle to a greater Basque participation at EU level in 
fiscal and other matters, rather than the EU framework itself, serves to intensify the 
clash between the PNV’s pro-sovereignty territorial agenda and the more centralist 
vision of most Spanish parties. In their analysis of the rise and fall of the Ibarretxe 
Plan, Keating and Bray (2006: 362) suggested that ‘Europe, instead of providing a 
forum where new ideas such as sovereignty can be discussed, is being utilized as a 
conveniently malleable concept for backing quite different political visions and 
ambition’. Several years later, analysis of the Basque trajectory suggests that this 
continues to be the case. The clash in political perspectives as to what the EU could 
mean for the future of the Concierto has become increasingly apparent of late in the 
response of PNV representatives to the challenges made by the centre-right party 
Ciudadanos, the Spanish party which most opposes the Concierto. The views of the 
PNV and Ciudadanos on what the prospect of a European fiscal union would mean 
for the Basque Concierto are polar opposites. PNV spokesperson Josu Erkoreka, for 
example, has argued that ‘a fiscal union should be no obstacle to allowing the fiscal 
and financial powers of the Basques institutions, by virtue of the Concierto, to keep 
reaching the same level as those afforded by the EU to member states in a new 
context of increasingly limited fiscal sovereignty’ (Erkoreka 2012)132 – a statement 
which is emblematic of the vision of the PNV that the process of increasing fiscal 
                                                
132 See also ‘PNV reclama que los poderes fiscales tributarios vascos sigan equiparados a los 
de estados si se llega a una unión fiscal europea’, Europa Press, 05.08.12. 
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harmonisation within the EU will ultimately put the Basque and Spanish treasuries 
on an equal footing in Europe. In stark contrast, Ciudadanos has argued that the 
fiscal harmonisation process in Europe will eventually result in the Basque and 
Navarran financing systems being replaced by the common system. In other words, 
in a climate of ever increasing fiscal harmonisation among member states within the 
EU, it suggests that specific tax systems at substate level are likely to be rendered 
‘obsolete’. 133  These different perspectives have been the source of much 
controversy.134 At present, the issue of developing the Concierto further within the 
EU context is not an immediately pressing one for the PNV, and debates over 
questions such as the Basque participation in Ecofin remain primarily at a technical 
level. The polarisation in perceptions as to what opportunities or obstacles the EU 
creates for the development of shared sovereignty within a state in fiscal matters and 
beyond nevertheless points to the challenges that could lie ahead for Spanish-Basque 
relations.   
  
                                                
133 For example, ‘Ciudadanos vuelve a cargar contra el Concierto vasco’, Noticias de 
Guipúzcoa, 05.04.16 
134 For example, ‘El Gobierno vasco denuncia la ignorancia supina de Ciudadanos sobre el 
Concierto Económico’, Deia, 05.04.16; ‘Ciudadanos y el PNV se enzarzan por el 
Concierto’, El Diario Vasco, 04.04.16 
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Chapter 6 
The intra-regional dynamics of the Concierto:  
Fiscal and political relations within the Basque region 
 
           The Concierto is a bilateral agreement which governs fiscal relations between 
the Basque and Spanish authorities, but one which is also affected by complex intra-
regional dynamics within the Basque region, since the model affords tax-raising 
powers to each of the three provincial governments for historical reasons, rather than 
to the regional government. Both the Concierto legislation and the Basque Statute of 
Autonomy grant tax-raising powers to the Basque provinces, in accordance with the 
First Additional Disposition of the Spanish Constitution. Each province raises the 
revenues in its territory, which are then distributed among three levels of public 
administration responsible for different areas of spending within the region (the 
regional government, the provincial governments, and the municipal or local 
authorities), after payment of the annual quota to the central Spanish government. 
This chapter is designed to investigate the intra-regional dynamics in relation to the 
Concierto and their implications for the territorial strategies and behaviour of the 
PNV. What are the consequences of the complex nature of the intra-regional 
dimension of the Concierto for fiscal and political relations between different 
provinces and political forces within the region itself? And how has this contributed 
to shaping the PNV’s behaviour regarding not only the balance of powers between 
provincial and regional authorities, but also the relationship of the Basque region as a 
whole to Spain?  
         The main argument of the chapter is twofold. First, it is argued that the intra-
regional and inter-provincial nature of the Concierto has had a significant impact on 
the PNV’s own coherence, or rather its lack thereof. The heterogeneity of the PNV 
(partly across territories) and the changing political map at provincial level make 
strategic consistency difficult for the party, thereby reducing the possibilities for 
shifts from one position to another. Notwithstanding the diversity of the PNV, the 
conservative wing most closely connected with business is strongest in Vizcaya. 
While pro-independence leanings within the party are generally considered strongest 
in Guipúzcoa, more moderate, pro-autonomy tendencies are associated first and 
foremost with Vizcaya. Conservatism and moderation have traditionally dominated 
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in Álava too, though it has experienced a more mixed picture with an occasional 
shift in the balance of forces (Gillespie 2015c).135  Vizcaya is both the PNV’s 
stronghold in the Basque region (the party has governed the province consistently 
since the first provincial elections of the democratic period in 1979), and also the one 
that raises the most revenues, accounting for around 50% of the Basque region’s 
GDP (see Table 8). It is argued here that this revenue-raising power of Vizcaya has 
given the Vizcayan provincial government a strong weight and negotiating power 
within the region as a whole, thereby contributing to the dominance of the PNV in 
the region, as well as increasing the influence of the Vizcayan wing of the PNV 
within the party.  
 
Table 8: Basic statistics for the Basque provinces and region 
 
 Alava Guipuzcoa Vizcaya Basque region 
Area (sq km) 3037 (42.0%) 1980 (27.4%) 2217 (30.6%) 7234 (100%) 
Population 324036 
(14.8%) 
717755 
(32.8%) 
1147302 
(52.4%) 
2189093 
(100%) 
GDP (€bn)  10.9 (16.3%) 22.1 (33.0%) 33.9 (50.7%) 66.9 (100%) 
Sources: area data from Anuario Estadístico de España, 2000, INE; population data 
(provisional) from the Padron 1 January 2016, INE; GDP from the Basque Region 
Statistics Agency (Eustat), 2014 advance data 
 
Second, it is argued that the intraregional dimension of the Concierto has 
reduced the possibilities for nationalist alignment between the PNV and parties of 
the Basque izquierda abertzale to advance a pro-sovereignty agenda for the Basque 
Country. This is because their discrepancies over left-right politics, which have 
emerged through their respective uses of the fiscal powers afforded by the Concierto, 
have highlighted the competitive dynamic between them, reducing the possibilities 
for their collaboration on territorial issues. Aside from their vision of an independent 
Euskal Herria, most of the parties of the izquierda abertzale are also known for their 
radical anti-capitalist ideology. After ETA ceased its violence, the izquierda 
abertzale re-entered formal politics from 2011 onwards (after bans on previous 
parties, most notably Batasuna), winning power in the province of Guipúzcoa that 
year. The open question would become whether a form of pro-sovereignty alliance 
between the PNV and Bildu to advance territorial agendas concerning the 
relationship of the Basque Country to Spain would become possible. In this regard, 
                                                
135 On the PNV in Álava, see De Pablo 2008. This is one of the very few studies of the party 
at provincial or local level. 
172	
 
there would be a long list of obstacles, including most notably the still recent history 
of violence, the lack of experience of the izquierda abertzale in democratic 
government, and competition between both the PNV and the izquierda abertzale to 
lead a pro-sovereignty process, as well as differences between them in the degree of 
sovereignty sought and which parts of the Basque homeland this would embrace. 
This chapter argues that the experience of the izquierda abertzale entering seriously 
into formal politics for the first time and with a significant political presence, 
governing at provincial level in Guipúzcoa, also drew attention to the gulf between 
the PNV and the izquierda abertzale on issues of fiscal and social policy, particularly 
the use of the fiscal powers afforded by the Concierto, which therefore reduced the 
potential for a nationalist alignment more widely too. 
            The sections that follow start by introducing the debate over the balance of 
powers between the regional and provincial levels of government that has shaped the 
legislation on the intra-regional dimension of the Concierto. Next, the chapter 
analyses the two main areas of how the Concierto works within the Basque region – 
(1) intra-regional revenue-raising and resource distribution and (2) inter-provincial 
tax harmonisation – and the main unresolved areas of controversy in these spheres 
between different provinces and different political forces in the Basque Country. 
These analyses will be used as a foundation to understand the implications for the 
PNV’s behaviour towards the Basque region’s territorial problematics regarding both 
the balance of powers within the region and the relationship of the region as a whole 
to Spain.  
 
Legislative background: The regional-provincial debate 
           The Concierto law of 1981, subsequently replaced with a new, updated 
version in 2002, focuses primarily on bilateral fiscal and financial relations between 
the Basque region as a whole and the Spanish central government. It is instead the 
Basque Law of Historical Territories (Ley de Territorios Históricos, LTH) of 1983 
that sets the basis for how the Concierto functions within the Basque region, in terms 
of fiscal and financial relations between regional and provincial administrations and 
among the provinces themselves (Reta 2002: 184-185). Article 42 of the Statute of 
Autonomy stipulated that the Basque parliament would approve a law to establish 
the provinces’ contribution to the regional government, which materialised as the 
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LTH. The Law in its entirety governs both the distribution of competences between 
different levels of Basque administration (regional, provincial, municipal), as well as 
the principles for how these should be financed. The latter financial dimension is 
what concerns us here and is regulated under Part II of the Law, providing the 
procedural basis for the intra-regional and inter-provincial dimension of the 
Concierto.  
           The drafting of the LTH at the start of the 1980s brought to the fore the clash 
between different political parties in the Basque region, and indeed within the PNV 
itself, over what the balance of powers between the traditional provinces and the new 
regional level of government should be going forward (De Pablo and Mees 2005: 
412-421). The First Additional Disposition of the Constitution, which pledged to 
‘respect the historical rights of the foral territories’, was fundamentally taken as a 
reference to the historical tradition of the Basque (and Navarran) provinces in raising 
their own taxes – the last vestige of the original ‘fueros’ or legal charters between 
Castile and each province to have survived. And yet since the Constitution also 
created a regional level of government which united the three Basque provinces of 
Álava, Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa for the first time, a clash in perspectives would ensue 
regarding to what extent the regional level of government should take precedence 
over the provinces going forward. Should the provinces be reduced to simply 
administrative bodies (much like the provinces elsewhere in Spain) or should they 
retain greater autonomy and competences? The Basque provinces, unlike all other 
provinces in Spain, retained elected governments (diputaciones) and parliaments 
(juntas generales) under the Basque Statute of Autonomy. The Concierto of 1981 
itself had provided a form of halfway house between regional and provincial 
administrations: it respected tradition in the sense that the three Basque provinces 
would retain their responsibility for tax collection, and yet bilateral relations under 
the Concierto would take place for the first time between Madrid and the Basque 
autonomous community as a whole following its creation during the Transition, 
under which system the Basque provinces would for the first time combine to pay 
one single Basque quota to Madrid. Navarre, where the province coincided with the 
newly created autonomous community of the same name, largely avoided this 
complexity.  
        Carlos Garaikoetxeta, then PNV head of the Basque government, favoured 
centralising powers at regional government level, putting arguments concerning 
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efficiency and rationalisation ahead of tradition. The first draft of the LTH and the 
Basque government’s first budget, both presented in May 1981, reflected this vision, 
but he faced a backlash from certain sectors of his own party and other political 
forces which sought to retain a greater role for the provinces and envisaged a more 
confederal rather than centralised Basque Country (De Pablo and Mees 2005: 412-
421). Opposition from within the PNV was led first and foremost by Emilio 
Guevara, head of the provincial government of Álava and PNV spokesperson 
(Castells and Cajal 2009: 359-361; De Pablo 2008: 355-360). The Concierto 
agreement of 1981 with the Basque region as a whole was largely made possible by 
the fact that the Concierto had never been abolished in Álava, which explains why 
the defence of the provincial level during the LTH debate would be particularly 
strong from that province. Emilio Guevara was supported in his stance by the Álava 
section of the PNV (ABB) and indeed by all parties in the provincial government at 
that time (PNV, UCD, PSOE and two independents). With regard to the Concierto in 
particular, Guevara rejected, for example, Garaikeotxeta’s proposal (as reflected in 
the draft budget) that the Basque government should decide unilaterally the financial 
contributions (Aportaciones) that each provincial treasury should make to the 
regional government to cover its spending competences, proposing instead a 
bilaterally pacted flow of funds as part of a more confederal vision of the 
relationship between the provinces and the regional government. In his opposition to 
Garaikoetxeta’s centralising vision, Guevara was also joined by influential PNV 
members in other Basque provinces – most notably José María Makua, head of the 
Vizcayan provincial government (Castells and Cajal 2009: 359-361; De Pablo 2008: 
355-360). 
             Ultimately, given the extent of the backlash within the PNV itself, the final 
version of the LTH approved in 1983 was a much watered-down version of the 
original draft, offering a more confederal rather than centralised vision of the Basque 
region. In many respects the final text was somewhat ambiguous rather than rigidly 
prescriptive regarding the balance of powers between the regional and provincial 
levels, but it left the door open to a greater role for the provinces than the initial draft 
had done. The frictions within the PNV that the issue had caused would prove 
insurmountable. Garaikoetxeta would resign from his role as lehendakari in 
December 1984 (to be replaced by José Antonio Ardanza from January 1985), leave 
the PNV and subsequently found his own new party, Eusko Alkartasuna (EA) in 
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1986. The split was a traumatic one for the PNV which weakened the party 
significantly. The PNV immediately lost 11 deputies in regional parliament, and at 
the regional elections of November 1986 (the first under Ardanza) it still won but 
with only 17 seats, down from 32 at the previous elections in February 1984, when 
the party was still united under Garaikeotxeta’s leadership (De Pablo and Mees 
2005: 422). The situation made it necessary for the PNV to enter into a coalition 
with the Basque Socialists (PSE) to form a government, an arrangement which 
would be repeated following subsequent elections and thus become a longstanding 
one (1987-1996).  
           Given the traumatic events that the debate over the provincial and regional 
balance of powers had caused, the PNV would thereafter seek to avoid revisiting the 
issue, with the result that the ambiguous parameters of the final draft of the LTH of 
1983 still stand today. The PNV has sought to maintain a compromise solution 
balancing provincial and regional powers, by respecting the role of the provinces as 
home to the Basque treasuries and seeking to negotiate agreements between the 
provinces and the regional government on fiscal and financial matters, rather than 
imposing decisions on the provinces taken unilaterally by the regional government. 
The fact that Vizcaya has proved the PNV’s most reliable stronghold in the region (it 
has won every provincial election there in the democratic period – see Table 9, 
p.176) has inevitably contributed to the continued respect for the autonomy of the 
provincial level within the PNV. For the Basque PP too, defending the provincial 
level has remained of fundamental importance, due to the party’s weight in Álava in 
particular – a historical stronghold of the Spanish right which it reclaimed when the 
PP won the provincial elections in Álava for the first time in the democratic period in 
1999, since when it has usually alternated with the PNV in the provincial 
government, winning every other election (see Table 9, p.176). The Basque PP is 
arguably even more defensive of the provincial level than the PNV, in the sense that 
it rejects the PNV’s attempts to develop the Concierto as an instrument of fiscal 
sovereignty for the Basque region as a whole as the basis for ever greater autonomy 
from Spain, arguing that this distorts the conception of the original Concierto based 
on the individual provinces. In contrast, there has emerged a broad consensus among 
left-wing parties in the Basque region – both the PSE (the Basque federation of the 
Spanish Socialist Party) as well as EA and the radical left-wing secessionists under 
the izquierda abertzale – that one central treasury for the Basque region would be 
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preferable to separate treasuries at provincial level, privileging reasons of efficiency 
and equality over tradition. 
 
Table 9: Basque provincial election results, 2007-2015
  
          In all cases, however, some nuances are required to these overall party visions, 
since much also depends on political circumstances. Party representatives at 
provincial level inevitably end up defending their own province’s interests first and 
foremost, over and above the party’s wider interests or views in the region as a 
whole.136 The izquierda abertzale has always been fiercely critical of the Concierto as 
insufficient since it seeks secession for Euskal Herria and considers the Concierto a 
form of out-dated subordination to Spain.137 It also accuses the Spanish government 
of using the Concierto and the Convenio during the Transition to seek to separate 
                                                
136 Personal interviews with senior officials in the provincial treasury departments of 
Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, 2014-2015. 
137 See, for example, the tirade against the Concierto Xabier Olano (Director of the Treasury 
of Guipúzcoa in 2011-2015) delivered in a speech in 2002 (Olano 2002).  
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Navarre from the rest of the Basque Country, since the three Basque provinces 
started to make one joint quota payment.138 Nevertheless, it would need to clarify its 
views on how it would actually use the Concierto once it won power to govern in 
Guipúzcoa for the first time in 2011-2015 and thus took control of the Guipúzcoan 
treasury. Key representatives of Bildu clearly joined other left-wing parties in 
criticising the existence of three separate treasuries in such a small territory as 
inefficient, especially given the extent of mobility of capital in the 21st century. And 
yet since Bildu had power in Guipúzcoa and had a more left-wing social and fiscal 
agenda from the PNV and the PP in power at the time in Vizcaya and Álava 
respectively, it would at the same time come to resent attempts by the overall 
majority within the region to force Guipúzcoa into line with the other two provinces’ 
fiscal decisions, seeking to assert the province’s autonomy. Meanwhile, the Basque 
PP strongly defends the provincial level of government, yet this has not prevented it 
from favouring tax harmonisation almost to the extent of uniformity throughout the 
Basque region as a whole (to the detriment of provincial autonomy), criticising the 
afore-mentioned Guipúzcoan government for attempting to step out of line with the 
reigning centre-right ethos in Vizcaya and Álava at the time. 
           The fact that the main precepts of the LTH of 1983 have remained unchanged, 
and that the balance of powers between regional and provincial governments remains 
politically controversial, has had significant implications for the Concierto. Much of 
the legislation relevant to the intra-regional functioning of the Concierto has barely 
been updated, if at all, since the 1980s, given the different political views on the 
matter. The fact that the three provinces are responsible for collecting taxes and set 
their own legislation for direct taxes raises a number of complex questions within the 
region. These include how the revenues should be distributed between regional and 
provincial levels of government; what tax harmonisation measures should be in place 
to avoid the risk of significant tax distortions between the Basque provinces; and 
what means of coordination and collaboration between provincial and regional 
governments over fiscal matters are required. Indeed, many of the controversial 
issues between the Basque region and the rest of Spain over the Concierto discussed 
in earlier chapters – for example, to what extent the Basques should contribute to 
revenue redistribution within Spain, or how rigidly to interpret the harmonisation 
                                                
138 Personal interviews with Laura Mintegi (Bildu) and with senior treasury officials in the 
Guipúzcoan provincial government, 2014. 
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criteria between Basque and Spanish tax legislation – bear parallels with some of the 
sources of contention within the Basque region itself between regional and 
provincial administrations and between the different provinces. And in both cases 
(Spanish-Basque bilateral relations and intra-regional Basque relations), different 
political interests at different levels of government heavily influence the outcome of 
such sources of contention in fiscal and financial relations.  
 
How the Concierto works within the Basque region (1): Revenue-
raising and resource distribution 
           Article 22 of Part II Chapter II of the LTH stipulates the basic principles and 
procedure that must be followed to decide how the tax revenues raised by the three 
Basque provinces should then be distributed between the regional government and 
the provinces to finance their respective competences (the provinces, in turn, then 
also make a smaller payment to their respective local authorities or municipalities). 
The exact methodology for the distribution of resources and contribution of each 
province to the regional government are decided in meetings of the Basque Council 
of Public Finances (Consejo Vasco de Finanzas Públicas), in accordance with the 
criteria stipulated in Article 22 of the LTH, and then set in a contribution law (Ley de 
Aportaciones), to be approved by the Basque parliament.139 The contribution law 
must comprise a single article, thus it is not subject to partial amendment. The 
contribution law determines how much each province must transfer to the Basque 
regional government (their aportación or contribution), as well as how much of the 
Basque quota to the central government each must pay. It also recommends a 
minimum share of revenues each should give to the local authorities in their territory. 
Since the Basque regional government has by far the most spending competences 
within the region and yet raises almost no revenues of its own (since revenue-raising 
powers are almost entirely concentrated in the hands of the Basque provinces), it is 
actually the regional government with the least revenue-raising powers in Spain, 
even though the Basque region as a whole has far greater revenue-raising powers 
than any other region. Under the LTH, each contribution law originally had to be 
valid for at least 3 tax years (Article 22.8). Since 1992, however, the contribution 
                                                
139 On the technicalities of how the Concierto works internally in the Basque region, see 
Zubiri 2010: 71-78. 
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laws have been five-yearly so that they run more or less in tandem with the five-
yearly quota laws governing the payment of the Basque region to the Spanish central 
government (Zurutuza 2014: 6). The contribution law is usually negotiated and 
approved shortly after the quota law. In practice, all the contribution laws approved 
so far have tended to be very similar, since conflicting political interests make it very 
difficult to push through any changes to the calculation of the contributions 
(mirroring the problem with the quota laws).140 The Basque Council of Public 
Finances usually meets twice per year, once in February to settle the final revenues 
for the previous year and thus the final contributions, and once in October to draw up 
the Basque budget (the regional government needs to collaborate with the provinces 
over this since the latter raise the revenues to be spent primarily by the regional 
government). 
           The total resources of the Basque region comprise the tax revenues raised by 
the provinces and, in much smaller measure, some additional financing for certain 
specific competences provided directly to the Basque regional government by the 
central Spanish government. These include funds to contribute to the additional costs 
of the Basque regional police, the Ertzaintza (for historical reasons, due to the 
history of terrorism); and special financing for specific expenditure policies to cover 
the cost of policies to promote economic development and ensure the political and 
economic stability of the Basque region. Once the annual quota has been paid to the 
central government (a joint payment to which all three provinces contribute a share 
of their revenues), the remaining bulk of the revenues raised by the Basque provinces 
provide the common resources to be shared between different levels of government 
in the Basque region to cover general competences. These are distributed according 
to a vertical coefficient (which determines the total amount the provincial 
governments must pay to the Basque regional government) and horizontal 
coefficients (which determine how the amount to be paid to the regional government 
should be split between the three provinces), with some final adjustments (Zubiri 
2010: 74-78; Zurutuza 2014). Lastly, of the common resources that remain in the 
hands of the provinces after they have paid the contribution to the regional 
government, a proportion also goes to the municipalities or local authorities. Figure 
4 and the following subsections explain this split in resources in more detail. 
                                                
140 Personal interviews with senior officials in the provincial treasury departments, 2014. 
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Figure 4 – Revenue raising and resource distribution in the Basque region 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Zubiri 2010: 78 and Article 22 of Part II Chapter 
II of the Ley de Territorios Históricos (LTH)  
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Vertical coefficient 
The vertical coefficient determines how much the Basque government 
receives of the common resources (i.e. the remaing resources to be used within the 
Basque region after the quota has been paid to Madrid) to fulfil its general spending 
competences. This was last set at 70.04% under the 2007-2011 contribution law, 
which was subsequently also rolled over from 2012. In other words, the Basque 
government is due 70.04% of the common resources for general spending 
competences in the Basque region, while the remaining 29.96% remains in the hands 
of the provincial authorities. The trend to date has been a gradual increase in the 
share of the Basque government in the common resources, rising from 64.25% under 
the first contribution law in force in 1986-1988 to the current level of approximately 
70% (Zubiri 2010: 74).  
 
Horizontal coefficients 
Horizontal distribution coefficients then determine what proportion of the 
contribution to the Basque government is covered by each of the three provinces, as 
well as what proportion of the quota payment to the central government they each 
pay. 70% of the horizontal coefficient of each province is based on its income 
(average provincial GDP relative to that of the region over the prior four years) while 
30% is based on its tax capacity relative to that of the other provinces. Indicators of 
tax capacity are used instead of the figures for actual tax collection, in order to 
incentivise efficient tax management. The horizontal coefficients are calculated each 
year under the methodology approved in the contribution laws, with Vizcaya (as the 
largest province) always accounting for the largest share (typically in the region of 
50-52%), followed by Guipúzcoa (around 32%-34%) and then Álava (around 14%-
16%) (Zubiri 2010: 76). 
 
Final adjustments  
Two final adjustments are made to the horizontal distribution in an attempt to 
ensure the model produces fair outcomes, the first of which aims to share out indirect 
tax revenues appropriately using the horizontal coefficients (Zubiri 2010: 75). For 
the second adjustment, a General Adjustment Fund (Fondo General de Ajuste) aims 
to make sure that the final share each province receives of total tax collection (after 
payment of the contribution and the adjustment for indirect taxes) is equal to at least 
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99% of its horizontal coefficient (Zubiri 2010: 75; Zurutuza 2014: 8-9). The Fund is 
endowed with contributions from the Basque government (which provides a 
proportion in line with its vertical coefficient) and from any province whose final 
share of total tax collection is above 99% of its horizontal coefficient. The Fund is 
relatively small since it is designed for final adjustment purposes only, with its 
maximum size capped at 1% of the total common resources to be shared.  
 
Final distribution of resources 
  The contribution law recommends a minimum transfer to the local authorities 
of 54.6% of the share of the common resources left in the hands of the provinces, 
after both the 70.04% paid to the regional government and some further deductions 
specified in the Fourth Additional Disposition of the contribution law. Ultimately, 
following the transfers to the central government (via the quota), the Basque regional 
government (via the contribution) and the local authorities, the provincial 
governments are left with around only 18% for themselves of the total revenues they 
actually collect. The distribution of total revenues among different governmental 
levels has remained broadly consistent since 1997 (when the Concierto was 
developed to give the Basque region significant new tax-raising powers), with at 
least 60% going to the Basque government, around 18% to the provinces, around 
11% to the local authorities and approximately the same to the central government 
for the quota, though the relative proportion paid to the central government declined 
rapidly during the financial crisis to around 8%, since state tax collection decreased 
more rapidly than Basque tax collection) (Zubiri 2010: 77-78). It might be expected 
that this would give few incentives to the Basque provinces to raise taxes effectively, 
since they keep so few of the proceeds for themselves, but the reality of tax 
collection outcomes suggests otherwise, since the provincial governments accept 
their duty to provide the necessary resources for the Basque public sector in its 
entirety to benefit both the individual provinces and the region as a whole (Zubiri 
2010: 77-78). 
 
Intra-regional distribution of resources: The controversies 
           Virtually all the controversies concerning the intra-regional distribution of 
resources relate to different aspects of the way in which the horizontal coefficients 
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and distribution model work.141 In this regard, the main controversy – on which we 
shall focus here – is the extent of the imbalance in the final distribution of resources 
between provinces. The idea behind the design of the horizontal coefficients, which 
determine how much each province contributes to the Basque regional government 
(via the contributions) and also to the Spanish central government (via the quota), 
was to incentivise competition in tax collection among the three provinces and thus 
promote efficient tax management. Nevertheless, there have been criticisms from 
Guipúzcoa and Álava since the coefficients have ended up favouring Vizcaya in the 
past decade. The figures for the final revenues left in the hands of each province after 
payment of the contribution and quota reveal that the model results in significant 
differences in levels of resources, both in per capita terms and as a percentage of 
GDP. Despite being the province with the lowest relative GDP per capita, Vizcaya 
has ended up with the greatest resources both as a percentage of GDP and per capita 
(Zubiri 2010: 76). This has not always been the case – prior to 1997, the province of 
Vizcaya had been disadvantaged, which was the main factor behind the decision 
reached that year to create the General Adjustment Fund (originally called the 
Solidarity Fund) and also to share out the revenues from excise duties using the 
horizontal coefficients (a decision which would eventually be applied to VAT too), 
in an attempt to alleviate the imbalances negatively affecting Vizcaya.142 For nearly 
the past decade, however, Vizcaya has consistently come out on top even after 
contributing to the General Adjustment Fund.  
            A study by Sebastian Zurutuza Mujika (2014), of the Guipúzcoan provincial 
treasury department, analyses the results of the horizontal distribution model over the 
period 2007-2013, calculating average annual figures for that seven year period, to 
highlight the imbalances in the model.143 In that period, the proportion of revenues 
raised in each province relative to the horizontal coefficient of each (after the 
adjustment for indirect revenues but prior to application of the General Adjustment 
Fund) was higher than the horizontal coefficient in Vizcaya but lower in Álava and 
Guipúzcoa (see Table 10, p.184). Since the horizontal coefficients are used to 
determine how much each province contributes to the Basque regional government 
                                                
141 Personal interviews with senior officials in the provincial treasury departments, 2014. 
142 Personal interview with senior officials in the treasury department of Vizcaya, 7 
September 2015. 
143 Sebastián Zurutuza and José Luis Hernández Goicoechea, officials in the treasury 
department of Gizpuzkoa, were also interviewed by the author on 7 October 2014. 
184	
 
(as well as to the central government via the quota), this means that Vizcaya gets to 
keep greater resources for its province than Álava and Guipúzcoa. Furthermore, the 
General Adjustment Fund has proven insufficient in size to achieve its aim to ensure 
that each province would keep resources for use within its territory (after payment of 
the quota and the contribution) equivalent to at least 99% of its horizontal coefficient 
(see Table 11). If the average results are calculated in per capita terms, instead of by 
province as a whole, then this reduces to some degree Vizcaya’s advantage and 
Álava’s disadvantage, though Guipúzcoa remains significantly disadvantaged (see 
Table 12).      
       
Table 10 – Provincial revenues raised relative to horizontal coefficient 
Province Total revenues raised in province relative to horizontal coefficient  
Álava 96.81% 
Vizcaya 104.01% 
Guipúzcoa 97.43% 
Source: Based on Zurutuza 2014: 12 
 
Table 11 – Final provincial revenues relative to horizontal coefficient  
Province Yearly average 2007-2013 (after application of the General 
Adjustment Fund) 
Álava 88.13% 
Vizcaya 114.81% 
Guipúzcoa 90.51% 
Total 
provinces 
102.33% (above 100% due to the contribution from the Basque 
regional government to the General Adjustment Fund) 
Source: Based on Zurutuza 2014: 14 
 
Table 12 – Final provincial revenues per capita 
Province Yearly average 2007-2013 (in euros) 
Álava 1,516 
Vizcaya 1,621 
Guipúzcoa 1,369 
Total provinces 1,524 
Source: Based on Zurutuza 2014: 14 
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           Another study, by Ignacio Zubiri (2010: 76), shows the imbalances in final 
resources taking the year 2008 as an example, providing both the final resources per 
capita and as a percentage of GDP in each province. What is particularly interesting 
to note is the fact that Vizcaya, the region with the lowest GDP per capita, ends up 
with the highest resources both per capita and as a % of GDP. This suggests that the 
model is overly redistributive of income, going beyond the recommendations of 
Article 22.4 of the LTH. The latter stipulates that the criteria and methods used to 
distribute resources between regional and provincial administrations in the Basque 
region should, taking as a basis the principle of budgetary sufficiency, provide an 
overall average expenditure policy per capita that is equitable and shows solidarity.           
           A number of potential reasons could explain why the distribution model 
results in inequitable outcomes for the three provinces (Zurutuza 2014: 15). Since 
the horizontal coefficients incorporate indicators of tax capacity (i.e. what a province 
should be able to collect) rather than actual tax collection figures in order to 
incentivise good tax management, the first factor to investigate would be whether, or 
to what extent, different tax legislation or deficits in tax management in some 
provinces explain the imbalances in outcomes. There are also several other possible 
explanations or contributing factors. Does the methodology used to calculate the 
horizontal coefficients (based on 70% income and 30% tax capacity – see p.181) 
actually properly reflect the relative tax-raising power of each province? Is the 
General Adjustment Fund, the total size of which is capped at 1% of the total 
common resources for the region, large enough to correct distortions in the system? 
The Basque regional government, for example, almost consistently contributes the 
maximum permitted to the Fund under the current rules (approximately 0.7% of the 
common resources, since it receives around 70% of these and the Fund constitutes a 
maximum 1% of them in total), and yet this has not proven sufficient to help ensure 
that each province’s share in total Basque tax collection, after payment of the quota 
and contribution and following the final adjustments, reaches at least 99% of its 
horizontal coefficient. Does the Basque regional government receive too large a 
share of the common resources under its vertical coefficient? Beyond the question of 
coefficients, there are some other potentially problematic areas too. The Concierto 
establishes ‘points of connection’ for each tax that determine whether Spanish or 
Basque legislation applies in each case (be it to an individual or a company, 
depending on the tax). If Basque legislation applies, however, it does not then 
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specify further rules to determine which province’s legislation is applicable, which 
must be decided internally within the Basque region (Reta 2002: 180-1). With the 
taxes at risk of most geographical distortion such as Non Residents Tax and 
Corporation Tax (given the complications of deciding where companies are 
domiciled for tax purposes), do the current rules determine appropriately which 
revenues should belong to which province?  
            Addressing these questions properly would require a willingness of all 
government levels involved (the Basque regional government and the three Basque 
provincial governments) to undertake proper analysis and reform of the contribution 
law. There have been seven contribution laws in total, in force respectively in 1985, 
1986-1988, 1989-1991, 1992-1996, 1997-2001, 2002-2006, 2007-2011, the last of 
which was also rolled over from 2012 due to the lack of ability to reach a new 
agreement (mirroring the lack of a new quota law agreement). Most have remained 
very similar under each new version, since conflicting interests between the 
provinces usually prevent meaningful changes, since it is essentially a zero-sum 
game. In 2012 a working group was initiated to address the need for a proper 
overhaul of the law but its progress would prove very slow. Representatives of the 
provincial administration of Guipúzcoa would blame political opposition from the 
Vizcayan provincial government.144 At the time, under the 2011-2015 provincial 
parliamentary term, the three provinces were each governed simultaneously by 
different parties for the first time: the PP in Álava, the PNV in Vizcaya and Bildu in 
Guipúzcoa. As the largest province, home to the region’s largest companies (mainly 
energy companies) and thus the financial powerhouse of the Basque region in terms 
of total resources collected, Vizcaya can hold significant weight in intra-regional 
negotiations over finances and, at times, considerable sway over the Basque regional 
government.145 The fact that Vizcaya has been a PNV stronghold throughout the 
democratic period (the party has governed the province consistently since the first 
provincial elections of the democratic period in 1979) has also increased its influence 
over PNV-led regional governments and within the PNV in general on matters 
pertaining to the Concierto. There have been complaints at times from Álava and 
Guipúzcoa (particularly when these have been governed by political parties other 
                                                
144 Personal interview with Helena Franco and Itziar Miner, 5 September 2014. 
145 Personal interviews with senior officials in the treasury departments of Álava and 
Guipúzcoa, 2014. 
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than the PNV) of relations being centralised around the Basque regional government 
and Vizcaya to the detriment of the other two smaller provinces. Or even of Vizcaya 
seeking to dominate over the regional government too and dictate policy, since the 
regional government is dependent first and foremost on Vizcaya for financing, 
giving the latter significant bargaining power. 
           Senior officials in charge of the technical functioning of the Concierto within 
the Vizcayan provincial government acknowledge the need for an overhaul of the 
contribution law, since Álava and Guipúzcoa have ended up at a consistent 
disadvantage for nearly a decade, but they suggest that negotiations at the political 
level are more challenging.146 The return of the PNV to govern in all three provinces, 
in alliance with the PSE in each, following the 2015 provincial elections, did not 
however look set to promise an easier resolution to the matter either. Since each 
province represents its own interests first and foremost, experience has shown that 
achieving agreements over matters concerning the intra-regional workings of the 
Concierto between provincial governments when all three are controlled by the PNV 
can be even harder than with governments of different political colours, since in such 
circumstances each PNV representative then becomes more defensive of its 
province’s interest relative to the overall party interest. Moreover, the PNV and the 
PSE, in alliance together in all three provinces, hold very different party views on the 
question of the balance of powers between regions and provinces, with the PSE in 
favour of a revision of the LTH to centralise powers more at regional level. 
           These dynamics have had relevant implications for the PNV’s attitude to the 
internal territorial problematic of the balance of powers between regional and 
provincial institutions in the Basque region. Over the decades since the LTH of 1983 
was approved, the PNV has maintained its reluctance to reopen the question and risk 
any revision of the LTH that might threaten the powers of the provinces. The weight 
of the party in Vizcaya, the importance of the provincial level for the party and the 
different party interests in different provinces are fundamental factors that would 
certainly make any such revision fundamentally difficult, even if some sectors of the 
party would prefer greater centralisation at regional level. To some extent, the fact 
that the Vizcayan provincial government holds significant weight in financial matters 
compensates for its relative lack of weight (compared to its population size) in the 
                                                
146 Personal interviews with senior officials in the Vizcayan treasury department, 2014. 
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Basque parliament. The Basque regional parliament has 75 members, with each 
province electing 25, despite their very different population sizes (Vizcaya, the 
largest, has a population more than three times the size of Álava, the smallest). This 
equal distribution of seats was decided upon by Basque forces during the Spanish 
transition to democracy as a means of ensuring support for Basque regional 
autonomy from Álava, the most reluctant province, and to leave open the possibility 
of enticing Navarre to join one day too, with the incentive that it would have 
substantial seats relative to its small population (a further 25, to make 100 seats in 
total). Where Vizcaya is thus relatively underrepresented in Basque regional 
parliament (relative to its population size), the fact that it raises by far the most 
revenues in the region nevertheless gives it weight and negotiating power of a 
different kind both within the region and within the PNV itself. This has contributed 
to the PNV’s dominance in the region as a whole, Vizcaya’s dominance within the 
PNV, and in consequence, the PNV’s continued strong support for the weight 
afforded to the provincial level of government. Since the party’s conservatism and 
pragmatism is strongest in Vizcaya, in part due to the party’s particularly strong 
links to big business there, this also reduces the scope for radical shifts in agenda. 
 
How the Concierto works within the Basque region (2): Inter-
provincial tax harmonisation, coordination and collaboration 
            Another fundamental and equally controversial question is that of inter-
governmental tax harmonisation, coordination and collaboration within the Basque 
region, since each of the three provinces has its own revenue-raising authority and 
therefore could in theory establish a separate tax system to a degree. From the 1980s, 
one of the key questions regarding the balance of powers in relation to the Concierto 
became: To what extent should the Basque parliament exercise a harmonising role 
over taxation, thereby reducing provincial autonomy over fiscal decisions, in order to 
reduce potentially harmful inter-provincial disparities in legislation? The lack of 
consensus over what is meant by harmonisation has added to the complexity of the 
debate. It is generally accepted that tax harmonisation within the Basque region itself 
between the provinces needs to be even stronger than between the Basque region and 
Spanish tax legislation, given the concept of shared risk which characterises the 
intra-regional dimension of the Concierto, whereby all three provinces collect 
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revenues to provide the common resources of the region as a whole (Martínez 
Bárbara 2013: 74-75). But views differ on whether strong harmonisation should 
necessarily require exactly the same tax rates in each province. 
           The Concierto law stipulates the harmonisation rules with Spanish tax 
legislation to which Basque tax legislation is subject and provides the framework to 
create the necessary bilateral bodies or committees to ensure bilateral Spanish-
Basque coordination over the Concierto. Beyond that, however, the Concierto does 
not address what harmonisation or coordination between tax systems is required 
within the Basque region itself between the three provinces. The Basque Statute of 
Autonomy (Article 41.2.a), followed also by the Concierto (Article 3.1.4) and the 
LTH (Article 14.3), put the role of designing the framework for intra-regional tax 
coordination and harmonisation firmly in the hands of the Basque parliament (Reta 
2002: 183-184). The LTH, under Article 14.3, was the first piece of legislation to 
give an indication of the level of tax harmonisation to be required in the Basque 
region. It stipulated that the Basque provincial assemblies, in exercising their 
legislative power over taxation, would ‘regulate uniformly the main elements of the 
different taxes’ (Article 14.3). This gave a clear mandate for inter-provincial 
uniformity in at least the main aspects of each tax, which would reduce provincial 
autonomy over taxation. Nevertheless, the LTH did not have the final word on the 
matter, stating in its Third Transitory Disposition that the stipulations of its Article 
14.3 would only be applicable once expressly provided for in the law on 
coordination, tax harmonisation and collaboration between the Basque provinces to 
be drawn up and approved by the Basque parliament (Martínez Bárbara 2013: 75-
76).  
         The Basque law on tax harmonisation eventually materialised as Law 3/1989, 
of 30 May, on Fiscal Harmonisation, Coordination and Collaboration (hereafter 
Basque Tax Harmonisation Law) – which was later reformed in 1998 under Law 
4/1998 of 6 March, following the significant increase in tax legislative capacity 
afforded to the Basque provinces after the reform of the Concierto in 1997 (Martínez 
Bárbara 2013: 76-77; Reta 2002: 184). The provisions of the Law were deliberately 
vague, given the difficult task of reconciling the tax-raising autonomy of the 
provinces with the harmonising role of the regional parliament. The preamble of the 
1989 Basque Tax Harmonisation Law is devoted to discussing the dilemma of 
striking the right balance. It refers to the difficulties of defining tax harmonisation 
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without going as far as uniformity, and to ‘the need to address the issue delicately 
and be respectful of the competences of the different institutions’ as well as to 
provide a flexible mechanism, ‘adaptable to the very dynamic of tax legislation’. In 
light of this, it explains the decision taken that the Law would not be comprehensive 
or prescriptive, but rather serve as ‘a framework law’ to lay the bases for the ‘later 
development of more concrete and specific aspects’.147 The Law shies away from 
prescribing what exactly must be coordinated or what extent of tax harmonisation is 
required (given the fine line between harmonisation and uniformity), instead 
providing a basic framework subject to future specification and development. In 
Article 2, the Law echoes the stipulations in Article 14.3 of the LTH, stating that the 
provisions issued by the competent authorities of the historical territories ‘will 
regulate uniformly the substantial elements of the different taxes’. And yet the same 
Article also stresses that the level of harmonisation reached will still allow different 
legislative provisions in each of the historical territories, ‘provided that these 
guarantee a global equivalent fiscal pressure in the whole autonomous community’ – 
without defining what it means by the ambiguous term ‘global equivalent fiscal 
pressure’.  
           The ambiguity of the Law in terms of its definition of harmonisation, and also 
regarding the relative weight it affords to the provinces on the one hand and the 
Basque parliament on the other, is also reflected in the conflicting interpretations of 
it that have ensued among Basque politicians, lawyers and academics. For most 
taxes, the Law lists what specific aspects of the tax should be harmonised going 
forward, ‘when appropriate’ (cuando proceda). This has lent itself first and foremost 
to the interpretation that the harmonisation of such aspects should be prescribed ex 
ante in further laws approved by the Basque parliament, prior to the provinces 
approving their relevant tax legislation in compliance. The Additional Disposition of 
1989 specified that the Basque parliament should approve within one year of the 
framework law a series of draft laws to harmonise the aspects of the taxes listed in 
Articles 3, 4 and 5. Others, however, have instead suggested the term ‘cuando 
proceda’ implies that the Basque parliament’s role can be ex post rather than ex ante. 
Under this interpretation, the Basque parliament only needs to intervene in specific 
                                                
147 These are my approximate translations. The full text of the law is available in Spanish 
here: http://noticias.juridicas.com/base_datos/CCAA/pv-l3-1989.html#i  
191	
 
cases where any provincial tax measures result in a lack of harmonisation requiring 
correction (Martínez Bárbara 2013: 77-78, 80; 2014b: 196).  
          In any case, the debate has been a theoretical one only, since in practice the 
Basque parliament has never debated or approved any harmonisation laws as 
foreseen in the framework law of 1989 and the updated version of 1998 (Martínez 
Bárbara 2013: 80). Thus it did not fulfil the mandate given in the additional 
disposition of the framework law of 1989 to approve a series of harmonisation laws 
in the following year, nor has it approved any other harmonisation law since. This 
inevitably reflects to a large degree the PNV’s desire to avoid the risk of stirring up 
unresolved political differences over the relative weight of the provinces and the 
Basque regional parliament in the region’s political setup. Nevertheless, 
representatives of the three provinces and Basque regional government have usually 
managed instead to reach agreements within the Basque Tax Coordination Body 
(Órgano de Coordinación Tributaria de Euskadi), also created under the provisions 
of the Basque Tax Harmonisation Law, to ensure sufficient harmonisation ex ante 
generally to avoid major controversies – thus also reducing the need for the Basque 
parliament to intervene with legislation (Martínez Bárbara 2013: 81).  
             The Basque Tax Coordination Body, which comprises six representatives 
(three from Basque government and one from each of the three provinces), was 
envisaged in the Tax Harmonisation Law as a means of ensuring that the provinces 
complied with the framework Tax Harmonisation Law and any future laws on 
specific aspects of tax harmonisation issued by the Basque parliament. The 
framework law stipulated that the provincial governments would each inform the 
Tax Coordination Body of any changes they intend to implement to their tax 
legislation, which would then issue a report within a month to determine whether the 
measure complied with the legislation on tax harmonisation issued by the Basque 
parliament. In practice, since no harmonisation laws to develop the original 
framework law have ever been drafted, the framework law – which lists the main 
aspects of the different taxes that should be harmonised, but does not provide rules 
for harmonising them – is the only benchmark the Tax Coordination Body has to 
use. The reports issued are non binding, but the provincial authorities have tended to 
adhere to them on most occasions. Almost all reforms undertaken by the Basque 
provinces of the direct taxes, for which they have legislative competence, have been 
agreed within the Tax Coordination Body to seek sufficient harmonisation between 
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provinces. The work of the Tax Coordination Body seeks to ensure that any new tax 
measures introduced by provincial government are very similar in each of the three 
provinces and as a result, this has usually (but not always) avoided the introduction 
of tax measures that could cause a serious lack of harmonisation between provinces.  
           The Tax Coordination Body undoubtedly gives a greater voice and veto 
power to each provincial authority than they would have in a parliamentary vote on a 
tax harmonisation law. For those keen to retain and respect the traditional fiscal 
competences of the provincial authorities, the work of the Tax Coordination Body to 
achieve agreement between provinces over fiscal decisions, without the imperative 
need for intervention by the Basque regional parliament, has been very positive.148 
Inevitably, the fact that there has usually been a similar constellation of political 
forces in each of the three provinces and at regional government level has helped to 
facilitate agreements. Frequently, the PNV has been in power at regional government 
level as well as in all three provinces at once, albeit usually with a minority, and it 
has usually been able to ally with the PP and the PSE on fiscal matters to reach a 
consensus among the provinces. Nevertheless, the issue of inter-provincial tax 
harmonisation and coordination has still been a source of significant controversy. 
Both the lack of legal relevance of the agreements reached by the Tax Coordination 
Body and the lack of definitive laws guiding it have inevitably contributed to: (1) a 
lack of legal security for taxpayers on occasion, in cases when conflicts of 
competence between provinces have emerged over the collection of certain taxes 
(Reta 2002: 180-1); and (2) a risk of inter-provincial tax disharmonisation in the 
event of serious disagreements between provinces over tax measures. This has 
inevitably resulted in criticisms of the lack of a fully developed legal framework for 
the inter-provincial dimension of the Concierto, leading to calls to set aside the 
politically conflictive dimension of the question of the balance of competences 
between the provincial and regional levels in order to ensure first and foremost that 
the Concierto functions a fully developed legal instrument (e.g. Reta 2002: 189). 
Recently, Pedro Luis Uriarte, who headed the Basque delegation that negotiated the 
Concierto agreement of 1981 under the government of Carlos Garaikoetxeta, 
expressed the view that the Basque Tax Harmonisation Law of 1989 not only took 
too long to be introduced in the 1980s, but that its content remains poor and 
                                                
148 Personal interviews with senior officials in the Vizcayan treasury department, 2014. 
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undeveloped to this day, requiring a full revision (Uriarte 2015: Pt VIII, 48). This in 
itself reveals the continued differences in perspective within the PNV over the 
question of the balance of powers between the provincial and regional authorities in 
taxation matters. 
 
Tax (dis)harmonisation: The controversies 
Some provincial tax measures in the past decade, in particular since 2007, 
have put the existing, non legally-binding procedures for tax harmonisation via the 
Tax Coordination Body to the test to a greater extent than previously (Martínez 
Bárbara 2013: 82). This has been fundamentally due to opposition from Guipúzcoa 
to certain tax measures which have nevertheless secured the approval of both 
Vizcaya and Álava, in large part owing to the longstanding relatively greater weight 
of left-wing political forces in Guipúzcoa – not just the Basque Socialists but also 
more radical left-wing political forces under EA and the izquierda abertzale (see 
Table 9, p.176). The izquierda aberztale is characterised not only by its support for 
the independence of Euskal Herria but also by its fundamentally anti-capitalist 
ideology.      
          Understanding why desires for different fiscal policies have emerged from 
Guipúzcoa in particular in recent years first requires an understanding of the 
different political landscape in each province (see also Table 9, p.176). Throughout 
the democratic period, Vizcaya has been the PNV’s stronghold: it has won every 
provincial election, consolidating its majority at 22 or 23 seats (out of 51) in each of 
the four provincial elections since 2003 (2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015). In Álava, the 
dominant political forces have been the PNV and the PP, the two of which have 
alternated in government in the past decade: in 2003 the PP won, followed by the 
PNV in 2007, the PP again in 2011, and the PNV again in 2015. Meanwhile, in 
Guipúzcoa, the predominant force has usually tended to be the PNV but it has also 
faced far greater competition (relative to Álava and Vizcaya) from both the Basque 
Socialists (PSE), EA (the party which formed following the split within the PNV in 
1986), as well as other more radical left-wing, secessionist political parties grouped 
under the izquierda abertzale, an umbrella group which EA would also join from 
2009 onwards. Between 1999 and 2007, the PNV and EA had formed a stable 
alliance and presented a joint coalition candidature at elections at regional and 
provincial level to strengthen the nationalist camp and fend off the threat to 
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nationalist dominance from the Basque Socialists, but increasing differences between 
the parties – not least on fiscal and social matters – led the coalition alliance to split 
from 2007 when EA decided to go it alone at the provincial and municipal elections 
that year. From then onwards it emphasised its left-wing credentials more as it 
moved closer to the secessionist izquierda abertzale, which it allied with from 2009 
onwards as ETA moved closer to a definitive ceasefire. At the 2011 provincial 
elections, the izquierda abertzale would triumph for the first time in Guipúzcoa 
under the new coalition Bildu, which included EA. Bildu was a formation bringing 
together parties of the izquierda abertzale spearheaded by Sortu, the new lead 
political party of the izquierda abertzale formed in 2011, following the outlawing of 
the previous lead party Batasuna in 2003 by the Spanish authorities on account of its 
links to ETA (see Terminology section, Chapter 1, pp.22-3).   
            This stronger left-wing presence in Guipúzcoa has had a significant impact 
on political alliances in the province and the behaviour of the PNV there. 
Throughout the Basque region, at both regional and provincial levels of government, 
the winning party has never usually won an outright majority of seats, raising the 
constant need for formal coalitions or more informal alliance arrangements to push 
policies through parliament. In general terms, the PNV and the PP in the Basque 
region as a whole are usually quite closely aligned on fiscal policy, since the PNV is 
fundamentally a centre-right party in its fiscal policies. Nevertheless, the PNV often 
appears almost centre-left in its social policies, since the fact that the Concierto gives 
the region higher per capita resource levels (relative to the rest of Spain) means that 
the party has often been able to combine essentially right-wing fiscal policies with 
more generous social policies than might normally be expected of a centre-right 
party. Since the Basque Socialists, the PSE, are left-of-centre rather than a radical 
left party, collaboration between the PNV and the PSE on fiscal and social policy has 
also often been possible in the Basque region, especially given the PNV’s afore-
described mix of centre-right and centre-left dimensions. However, specifically in 
the province of Guipúzcoa, the relative strength of more extreme left-wing parties 
under the izquierda abertzale has had several consequences for party alliances and 
behaviour. Left-wing alliances against the PNV and the PP have emerged on 
occasion in Guipúzcoa, more so than in Álava or Vizcaya. Since the PSE in 
Guipúzcoa is more accustomed to the political presence of the izquierda abertzale 
than the Socialists elsewhere in the Basque region, it initially proved more inclined 
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to work with them on social issues when the izquierda abertzale won power in the 
province in 2011 under its coalition Bildu to govern for the first time. Indeed, some 
former leading members of the PSE from Guipúzcoa, most notably Jesús Eguiguren, 
have envisioned a nationalist, left-wing alliance incorporating the PSE as the way 
forward for the Basque Country (Eguiguren 2014: 114-115). This, in turn, has also 
meant that the PNV in Guipúzcoa has had to be more careful than the PNV 
elsewhere not to alienate the PSE, EA and the izquierda abertzale, since there is an 
increased risk they could ally together against the PNV. PNV leaders in Guipúzcoa 
tend to be more inclined to want to work towards a relationship with the izquierda 
abertzale than their colleagues in Vizcaya and Álava.149 
 
Experiences of tax disharmonisation (1): 2007 corporation tax reform 
The different political dynamics in Guipúzcoa compared to Álava and 
Vizcaya became clear in 2007 when difficulties emerged in securing Guipúzcoa’s 
approval for the corporation tax reform of 2007 (Martínez Bárbara 2013: 82-84).150 
This was the first significant overhaul of corporation tax in the Basque region since 
1996. Tough negotiations within the Tax Coordination Body resulted in each 
provincial representative agreeing the same new corporation tax regulation 
(reflecting the minimum parameters that all could agree on), which was given the 
green light by the Tax Coordination Committee at a session on 1 February 2007. 
Among other changes, this set the general rate of Corporation Tax at 28%. The 
reform was one spearheaded by the PNV, which at the time led the Basque regional 
government, the Vizcayan provincial government, and the Guipúzcoan provincial 
government (in all cases the PNV was at the time the lead partner in a stable 
coalition with EA, since the two parties had presented a joint candidature at the 
previous regional and provincial elections). It also had the backing of the PP 
governing in Álava. In the following weeks, the three provincial governments 
                                                
149 This was evident in the contrasting opinions expressed by Joseba Egibar (Guipúzcoa) on 
the one hand and Andoni Ortuzar (Vizcaya) on the other, in interviews held on 8 April 2014 
and 10 April 2014, respectively.  
150 To my knowledge, Martínez Bárbara (2013: 82-84) is the only author to have addressed 
this controversy in any detail. Her primarily technical account of the discrepancies in 
proposed corporation tax rates is complemented here by further analysis of the political 
dynamics of the debate gathered from extensive reading of mainly Basque newspaper 
reports from the time, especially in El Correo, El Diario Vasco, Noticias de Guipúzcoa, 
Gara, as well as Spanish newspapers such as El País.   
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approved their respective new draft corporation tax regulations and submitted them 
to the provincial assemblies for debate, amendment and approval. Álava and Vizcaya 
both approved their respective regulations in March, but in Guipúzcoa, with a 
different correlation of political forces in the provincial assembly, various groups 
opposed what they considered too low a general corporation tax rate, thus preventing 
approval of the regulation. It was therefore withdrawn in March and, given the 
proximity of the provincial elections, the reform of corporation tax remained pending 
until the new provincial government and assembly were formed. 
        The 2007 provincial elections followed, which resulted in the PNV forming a 
coalition government in Guipúzcoa with EA for the provincial government term 
2011-2015. This had certainly not been a foregone conclusion: the PNV and EA had 
presented separate candidatures at the 2007 elections after the breakup of their 
longstanding alliance, and following the elections, which the PNV won with a 
relative majority, EA had debated whether it would form a coalition government 
with the PNV to enable the latter to govern or whether it would ally instead with the 
PSE against the PNV. A coalition with the PNV was agreed, but as part of the deal, 
the crucial role of Guipúzcoan treasury minister was assigned to EA (a position 
assumed by Peio González) and fiscal policy would become one of the main sources 
of contention between the coalition partners throughout the government term.151 As 
the financial crisis set in, the desire for more left-wing tax policies in Guipúzcoa 
would make tax harmonisation between the three provinces increasingly difficult 
over major taxes such as corporation tax, personal income tax and wealth tax. 
           With the question of corporation tax reform still pending in Guipúzcoa, the 
new PNV-EA coalition government proceeded to propose a new corporation tax 
reform in September 2007 putting the general corporation tax rate at 30%, though the 
Guipúzcoan treasury argued that in practice the gap between this and the agreed 28% 
rate was offset by differences in corporation tax incentives and deductions being 
offered to businesses in relation to innovation and the environment. This was 
designed first and foremost to satisy coalition partner EA (not the PNV, which was 
more supportive of harmonisation with the other provinces) and was also expected to 
count on the support of the PSE in the provincial assembly. Meanwhile, the 
provincial governments of Álava and Vizcaya continued to maintain that Guipúzcoa 
                                                
151 See, for example, ‘Pello González calienta las elecciones y arremete contra la gestión 
foral de su socio, el PNV’, diariovasco.com, 18.04.11. 
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should respect the agreement reached within and approved by the Tax Coordination 
Committee. The 30% proposal nevertheless still failed to get passed in the 
Guipúzcoan assembly, and eventually, a year later, in December 2008, the provincial 
assembly of Guipúzcoa approved a corporation tax reform with a general corporation 
tax rate of 28% (Norma Foral 8/2008 de 23 de diciembre), i.e. the rate previously 
agreed and approved by all parties to the Tax Coordination Committee back on 1 
February 2007. EA, the coalition partner which in 2007 had been reluctant to agree 
to the 28% rate, had changed its stance in 2008 given that the 30% proposal it 
supported had been rejected by the Guipúzcoan assembly and the existing 32.6% 
was widely accepted as too high, leaving the only possibility to negotiate the 28% 
with the PNV and seek the support or abstention of the PP in the Guipúzcoan 
assembly, though it still maintained some of its own specific incentives to encourage 
innovation and employment creation and maintenance, in an attempt to increase the 
societal benefit of business.  
 
Experiences of tax disharmonisation (2): 2008 wealth tax reform 
A similar situation occurred with the reform of wealth tax (impuesto sobre 
patrimonio), though in this case the extent of disharmonisation was more substantial  
(Martínez Bárbara 2013: 84-85). 152  In December 2008, both the provincial 
assemblies of Vizcaya and Álava passed regulations to abolish the wealth tax. Both 
provincial governments had previously submitted their draft proposals to the Tax 
Coordination Body in October that year, which had issued a favourable report. At the 
same meeting, the representative of Guipúzcoa had indicated that the province had 
not yet taken a decision on the matter. The province would come under significant 
pressure at this and subsequent meetings of the Tax Coordination Body to eliminate 
the wealth tax in order to harmonise with the other two provinces.153 Eventually 
Guipúzcoa abolished the tax a year later, via a provincial regulation approved in 
December 2009. Nevertheless, in early 2010, when the time came to settle the final 
                                                
152 As per the above, to my knowledge, Martínez Bárbara (2013: 84-85) is the only author to 
have addressed this controversy in any detail. Her primarily technical account of the 
discrepancies in proposed wealth tax reforms is complemented here by further analysis of 
the political dynamics of the debate gathered from extensive reading of Basque newspaper 
reports from the time, especially in El Correo, El Diario Vasco, Noticias de Guipúzcoa, 
Gara, as well as Spanish newspaper El País.   
153 For example, ‘Álava aprueba el Impuesto de Patrimonio y le pide a Guipúzcoa que 
“renuncie a sus propuestas”’, elEconomista.es, 23.11.2011. 
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contributions made by the provinces to the regional government for 2009 (once the 
revenue collection figures for the year were known), an inter-provincial dispute 
emerged due to the impact of this tax disharmonisation throughout 2009 on the 
amount each province was due to contribute to the regional government.  
         Given the way that provincial contributions to the regional government are 
calculated, if one province raises a tax that the other two provinces do not raise, this 
increases the total revenues raised and thereby increases the share that each of the 
three provinces must pay to the regional government. 154  This is because the 
provinces contribute to the 70% of revenues that go to the regional government 
according to their respective horizontal coefficients. In this instance, since 
Guipúzcoa had raised 45 million euros in wealth tax in 2009, this disadvantaged 
Vizcaya in particular, increasing its total contribution payment due by around 15.8 
million (50% of the 70% contribution for that tax). Given that neither Vizcaya nor 
Álava had collected any wealth tax, this situation had arisen due to the lack of 
harmonisation over the tax and the lack of flexibility of the contributions’ model to 
adapt to tax disharmonisation between provinces. In the absence of an agreement 
between Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa (both PNV-led) over how to resolve the matter, the 
then Socialist-led Basque regional government mediated at the meeting of the 
Basque Council of Public Finances in February 2010, where the final contribution 
payment of each province to the regional government for 2009 was to be agreed. The 
solution reached was a final adjustment to the contribution payments whereby 
instead of Vizcaya’s theoretical 15.8 million contribution would be covered instead 
by a one-off special contribution of 8.1 million euros from the Basque regional 
government itself, 7.4 million euros from the provincial government of Guipúzcoa 
and 300,000 euros from the provincial government of Álava (which still ended up 
making a contribution to cover Vizcaya while also paying its own share, for other 
reasons).155     
           The heads of the provincial governments of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, José 
Luis Bilbao and Markel Olano respectively, both of the PNV, publically celebrated 
                                                
154 Personal interviews with senior officials in the Vizcayan provincial treasury department, 
2014. 
155 For example, ‘El Gobierno vasco y Guipúzcoa ceden ante Vizcaya y le perdonan 16 
millones’, elcorreo.com, 13.02.10; ‘El gobierno vasco salva un enfrentamiento entre Vizcaya 
y Guipúzcoa por Patrimonio’, 12.02.10; ‘La ronda la paga el Gobierno’, elpais.com (Basque 
edition), 22.02.2014. 
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the agreement as one showing the ability of the representatives of the provinces and 
the regional government to reach an ‘intelligent’ and ‘sensible’ agreement within the 
Basque Council of Public Finances, citing this an example of how well the Council 
works.156 Nevertheless, it was clear that Vizcaya had won the battle. It had become 
clear that given the way the contribution law works, it essentially imposes tax 
uniformity or very strong harmonisation since Guipúzcoa could not fully reap the 
financial benefits if it decided to have additional taxes or higher tax rates, as it would 
have to compensate the other provinces. Olano made declarations acknowledging 
that it had become clear one province could not have a different tax from the other 
two, yet he also added that he had specifically requested that this additional financial 
contribution from Guipúzcoa in lieu of Vizcaya to the regional government be taken 
into account when the Basque regional government applied its anti-crisis plan to the 
province.157  In other words, rather than Guipúzcoa simply paying extra to the 
regional pot on account of the fact that it was the only province to have raised a 
wealth tax, it was hoped that some of that extra payment would be re-invested back 
into the province.  
          Despite Olano’s attempts to put a positive gloss on the matter, significant 
dissatisfaction voiced from other parties represented in Guipúzcoa drew attention to 
the contentious nature of the outcome and the ongoing controversies over the 
contributions’ model, the inter-provincial tax harmonisation requirements, and the 
ambiguous balance of competences between provinces and the regional level. While 
members of the PNV praised the agreement as a good solution, the PP focused on 
criticism of Guipúzcoa’s lack of tax harmonisation in the first place, criticising the 
PNV-EA coalition for creating problems to detract from their poor tax collection in 
general. The reaction of left-wing EA and various radical left-wing parties under the 
izquierda abertzale (Aralar, Alternatiba, etc.), however, was very different. They 
condemned Guipúzcoa’s ‘loss’ of 7.4 million euros on account of the fact that 
Vizcaya had not collected the wealth tax, criticising the discrepancy between the 
                                                
156 For example, ‘Vizcaya recibirá 15,8 millones para compensar su aportación al Impuesto 
de Patrimonio’, elcorreo.com, 12.02.10.  
157 For example, ‘Vizcaya recibirá 15,8 millones para compensar su aportación al Impuesto 
de Patrimonio’, elcorreo.com, 12.02.10; ‘Olano se felicita del acuerdo del CVF para 
compensar a Vizcaya por la recaudación del Impuesto de Patrimonio en Guipúzcoa’, Europa 
Press, 16.02.10. 
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supposed fiscal autonomy of each province and the imposition of fiscal 
harmonisation.158  
           The question of the 7.4 million payment would become one of the many 
thorns in the relationship between the PNV and EA coalition partners in Guipúzcoa 
over fiscal and social policy, since EA treasury minister Peio González was very 
critical of the lack of guarantee from the regional government that the extra money 
paid by Guipúzcoa to it would be reinvested in the province.159 Thus he echoed the 
stance of radical left-wing parties in the region, which maintained that Guipúzcoa 
should reap the benefits if it chose to implement higher or additional taxes in 
comparison with other provinces. Debates emerged as to whether the agreement 
reached to settle the contribution payments within the Basque Council of Public 
Finances was even legal, with calls for an urgent revision of the LTH to clarify 
contradictions as to the respective role of the provinces and regions and also of the 
contribution law to rectify its shortcomings. 
 
Experiences of tax disharmonisation (3): Bildu provincial government 2011-2015 
Such debates between provinces over tax harmonisation became stronger still 
following the triumph of the Bildu coalition in the 2011 provincial elections in 
Guipúzcoa. This marked the first time the izquierda abertzale – with which EA had 
by then joined forces, breaking ties with the PNV – would win power at provincial 
level in the Basque Country. After Bildu had formed a minority government in 
Guipúzcoa, it would seek an ally in the PSE and Aralar (the latter of which would 
later join the Bildu coalition) to push through its fiscal reform in Gizpuzkoa in 
December 2011, to take effect from 2012, which fundamentally affected three taxes: 
personal income tax (IRPF), inheritance tax (Sucesiones y Donaciones) and wealth 
tax (Patrimonio).160 The main changes to these included, for example, introducing 
higher IRPF rates for the highest earners (applying to incomes from 90,000 euros 
upwards); eliminating the existing exemption to inheritance tax when the recipient of 
the inheritance is a direct descendent; and reinstating a wealth tax. In all cases, 
                                                
158 ‘Olano se felicita del acuerdo del CVF para compensar a Vizcaya por la recaudación del 
Impuesto de Patrimonio en Guipúzcoa’, Europa Press, 16.02.10. 
159 For example, ‘Pello González calienta las elecciones y arremete contra la gestión foral de 
su socio, el PNV’, diariovasco.com, 18.04.11. 
160 For example, ‘Bildu y PSE sacan adelante la reforma fiscal para Guipúzcoa’, 
diariovasco.com, 23.12.11. 
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taxation would be higher in Guipúzcoa than in neighbouring Vizcaya and Álava 
under the fiscal reforms both introduced at the same time. For example, Vizcaya and 
Álava also reintroduced wealth tax, but they would both set the same, higher 
minimum tax-exempt amounts (800,000 euros, plus 400,000 per main residence) 
than Guipúzcoa (600,000 euros, plus 300,000 per main residence).161 Guipúzcoa 
would once again come under attack from PP and PNV representatives in Álava and 
Vizcaya, which accused it of taking unilateral decisions with regard to some taxes, 
without proper discussion in the Basque Tax Coordination Body beforehand and 
without its backing. In the Guipúzcoan assembly, the PP voted against the changes to 
all three taxes while the PNV voted against the changes to IRPF and other taxes 
apart from Inheritance tax, where it abstained. A definitive left-wing alliance 
between both secessionist (izquierda abertzale) and anti-secessionist (PSE) forces 
thus seemed underway, with the left-right dimension of political competition (fiscal 
and social policy) taking precedence in terms of alliance-building over the territorial 
question of the Basque Country’s relationship to Spain.  
         The fiscal reforms implemented by all three provinces at the end of 2011, to 
take effect from 2012, were intended to be urgent reforms to respond to the crisis but  
temporary in nature, until a more coordinated and comprehensive reform could be 
agreed and approved between the three provinces. Given the different direction that 
Bildu had taken with the support of the PSE in Guipúzcoa, there were concerns 
among the PNV and the PP that a coordinated and harmonised fiscal reform between 
the three provinces would be extremely difficult. In 2012, Bildu would continue to 
make proposals showing its more left-wing agenda. For example, the Guipúzcoan 
treasury minister Helena Franco and other members of Bildu in key treasury 
positions would take a heavily critical stance in 2012 towards the PNV’s 
longstanding ‘neoliberal’ use of corporation tax rates and panoply of exemptions, 
deductions and other incentives. They would accuse the PNV of a long tradition of 
‘fiscal dumping’ by providing a consistently lower tax environment for businesses in 
the Basque Country relative to the situation in the rest of Spain.162 They made it clear 
that they wished to overhaul corporation tax by simplifying it, first and foremost by 
                                                
161 ‘Euskadi hace su reforma fiscal de urgencia, en que los guipuzcoanos pagarán más’, 
elEconomista.es, 23.11.11. 
162 Personal interviews with Helena Franco and Itziar Miner, 5 September 2014; and with 
Xabier Olano, 29 May 2014. See also Olano 2002. 
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eliminating most of the deductions and incentives except where they would be linked 
to the creation and maintenance of employment in Guipúzcoa, to ensure business 
benefitted society. For such measures, Bildu hoped in 2012 that it would continue to 
be able to count on the PSE in Guipúzcoa for support, following the precedent set at 
the end of 2011.   
           Nevertheless, a fundamental change in political alliances in Guipúzcoa would 
soon occur as a result of developments at regional government level. In 2012, the 
Basque regional elections returned the PNV to office after three years in opposition 
to a PSE-PP coalition government. As a minority government, the PNV initially 
struggled to govern alone without a stable alliance arrangement with any other party. 
The tables then turned in 2013 when it finally struck a deal with the PSE, agreeing a 
full fiscal reform package with the latter (a reform which would also ultimately 
receive the support of the PP too), in return for which a deal was struck between the 
PNV and PSE to form alliances in the regional parliament and three provincial 
governments thereafter. After an unusual period of PSE-PP coalition to keep the 
PNV out of office in 2009-2012, 2013 thus saw a return to a more traditional PNV-
PSE collaboration. Throughout the Basque region, the PSE was thereafter subject to 
the fiscal pact agreed with the PNV for the following three years. In other words, the 
PSE in Guipúzcoa, which had until then been allying with Bildu on matters of fiscal 
policy, now had to change tack and ally with the PNV (and also the PP) to ensure the 
fiscal reform agreed at Basque government level was also approved in the 
Guipúzcoan assembly, since it is the provinces that are responsible for changing and 
implementing fiscal legislation.163 The potential risk of further inter-provincial tax 
disharmonisation problems, stemming from the desire for more left-wing policies 
from the Guipúzcoan provincial government, was thus cut short and the main parties 
in opposition in the province (PNV, PSE and PP) pushed through the fiscal reform 
agreed at regional level in the provincial assembly too, against the interests of the 
minority Bildu provincial government. After the episodes of disharmonisation 
experienced since 2007, a return to a period of relatively more harmonised and 
harmonious fiscal relations between the three provinces then looked set to ensue 
from 2015, when the provincial elections put the PNV back in government in all 
                                                
163 For example, ‘La oposición impone a Bildu la reforma fiscal en Guipúzcoa’, Expansión, 
15.01.2014. 
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three provinces and resulted in stable PNV-PSE coalition or support arrangements 
throughout the whole region. 
 
The implications for political relations and territorial agendas 
           Decision-making and coordination relative to the Concierto between regional 
and provincial levels has worked reasonably well in general since the 1980s, despite 
the absence of a more concrete legal framework and the ambiguities and 
shortcomings of the existing legislation, fundamentally the contribution laws and the 
Tax Harmonisation Law. Recent years have nevertheless pointed to the pressure that 
the system is under, particularly at times when different political forces with 
different agendas are dominant in different provinces. Disputes over both the intra-
regional distribution of tax revenues and the level of tax harmonisation required 
between the three provinces have put the spotlight on the longstanding, unresolved 
debate regarding the balance of powers between the regional and provincial levels 
and also among the provinces themselves – one of the most politically complicated 
and controversial areas of Basque politics, particularly for the PNV.  
         For the PNV, longstanding internal discrepancies within the party over the 
balance between provincial and regional levels of government, combined with the 
heterogeneity of the party in different provinces, have contributed to the party’s 
moderation since such complexity makes it difficult for it to make strategic shifts in 
position. This situation has contributed to the party’s continued strong defence of the 
weight of the provincial level within the region and as the fundamental basis of the 
Concierto. The different territorial interests within the PNV have also resulted in 
internal debates over the relationship to the izquierda abertzale, given the varying 
strength of the izquierda abertzale in different provinces (its strongest presence is in 
Guipúzcoa), and therefore the need for different alliance arrangements and 
competition tactics in different provinces. Overall, however, what emerges strongly 
is a sense of incompatibility between the PNV and Bildu on fiscal and social matters. 
The discrepancies between the PNV and the izquierda abertzale over fiscal policy 
and the Concierto which emerged during 2011-2015 suggest wider implications for 
possible alliances (or a lack thereof) between them going forward. As the nationalist 
or secessionist parties in the region, they both share a desire for sovereignty for the 
Basque region but with considerable differences in their territorial goals and 
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proposals and also very different fiscal and social agendas. The experience of the 
izquierda abertzale entering seriously into formal politics for the first time and with 
significant political presence, governing at provincial level in Guipúzcoa in 2011-
2015, drew attention to the differences between the PNV and the izquierda abertzale 
on issues of fiscal and social policy, particularly the use of the fiscal powers afforded 
by the Concierto, with Bildu accusing the PNV of a neoliberal use of the latter. In 
attempting to seek allies within the PSE to make changes to personal income tax and 
wealth tax in 2012 and subsequently corporation tax too in 2013, Bildu sought to 
distance itself from the PNV and to carve out a different fiscal vision for the Basque 
Country starting in Guipúzcoa, preferring to ally with the Basque federation of a 
leftwing statewide party (the PSOE) rather than a centre-right nationalist party. 
           Ultimately, Bildu’s efforts were thwarted on that occasion by the regional 
alliance arrangement sealed between the PNV and the PSE in 2013, which put an 
end to Bildu-PSE collaboration on fiscal issues in Guipúzcoa. The alliance deal saw 
the PNV and PSE agree a pact on fiscal reform to address the crisis, which has been 
described as arguably the first ever proper fiscal reform in the Basque region, in that 
it was designed specifically for the region and preceded its Spanish counterpart, 
rather than providing a close version of a fiscal reform previously introduced in 
Spain but with lower rates for the Basque region (Zubiri 2014b: 89). Bildu treasury 
representatives argue that the work they did with the PSE from Guipúzcoa helped to 
pave the way for a proper fiscal reform in the Basque region, albeit not exactly the 
one that Bildu would have wanted. Bildu treasury representatives at the time 
suggested that their PSE counterparts seemed noticeably uncomfortable with the 
change in alliances and fiscal policy agreements, withdrawing from debates in the 
provincial assembly on fiscal policy rather than actively participating in them, since 
their hands were tied.164 In these circumstances, Bildu did not rule out the possibility 
of reestablishing a left-wing collaboration with the PSE against the PNV and the PP 
again in the future, seeing the PSE as its more natural ally on fiscal and social policy, 
albeit still a left-of-centre party rather than a radically left-wing one like Bildu.165 
Bildu subsequently lost power in the province at the 2015 provincial elections, but a 
precedent of Bildu-PSE collaboration in Guipúzcoa had nevertheless been set. The 
rise of Podemos in the Basque region in 2015, particularly at the Spanish elections in 
                                                
164 Personal interview with Helena Franco and Itziar Miner, 5 September 2014. 
165 Personal interview with Helena Franco and Itziar Miner, 5 September 2014.  
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December, provides another potential left-wing ally for Bildu and one which is 
further to the left than the PSE.   
        In addition to the discrepancies over left-right politics that emerged through the 
PNV’s and Bildu’s contrasting use of the fiscal powers afforded by the Concierto, 
their attitudes towards the Concierto also manifested the differences in their 
territorial goals regarding the Basque Country and its relationship to Spain. Bildu’s 
criticism of the Concierto as an insufficient basis for proper self-government clearly 
differed from the PNV’s praise of the Concierto as the closest current equivalent to 
the form of ‘bilateral relationship between equals’ that the PNV seeks in wider 
Spanish-Basque political relations. Certainly, the PNV shares with Bildu many of its 
frustrations over the Concierto and its ‘limitations’: both political forces consider it 
very positive that they have almost full legislative autonomy over direct taxes but 
criticise the lack of Basque autonomy over indirect taxes and the fight against tax 
fraud, as well as the lack of Basque authority over other areas of competence crucial 
to the economy and financial sector such as financial system regulation, society 
security and labour relations.166 In all these cases, the Basques remain subject to 
Spanish legislation. Nevertheless, while the PNV and Bildu agree on the fact that 
these are serious shortcomings, the PNV under Urkullu has not shared Bildu’s sense 
of urgency to progress these matters.  
         In the view of Helena Franco, Gizpuzkoan treasury minister for Bildu in 2011-
2015, in a personal interview with the author in 2014, ‘At a theoretical level, we in 
Bildu and the PNV might be in agreement on what still needs to be done to develop 
the Concierto, but the practice is another matter. […] Ultimately, a part of Basque 
nationalism represented by the PNV seems quite comfortable with the Concierto 
despite its limitations, while for another, more sovereignty-orientated part of Basque 
nationalism it seems clearly insufficient to us to guarantee the future of this country.’ 
Franco cited the example of the attempts by Bildu in Guipúzcoa to make a push in 
2014 at the Basque Council for Public Finances for a new body to work on 
establishing a common position between the three provincial governments and the 
Basque regional government vis-à-vis negotiations with the Spanish state on 
questions of ‘economic sovereignty’, with two particularly urgent topics on the 
                                                
166 The perceived shortcomings of the Concierto listed by Juan José Ibarretxe in an interview 
on 28 October 2014 closely matched those listed by Helena Franco and Xabier Olano, 
interviewed on 5 September 2014 and 29 May 2014 respectively. 
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agenda: (1) discrepancies with the Spanish state over the quota (which, as of late 
2015, had prevented the settlement of any annual quota payments since 2007 and 
prevented the agreement of a new five-yearly quota law for the period from 2012 
onwards, resulting in the rolling over of the 2007-2011 law; see also Chapter 4 
pp.135-6); and (2) discrepancies over the VAT adjustment between Spain and the 
Basque Country. Bildu proposed the creation of this new body at the February 2014 
meeting of the Basque Council of Public Finances, but according to Franco, despite 
the theoretical agreement between all representatives present (of the provinces and 
the regional government), subsequently the PNV-led regional government that 
presides over the Council showed ‘little interest’ in putting the body into practice 
and holding meetings, unless forced to in response to press releases or parliamentary 
questions from Bildu.167  
            Although the PNV was dissatisfied with the ongoing lack of agreement over 
the quota payments and quota law, it tended to adopt more of a ‘wait and see’ 
approach. When interviewed by this author in 2014, one PNV representative seemed 
noticeably unconcerned about the matter, suggesting that it would likely be resolved 
following the 2015 Spanish general election. At the time, it was anticipated that one 
of the two main statewide parties (the PSOE or the PP, but most probably the latter) 
would win again but without an outright majority, and the PNV representative in 
question thus anticipated a reopening of the possibility for the PNV to strike deals 
over unresolved issues such as the quota in return for giving its support to the ruling 
Spanish party in the Spanish parliament on other matters. Such an attitude reflects 
the ongoing view among a significant proportion of the PNV that since the Concierto 
is safeguarded from unilateral Spanish action by its bilateral nature, the most feasible 
way forward regarding any stalemates continues to be to strike deals when Madrid 
needs the PNV’s support on other matters – as has happened on numerous occasions 
since the first minority Spanish government of the democratic period was formed in 
1996 (see Chapter 4). In this way, the Concierto continues to encourage 
accommodationist behaviour on the part of the PNV today.   
          Bildu’s period of government in Guipúzcoa in 2011-2015 thus put the 
spotlight on differences between the PNV and the izquierda abertzale over the 
Concierto, in terms of their views on both the desired fiscal and socioeconomic 
                                                
167 Personal interview with Helena Franco and Itziar Miner, 5 September 2014. 
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model for the Basque Country, and whether or not the Concierto itself provides a 
suitable starting point to develop Basque self-government. Bildu sought on many an 
occasion to stress these differences publically, aiming to differentiate itself clearly 
from the PNV as they compete with one another to lead a pro-sovereignty process in 
the Basque Country. PNV representatives, on the other hand, downplayed these 
differences. For example, they suggested that Bildu over-emphasised and even 
exaggerated its discrepancies with the PNV on fiscal policy as a short-term 
competition tactic only, but that ultimately it was highly unlikely the izquierda 
abertzale would seek a longer-term social pact with the Socialists, a statewide party, 
given their incompatibility on the national and territorial question.168 They also 
suggested that practical experience of being in government in Guipúzcoa had served 
to soften the strength of Bildu’s anti-capitalist ideology, making it increasingly 
difficult for the izquierda abertzale to claim genuinely that it was carving out a 
radically different fiscal and social path for the Basque region to that of the PNV.  
         Whether or not there was a degree of short-termism in Bildu’s behaviour, 
however, it still revealed the extent to which the izquierda abertzale is in strong 
competition with the PNV, with both seeking to be the dominant nationalist force in 
the region. For now at least, this has contributed to reducing the possibilities for 
collaboration between the two to advance a sovereignty agenda together for the 
Basque Country.  
  
                                                
168 For example, personal interview with Joseba Egibar, 8 April 2014. 
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Chapter 7 
From the common system to the quest for a fiscal pact and 
beyond: How regional financing has influenced CDC’s 
territorial agenda 
 
           Given the longstanding dissatisfaction in Catalonia with the region’s 
treatment under the common financing system, Catalan politicians of different 
political affiliations have made repeated calls for a form of bilateral fiscal pact akin 
to the Basque Concierto in recent decades, in particular since the late 1990s. The 
impasse over regional financing has become one of the key factors contributing to 
the deterioration in Spanish-Catalan relations in recent years, particularly in the wake 
of the financial crisis, which has given rise to a context of unprecedented pressure on 
resources. In this context, the aim of this chapter is to examine how and when the 
issue of regional financing has contributed to shaping shifts in the territorial agenda 
of CDC. While some consideration will be given to the period from the Transition 
onwards, the main focus will be on the period from the late 1990s onwards, starting 
with the then Catalan president Jordi Pujol’s first explicit shift towards support for a 
form of fiscal pact in 1998. What explains this turning point? Why have repeated 
reforms of the regional financing system, both before and since then, failed to satisfy 
CDC despite the leading role CDC/CiU169 played in negotiating each reform? What 
role did dissatisfaction with regional financing play in the quest for a new regional 
statute for Catalonia and the statute reform negotiations? Why did the 2006 statute 
reform fail to resolve the issue of regional financing? And what role has the 
dissatisfaction with regional financing played in the rapid rise in citizen support for 
independence in recent years and CDC’s shift towards a pro-independence agenda?         
The debate over the regional financing system in Catalonia has been a 
symptom of, and indeed overtaken by, a broader clash between the Spanish and 
Catalan governments that is not primarily economic in nature, for the Catalan pro-
independence movement is concerned more widely with securing sovereignty for 
                                                
169 No differentiation is made in this chapter between the attitudes of CDC and UDC towards 
regional financing over the years since this issue in one on which they generally held the 
same views while together as a party federation until their split in 2015, as confirmed by 
party representatives when interviewed in 2015 and 2016. 
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Catalonia, and thereby also equality in Catalonia’s relations with Spain. In this 
regard, identity factors related to culture and language, which have traditionally 
characterised the Catalan nationalist movement since its nineteenth century origins 
or even earlier (see Smith 2014), remain a fundamental driver. Nevertheless, 
demands for the reform of regional financing have been a major theme of Catalan 
political debate for more than a decade, thus preceding the recent context of major 
economic recession. In a context of longstanding calls from different parties in 
Catalonia for a better financing deal for Catalonia, this chapter investigates the 
evolving attitudes of CDC/CiU towards regional financing and the factors that have 
shaped this, as well as how central the issue has been to its articulation of 
sovereignty ideas. It is argued that problems with the regional financing system (in 
conjunction with the relative lack of Spanish state investment in Catalonia)170 have 
played a significant role in shaping and accelerating the rise of pro-sovereignty 
sentiment in general in Catalonia, including CDC’s shift away from 
accommodationism and towards a pro-independence agenda. And yet CDC’s 
demand for a fiscal pact has not always been entirely clear or committed, thus raising 
the question of what has driven the party to make more coherent proposals for a 
fiscal pact at certain times rather than others. The chapter is structured in order to 
analyse four key processes that have influenced CDC/CiU’s evolving attitudes 
towards regional financing, namely the design of regional financing during the 
Transition, the politics of accommodationism, the Catalan statute reform, and the 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 and its aftermath.   
 
The debate over regional financing during the Transition 
          The question of whether or not CDC actually wanted a Concierto-style 
arrangement for Catalonia during the Transition – in other words, a system based on 
the region raising most of its own taxes – has been subject to considerable dispute 
and mythologising. Catalonia did not benefit from any special recognition in the 
Spanish Constitution akin to the ‘historical rights’ of the foral territories recognised 
                                                
170 The main focus in this chapter is on the regional financing system per se rather than state 
spending on infrastructure, but some references will be made to the latter since the two 
issues go hand in hand from the Catalan perspective and are usually raised in tandem as 
grievances, given that Catalonia is perceived to be unfairly treated in both regards. For the 
Catalanist view on Spain’s overly centralised infrastructure network and its use as a 
nationbuilding tool, see Bel 2012 and 2015: 112-139. 
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in the First Additional Disposition for the Basque Country and Navarre, which made 
it much more difficult for the region to seek different treatment. Nevertheless, some 
members of the PNV have long argued, based on the recollections of their 
negotiations with their Catalan counterparts at the time, that CDC was averse to 
seeking a Concierto-style arrangement in any case, suggesting that Miquel Roca and 
other representatives of the party were wary of the risk of collecting their own taxes 
(as well as the fact that such a task could make them unpopular with their citizens), 
and that they also thought the Concierto was outdated.171 Pedro Luis Uriarte, for 
example, recalls a meeting in mid- to late-1980 between himself (then Basque 
economy minister), Jaime García Añoveros (then Spanish treasury minister) and 
Ramón Trias Fargas (then CDC economy minister for Catalonia), after CiU had won 
the first Catalan elections earlier that year. At said meeting, according to Uriarte, 
García Añoveros offered Trias Fargas the opportunity of a Concierto-type 
arrangement shortly before the first regional financing law (LOFCA) was due to be 
approved, taking advantage of the fact that this was to include additional dispositions 
for the Basque Concierto and Navarran Convenio, but Trias Fargas turned down the 
offer (Uriarte 2015: Pt V 101-103).  
             Pujol and many others within CDC have nevertheless rejected suggestions 
that CDC turned down the possibility of a Concierto during the Transition, arguing 
that it was not given the opportunity. Pujol himself says he was called in the late 
1970s by then Spanish prime minister Adolfo Suárez, deputy primer minister 
Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado and minister Joaquin Garrigues (the latter also a good 
friend of Pujol) to assure him that the Basque and Catalan regions would both be 
granted autonomy statutes with distinctive features. He recalls being told that while 
the distinctive feature of Basque autonomy would be the Concierto, that of Catalan 
autonomy would be the Catalan language, and a Concierto-style arrangement for 
Catalonia would not be possible.172 It is well documented and acknowledged that 
CDC and UDC did still make an attempt to secure a Concierto-style arrangement 
during the regional statute negotiations of the late 1970s, but they failed not only due 
to opposition from the UCD Spanish government but also, importantly, since they 
were constrained by the parliamentary predominance of the primarily left-wing 
                                                
171 Personal interviews with current and former PNV representatives, 2014. 
172 Personal interview with Jordi Pujol, 24 February 2016. 
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statewide parties in Catalonia at the time.173 Both the Socialists (PSC) and the 
Communists (PSUC) opposed any separate financing deal for Catalonia, since they 
thought this risked lacking in solidarity with Spain and they also deemed the 
Concierto to be out-of-date, given its origins in the Carlist era. The PSC had won the 
most seats in the Catalan provinces at the 1977 and 1979 Spanish elections, followed 
by the PSUC. UCD too had won more seats than CDC. The proposals made by CDC 
and UDC for a Concierto-style arrangement at the negotiations for the 1979 Catalan 
autonomy statute were rejected outright by the PSC, PSUC, UCD and Alianza 
Popular. ERC, which was in favour of a Concierto, only had a weak presence in 
Catalonia at the time.  
         There nevertheless seems to have been some degree of disagreement within 
CDC over whether to push more for a Concierto-style arrangement or not, with 
attention focusing on possible discrepancies between Pujol and his economy minister 
Ramón Trias Fargas. Trias Fargas himself is known to have been particularly 
supportive of the idea of a Concierto-style arrangement in which Catalonia would 
raise its own taxes, as clearly evidenced by his writings (e.g. Trias Fargas 2011 
[1985]) and widely acknowledged within Catalonia itself by representatives of 
different parties.174 While Pujol himself argues that he and Trias Fargas were on the 
same page in this regard,175 it has been suggested that there was some discrepancy 
within CDC at the time between party leaders who thought they should accept the 
regional statute proposed in 1979 as the best possible in the circumstances, and 
others (most notably Trias Fargas) who thought they should be more wary of 
accepting it given its suboptimal financing arrangements, among other issues (e.g. 
                                                
173 Pujol recounts this opposition of the left in Catalonia to a Concierto-style arrangement in 
his memoirs (Pujol 2012: Pt 4 Chap 9 loc 4027), but it is also reflected in documentation 
from the time (as seen, for example, in the documentation on the drawing up of the regional 
autonomy statute published by the historians Sobrequés and Riera: 1982) and widely 
acknowledged among Catalan politicians of different political affiliations in Catalonia today. 
Several interviewees of different political affiliations drew attention to the importance of the 
predominance of left-wing forces in Catalonia in the time opposed to a Concierto for 
Catalonia, including Josep Huguet (ERC), Antoni Castells (PSC), Germà Bel (formerly PSC, 
now Junts Pel Sí) and Andreu Mas-Colell (CDC), among others.  
174 For example, in personal interviews held in 2015-2016 with Germà Bel (formerly PSC, 
now Junts pel Sí), Josep Huguet (ERC) and Andreu Mas-Colell (CDC). 
175 Personal interview with Jordi Pujol, 24 February 2016. 
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Paluzie 2011: 11).176 The generally held view within CDC is that by accepting the 
proposed statute, the party behaved in a pragmatic way with a view to what was 
possible in the circumstances, and also with the optimism that there would be scope 
within the common financing system gradually to reach a suitable arrangement for 
Catalonia, if not immediately then within time, through negotiations with the central 
government.177 Nevertheless, this did not stop CiU from lamenting the statewide 
parties’ opposition to a Concierto-style arrangement for Catalonia in its 1980 
regional election campaign, vowing to seek new negotiations for a Catalan treasury 
after a transitional period of a few years.178  
            Uriarte’s aforementioned account of the subsequent offer made by García 
Añoveros to Trias Fargas in late 1980 and the latter’s alleged rejection of it might 
suggest that CiU, following the regional elections and its unexpected win, had by 
then warmed to – or at least ‘accommodated’ to – the idea of the common financing 
system and wanted to use the potential scope for development it offered via 
negotiations with the central government to its advantage. But given the lack of 
detail known as to what exactly García Añoveros offered Trias Fargas in that 
meeting and in what circumstances, it is impossible to draw any firm conclusions.179 
Arguably, however, even more important than the exact facts of what stance CDC 
took towards a Concierto-style arrangement at different stages in the late 1970s and 
1980 is how those years are generally perceived and recalled in Catalonia today. 
There are different views among Catalan politicians themselves as to whether CDC, 
and in particular Pujol, did enough to try and secure a Concierto-style arrangement 
for Catalonia during the Transition: most back the view of Pujol himself that it was 
simply impossible in the circumstances with the predominance of anti-Concierto 
left-wing forces in Catalonia at the time and the Spanish government’s opposition to 
a different financing arrangement for Catalonia, but some do argue that CDC in 
                                                
176 In a personal interview with Josep Huguet (ERC), he also recalled that Trias Fargas’ 
support for a Concierto-style arrangement was much stronger than that of his party at the 
time.  
177 Personal interviews with Germà Bel, 27 April 2015 and Andreu Mas-Colell, 25 January 
2016. 
178 Xabier Barrena, ‘Y los catalanes, ¿Por qué no?’, post published on the blog of Iñaki 
Anasagasti, 01.11.11 http://ianasagasti.blogs.com/mi_blog/2011/01/y-los-catalanes-por-qué-
no.html  
179 Neither of the other two participants in that meeting remain alive and, to my knowledge, 
there are no other published accounts of the meeting or references to it aside from that of 
Uriarte (2015: Pt V 101-103).  
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general lacked the foresight to anticipate properly the benefits of fiscal autonomy 
and fight sufficiently for this.  
 
Regional financing during the politics of accommodationism 
          Following the Transition, a pragmatic, accommodationist approach towards 
regional financing and the common financing system certainly came to dominate 
within CiU throughout the 1980s and 1990s under successive Pujol-led governments, 
as part of the party’s wider accommodationist approach at the time (see Chapter 2). 
CiU collaborated with Spanish governments and participated fully in reforms of the 
LOFCA via both bilateral and inter-regional negotiations, seeking to secure gains in 
regional financing when possible. The period from 1980 through to the mid 1990s 
was one in which CiU consolidated its dominance in Catalonia and the region 
remained the main financial powerhouse of Spain despite the common financing 
system,180 thus encouraging an accommodationist attitude towards regional financing 
rather than radical proposals for a new system. CiU ceased during this time to 
request a Catalan treasury under a Concierto-style arrangement, focusing its 
proposals instead on what was possible within the scope of the Spanish Constitution, 
the regional autonomy statute and the LOFCA. Thus in the 1990s it fought 
increasingly for shares of taxes to be ‘ceded’ to the regions, as the best means of 
gaining some fiscal powers within the framework of the common financing system, 
as well as for the amount granted to the Catalans under the transfers to increase, so 
as to reduce the Catalan deficit with the Spanish state that was by then becoming 
apparent. In 1993, when the PSOE won the general elections again but only with a 
simply majority this time, CiU secured its agreement to cede 15% of personal 
income tax to the regions for the first time, albeit without legislative autonomy over 
the tax at this stage.181 In its programme for the 1995 regional elections, CiU 
included its aim to secure an increase in the share of personal income tax ceded to it 
                                                
180 In 1980, Catalonia was the richest region in Spain in absolute terms, accounting for 
approximately 19% of Spain’s GDP, compared to approximately 14% in the case of the 
Madrid region, the second most prosperous in absolute terms, according to the official 
figures published by Spain’s national statistics institute (INE). Since then, Catalonia’s 
relative share of Spain’s GDP has remained broadly stable at about 19%, but Madrid’s share 
has gradually increased, eventually catching up with and even overtaking Catalonia for the 
first time in 2015. For an analysis of the evolution of the Catalan economy relative to that of 
Madrid in the 1980s and 1990s, the period under consideration here, see De la Fuente 2007.  
181 On the history of the taxes ceded to the regions, see, for example, Sánchez Galina et al. 
1997: 94-96 and ‘El polémico camino del reparto del dinero’, El País, 02.05.05. 
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at the next reform of the LOFCA, as well as a share of VAT and excise duties for the 
first time. 
           The fact that CiU was still committed in the early and mid 1990s to 
attempting to reform the common financing system to increase fiscal co-
responsibility, rather than seeking a Concierto-style arrangement instead, became 
evident when ERC proposed a parliamentary commission to study the possibility of 
a Concierto for Catalonia in early 1996. Josep Huguet i Biosca, who led the proposal 
for ERC, recalls that CiU was not at all in favour of seeking a Concierto arrangement 
at the time,182  and transcripts of relevant parliamentary sessions from the time 
support this view. CiU did somewhat reluctantly back ERC’s proposition, and thus 
the proposal to create a Committee to Study the Concierto Económico as a Means for 
the Appropriate Financing of Catalan Autonomy was presented jointly by ERC and 
CiU in the Catalan parliament on 7 February 1996.183 However, Pujol had been 
sceptical from the start. In response to ERC’s original proposal for a commission, he 
had argued during the investiture debate on 14 December 1995 that ‘we all know 
already’ the conclusion to the question of whether a generalised Concierto for 
Catalonia too within Spain is feasible – in other words, that it would not be permitted 
– but that ‘if [ERC] insists on such a study committee simply to study the idea, we’ll 
do it’.184 On 7 February 1996, when Ramón Camp i Batalla spoke on behalf of CiU 
to propose the creation of the commission, his speech was markedly different from 
that of Josep Huguet on behalf of ERC, who had preceded him.185 While Huguet 
spoke unequivocally of the need for a Concierto to resolve Catalonia’s funding 
problems under the common system, Camp was more reticent, insisting that despite 
the title of the committee, CiU intended to use the opportunity to explore different 
financing possibilities for Catalonia, rather than focusing exclusively on one system. 
The main aim, he stated, should be to design a new system under which all the 
autonomous communities would receive similar levels of resources per capita for the 
                                                
182 Personal interview with Josep Huguet, 9 June 2015. 
183 The transcript of the parliamentary debate surrounding the proposal to create the 
committee is available here: Diari de Sessions del Parlament de Catalunya, V legislatura, 
Segon període, Sèrie P – Núm. 7, 7 de febrer de 1996, pp. 154-162. 
184 As recalled by Josep Curto, Catalan PP party deputy, in his criticism of CiU for backing 
the creation of a committee ‘to give the impression of doing something only then to do 
nothing’. Diari de Sessions del Parlament de Catalunya, V legislatura, Segon període, Sèrie 
P – Núm. 7, 7 de febrer de 1996, p. 159. 
185 Diari de Sessions del Parlament de Catalunya, V legislatura, Segon període, Sèrie P – 
Núm. 7, 7 de febrer de 1996, pp. 155-157. 
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same level of competences, to correct the imbalance whereby Catalonia had been 
receiving below average levels of resources in the final distribution. And he argued 
that from CiU’s perspective, it should be ‘perfectly possible’ to achieve this by 
improving the existing common financing system to increase fiscal co-responsibility 
– in other words, by ceding a greater share of taxes to the regions and increasing 
their legislative autonomy over these. For CiU, at this stage, the aim was thus still 
first and foremost to improve the common financing system, rather than to seek a 
Concierto-type arrangement, and it still believed there was scope to do so.  
           The following year, when the PP won the Spanish elections without an 
absolute majority of seats and thus needed the nationalists’ support in the Spanish 
parliament, this gave CiU the opportunity to strike a deal in this regard: Aznar 
agreed to increase the share of IRPF ceded to the regions to 30%, as well as 
providing some additional powers to the regions over the fully ceded taxes, under the 
reform of the LOFCA agreed with the PP in 1996 for the period 1997-2001.186 Most 
notably, legislative autonomy over the share of personal income tax ceded to the 
regions was devolved for the first time, marking the first genuine step towards fiscal 
co-responsibility. Previously, under the agreement with the PSOE, part of IRPF had 
been ceded to the regions but without legislative autonomy, in other words, still 
subject entirely to the rates set by Spanish legislation (Montalvo Barragán 1997: 
148). The new cession agreed between the PP and CiU in 1996 required an update to 
the 1983 Tax Cession Law (Law 30/1983), which was limited in scope in terms of 
what taxes could be ceded and under what terms, for example it had not allowed for 
the partial cession of legislative autonomy over IRPF under its provisions. It was 
therefore replaced by Law 14/1996, the scope of which allowed for more taxes to be 
partially or fully ceded to the regions (Mora Lorente 2004: 109-110).  
           Thus, from the first LOFCA of 1980 up until 1996, CiU under Pujol remained 
committed to seeking improvements in fiscal co-responsibility under the common 
financing system in order to provide a suitable financing model for Catalonia. The 
aim was to rectify the main problem that had emerged whereby Catalonia 
consistently ended up receiving resources below the average level for the regions in 
the final distribution, despite being one of the main contributors to the system in 
terms of revenues per capita. The financing system had always been designed to be 
                                                
186 For example, ‘Aznar logra el apoyo de Pujol para formar Gobierno’, El País, 27 April 
1996. See also Sánchez Galina et al. 1997: 94-96. 
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redistributive to a degree in order to ensure sufficient resources in each region for an 
equal provision of basic services, but an unintended outcome of the system was that 
it proved overly redistributive in some cases (see Chapter 3). CiU’s main reasons for 
seeking improvements to the common financing system at the time, rather than a 
completely new Concierto-style system based on more substantial fiscal autonomy, 
were twofold: (1) the knowledge that achieving a Concierto-style arrangement was 
very unlikely to be possible within the parameters of the 1978 Spanish Constitution 
and the 1979 regional autonomy statute; and (2) the conviction that the common 
financing system did still offer genuine scope for improvement, in order to resolve 
the shortcomings of the existing system and provide suitable funding for Catalonia. 
It was envisaged that this would be achieved primarily by increasing the regions’ 
fiscal powers within the system and thus increasing fiscal co-responsibility between 
the central and regional governments. Pacts made by CiU with minority central 
governments, first the PSOE in 1993 and then in particular the PP in 1996, which 
allowed for the cession of shares of some of the most important taxes to the regions, 
had seemed to lend support to the idea that the desired improvements to the common 
system were feasible.  
           Despite this, however, Pujol made a volte-face in 1997 to start to request 
publicly for the first time a ‘fiscal pact’ for Catalonia akin to the Concierto, based on 
Catalonia raising its own taxes and bilateral fiscal relations between Catalonia and 
the Spanish state. He announced that CiU would launch a campaign in 1998 to seek a 
‘radical change’ in regional financing at the next reform of the common system due 
in 2001, in order to achieve a similar system for Catalonia to the Basque and 
Navarran models.187 The so-called ‘fiscal pact’ would be based fundamentally on 
bilateral relations between Madrid and Catalonia, under which the Catalans would 
raise their own taxes and then pay a quota to Madrid – in other words, the main 
principles governing the Concierto. This change in stance came less than a year after 
CiU had praised as a great success the deal to increase fiscal co-responsibility within 
the common financing system struck with the PP in 1996. What explains the sudden 
turning point at this stage? 
                                                
187 This volte-face was widely reflected in newspaper reports at the time, for example ‘Pujol 
reclama un “cambio radical” del sistema de financiación autonómica a partir del año 2001’, 
El País, 16.10.97. See also Alonso Olea 2014: 84.  
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            By the late 1990s, regional financing – and the related problem of the relative 
lack of sufficient Spanish state investment in Catalan infrastructure compared to 
spending elsewhere in Spain – had become the main source of contention in Spanish-
Catalan relations.188 While CiU had managed to secure pacts in 1993 and 1996 with 
PSOE and PP governments respectively to start to cede shares of important taxes to 
the regions, such developments – often described by Catalan politicians as ‘parches’ 
(temporary fixes) – were not happening fast enough to rectify the fact that Catalonia, 
year after year, was receiving below average resources per capita and thus 
accumulating a growing fiscal deficit with the Spanish state.189 It was also widely felt 
that the developments were not substantial enough to give Catalonia the increased 
fiscal powers and financial resources sought by politicians across the political 
spectrum to tackle the challenges the region faced in the mid to late 1990s, most 
notably growing levels of immigration into the region, following other challenges 
such as the economic crisis of 1992-1993.190 With the influx of migrants, Catalonia 
sought more resources from the centre to reflect its increased commitments in health 
and education.  
           CiU’s attempts to negotiate reforms of the common financing system via 
bilateral bargaining arrangements with central governments, in conflict with the 
otherwise inter-regional nature of the system, had also come under intense criticism 
from the PSOE opposition in Madrid and a number of PSOE-led regional 
governments in the wake of the 1996 agreement between Pujol and Aznar.191 This 
contributed to the increasing frustration within CiU regarding the inter-regional 
nature of the common financing system and drew attention to the PSOE’s growing 
opposition both to bilateral pacts between CiU and the central government as well as 
to the concept of fiscal co-responsibility, which many PSOE politicians perceived as 
a threat to equality among Spaniards in terms of ensuring similar resources per capita 
for the same competences. While the PSOE had struck a deal with CiU to cede a 
                                                
188 Personal interviews with current and former representatives of PSC, ERC and CDC, 
2015-2016. 
189 Personal interviews with current and former representatives of PSC, ERC and CDC, 
2015-2016. 
190 On the rapid growth in immigration in the 1990s and early 2000s, see, for example, Cabré 
and Domingo 2007. 
191 For example ‘Los congresistas instan a la nueva dirección a reabrir la negociación 
autonómica con el PP’, El País, 22.06.97 and ‘El PSOE ofrece al Gobierno de Aznar un 
pacto de Estado sobre la financiación autonómica’ El País, 27.06.97. 
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share of IRPF to it in 1993, it was heavily critical of the further advances in this 
direction taken by the subsequent PP government, including the modification of the 
1983 Tax Cession Law that the PP-CiU deal necessitated. The PSC persuaded the 
PSOE in Madrid to abstain rather than vote against the PP’s cession of 30% of IRPF, 
since the PSC itself was in favour of the cession and wanted to avoid criticism from 
CiU. But other regional branches of the PSOE were not in favour, and three did not 
approve the new LOFCA reform following the PP-CiU deal. 192  The strongest 
opposition came from the PSOE government in Extremadura, the region which has 
traditionally benefitted most from the redistribution of resources under the common 
financing system. PSOE headquarters in Madrid was under increasing pressure from 
its regional representatives in Extremadura, as well as some other PSOE regional 
governments, to reduce the possibilities for Catalan nationalists to agree deals 
bilaterally over regional financing with the central government. Such political 
constraints risked reducing CiU’s ability to negotiate the financing arrangements it 
wanted for Catalonia going forward. 
           More importantly still, while CiU under Pujol was for a long time keen to try 
and resolve Catalonia’s financing problems by improving the common system, by 
the late 1990s it was also coming under pressure from increased party competition 
within Catalonia itself over the issue. Regional financing is one of the few issues on 
which there was at the time, and has been since, a cross-party consensus within the 
region that the existing provisions of the common financing system and its outcomes 
for Catalonia were unsatisfactory, notwithstanding different political views on how 
the matter should be resolved. Although ERC was at the time the only party strongly 
in favour of a Concierto (which was consistently rejected by other left-wing parties 
in Catalonia due to its perceived lack of solidarity and lack of generalisability to the 
rest of Spain), there was a general consensus among the other main parties operating 
in the region on both the left (PSC, ICV) and right (PP) that the common financing 
system needed to be improved so as to reduce Catalonia’s financial disadvantage 
under the system. The main demand made not only by CiU, but also by PSC, ICV 
and the PP, was for fiscal co-responsibility, as a means to resolve Catalonia’s 
disadvantage while at the same time maintaining a solidarity contribution to other 
                                                
192 For example, ‘El PSOE ofrece al Gobierno de Aznar un pacto de Estado sobre la 
financiación autonómica’ El País, 27.06.97. On the opposition of Andalusia to the new 
reform, for example, see Montalvo Barragán 1997: 150.  
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regions in Spain. The fact that all the main parties in Catalonia were in agreement 
that the system needed to be improved put increasing pressure on CiU, as it came 
under fire for not rectifying the situation and faced competition from competing 
proposals from different parties as to how to proceed, ranging from ERC’s proposal 
for a Concierto to the PSC’s proposal for a more federal system in which the regions 
would have greater fiscal co-responsibility while still guaranteeing sufficiency and 
solidarity. This occurred at a time when CiU was facing increased competition from 
other parties in general, having lost its absolute majority at the 1995 regional 
elections to secure a relative majority of seats only (see Chapter 2, p.79). The 1999 
regional election became the most competitive since 1980, with the PSC coming a 
close second to CiU (Barrio and Rodríguez-Teruel 2014). At the time, under Pasqual 
Maragall (PSC candidate for regional president at the 1999 elections), the PSC was 
shifting towards a more ‘Catalanist’ agenda while the pro-independence ERC was 
moving more into the mainstream to adopt federalist agendas and thus also become a 
more genuine contender in Catalan party politics. As a result CiU came to face 
competition from ‘nationalist’ or ‘Catalanist’ parties offering a left-wing alternative 
to CiU (Dowling 2009; Wilson 2012: 135), all of which also offered competing 
alternatives to how to improve Catalonia’s financing situation.  
          It was in this climate that Pujol made a volte-face from 1997 to request a fiscal 
pact similar to the Concierto from the next regional financing reform in 2001 
onwards. The conclusions delivered in 1999 of the aforementioned parliamentary 
committee to study the Concierto, which were backed not only by CiU but all the 
main parties operating in Catalonia, went considerably beyond CiU’s initial 
proposals outlined by Ramón Camp when the committee was launched in February 
1996.193 Under pressure from other parties and from the challenges that Catalan 
society faced, it had become increasingly difficult in the second half of the 1990s for 
CiU to argue convincingly that piecemeal reforms of the LOFCA could ever achieve 
the radical overhaul in regional financing that Catalan politicians across the spectrum 
now felt necessary. Although the term ‘Concierto’ was never explicitly used in the 
conclusions, these set out the parameters for a desired ‘fiscal pact’ which resembled 
the Concierto in almost all but name, with the important caveat that Catalonia would 
still make a meaningful solidarity contribution to the rest of Spain. The idea, as 
                                                
193 The conclusions delivered in 1999 can be found here: Butlletí Oficial de Catalunya, IX 
legislatura, Tercer període, Número 175, 3 de noviembre de 2011, pp. 3-5. 
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expressed in the conclusions, was to seek a new model that would be based strictly 
on bilateral relations between Catalonia and the Spanish state, thus superseding the 
limitations of the inter-regional LOFCA and CPFF194. Under the proposed model, per 
capita resources would progressively reach the same levels as those received by the 
Basque and Navarran regions under the foral system for the same competences; the 
Catalan regional government would have legislative autonomy over all the ceded 
taxes, with the increase in legislative autonomy allowing for a model of shared fiscal 
sovereignty with the Spanish state and the EU; and a Catalan treasury would be 
created to collect all taxes in Catalonia.  
          This notwithstanding, doubt has been cast on the sincerity of Pujol’s stated 
commitment from 1997 onwards to securing a radically new financing system for 
Catalonia. Opposition parties accused Pujol of raising the issue for electioneering 
purposes only ahead of the 1999 regional elections.195 In a similar vein, Pujol was 
accused of electioneering in his creation of a new parliamentary committee to study 
possibilities for improving Catalonia’s self-government (Comisión de Estudio sobre 
la Mejora del Autogobierno) in March 1999, just a few months before the regional 
elections that year. Despite calling for a radically different fiscal model akin to the 
Concierto from 1997 onwards, Pujol’s 1999 election manifesto did not demand a 
Concierto-type fiscal pact, but rather centred on improving the LOFCA via the usual 
methods used by CiU up until then: (1) seeking to increase the share of taxes ceded 
to the regions; and (2) increasing the revenue shares afforded to Catalonia to reduce 
the Catalan fiscal deficit – in this case, the stated aim was 400 bn pesetas 
(approximately 2.4 bn euros) (Homs 2008: 39).  
           Within CDC too, the general opinion is that Pujol remained reluctant in his 
final years at the helm of CiU to go beyond his accommodationist tradition of 
securing pacts with central Spanish governments in return for gains in autonomy, 
within the boundaries of the existing Catalan regional autonomy statute and the 
Spanish Constitution.196 Given the ongoing prevalence of such pacts, Pujol was also 
inevitably constrained by the circumstances, since CiU in the Catalan parliament was 
dependent upon parliamentary support from the PP following both the 1995 and the 
                                                
194 Defined on p.107. 
195 For example, personal interview with Josep Huguet, 9 June 2015. Such accusations were 
also widely reflected in the press at the time. 
196 For example, personal interviews with Lluís Corominas, 27 January 2016 and with 
Francesc Homs, 28 January 2016. 
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1999 regional elections. 197  Despite the 1999 conclusions of the parliamentary 
committee to study the Concierto, these then had relatively little impact on the 2001 
reform of the LOFCA, which did not entail a radical change in financing for 
Catalonia. The more moderate changes secured were instead in line with the more 
moderate goals CiU had outlined in its 1999 election campaign and in the same vein 
as the changes made at the previous reform of the LOFCA in 1996, focusing 
primarly on gradual increases in the taxes ceded to the autonomous communities in 
order to gradually increase fiscal co-responsibility, as well as ensuring sufficient 
resources. CiU praised the 2001 reform as satisfactory: some progress had still been 
made. CiU’s bargaining power to secure a better deal was in any case very limited 
given the parliamentary arithmetic at the time, with CiU still dependent on the PP to 
support it in the Catalan parliament while the PP in 2000 unexpectedly secured an 
absolute majority of seats in the Spanish parliament and thus no longer needed CiU’s 
support there. Pushing actively for a Concierto-style fiscal pact for Catalonia in the 
late 1990s or early 2000s would have required a sea change in parliamentary 
alliances in Catalonia which was not seriously contemplated at the time by CDC 
under Pujol, nor indeed by the other main nationalist party ERC. The left-right axis 
of competition still dominated Catalan politics at this time over and above the 
nationalist-statewide axis, with CiU allying with the PP while ERC had begun to 
glimpse opportunities to ‘nationalise’ the left in Catalonia (PSC and ICV) by 
creating a more left-wing nationalist alliance in opposition to CiU.198 
           Overall, towards the end of the 1990s, the steps CiU started to take under 
Pujol towards requesting a radically new financing deal for Catalonia in the form of 
a bilateral fiscal pact were thus still only tentative at this stage, given the difficulties 
in securing any radical changes to Catalan financing within the context of the 
Catalan autonomy statute at the time, the Spanish Constitution and Pujol’s 
accommodationist tactics. Importantly, however, dissatisfaction with Catalonia’s 
treatment under the regional financing system, combined with the perceived lack of 
sufficient Spanish state investment in Catalonia, had clearly emerged as the main 
source of discontent in Spanish-Catalan relations, shared by all the main nationalist 
and statewide parties in the region (CiU, ERC, PSC, PP, ICV). Not only was there a 
cross-party consensus that the existing financing arrangements were inadequate for 
                                                
197 For example, personal interview with Andreu Mas-Colell, 25 January 2016. 
198 For example, personal interview with Andreu Mas-Colell, 25 January 2016. 
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Catalonia, but for most parties this was also to end up becoming one of, if not the 
main reason for seeking a new statute for Catalonia. ERC, for example, moderated 
its pro-independence agenda to focus on what it was possible to achieve at the time, 
considering a Concierto-type model a suitable medium-term goal, and it would find 
sufficient common ground (notwithstanding significant differences in their 
proposals) with the PSC and ICV in terms of their goals for financing.199 These three 
parties (ERC, PSC and ICV), would embrace statute reform as convincingly as CiU 
in the lead up to the 2003 regional elections. In addition to the beginnings of a 
decline in scope for accommodationism, CiU was thus also being pushed along by a 
wider Catalanist evolution. Even the Catalan PP, the only party in Catalonia that did 
not support moves for a new Catalan statute at the turn of the century and did not 
include this as a goal in its 2003 regional election manifesto, had been supportive of 
the need for a serious overhaul of financing for Catalonia since the topic had 
emerged seriously in the late 1990s. 
 
Regional financing and the Catalan statute reform 
           Regional financing became one of the key issues featuring in cross-party 
negotiations in Catalonia for a regional statute reform from 2003 onwards, along 
with questions of identity (especially the quest to seek recognition of Catalonia as a 
nation) and institutional autonomy (designed to shield Catalan competences and the 
institutions which implement them from the risk of central government interference). 
After CiU, under the new leadership of Artur Mas, had unexpectedly ended up 
pushed into opposition by the left-wing tripartite coalition comprising the PSC, ERC 
and ICV following the 2003 regional elections, it found itself initially on the 
backseat as the coalition government took the lead in taking forward statute reform 
proposals. The leadership succession, which had seen Pujol replaced by Mas ahead 
of the elections, did not initially seem to mark a fundamental turning point in 
CDC/CiU’s agenda: Mas, more economically liberal than Pujol but not as 
conservative as Duran i Lleida (leader of UDC and an alternative candidate), was 
seen as a good compromise in terms of being a leader that could reflect the 
traditional moderate centre of the party as well as the beginnings of a soberanista 
current, so as not to alienate the one nor the other (Gillespie 2015c, following 
                                                
199 Personal interviews with Josep Huguet, 9 June 2015, and Jaume Bosch, 19 March 2015. 
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Barberà 2011: 267). Mas did defend proposals for a new regional autonomy statute, 
including a new financing framework for Catalonia, in the run up to the 2003 
elections, but no more so than his left-wing competitors who would end up forming 
the tripartite coalition. It was only once CiU was pushed into opposition that CiU 
would then become more aggressive in its defence of a Concierto-style arrangement 
for Catalonia, among other matters. Since CiU’s support would also be needed to 
push through any statute reform in the Catalan parliament (since such reforms 
require approval by two thirds of deputies), from early on the head of the Catalan 
government Pasqual Maragall formed a parliamentary committee, which integrated 
CiU, to hold cross-party discussions to agree a statute reform proposal. Members of 
the tripartite coalition nevertheless argue that the dynamic became a negative one, 
with CiU repeatedly making proposals that were more radical than what ERC was 
able to achieve as part of the tripartite government (due to the compromises that 
needed to be reached with PSC and ICV), in an attempt to put ERC in a difficult 
position and portray itself as the most pro-Catalan party.200  
           Academics applying ‘outbidding’ theories to the Catalan case have argued 
that the party behaviour seen during the Statute reform negotiations, including CiU’s 
attempts to outbid the tripartite coalition (which in itself involved parties such as 
PSC and ICV whose agendas had become increasingly Catalanist), can be interpreted 
as an elite-led process of radicalisation in response to a climate of increasing party 
competition (e.g. Barrio and Rodríguez-Teruel 2014). To some degree, this certainly 
seems to hold true, as CiU needed strategically to outbid ERC with its proposals, in 
an attempt to win popularity for CiU as the most pro-Catalan party and seek its 
return to power in subsequent elections. CiU’s outbidding strategy was clear in the 
area of financing, where it fiercely defended a Concierto-type model, taking 
advantage of the fact that ERC had had to water down its proposals in this regard to 
reach an agreement with PSC and ICV to form a coalition government (the Tinell 
Pact). CiU’s opponents in the left-wing tripartite coalition accused CiU of tactical 
behaviour in this regard, particularly since Artur Mas eventually reduced his 
financing demands considerably as part of the final Zapatero-Mas agreement to gain 
the Spanish parliament’s acceptance of the statute in 2006, suggesting his 
                                                
200 Personal interviews with Antoni Castells (PSC), Josep Huguet (ERC) and Jaume Bosch 
(ICV), 2015. 
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commitment to a Concierto-type model was not absolute after all.201 Nevertheless, 
while some degree of instrumentalism was inevitably involved, CiU’s behaviour was 
not purely tactical. The transition from Pujol to Mas and the generational change 
within CDC around that same time, which brought younger, more pro-sovereignty 
figures into the party, meant that CDC was starting to evolve beyond the 
accommodationist tactics of Pujol’s era.202 In conjunction with this generational shift, 
there also came a stronger conviction and determination that if CDC had not done 
more to demand a Concierto during the Transition, it had to take the opportunity to 
do so now and table a concrete proposal.203 
           Moreover, the presentation of different financing proposals was not just a 
question of outbidding for the sake of it, but rather in response to the genuine 
conviction now shared by all parties in Catalonia that regional financing needed to 
be seriously improved for Catalonia if the region were to be able to face its economic 
and social challenges. While this conviction had become widespread in the late 
1990s, it was also gradually compounded by the shortcomings of the 2001 reform of 
the LOFCA that soon became apparent, for it did not make headway towards 
resolving the problem whereby Catalonia fell in the regional ranking of resources per 
capita after the equalisation of revenues. Importantly, the 2001 reform did not 
include mechanisms to adapt to asymmetric changes across the regions, most notably 
uneven population increases, nor did it account for the fact that population increases 
would not necessarily automatically result in tax increases (Blöchlinger and 
Vammalle 2012: 114). As immigration soared during the first half of the 2000s, the 
regions receiving the most migrants – including Catalonia – were penalised by the 
system.  
           What a new financing system for Catalonia should look like was one of the 
most difficult areas for the three left-wing parties to agree on when drawing up a 
joint agenda to form a tripartite coalition government in 2003 (the Tinell Pact).204 
ERC, on the one hand, was in favour of a Concierto for Catalonia. The PSC, on the 
other hand, was against a Concierto and wanted instead a federal model that would 
                                                
201 Personal interviews with Antoni Castells (PSC), Josep Huguet (ERC) and Jaume Bosch 
(ICV), 2015. 
202 Personal interview with Agustí Colomines, 23 March 2015. On the question of 
generational change within CDC, see also Gillespie 2015c. 
203 Personal interview with Francesc Homs, 28 January 2016. 
204 Personal interviews with Antoni Castells (PSC), Josep Huguet (ERC) and Jaume Bosch 
(ICV), 2015.  
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be generalisable to other regions of Spain too should they so want it, inspired by the 
German model of fiscal federalism. ICV, meanwhile, was in favour of a so-called 
‘Concierto solidario’ (‘solidarity Concierto’), which incorporated elements of both 
ERC’s and the PSC’s proposals. The federal model envisioned by leading members 
of the PSC, including the then Catalan economy minister Antoni Castells, would be 
based on two main principles: (1) a strong degree of authority in tax-raising 
decision-making (the Catalan government must be able to raise income that 
corresponds first and foremost to its own tax decisions) and (2) fiscal equalisation 
mechanisms, to share wealth between the regions, but without over-redistribution. If 
these two principles were respected, no region should fall in the ranking of per capita 
resources post equalisation of revenues (i.e. if a region is the third largest contributor 
of revenues per capita to the system, it should also come third in the final 
distribution of resources per capita for homogenous competences).205  The main 
differences between ERC’s vision of a Concierto and the fiscal federal model 
envisioned by the PSC were as follows: under the Concierto, the Catalan tax agency 
would raise and collect all taxes paid in Catalonia, while under the federal model, 
tax-raising powers would be shared between Spanish and Catalan governments (in 
contrast to the existing common system, where fiscal sovereignty lies heavily with 
the Spanish state). A Catalan treasury would be created which would have more tax-
raising powers of its own, most notably, the shares of taxes ceded to Catalonia would 
increase and the Catalan treasury would collect the partially ceded taxes (as well as 
those fully ceded and its own taxes), in contrast to the existing common system, 
where the shares of taxes partially ceded to the regions were still collected by the 
central government. While it would be very difficult to generalise the Basque 
Concierto widely to other regions of Spain (for several reasons including, for 
example, the fact that the Spanish treasury would no longer collect any taxes of its 
own were that the case), the federal model was designed to create a system for 
Catalonia that would be generalisable to other regions too. 
               The fact that ERC had to water down its demands for a Concierto and 
accept a federal proposal with Concierto-like elements, in order to reach an 
agreement with the PSC, created an obvious opportunity for CiU to make demands 
specifically for a Concierto in the first half of 2005, when negotiations took place for 
                                                
205 For further explanation of Castells’s vision of fiscal federalism, see, for example, Castells 
2014: 287. 
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a cross-party agreement between the tripartite coalition and CiU on a draft statute. 
This created tensions within the tripartite coalition, as ERC was uncomfortable being 
outbid by CiU on the financing question. CiU focused on the differences between its 
proposal for a fiscal pact specifically for Catalonia and what it described as the 
tripartite coalition government’s aim to use the Catalan statute reform to federalise 
Spain (e.g. Homs 2008: 72-73, 158-159). It also differentiated its financing proposal 
by focusing on certain specific areas where the tripartite coalition’s proposal had 
been more vague or non-committal, due to the PSC’s reluctance in some areas: for 
example, CiU was clear in its proposal that the Generalitat should have exclusive 
competence over local financing (i.e. the financing of the provincial authorities and 
town halls), in contrast to the status quo whereby this was almost exclusively the 
competence of the central Spanish government, which provided funding directly to 
the municipalities (Tremosa 2007: 16; Homs 2008: 77). 
           Despite CiU’s intentional focus on the differences between its proposal and 
that of the tripartite coalition government, however, analysis of both proposals 
reveals that they overlapped in many respects. They both shared fundamental 
principles, including most notably the aim to supersede the inter-regional nature of 
the LOFCA to establish a bilateral relationship with Spain in fiscal matters; the aim 
to increase significantly Catalan decision-making authority over fiscal powers, 
establishing a Catalan treasury endowed with significant tax-raising powers and thus 
a strong degree of fiscal sovereignty; a proposed annual Catalan contribution to the 
Spanish state to finance the Catalan share of state competences; a commitment to 
solidarity (within certain limits) with the rest of Spain via an annual solidarity quota 
payment; and an increase in Spanish state investment in Catalonia. These 
commonalities inevitably helped in the end to facilitate an agreement between the 
tripartite coalition government and CiU on a financing proposal in September 2005, 
which was included in the statute reform proposal approved by all four parties in the 
Catalan parliament at the end of the month. While Antoni Castells describes the final 
financing proposal included in the September 2005 statute as ‘not a Concierto’, 
Josep Huguet, the main negotiator for ERC on financing matters at the time, 
describes it as ‘a Concierto in almost all but name’.206 This difference in description 
is eloquent, pointing to the extent to which the different proposals (for a Concierto-
                                                
206 Personal interviews with Antoni Castells and Josep Huguet, 2015. 
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type model or a fiscal federal model) had come to share much in common. CiU was 
also satisfied with the outcome included in the September 2005 version of the statute 
since it achieved a substantial Catalan consensus around a proposed ‘unique 
financing model for Catalonia’ (Homs 2008: 165) which superseded the inter-
regional LOFCA.  
               The financing model envisaged in the September 2005 version of the 
Catalan statute undoubtedly shared much in common with the Basque Concierto in 
its conception. 207  Crucially, the statute approved by the Catalan parliament in 
September 2005 removed the reference to the LOFCA as the framework for Catalan 
financing, which had been included in the 7th Additional Disposition of the 1979 
autonomy statute. It made provisions for the creation of a Catalan tax agency, which 
would collect all taxes originating in Catalonia (impuestos soportados) and have 
legislative capacity over these, except for local taxes. The Catalan government 
would use some of the revenues collected to pay a contribution to the Spanish 
government to cover two concepts: (1) services provided by the state; and (2) 
solidarity with the rest of Spain. In this way, the Catalan model was designed to 
entail a Concierto-style ‘quota’ payment, but with an explicit additional quota 
payment towards solidarity with Spain too. The model would be governed by 
bilateral relations between the Catalan and Spanish governments, with a Mixed 
Commission to be created for this purpose. Any Spanish-Catalan conflicts over fiscal 
matters (e.g. the determination of the annual contribution to the Spanish state) should 
be resolved bilaterally by the Commission, with existing legislation to be rolled over 
in the event of disputes until agreement were reached. Importantly, however, the 
Catalan statute would take precedence over Spanish state legislation in the case of 
conflicts between the provisions of each. On the subject of Spanish state investment 
in Catalonia, it was stipulated that this should be proportional to the weight of 
Catalonia in Spain’s GDP and also provide compensation for the existing deficit 
accumulated.  
                                                
207 See Chapter VI (‘On the Financing of the Generalitat’) of the version Catalan statute 
approved by the Catalan parliament in September 2005, provided in the dossier for session 
no. 66.3 (30th September 2005) of the Catalan parliament plenary (Ple del Parlament. 
Dossier per a la sessió núm. 66.3). A summary of the key features of the financing model 
included in the statute approved on 30th September 2005, compared to both the 1979 statute 
and the final statute approved by the Spanish parliament and in a referendum in Catalonia in 
2006, is also available in Tremosa 2007: 56. 
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           While the Catalan statute of September 2005 thus prepared the ground for a 
fundamentally new financing model, this then became one of the most conflictive 
issues that made it difficult to reach an agreement with the PSOE Spanish 
government at the time in order for the statute to be approved in the Spanish 
parliament. The final agreement on the wording of the statute struck between 
Zapatero and Mas in January 2006 significantly cut back the provisions of the statute 
that had been approved by the Catalan parliament in 2005. The reference to the 
LOFCA as the framework for fiscal and financial relations between Catalonia and 
the Spanish state was reintroduced (Article 201.1) and references to bilateralism 
were reduced: for example, the clause ‘in agreement with the principle of 
bilateralism’ was removed in Article 201.3 (Article 202.3 in the original September 
2005 statute) when describing the functioning of the Spanish-Catalan Mixed 
Commission. The greater importance of the Spanish state in decision-making was 
reinstated in various places, for example, the provision stating that the Catalan 
statute would take precedence over Spanish legislation in case of disputes was 
removed, to be replaced instead by a more vague commitment to the fact that the 
financing of the Generalitat should not be discriminatory to Catalonia relative to the 
rest of the autonomous communities (Article 201.4). The notion in the September 
2005 statute whereby the Catalan tax agency would pay a contribution to the Spanish 
state based on the valuation of Spanish state services (i.e. centralised competences) 
and a solidarity contribution, keeping the remainder of the revenues for itself, was 
also watered down considerably. Instead, under the 2006 statute, the revenues 
Catalonia would keep would be determined in accordance with its ‘needs’ (thus 
reinstating the needs-based principle governing the LOFCA) and its ‘fiscal capacity’ 
(thus this principle was introduced, but in an ambiguous fashion) (Article 206.1). 
Adjustments would be made to its revenues as a result of its participation in fiscal 
equalisation and solidarity mechanisms, to be determined solely by the Spanish state 
(Article 206.3), entirely in-keeping with the existing LOFCA. Instead of collecting 
all taxes in Catalonia and having legislative autonomy over these (as stipulated in the 
September 2005 version of the Statute), the new Catalan tax agency would only 
collect and have legislative autonomy over its own taxes and the fully ceded taxes 
(the latter in cases where the Spanish state has delegated the authority) (Article 
204.1). The partially ceded taxes, which account for the main bulk of the taxes under 
the LOFCA, would continue to be collected by the Spanish treasury, unless it 
229	
 
delegated such functions to the Generalitat (Article 204.2). In this regard, Article 
204.2 of the final statute included the provision that within the space of two years, a 
‘Consortium or other equivalent body’ would be set up, in which the Spanish tax 
administration and the Catalan tax agency would participate ‘in equal measure’ – and 
which ‘could become the [sole] Catalan tax administration’. This was to allow for 
Spanish-Catalan collaboration over the ‘state taxes collected in Catalonia’ (i.e. bulk 
of the taxes, including the partially ceded taxes), but exactly how such collaboration 
would work under the ‘Consortium’ was left ambiguous in the statute. 
           While the version of the statute approved by the Catalan parliament was very 
similar in many respects to a Concierto-style arrangement, the final version of the 
statute – approved by the Spanish parliament and in a referendum in Catalonia – 
undid many of the key advances and situated Catalan financing back very clearly in 
the realm of the LOFCA (Tremosa 2007: 13). Both the PSC and CiU, in their praise 
and defence of the final agreement, nevertheless focused on its possibilities: most 
notably, the door was in theory open to the creation of a Spanish-Catalan joint 
Consortium which could potentially allow for a genuine sharing of tax-raising 
powers between Spanish and Catalan authorities. In this regard, the percentages of 
the partially ceded taxes (50% of IRPF, 50% of VAT and 58% of Excise duties) to 
be granted to the Catalans under the new statute were designed specifically in order 
to ensure that the revenues raised would be split equally. To achieve a genuine 
sharing of these tax-raising powers under a Consortium arrangement, however, the 
Spanish government would need to delegate both collection powers and legislative 
autonomy to the Catalans over their shares of the partially ceded taxes – an 
opportunity which, in the end, would not be exploited due to Spanish opposition to it 
at the next reform of the LOFCA in 2009. 
           Whether the statute reform could suffice to satisfy Catalanist demands for 
financing was put to the test with the 2009 reform of the LOFCA (see also Chapter 
3, pp.107-8). This reform was primarily motivated and necessitated by the fact that 
Catalonia’s new regional autonomy statute required a revision of the regional 
financing system. The Catalan statute had stipulated that a reform of the LOFCA 
would be agreed by 9 August 2008 to implement the provisions of Chapter VI on the 
financing of the Generalitat. The eventual reform agreed in July 2009, after tough 
bilateral negotiations between Spanish and Catalan governments over the period of a 
year, was inevitably subject to different political perspectives in Catalonia, with the 
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PSC-led Catalan government praising it as a good agreement that at least achieved 
the minimum progress deemed necessary, while CiU, given its position in 
opposition, took the opportunity to criticise the reform from the outset as 
insufficient. The reform as initially agreed and first implemented in 2009 was 
generally perceived from the Catalanist perspective as a good one, and thus CiU’s 
immediate criticism of it in 2009 seems to have been first and foremost tactical and 
electorally-motivated. Within a year, however, the reform would end up 
disappointing the PSC too since it did not achieve the intended outcomes due to 
unforeseen factors (most notably the extent of the economic crisis, as well as lack of 
central government compliance with some provisions of the reform). Criticism of the 
reform therefore became more widespread. What problems characterised the 
negotiations for the 2009 reform of the financing system and why did the reform 
quickly prove inadequate to satisfy not only CiU but also the tripartite coalition 
government that had agreed it? 
           Throughout the prolonged reform negotiations in 2008 and 2009, the PSC (as 
lead negotiator for the Catalan government) sought to achieve the model based on 
two pillars which had characterised its vision of a fiscal federal model during the 
statute reform negotiations: (1) an increase in fiscal co-responsibility, to give the 
Catalan government greater fiscal authority and responsibility for its own decisions; 
and (2) solidarity with the rest of Spain, but within clearly established limits (in other 
words, the Catalan fiscal deficit was to be reduced). Although the LOFCA remained 
an inter-regional law, negotiations for its reform took place bilaterally between the 
Spanish and Catalan governments in 2008 and 2009, which in itself would become a 
source of political dispute when the reform was agreed in July 2009, since other 
regions rejected the privileged role that Catalonia had had in negotiations for a 
reform that the Spanish government would then seek approval for in all regions. The 
reform finally agreed between the Spanish and Catalan governments in July 2009 
was praised by the then Catalan economy minister Antoni Castells as a excellent 
agreement which met the minimum requirements the PSC had sought. The main 
positive aspects of the agreement from the PSC’s perspective were as follows.208 
Firstly, the final amount of resources the Catalans received annually was to increase 
by EUR 3.8bn over a three year period, a significant amount (much more than the 
                                                
208 Personal interview with Antoni Castells, 25 March 2015. 
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EUR 2bn proposal Zapatero had made in December 2008). Secondly, for the first 
time, the equalisation of resources between regions was to be partial rather than 
complete, since 75% of revenues (rather than 100%) were to be pooled into the Fund 
for the Guarantee of Fundamental Public Services (the new main vehicle for 
equalisation, which replaced the Sufficiency Fund under the 2001 reform). This 
meant that the Catalans (and other regions) would reap some of the benefit of their 
own fiscal efforts if they raised greater revenues per capita compared to other 
regions. And, in relation to this final point, fiscal co-responsibility was also 
increased by raising the shares of taxes ceded to the regions, as envisaged in the new 
Catalan statute: the share of IRPF ceded to the regions reached 50%, VAT reached 
50% and excise duties 58%. As a result of these and other developments, in the first 
year of implementation of the model (2009), Catalonia’s financing position appeared 
to improve significantly: whereas the region’s per capita resource levels were ranked 
at 94 in the year 2007 (where the average of the common regime regions is 100), in 
2009 they reached 102.3 (Castells 2014: 285). In those same years (2007 and 2009), 
the tax capacity of Catalonia was 121.1 and 119.2 respectively (Castells 2014: 285).   
            This notwithstanding, the agreement fell short from the Catalanist 
perspective relative to what it had been hoped could be achieved within the scope of 
the new statute. CiU, taking advantage of its position in opposition, therefore 
criticised it from the outset. Most notably, due to Spanish opposition, the reform did 
not achieve the Spanish-Catalan bilateral ‘consortium’ on fiscal matters that had 
been envisaged in the Catalan statute, since the power to collect the partially ceded 
taxes was not transferred to the Catalan authorities. They remained only able to 
collect the fully ceded taxes and their own taxes, which account for a very small 
share of total tax revenues. A consortium could in theory still have been set up in 
these circumstances, but it would have been a bilateral consortium in name only, 
with tax-raising powers still very heavily weighted towards the Spanish authorities. 
Moreover, the improvement in resource levels which Catalonia experienced in 2009 
did not endure thereafter, due to ongoing problems with the nature of the 
equalisation mechanism included in the system; the extent of the impact of Spain’s 
shift to austerity measures from 2010 onwards; and the Spanish government’s lack 
of compliance with some of the provisions of the Catalan statute and new LOFCA 
relative to financing. As a result, by 2010, the PSC’s initial satisfaction with the 
reform had also waned.  
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           The fact that the new LOFCA very quickly ended up disappointing Catalan 
officials in terms of the resource levels provided to Catalonia was in part a result of 
the complex way in which the way the equalisation mechanism was designed, in 
order to satisfy different regions’ interests (see Chapter 3). Thus this pointed to the 
continued difficulties in trying to achieve a bilateral Spanish-Catalan deal over 
financing within an inter-regional financing system applicable to 15 of Spain’s 17 
regions. The problems with the equalisation mechanism were exacerbated further by 
other unexpected factors such as the full extent of the impact of Spain’s debt 
reduction strategies on resource levels from 2010 onwards, which also contributed to 
the central government’s decision to delay making payments from the 
Competitiveness Fund. By the autumn of 2009 Spain was under intense pressure 
from the EU and the financial markets to reduce its debt burden and cut public 
spending, which meant a sharp reduction in public spending from 2010 onwards. 
This effect on resource levels had not been properly anticipated during the reform 
negotiations between mid 2008 and mid 2009, when the PSOE government was 
implementing fiscal stimulus measures.209 While a reduction in resource levels was 
widespread across the regions, the main Catalan complaint in 2010 was that 
Catalonia was affected relatively more than most, due to the Spanish government’s 
lack of compliance with with some of the provisions of the new reform and the 
Catalan statute, in part due to the financial difficulties it was facing in the context of 
an unprecedented crisis in resources. Under the common financing system, each 
year, the regions receive provisional transfers of funds from the central government 
(known as entregas a cuenta) based on provisional revenue estimates for that year, 
which are later revised when the regional financing system is finally settled 
(liquidado) 18 months after the end of the year in question. In 2009 and 2010, 
payments from the Competitiveness Fund were made as part of these entregas a 
cuenta in the relevant year. However, for 2011, the central government decided 
instead that it would make the payments from the Competitiveness Fund when the 
system was settled (i.e. 18 months after the end of the year in question) rather than 
during the relevant year itself. Aside from the financing system itself, the Spanish 
government also planned changes to investment spending in 2010 which meant that 
Catalonia, as a result, would not receive a share of investment spending proportional 
                                                
209 On the shift from economic stimulus measures in 2008-2009 to austerity measures and 
debt reduction strategies from late 2009 onwards in Spain, see Salmon 2010a and 2010b.  
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to its share of Spain’s GDP, as had been stipulated in the Third Additional 
Disposition of the new regional statute.210  
           2010 was also the year of the Constitutional Court ruling on the Catalan 
statute. The scope for a new regional financing system for Catalonia had already 
been significantly reduced under the changes agreed in 2006 by Zapatero and Mas to 
secure the Spanish parliament’s approval for the Catalan statute, but some additional 
changes were then made in 2010 by the Constitutional Court. These served to reduce 
further the fiscal authority afforded to the Generalitat and to emphasize the 
principality of Spanish state decision-making.211 For example, under the statute of 
2006, Article 206.3 of Chapter VI had stated that the financial resources of the 
Generalitat could be adjusted for reasons of equalisation and solidarity, to ensure that 
all regional governments can provide similar levels of provision for essential state 
services such as health and education, ‘provided that they [the regional governments] 
also make a similar fiscal effort’. This was designed to ensure the LOFCA would 
encourage fiscal accountability and responsibility on the part of regional 
governments, so that those which raised lower revenues due to poorer fiscal efforts 
(rather than, simply, to having a poorer population) would not automatically be 
bailed out by additional resources contributed by regions which made a greater fiscal 
effort. The Constitutional Court, however, ruled that this clause  (‘provided that…’) 
was inadmissible, arguing that it is the prerogative of the Spanish state only to decide 
what fiscal effort each region must make. The other part of the statute related to 
financing which the Constitutional Court omitted was the part of Article 218.2 which 
had established that the Generalitat would have legislative competence to establish 
and regulate the taxes of local governments. In so doing, the Constitutional Court 
made it clear that the state would continue to have sole and exclusive power over 
local financing. The other changes made by the Constitutional Court to the financing 
provisions in the statute were clarifications of meaning, providing a more strict 
interpretation where the statute had left open a wider scope for interpretation. For 
example, it clarified that the functioning of the bilateral Mixed Commission on 
                                                
210 Complaints about these matters (the Competitiveness Fund and changes to investment 
spending) were made by Catalan economy minister Antoni Castells to Spanish economy 
minister Elena Salgado in a letter dated 23rd September 2010, a copy of which was provided 
by Castells to this author. 
211 The changes to the statute required by the Constitutional Court are indicated in the 
consolidated text of the statute published by the Catalan parliament in February 2013. 
Available here: http://www.parlament.cat/document/cataleg/48146.pdf   
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Economic and Fiscal Matters between the Spanish state and the Generalitat would be 
subordinate to the inter-regional mechanisms and committees governing financing 
(in other words, the traditional CPFF). 
        Thus, by the time CiU returned to power in Catalonia following the regional 
elections in late 2010, it had become clear that the statute reform and the subsequent 
reform of the LOFCA had not served to create a financing system that would provide 
the increased resources or fiscal authority sought by parties across the spectrum in 
Catalonia. This situation would then continue to worsen from 2010 onwards as 
Catalonia’s financial predicament deteriorated as a result of the financial crisis. 
Concerns over the fiscal indiscipline of many of Spain’s regions throughout the 
crisis amplified tensions over the regional financing system. The following section 
looks in detail at the impact of the financial crisis on regional resources and funding 
mechanisms, focusing in particular on the impact on Catalonia, before a final section 
looks more specifically at the implications for CDC’s agenda.  
 
Regional financing and the financial crisis 
  Catalonia’s financial situation – along with that of the central and other 
regional administrations in Spain – deteriorated in particular from 2010 onwards 
once the markets had lost confidence in Spain, which found itself under intense 
pressure from the EU to reduce its debt and deficit. As one of the largest regions and 
therefore one with particularly high financing needs, the Catalan government became 
increasingly reliant upon centralised funding mechanisms created by the Spanish 
government when it lost access to the markets to raise funding to supplement its 
revenues from taxes. These centralised funding mechanisms, in turn, required 
Catalan adherence to strict deficit targets set by the Spanish government for regional 
governments in Spain, in order to meet the overall targets set by the EU authorities. 
And yet Catalonia became one of the most frequent underperformers in terms of 
meeting these fiscal targets. This scenario served to exacerbate already existing 
tensions between Spanish and Catalan authorities over regional financing, creating 
extensive debate over a number of questions, such as: To what extent has the 
regional financing system been to blame for Catalonia’s financial woes, relative to 
discretionary spending decisions taken by the Catalan government? Has the Spanish 
government’s recentralisation of funding mechanisms and control over regional 
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spending corresponded purely to the economic motive of meeting the fiscal targets 
set by the EU for Spain, or has it also taken advantage of the opportunity to impose 
recentralisation to further its ideologically centralist motives? And, in this regard, 
has the split of deficit targets between the different levels of administration in Spain, 
as decided by the Spanish government in order to meet the EU’s overall target for 
Spain, been fair? The aim here is not to provide any definitive answers to these 
questions, which is not the focus here, but rather to explain the nature of these 
debates in order to consider how this has contributed to the pro-sovereignty 
movement in Catalonia and the evolution of CDC’s territorial agenda.  
            At the start of the crisis in 2007, Spain’s total public sector debt as a 
percentage of GDP was among the lowest levels in Europe but it rapidly grew: total 
government debt (which comprises that of the central government, the regional 
governments, the local authorities and the social security system) rose from 35.5% of 
GDP at the end of 2007 to almost double that (69.5%) by the end of 2011, before 
reaching nearly 100% (99.3%) at the end of 2014, measured according to the EU’s 
Excessive Deficit Procedure.212 Borrowing by the regional governments in particular 
ballooned at an unsustainable rate and thus regional government debt came to be 
seen as one of the main obstacles to Spain’s deficit reduction targets (Bosch and 
Solé-Ollé 2013: 7). Prior to the crisis, the total debt held by the 17 regions as a 
percentage of GDP had hovered consistently around the 6% mark between 2000 and 
2006 before declining slightly to 5.7% in 2007. These figures were not surprisingly 
very low, given that Spain’s regional governments had only been in existence since 
the early 1980s. Low interest rates following Spain’s entry to the euro, combined 
with the availability of European structural funding and the cyclically elastic nature 
of regional tax revenues, had encouraged a rapid growth in real expenditure during 
the years of the construction boom, for which windfall revenues compensated (Von 
Hagen and Foremny 2013: 24). When the crisis hit, however, regional debt doubled 
both as a percentage of GDP and in absolute terms in only three years between end 
2007 and end 2010, increasing from 5.7% (EUR 61.1bn) to 11.4% (EUR 123.4bn) in  
 
                                                
212 Spain’s public sector debt figures calculated according to the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
are published by the Bank of Spain here: 
http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/htmls/cdp.html (figures cited as accessed on 12 
March 2016).  
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Table 13: Evolution of public debt in Spain (as % of GDP, according to 
Excessive Deficit Procedure), 2007-2015 
 
 Total Central 
government 
Regional 
governments 
Local 
authorities 
Social 
security 
system 
2007 35.5 29.5 5.7 2.7 1.6 
2008 39.4 33.0 6.6 2.8 1.5 
2009 52.7 45.2 8.6 3.2 1.6 
2010 60.1 51.0 11.4 3.3 1,6 
2011 69.5 58.3 13.6 3.4 1.6 
2012 85.4 73.1 18.1 4.2 1.6 
2013 93.7 81.3 20.3 4.1 1.7 
2014 99.3 86.0 22.7 3.7 1.7 
2015 99.2 87.0 24.2 3.2 1.6 
Source: Bank of Spain 
 
Table 14: Public debt by region (as % of GDP, according to Excessive Deficit 
Procedure), 2007 and 2015  
 
 2007 2015 
Andalusia 4.8 21.6 
Aragon 3.4 20.5 
Asturias 3.2 18.0 
Balearic Islands 6.9 30.2 
Canary Islands 3.7 15.8 
Cantabria 3.4 22.0 
Castile-La Mancha 4.7 35.6 
Castile and León 3.4 19.5 
Catalonia 7.8 35.3 
Extremadura 4.5 20.3 
Galicia 6.6 18.6 
La Rioja 3.5 18.0 
Madrid  5.2 13.6 
Murcia 2.3 27.4 
Navarre 3.6 18.2 
Basque Country 1.0 14.4 
Valencia 11.3 41.3 
Source: Bank of Spain 
 
that period (see Table 13). These debt figures were exclusive of billions of euros 
accumulated by the most cash-strapped regions throughout the crisis in unpaid bills 
to suppliers, particularly in the most indebted regions. By the end of 2011, before the 
central government intervened to provide loans for repayment, these were estimated 
to have reached as much as EUR 30bn. By the end of 2015, regional debt had 
reached 24.2% of GDP (EUR 261.5bn). Catalonia stands out as the third most 
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indebted region in terms of debt as a percentage of GDP, reaching 35.3% at the end 
of 2015, behind Valencia (41.3%) and Castilla La Mancha (35.6%) (see Table 14, 
p.236). Catalonia is also by far the most indebted in absolute terms (EUR 72.3bn at 
the end of 2015). At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Madrid region had the 
lowest level of debt as a percentage of GDP at 13.6% (at the end of 2015), followed 
by the Basque region with 14.4%.  
Concerns grew over regional finances in particular from 2010 since the spirit 
of austerity was late in filtering through to the regions once Spain had come under 
pressure from late 2009 to drastically cut its spending (e.g. FUNCAS 2012: 46). The 
combination of extensive devolved spending powers and a primarily centralised 
revenue-raising system is a well known risk for weakening fiscal discipline (Rodden 
2006). The regions had started to suffer the fall in tax revenues in 2008 but the 
reaction to adjust expenditure accordingly did not begin until 2010 (Leal Marcos and 
López Laborda 2013: 34). While this matched the trajectory taken by the central 
government, the difference was that many regional governments then remained 
reluctant to reduce spending once the Spanish government had made the shift to 
austerity measures. The regions faced a tougher task than the central government to 
trim their budgets: they manage around one third of state expenditure213 but around 
two thirds of this amount goes towards the fundamental policy areas of health, 
education and social services. These were far harder to control demand for and cut 
than areas being slashed at the time by the central government, such as public 
investment in infrastructure, civil servants’ salaries and the foreign office budget. At 
the same time, however, many regions showed reluctance to make cuts in more 
feasible areas too, and there were concerns this would persist ahead of the regional 
elections of May 2011. Moreover, regional tax revenues from the ceded taxes, which 
had been increased under the 2009 financing system, suffered a greater fall as a 
result of the crisis than the transfers derived from non-ceded taxes, which had 
decreased (Leal Marcos and López Laborda: 30). In this climate, by mid 2010, the 
EU authorities were starting to focus their attention on the threat that regional 
finances in Spain posed to the country’s overall financial health and debt 
                                                
213 See Castells 2014: 281 for the breakdown of expenditure in Spain per level of 
government from 1978 to 2010. 
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sustainability, as the rapid growth in regional debt made it the main obstacle to 
Spain’s deficit-reduction targets.214  
           In this context, the Spanish Socialist government at the time first began to 
attempt a crackdown on regional government spending and borrowing in the second 
half of 2010, beginning to exercise its right to ban regions failing to comply with 
new deficit targets from issuing new debt. Since Article 156 of the Constitution gave 
the regions the authority to design their own budgetary policies, the central 
government was not authorised to impose a budgetary ceiling on them and the stamp 
of approval for debt issuances was therefore the only significant lever it had on the 
finances of the fifteen regions under the common regime at the time. A few months 
later, under pressure from the EU to ensure the sustainability of Spain’s public 
finances, the then prime minister Zapatero promised to come up with Spain’s own 
equivalent of a German debt brake. He committed to introducing a budgetary ceiling 
limiting spending by the central government to nominal GDP growth to avoid a 
growing structural deficit. He nevertheless shied away from pressures from both 
European officials and the opposition PP to make this rule binding for the regional 
governments too, preferring instead to seek a consensus within the 
intergovernmental CPFF on the matter in order to respect the regions’ competences 
in the budgetary sphere. In August 2011, however, once Spanish bond yields were 
reaching unsustainable highs due to investors’ distrust of the country’s finances, 
Zapatero did reluctantly agree to a very unpopular pact with the PP to reform Article 
135 of the Spanish Constitution to oblige all tiers of government in Spain 
(autonomous communities included) to adhere to the budgetary stability principle. 
Henceforth (with effect from 27 September 2011) neither the central nor the regional 
governments would be allowed to incur a structural deficit exceeding the margins set 
by the EU without incurring a penalty (Hernández de Cos 2011). Crucially, while the 
overall annual deficit target for Spain was to be set by the EU authorities, the split of 
the target between the different levels of administration in Spain (central, regional, 
                                                
214 Note that although the debt issued by Spain’s regional governments had not been 
explicitly guaranteed by the Spanish government, the widespread view was the central 
government could not let a region default. Concerns about regional finances therefore 
negatively impacted Spanish bond yields throughout the crisis. In this regard, Spain fits the 
model propounded by Rodden (2006) whereby expectations that central governments will 
assume responsibility for bailing out their subnational governments are strongest in the 
countries where the latter rely on revenue sharing and transfers rather than independent 
regional and local taxation. 
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local) was to be decided thereafter by the Spanish government. In early 2012, the 
new PP government presented a new Budgetary Stability and Financial 
Sustainability Law (approved on 27 April 2012) to implement the constitutional 
reform of Article 135 agreed with the PSOE in September 2011, but with 
significantly tougher regulations than those the PSOE had conceded to then. For 
example, the new Law established a stricter deficit ceiling than had been envisaged 
(no structural deficit would be allowed after a transition period) and set out the 
Spanish government’s right to take control over the finances of any region that failed 
to comply with the fiscal targets it set, among other measures (Hernández de Cos and 
Pérez 2013).  
          The fact that most of the regions – including Catalonia – could still access 
some forms of financing for much of the period of Socialist central government gave 
them a crucial degree of autonomy, even if they needed the central government’s 
permission to issue debt. Nevertheless, securing financing rapidly became harder 
from the second half of 2010 onwards, especially for the largest and most indebted 
regions with the greatest financing needs. Prior to the crisis, Spain’s regional 
governments had met their financing needs primarily via bank loans (most often 
extended by the cajas de ahorros) and, in the case of the largest regions with the 
greatest needs (e.g. Andalusia, Valencia, Catalonia, Madrid), bonds issued on the 
public debt markets. These were subscribed by both Spanish and international 
institutional investors such as pension and insurance funds, as well as banks for their 
own portfolios. That was when regional bonds were considered solid investment 
grade by ratings agencies, in line with the rating of Spanish government debt at the 
time. However, the situation rapidly changed over 2010 and 2011 as investors 
became increasingly aware of the perilous state of Spain’s regional finances and 
ratings agencies drastically downgraded many of the regions from strong investment 
grade to junk or near junk status. Only the relatively healthier regions like Madrid 
and the Basque Country managed to cling onto the lower rungs of investment grade 
status, broadly in line with Spanish government debt at the time. Short-term retail 
bonds at expensive rates, credit lines from domestic banks and private placement 
notes tailored to specific investors became the new norm for many of the regions 
when the majority were almost completely shut out of the wholesale public debt 
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markets from mid 2010.215 For many of these instruments the regions ended up 
paying at least double (often triple) the rates the Spanish Treasury was paying for 
central government debt of the same duration, even as Spanish bond yields rose 
dramatically too. More than 75% of the roughly EUR 30bn financing secured by 
Spain’s 17 regions throughout 2011 was short-term financing due to mature in under 
three years as they struggled to access longer-term financing. Moreover, 
approximately 37% of the financing secured that year was in the form of retail bonds 
(dubbed ‘patriotic bonds’) issued to largely unsuspecting individual investors, with 
the remainder split between short-term loans (c.36%), private placement notes 
(c.17%), new public bond issues for institutional investors (c.5%) and taps on 
existing bonds (c.5%).216 Struggling to issue debt to institutional investors, Catalonia 
had been the first region to launch retail bonds to individual domestic investors – 
usually Catalan citizens, thus the name ‘patriotic bonds’ – in October/November 
2010. Yet the rate the Catalan government had to pay for such issuances was very 
high – a return of 4.75% plus bank commission of 3%, amounting to 7.75% (around 
triple the rate paid by the Spanish government for Treasury bills of the same duration 
at the time). Other struggling regions – the Balearics, Valencia, Andalusia and 
Murcia – would follow suit. These regional governments had little other option, but 
selling these retail bonds to the unsuspecting general public unaware of the full 
extent of the regions’ debt problems was akin to the scandal of the regional cajas de 
ahorros (savings banks) selling preference shares to customers as though they were 
as safe as deposits (on this, see for example Domínguez Martínez 2012).  
           By the time the PP government came into power following the general 
elections held on 20 November 2011, many of the regions’ access to funding had by 
then almost completely dried up as they were struggling to continue to find demand 
for ‘patriotic bonds’ and could not afford to keep issuing such expensive 
instruments, with the final such issuance taking place in May 2012. The 17 regions’ 
total gross financing needs in 2012 totalled around EUR 40bn, with Catalonia 
accounting for over a quarter of this amount. Moreover, the regions had by now also 
                                                
215 On the difficulties experienced by regional governments in securing financing from 2010 
onwards, see Goikoetxea and Cantalapiedra 2011. 
216 My thanks to Madrid-based consulting firm Analistas Financieros Internacionales (AFI), 
especially director César Cantalapiedra, for providing figures on the financing methods used 
by the regions. For more information on the evolution of regional debt and financing options 
during the crisis, see Goikoetxea and Cantalapiedra 2011.  
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accumulated billions of euros in unpaid bills to suppliers, to the extent that the 
National Association of the Pharmaceutical Industry in Spain (Farmaindustria) 
warned some pharmaceutical companies were starting to shy away from supplying 
medicines in certain Spanish regions. Faced with this situation, Spain’s new central 
government thus took action from January 2012 to avoid a potential regional 
government default. Since it had relatively greater access to financing than the 
regions (and at lower rates), it secured funds to make loans guaranteed by the 
Spanish Treasury to the regions. In this context, the situation changed substantially 
throughout 2012 as the new PP central government became the holder of the purse 
strings for several regional governments that became reliant upon loans from it.  
           This was a key turning point as all but the healthiest regions would sooner or 
later become reliant upon the centralised funding mechanisms created by the central 
government. These funding mechanisms were as follows: in January 2012 the 
government set up a EUR 10bn credit line (extendible to EUR 15bn) from the 
Official Credit Institute (ICO) to help the regions cover debt maturity needs and 
repay outstanding bills to suppliers. This was then superseded by two funds: (1) a 
EUR 30bn (extendible to EUR 35bn) Fund for Financing Payments to Suppliers 
(Fondo para la Financiación de los Pagos a Proveedores, FFPP) set up in March 
2012, to lend money to the regions in need to pay outstanding invoices to suppliers 
that year; and (2) an EUR 18bn Regional Liquidity Fund (Fondo de Liquidez 
Autonómica, FLA) set up in July 2012 to lend money to the regions primarily to 
cover debt maturities, with some limited funds to cover new financing needs and 
payments to suppliers too. Via the ICO, the FFPP and the FLA, Catalonia borrowed 
the second largest combined total (following Valencia) of nearly EUR 9bn out of 
over EUR 35bn used by the regions in 2012.217  While the amounts originally 
allocated to these funds were designed for 2012 only, both the FLA and the FFPP 
would be replenished and extended in 2013 and 2014. In return, the regions 
borrowing from the Funds would have to adhere to a strict adjustment programme to 
meet the regional deficit targets set by the central government, among other 
conditions. Similar funding mechanisms providing loans with strict conditions for 
adjustment were also provided to the local authorities.  
                                                
217 A full breakdown of the loans provided by the central government to each region in 2012 
is given in De la Fuente 2013b: 18. 
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          While the Funds were initially meant to be temporary, until the regions could 
regain market access and return to borrowing of their own accord, the central 
government took steps to make these more semi-permanent in nature under Royal 
Decree Law 17/2014, of 26 December. This established a new and unified Fund for 
the Financing of the Autonomous Communities (Fondo de Financiación a 
Comunidades Autónomas, FFCA) – as well as an equivalent Fund for the local 
authorities – which was designed to centralise the different funds providing liquidity 
support from the central government to the regions under one main umbrella Fund 
from 2015 onwards.218 The Fund comprises four tranches: the Liquidity Fund, which 
is a continuation of the previous FLA, lends money to the regions that breach deficit 
reduction targets, and thus comes with the most stringent conditions; the Financial 
Facility Fund (Fondo de facilidad financiera) lends money to the regions which 
comply with the stability targets; the Social Fund (Fondo social) provides funds to 
the regions that have accumulated payables owed to the municipalities as part of 
social expenditure agreements; and the Fund in Liquidation for Paying Suppliers to 
the Regions (Fondo en liquidación para la financiación de los pagos a proveedores 
de las comunidades autónomas) continues the role of the original FFPP.  
Through these Funds, regional governments are offered loans from the 
central government at very low interest rates: usually 0% in the initial years, and less 
than 1% thereafter (Martín 2015: 10). In 2012, 2013 and 2014, the relatively 
healthier regions, which still had some market access to raise funds of their own, had 
sought to avoid at all costs tapping the FLA, which was perceived as a form of 
undesirable central government bailout for regions unable to finance themselves. 
From 2014, the PP central government nevertheless encouraged even those regions 
still accessing funds of their own accord to apply instead for the centralised funding 
mechanisms, seeking to entice them by offering interest rates far lower than market 
rates (Martín 2015a and 2015b; Jiménez and Cantalapiedra 2016). The distinction 
between the FLA for non-compliant regions, and the Financial Facility for compliant 
regions, was designed in part to encourage compliant regions to tap the centralised 
mechanisms, by providing a system which differentiated them from the regions with 
greater financial problems. By the 20 January 2015 deadline to apply for funds for 
2015, all of the regions had chosen to apply apart from the Madrid region, the 
                                                
218 Martín (2015) gives a full account of the setting up of the new funding mechanism and its 
different tranches. 
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Basque region and the Navarran region (Martín 2015a: 8). The change in 
government in Madrid following the 2015 regional elections gave the PP central 
government a new opportunity to apply political pressure, with the result that the 
Madrid regional government too finally agreed to use the centralised funding 
mechanisms. Thus, by then, the only regions still accessing funding of their own 
accord were the two regions under the foral financing system, and almost half of 
regional debt was in the hands of the Spanish central government (see Table 15). The 
discrepancy in level of financial autonomy of the regions under the common system 
and those under the foral financing system thus reached new heights. 
    
Table 15: Regional debt lent by the Spanish government (as of the first quarter 
of 2015)  
Region Total debt (EUR mn)  Of which, debt lent by the 
Spanish government (via 
the different funds set up 
since 2012) (EUR mn) 
Andalusia 29,822 18,286 
Aragon 6,626 809 
Asturias 3,789 1,282 
Balearic Islands 8,260 4,642 
Canary Islands 6,483 3,339 
Cantabria 2,547 1,369 
Castile-La Mancha 13,138 7,754 
Castile and León 10,386 1,718 
Catalonia 66,813 40,119 
Extremadura 3,391 580 
Galicia 10,210 1,599 
La Rioja 1,390 143 
Madrid 26,341 945 
Murcia 7,467 4,551 
Navarre 3,586 321 
Basque Country 9,903 0 
Valencia 40,085 25,455 
TOTAL 250,237 112,913 
 Source: Martín 2015b: 38 and Bank of Spain 
 
This centralisation of funding mechanisms from 2012 onwards, and the 
opportunity it gave the central Spanish government to tighten its control over 
Catalonia’s finances, intensified Spanish-Catalan government tensions over regional 
financing. The Catalan government quickly became very heavily dependent on the 
central Spanish government for funding. In 2012, when the FLA was first created 
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(following lengthy disputes between the Spanish and Catalan governments over the 
conditions attached to loans from it), the Spanish state owned 16.58% of Catalan 
debt at the time (EUR 8.685bn of a total 52.354bn). And yet by the end of 2015, the 
share of Catalan debt in the hands of the central government had increased to 
59.97% (EUR 43.343bn of EUR 72.274bn), according to figures published by the 
Bank of Spain.219 This served to reignite the debate over the level of financing 
afforded to Catalonia under the common system, since the Catalan government has 
consistently argued that Catalonia would have sufficient resources without needing 
to depend on loans from the central government, were it to be allowed to keep more 
of the revenues raised in its territory. And CDC and other Catalan parties are very 
clear that they would rather have the resources allocated to them in the budget in the 
first place, rather than as loans from the central government, since the latter 
constitute a ‘source of dependence’ on the central government.220 The pressure on 
resources has not only fuelled longstanding Spanish-Catalan disputes over whether 
Catalonia receives sufficient funding in the present under the regional financing 
system, but it has also served to reignite debate over the so-called ‘historical debt’ 
which Catalan nationalists claim is owed to Catalonia for issues such as a historical 
lack of sufficient state spending on infrastructure in the region, as well as the under-
financing of competences such as health and education when these were first 
devolved. In 2014, the repayment of so-called ‘historical debt’ – the existence or 
extent of which is in itself subject to dispute – constituted one of CiU’s proposals to 
alleviate the financial predicament of the Generalitat and other regional 
governments.221 On the other hand, however, critics taking a more centralist stance 
have suggested that the Catalan government has exaggerated the extent to which the 
regional financing system is to blame for the region’s financial predicament. For 
example, when the central government published the Territorialised Public Accounts 
(Sistema de Cuentas Públicas Territorializadas, SCPT) for the first time in mid July 
2014 – a new methodology to show the fiscal balances of each region with the 
                                                
219 As reported in ‘El Estado duplica la deuda que posee de la Generalitat en apenas dos 
años’,  Expansión, 26.03.16. 
220 Personal interview with Andreu Mas-Colell (CDC), 25 January 2016. 
221 For example, ‘Las recetas de Mas-Colell para dar oxígeno a las autonomías’, El 
Confidencial, 07.10.14; and ‘CiU exige al Gobierno el pago de 3.500 millones por la deuda 
histórica a Cataluña en plena tensión soberanista’, Vozpopuli, 23.09.14. On the history of the 
concept of ‘historical debt’ and the political debate surrounding the matter, see, for example, 
Martínez López (2014). 
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central government, which Catalan nationalists do not readily accept (see Chapter 1, 
p.7-9) – this sparked a flurry of media articles in the Spanish press arguing that the 
results showed that Catalonia was not unduly prejudiced by the financing system.222  
           Those wishing to challenge suggestions that Catalonia’s financial woes could 
be attributed to the financing system have frequently argued that the comparison 
between the Madrid region and Catalonia suggests otherwise. Both the Madrid and 
Catalan regions are among the largest regions in Spain in terms of population size 
and among the richest regions in terms of GDP and fiscal capacity per capita, and 
both suffer from the overly redistributive nature of the common regime financing 
system – indeed, successive studies have shown that the Madrid region is more 
penalised than Catalonia (e.g. De la Fuente 2012b and 2013a). Yet Catalonia ended 
up far more in debt than Madrid and they became poles apart in terms of fiscal 
discipline and their appeal to investors in the wake of the crisis, suggesting poorer 
financial management by the Catalan authorities. Nevertheless, Catalan nationalists 
refute such comparisons, arguing that while the regions of Madrid and Catalonia are 
more or less comparable in terms of population size and GDP levels, in other 
respects the comparison falls flat, since Madrid has benefitted from factors related to 
the fact that it is the capital, such as increased infrastructure spending and other 
investments, as well as the fact that it has by far the largest number of civil servants. 
They also argue that transfers to the Madrid region for competences such as health 
and universities are also relatively more recent than to Catalonia, resulting in lower 
levels of accumulated debt. Another argument concerns the diputaciones: since the 
Madrid region only has one province, the region benefits more directly from the 
funding of the diputación too (which, importantly, has had more problems with 
indebtedness than the regional government), in contrast to Catalonia where there are 
four diputaciones.223 Finally, Catalan nationalists suggest that comparisons between 
the Madrid and Catalan regions are a ‘distortion’ in any case, due to the allegedly 
‘artificial’ way in which regions were created during the Transition: according to this 
argument, even though the Madrid region itself appears to be the most penalised by 
the common financing system (in terms of the fall in its resources per capita 
                                                
222 For example, Mikel Buesa, ‘Las cuentas desmontan que Cataluña sea la perjudicada’, 
ABC, 27.07.14.  
223 These comparative factors were listed by Andreu Mas-Colell (CDC) when interviewed on 
25 January 2016. 
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following the equalisation of revenues), other regions within the traditionally 
Castilian area (especially Castilla y Léon and La Rioja) benefit from the system, thus 
overall, the traditional Castile benefits from the financing system.224     
           Ultimately, there has thus been a stalemate in political perspectives as to what 
extent the regional financing system has been to blame for Catalonia’s financial 
woes (together with related factors such as the relative lack of Spanish state 
investment in Catalonia), relative to discretionary spending decisions taken by 
Catalan governments. While there is undoubtedly a link to some extent between the 
treatment of Catalonia under the regional financing system (combined with other 
related factors such as levels of investment spending) and the region’s level of 
indebtedness, the link is far from straightforward. Economists have shown that other 
factors such as regional variations in revenue and expenditure behaviour have also 
played a significant role in determining the indebtedness of each region (e.g. Leal 
Marcos and López Laborda 2013). Indeed, CiU itself recognised this in its campaign 
to regain control of the Catalan government at the 2010 regional elections, when it 
attributed Catalonia’s financial woes not only to the regional financing system, but 
also to the spending behaviour of the left-wing tripartite coalition that had governed 
the region since 2003.225 The complexity of the situation has created ambiguity as to 
what factors exactly have caused the indebtedness and fiscal indiscipline of the 
Catalan government. The convoluted nature of the regional financing system in itself 
creates an accountability gap, in particular in terms of its complicated division of 
revenue and expenditure responsibilities which is little understood by the general 
public (Bosch and Durán 2008: 15). Yet this has been intensified in the wake of the 
crisis by the opaqueness of the causes of the regions’ varying levels of budgetary 
compliance and the degree to which these relate or not to the financing models – all 
of which have served as fuel for disputes between the central and Catalan 
governments, giving them scope to offer different figures and interpretations. 
           The debate over financing levels has also become part and parcel of the 
related dispute over whether, or to what extent, the Spanish central government has 
                                                
224 Personal interview with Germà Bel, 27 April 2015.  
225 The spending policies of the Catalan tripartite coalition government in 2008-2009, the 
early years of the crisis, were in fact not dissimilar from the behaviour of the PSOE 
government in Madrid, which applied one of the largest fiscal stimulus packages in the EU 
in those years (Salmon 2010b: 84). This was at a time when fiscal stimulus measures were 
being used throughout the EU to combat the crisis, before a shift in trend to debt reduction 
strategies set in from late 2009 onwards.   
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used arguments of rationalisation for economic purposes as a guise for ideologically-
motivated recentralisation due to the party’s Spanish centralism (Bosch and Solé-
Ollé 2013; Muro 2015). On the one hand, the Spanish central government has been 
under repeated pressure from the EU authorities to meet budget deficit targets, with 
explicit requests from the EU authorities to rein in regional government spending as 
one means to achieve this. On the other hand, however, several regional 
governments including Catalonia have accused the PP government in particular of 
shifting too much of the fiscal burden of adjustment onto the regions in its split of 
the annual deficit target between the central government, the regional governments, 
the local authorities and the social security system. According to CDC, the split of 
the deficit targets has consistently put the burden of adjustment too heavily onto the 
regional governments since the share of the total deficit target for Spain they have 
been allotted has not been proportional to their share of total government 
spending.226 In Spain, the central government accounts for approximately 22% of 
total government expenditure, while the regional governments are responsible for 
approximately 38%, the local authorities for approximately 10%, and the social 
security system for approximately 30%. The deficit targets set by the central 
government, however, always allow the central government to incur the highest 
deficit: in 2012, for example, the new PP government set targets of 4% for the 
central government, 1.5% for the regional governments, 0.3% for the local 
authorities and 0% for the social security system. The Catalan government has also 
argued that the strict conditionality tied to the central government loans has 
constituted a de facto intervention since the regions using these have only been lent 
sufficient funds to remain compliant with the deficit targets and were banned from 
incurring additional debt from other sources. Representatives of the Mas government 
have thus accused the central government of a policy not just of ‘austerity’ but of 
‘asphyxiation’ towards the regional government.227 Such arguments are refuted by 
the central government, which argues instead that the fiscal discipline it requires of 
the regional governments is necessary in order to meet the targets set by EU 
                                                
226 Personal interview with Andreu Mas-Colell (CDC), 25 January 2016. The controversy 
has been widespread. See, for example, Pau Vall Prat, ‘¿Culpables o víctimas del reparto del 
déficit?’, El Periódico, 08.04.16.  
227 Personal interview with Andreu Mas-Colell (CDC), 25 January 2016. 
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authorities, which have put pressure on the Spanish government to control and 
reduce regional government spending.  
          The reality would seem a complex combination of both sides of the coin. The 
almost complete lack of central government controls over regional spending at the 
start of the crisis created a situation in which it was very difficult to enforce austerity 
cuts on regional governments, which were needed in order for Spain to meet EU 
deficit targets. Moreover, despite the lack of an explicit central government 
guarantee on regional government debt, it was widely expected that the Spanish 
government would be forced to bail out any regional government unable to repay its 
debt. In such circumstances, it was to be expected that the Spanish government 
would seek to recentralise control to some degree over regional government 
spending. On the other hand, however, there are signs that the PP government’s 
recentralisation of control over regional government borrowing and spending has 
been intensified due to the party’s centralist stance. For example, while the 
centralised liquidity mechanisms to lend money to regional governments have been 
necessary to keep many of the regions afloat, the fact that the central government has 
encouraged even those regions that were still managing to finance themselves to use 
them points to a degree of recentralisation for ideologically centralist motives. The 
centralised funding mechanisms offer the advantage of very low financing costs 
since the central government charges interest rates that are far lower than market 
rates, but nevertheless economic experts suggest that such centralised mechanisms 
offering loans at very reduced rates to the regions relative to market rates should 
only be temporary in nature and should not be seen as preferable to borrowing on the 
markets where possible (Martín 2015a; Jiménez and Cantalapiedra 2016). Such loans 
are perceived as not economically desirable in the long-term since they diminish the 
fiscal accountability of regions, reduce the diversity of their possible funding sources 
(the longer the regions are absent from international debt markets, the harder it will 
be for them to return), and risk encouraging them to seek a write-off of the debt 
owed to the central government rather than repaying it. 
 
CDC/CiU’s shifting stance in a context of financial crisis 
 The developments during the financial crisis and its aftermath analysed above 
played a significant role in intensifying pro-sovereignty sentiment in Catalonia, to 
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the extent that it is in fact difficult to differentiate the impact of these developments 
and context on CDC/CiU’s trajectory from the impact on the wider Catalanist 
movement, since by this stage CDC/CiU was caught up in a wider Catalanist 
evolution involving several parties and civil society groups, and dissatisfaction with 
the financing provisions for Catalonia during the crisis was widespread. 
Nevertheless, the following influences on CDC/CiU’s behaviour can be identified. 
The shortcomings of 2009 regional financing reform finally removed one approach 
short of a fiscal pact. Since CiU was in opposition at the time in Catalonia, it could 
take advantage of this position to be the first in Catalonia to be the most critical of 
the reform, before the members of the tripartite coalition government, who initially 
praised it until it became clear within a year that this reform too could not suffice to 
meet Catalanist expectations. CiU then used this need for a new financing agreement 
for Catalonia as a key feature of its 2010 regional election campaign. Ahead of the 
2010 regional elections, CiU focused its campaign on the financial crisis and the 
steps needed to reduce public spending, capitalising on its previous reputation for 
good economic management and criticising the tripartite coalition’s handling of 
Catalonia’s finances (Rico 2012: 221). At the time, survey data collected from before 
the referendum showed that after the protracted debacle of the statute reform, ‘only 
13 per cent of respondents mentioned either self-government or the related issue of 
regional financing as one of the region’s two most important problems, while 
unemployment or the economy was named by 90 per cent’ (Rico 2012: 221). CiU 
nevertheless found an obvious way to link the economic and territorial dimensions 
by focusing its 2010 campaign on proposals for a new Concierto-style financing 
system for Catalonia as a means of addressing the region’s economic predicament.  
           Once CiU was back in power at the end of 2010, the continued deterioration 
of Catalonia’s financial situation and the increasingly centralised controls over 
Catalan finances (via centralised funding mechanisms and the strict conditions 
attached to them) resulted in an escalation of demands for a new financing model for 
Catalonia from both politicians and citizens, as it became increasingly clear that the 
new financing model negotiated in 2009 could not suffice to satisfy Catalan 
demands. CiU was not only increasingly convinced itself by now of the need for a 
new model, but also under pressure from ERC, now back in opposition and therefore 
able to put pressure on CiU, thereby reversing the roles that both had played when 
ERC formed part of the tripartite coalition government and CiU was in opposition. 
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In this context, CiU backed ERC’s proposal in 2011 to create a Committee to Study 
a New Financing Model Based on the Concierto Económico in the Catalan 
parliament,228 the second such committee of its kind in the Catalan parliament 
following the previous Committee to Study the Concierto Económico as a Means for 
the Appropriate Financing of Catalan Autonomy fifteen years previously, in 1996 
(see pp.214-215). In a similar fashion to what had happened in 1996, ERC was the 
main driving force behind the creation of a new committee in 2011, but in a marked 
difference, this time round CiU backed the proposal for a committee to study the 
Concierto wholeheartedly, in contrast to the reticence it had shown back then. In 
another significant difference, whereas the 1996 committee had been characterised 
by a shared cross-party consensus of the need for a new financing system 
notwithstanding the different proposals presented, what best characterised the 2011 
committee was instead a clear division between nationalist (i.e. CiU and ERC) and 
non-nationalist parties from the outset, which was indicative of the new alliances 
now emerging in Catalonia. In the opening intervention, Joan Puigcercós (ERC) laid 
out his party’s views that a Concierto for Catalonia would avoid the current 
problems experienced by the region under the 2009 regional financing reform, such 
as the lack of payments from the Competitiveness Fund and the insufficient state 
spending on infrastructure in the region. While Jordi Turull i Negre (speaking on 
behalf of CiU) backed Puigcercós’ intervention as a ‘rather good’ explanation,229 the 
spokespeople for PSC, PP and Ciudadanos declined to back the creation of the 
committee, criticising it as a purely nationalist-led initiative which sought to create a 
model purely for Catalonia rather than one that would work for both Catalonia and 
the rest of Spain. ICV, meanwhile, did back the creation of the committee but 
insisted in traditional fashion on the need for federal elements including a solidarity 
commitment. 
          By the time Artur Mas went to Madrid to make a last ditch request for a fiscal 
pact for Catalonia in 2012, which was promptly rejected again by Rajoy, the pro-
independence wave in Catalonia was already surging. Artur Mas’ journey to Madrid 
                                                
228 The transcript of the parliamentary debate surrounding the proposal to create the 
committee is available here: Diari de Sessions del Parlament de Catalunya, IX legislatura, 
Segon període, Série P – Número 14, 4 de maig de 2014, pp. 22-28. The final report is 
available here: Butlletí Oficial de Catalunya, IX legislatura, Tercer període, Número 175, 3 
de noviembre de 2011. 
229 Diari de Sessions del Parlament de Catalunya, IX legislatura, Segon període, Série P – 
Número 14, 4 de maig de 2014, p. 27. 
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in 2012 to demand a fiscal pact was a crucial step in CDC’s radicalisation process: 
the fact that securing a different financing system for Catalonia again proved to be 
unviable pushed CDC into joining the rising pro-sovereignty wave increasingly 
demanding not just the ‘right to decide’, but also independence. Traditional Catalan 
nationalists who had long fought for greater recognition for Catalonia’s language and 
culture were by now increasingly being joined by a new wave of disaffected 
Catalans who were not necessarily traditional nationalist party supporters but had 
come to resent Catalonia’s economic treatment at the hands of the Spanish state and 
the austerity measures being imposed during the crisis – as well as the levels of 
corruption not only among Spanish but also Catalan nationalist politicians. Political 
disputes between central and Catalan governments over regional financing during the 
crisis and its aftermath have thus coincided with a rise in Catalan citizens turning to 
support independence not just for traditional reasons of culture and identity, but also 
economic motives. Studies analysing public opinion data have shown that economic 
considerations have played a role in the increase in support for independence among 
Catalan citizens in recent years, in addition to more traditional explanatory factors 
such as identity (e.g. Boylan 2015; Muñoz and Tormos 2015). The rise in mass 
mobilisation in Catalonia, which was crucial to CDC’s explicit shift towards a pro-
sovereignty lexicon in 2012 and eventually a pro-independence stance, in fact started 
out in its beginnings with demonstrations and marches protesting over local 
infrastructure problems, such complaints over toll roads and poor local rail networks 
(see Chapter 2). In this regard, political agency and grassroots mobilisation have 
gradually fed into one another, since CDC and other parties in favour of the ‘right to 
decide’ or independence have sought to draw citizens’ attention to the Catalan fiscal 
deficit and the relative lack of state investment in Catalonia, which has in turn 
contributed to higher levels of mobilisation.  
 
Conclusion 
             In the view of Andreu Mas-Colell, Catalan economy minister from 
December 2010 to January 2016, and thus probably the Catalan politician best 
acquainted with Catalonia’s financial woes in that period, the pro-sovereignty drive 
in Catalonia would still have occurred even without an economic crisis, albeit not 
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necessarily quite so rapidly.230 This would seem an appropriate reflection of the fact 
that economic and financial matters – including the regional financing system and its 
impact on Catalonia – have not been the only driver of the recent pro-sovereignty 
drive in Catalonia and the previous trajectory towards it, but have nevertheless 
significantly influenced, intensified and shaped the timing of it. Many, including 
Mas-Colell himself, see the origins of the current pro-sovereignty drive in the first 
absolute majority Spanish government of Aznar in 2000-2004, which marked the 
beginnings of a reassertion of the Spanish nationalist vision of ‘one nation’ and a 
move towards recentralisation. Nevertheless, the problems with the regional 
financing system and the related matter of the relative lack of Spanish state 
investment in Catalonia had already played an important role in starting to influence 
territorial agendas in Catalonia prior to that first absolute majority PP government 
from 2000 onwards. In the mid to late 1990s, dissatisfaction with the regional 
financing system was the main Catalan complaint regarding Spanish-Catalan 
relations, and one shared by all the main parties in Catalonia. This dissatisfaction 
with regional funding arrangements was in fact initially one of the most important 
factors at the turn of the century that propelled the move among Catalan parties 
towards demands for a new Catalan statute, some time before concerns would start to 
intensify about the implications of the PP’s recentralising drive for Catalan language 
and culture and other devolved areas such as education. Regional financing is one of 
the few issues on which there was at the time, and has been since, a cross-party 
consensus within the region that the existing provisions of the common financing 
system and its outcomes for Catalonia were unsatisfactory, notwithstanding different 
political views on how the matter should be resolved. The question, unresolved by 
the Catalan statute reform and the subsequent regional financing reform of 2009, 
would contribute significantly to the rise in pro-sovereignty sentiment when the 
impact of the economic crisis of 2007-2008 hit society in particular from 2010 
onwards, once the Spanish government’s debt reduction strategies were underway. 
This resulted not only in a drastic decline in resources but also the centralisation of 
regional funding mechanisms and control over regional finances. 
             Specifically in the case of CDC, Jordi Pujol’s explicit but still tentative 
move towards requesting a fiscal pact for Catalonia from 1997 onwards, and Artur 
                                                
230 Personal interview with Andreu Mas-Colell (CDC), 26 January 2016. 
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Mas’ more avid defence later on of a Concierto-style arrangement for Catalonia 
during the statute reform negotiations, were indicative of a growing conviction 
within the party that the common financing system was reaching its expiry date for 
Catalonia. However, the timing of such shifts in party stance was not only influenced 
by the declining opportunities for accommodationist behaviour given the evolving 
political context in Madrid, but also in part by the need to outbid other parties in 
Catalonia, given the cross-party consensus that the regional financing model had 
become inadequate. CDC/CiU thus became caught up in a broader Catalanist 
evolution whereby the majority of parties in Catalonia from the late 1990s onwards 
came to consider the existing regional financing arrangements inadequate. This 
broader Catalanist process would have a significant influence on CDC/CiU, pushing 
it to define more clearly its vision of a fiscal pact for Catalonia, reducing the scope 
for its non-committal attitude that had prevailed during prior periods of 
accommodationism, and encouraging a new kind of tactical behaviour in response to 
party competition within Catalonia over proposals for new financing models. 
Ultimately, CiU’s inability to achieve a suitable fiscal pact for Catalonia in 2012, in 
a climate of rising pro-sovereignty sentiment in Catalonia and a context of economic 
deterioration, would prove a decisive moment for the party federation, as it shifted 
its position clearly in favour of support for the right to decide, and eventually, in the 
case of CDC (but not UDC), independence for Catalonia. The issue of regional 
financing has thus played a significant role in influencing CDC’s shift from 
accommodationist to pro-sovereignty politics. As well as the evolving nature of 
relations with Madrid, intra-regional factors such as party competition and pressures 
from civil society have had a significant bearing on the timing of CDC’s shifts in 
attitude towards the financing question and beyond.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
           The fact that regional financing concerns have played a greater role in 
influencing the rise in pro-sovereignty demands in Catalonia than in the Basque 
Country in recent years is widely acknowledged and to be expected, since the 
Concierto affords the Basque region far greater autonomy and significantly more 
resources than the equivalent levels afforded to Catalonia under the common system. 
Beyond this general observation, however, what more detailed conclusions can we 
draw regarding the implications of the two different regional financing systems for 
the evolution of the territorial strategies and behaviour of the mainstream nationalist 
parties in each region, in particular since the late 1990s? The first section of this 
conclusion outlines the main findings of this thesis. It starts by summarising how the 
two regional financing systems have influenced the timing of shifts in pro-
sovereignty agendas, before drawing other conclusions specific to each case study 
based on each chapter’s main findings. This, in turn, allows for comparative 
comments regarding, for example, the differences in intraregional patterns of 
competition and alliance behaviour over regional financing and fiscal matters in each 
case; or, alternatively, the similarities in the two parties’ views and behaviour 
towards the EU. The second section then suggests where this thesis makes a 
contribution to knowledge, addressing both the individual contributions of each case 
study, and then the benefits of the comparative approach. A final section points to 
further avenues for research arising from this project.  
 
Main findings 
 
Regional financing has influenced the timing of shifts in territorial agendas: 
In both cases, albeit to different degrees, the regional financing systems and 
the different levels of fiscal autonomy and financial resources they provide have 
played a role in influencing the timing of the shifts in territorial agendas undertaken 
by the PNV and CDC, and the prospects of one agenda or the other being adopted, 
especially when a party is already under pressure to change. In the Basque case, the 
fiscal autonomy model and the responsibility it entails put the onus on the Basque 
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government to focus first and foremost on the economy in times of economic 
difficulty, since it cannot easily look to Madrid for additional financing or blame 
Madrid for the region’s financial woes (in contrast to Catalonia). Thus one of the 
contextual factors that contributed to Ibarretxe’s ability and determination to take 
forward a pro-sovereignty agenda in the late 1990s and early 2000s was precisely the 
fact that the Basque economy was by then much stronger than it had been during the 
years of Ardanza government in the 1980s and early 1990s and the Basque region 
was by then financially self-standing (as well as more fiscally autonomous after the 
1997 reform of the Concierto), in contrast to earlier periods where Madrid had made 
contributions towards reindustrialisation in the region to help surmount the crisis of 
the 1980s. In more recent times, when the PNV first returned to govern the Basque 
region in 2012 after a three-year period in opposition, Urkullu put the PNV’s 
territorial agenda temporarily on the backburner again to focus first and foremost on 
ensuring the Basque Country would emerge from the financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
Like everywhere the Basque region has suffered during the crisis, but in comparative 
terms, it has fared significantly better than much of the rest of Spain. This situation, 
which has been facilitated in part by the fiscal autonomy and greater resources 
enjoyed by the region, has contributed to the fact that securing a new status for the 
Basque Country has not been an immediate priority in recent years for many within 
Basque society nor indeed for many within the PNV itself.  
This is in stark contrast to Catalonia, where the problems of the regional 
financing system as applied to Catalonia have significantly accelerated CDC’s shift 
to a pro-sovereignty agenda in the recent context of economic deterioration (see 
Chapter 7). Demands for the reform of regional financing have nevertheless been a 
major theme of Catalan political debate for more than a decade, thus preceding the 
recent context of major economic recession. The economic context faced by 
Catalonia in the late 1990s, with the challenge of unprecedented levels of 
immigration, was also one of several factors that played a role in influencing the 
timing of shifts in agendas. By then, it was already clear that Catalonia received 
below-average resources under the common system despite being one of the main 
contributors in terms of per capita revenues, and the fact that the regional financing 
system at the time did not include suitable mechanisms to provide increasing 
revenues in regions with higher levels of immigration compounded the problem, 
since regions such as Catalonia did not receive additional resources to reflect their 
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increased commitments in matters such as health and education. Moreover, these key 
competences, which were now under increasing pressure, had originally been 
transferred to Catalonia with what was perceived from the Catalanist position as a 
deficient level of funding in the first place. The Catalans had not fought as hard as 
the Basques to secure funding to improve the existing substandard infrastructure in 
terms of schools and hospitals when the competences were originally transferred, 
believing that there would be scope for further deals in future – scope which did not 
eventually materialise. This context contributed to the growing cross-party 
dissatisfaction with the regional financing system from the late 1990s onwards, as 
the Catalans sought to keep more of their revenues to be able to face increased 
commitments in health and education, as well as other areas such as deteriorating 
local rail and other infrastructure networks. Importantly, regional financing thus 
became one of the main grievances that contributed to fuelling calls from several 
parties for a new autonomy statute for Catalonia from the turn of the century, in 
order to address a new financing model for the region, among other matters. 
 
Regional financing has influenced conceptions of sovereignty: 
Although regional financing in the Basque case has not become a strong 
point of contention as in Catalonia, the bilateral nature of the Concierto has 
nevertheless still influenced the PNV’s territorial agenda in other ways, by shaping 
the conception of sovereignty that it seeks for the Basque region, since the Concierto 
is the closest current equivalent to the form of ‘bilateral relationship between equals’ 
that the PNV seeks in wider Spanish-Basque political relations, under the vision 
articulated by the Urkullu government (see Chapter 4). On the one hand, bilateral 
relations over the Concierto have facilitated and encouraged accommodationist 
behaviour on the part of the PNV, since they have offered considerable scope for 
deals and payoffs to resolve disagreements. This bilateral relationship, combined 
with the greater resources that the Concierto affords to the Basque region, has 
allowed such accommodationist attitudes within the PNV to persist for longer than in 
the case of CDC in Catalonia. It is very significant that a substantial deal such as the 
new Concierto law of 2002 was even possible under a Spanish nationalist like Aznar 
when he governed with an absolute majority and therefore did not need the PNV’s 
support (see pp.139-140). On the other hand, however, Spanish-Basque conflict in 
relation to the Concierto has still increased over the decades, with the PNV seeking 
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to develop the Concierto as a model of fiscal sovereignty in Europe (in which the 
Basque treasuries would have essentially the same fiscal powers as Spain or any 
other member state treasury), in contrast to the Spanish authorities which continue to 
see the Concierto as subordinate to Spanish tax legislation (Chapters 4 and 5). At 
present, the issue of developing the Concierto further within the EU context is not an 
immediately pressing one for the PNV, and the debate over issues such as the scope 
for Basque participation in EU decision-making bodies over fiscal matters such as 
Ecofin often remains at the technical level rather than being of widespread concern 
for the PNV. It nevertheless points to the ongoing polarisation in perceptions 
between the PNV and Spanish authorities as to what opportunities or obstacles the 
EU creates for the development of shared sovereignty within a state in fiscal matters 
and beyond.   
 
Regional financing has influenced intraregional political dynamics and thereby 
parties’ territorial strategies and behaviour: 
           The way in which the Concierto works internally within the Basque region 
has also had significant implications for the PNV’s territorial strategies and 
behaviour (see Chapter 6). The heterogeneity of the PNV (partly across territories) 
and the changing political map at provincial level make strategic consistency 
difficult for the party, thereby reducing the possibilities for party shifts from one 
position to another on territorial matters. The Concierto, given the weight it affords 
to the provincial governments as the tax-raising authorities in the region, contributes 
to this complexity. For example, Vizcaya is both the PNV’s stronghold in the Basque 
region and also by far the largest province, and thus the one that raises the most 
revenues. While the province of Vizcaya is relatively underrepresented in the Basque 
regional parliament (relative to its population size), the fact that it raises by far the 
most revenues in the region nevertheless gives it a weight and negotiating power of a 
different kind both within the region and within the PNV itself. In addition, the 
different territorial interests within the PNV have also resulted in internal debates 
over the relationship to the izquierda abertzale, given the varying strength of the 
izquierda abertzale in different provinces (its strongest presence is in Guipúzcoa), 
and therefore the need for different alliance arrangements and competition tactics in 
different provinces.  
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Overall, what emerges through an analysis of the use of the powers afforded 
by the Concierto in different provinces is a sense of incompatibility between the 
PNV and Bildu on fiscal and social matters. The discrepancies between the PNV and 
the izquierda abertzale over fiscal policy and the Concierto which emerged during 
2011-2015, the first time the izquierda abertzale gained power under Bildu in 
Gizpuzkoa, suggest wider implications for possible alliances (or a lack thereof) 
between them going forward. While governing at provincial level in Guipúzcoa in 
2011-2015, Bildu sought to distance itself from what it perceived as the PNV’s 
traditionally ‘neoliberal’ use of the Concierto and to carve out a different fiscal 
vision for the Basque Country, preferring to ally with the Basque federation of a 
leftwing statewide party (the PSOE) in Guipúzcoa rather than the PNV. In addition 
to the discrepancies over left-right politics that emerged through the PNV’s and 
Bildu’s contrasting use of the fiscal powers afforded by the Concierto, their attitudes 
towards the Concierto also manifested the differences in their territorial goals 
regarding the Basque Country and its relationship to Spain. Bildu’s criticism of the 
Concierto as an insufficient basis for proper self-government clearly differs from the 
PNV’s praise of the Concierto as the closest current equivalent to the form of 
‘bilateral relationship between equals’ that the PNV seeks in wider Spanish-Basque 
political relations.           
What such attitudes and behaviour towards the Concierto reveal is a 
perpetuation of the historic divide in nationalism which originally came about 
through violence and resulted in the predominance of the PNV as the main 
nationalist actor in the region. Although ETA has ceased its violence, a strong divide 
between the PNV and the izquierda abertzale still persists and manifests itself in 
many areas, including questions of fiscal policy, the territorial organisation of the 
Basque Country and the relationship of the Basque Country to Spain, as seen in the 
contrasting attitudes of the PNV and the izquierda abertzale towards the Concierto. 
The PNV’s ultimately still conservative use of the Concierto, both in terms of is 
respect for the weight it gives to the provinces and its privileging of essentially 
centre-right fiscal policies, has contrasted strongly with the aims and intentions 
manifested by the izquierda abertzale. This is one among several factors that has 
contributed to the ongoing division between nationalist forces in the region, as well 
as increasing the potential for the izquierda abertzale to ally with statewide left-wing 
forces in the region, against the PNV.  
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The contrast with Catalonia in terms of alliance behaviour is striking. In 
Catalonia, the lack of fiscal autonomy and thus the lack of need or ability to draw up 
concrete fiscal agendas, combined with the wider Catalanist phenomenon which has 
often generated consensus rather than conflict among different parties and civil 
society groups, helped to make possible the decision reached between the centre-
right CDC and left-wing ERC in 2014-2015 to subordinate their differences over 
left-right politics to their common position on territorial politics. Thus they 
combined forces on a joint platform and in a single electoral list (Junts pel Sí) to 
seek independence for Catalonia at regional elections on 27th September 2015, 
intended by the pro-independence forces as a plebiscite on independence. Inevitably, 
this was not without considerable obstacles: the lack of common ground on social 
policy between CiU, on the one hand, and ERC and other left-wing independents, on 
the other, was one of a number of factors that contributed to the difficulties in 
securing an agreement on a single list. And once the agreement was secured, the 
programme presented in the run-up to the elections was inevitably very vague on 
issues of traditional right-left politics such as social policy, with those leading the list 
proving non-committal or even contradictory on the matter, trying to shift emphasis 
instead onto the common goal of seeking to create an independent state as a first 
step. Similarly, reaching an agreement with the radical left CUP to ensure a stable 
government once Junts pel Sí had won but without a sufficient majority to govern 
was a lengthy and complicated affair, finally resulting in the need for Mas to resign 
and be replaced by a figure of greater consensus in the form of Carles Puigdemont, 
previously mayor of Girona. Despite such obstacles and somewhat tenuous unity 
between the right- and left-wing components of the electoral list and subsequent 
government, however, the fact remains that an alliance of sorts between parties of 
traditionally radically different left-right orientation was possible. In this regard, one 
among various facilitating factors was the fact that Catalonia does not currently have 
its own proper treasury or any significant fiscal powers, thus making it more feasible 
for an alliance of left- and right-wing parties to present a common front postponing 
decisions on and arguments about such issues to the future.  
The longstanding Catalanist phenomenon (p.19) has had a significant impact 
on the evolution in the attitude of CDC/CiU towards regional financing and 
ultimately its shift towards pro-sovereignty agendas. CDC’s demand for a fiscal pact 
has not always been entirely clear or committed, thus raising the question of what 
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has driven the party to make more coherent proposals for a fiscal pact at certain 
times rather than others. A number of factors have contributed to this, including the 
decline in scope for accommodationist practices from the late 1990s due to the 
changing nature of governments in Madrid, generational change within CDC/CiU, 
and changes in economic context. However, the wider Catalanist phenomenon is also 
important, since party competition within the Catalanist sphere (most notably with 
ERC, but also at times from other left-wing parties) and pressures from civil society 
have at times reduced CDC/CiU’s room for manoeuvre and thus contributed to 
influencing the timing of shifts in its agenda. CDC/CiU became caught up in a 
broader Catalanist evolution whereby a majority in Catalonia from the late 1990s 
onwards came to consider the existing regional financing arrangements inadequate. 
This broader Catalanist process pushed CDC/CiU to define more clearly its vision of 
a fiscal pact for Catalonia, reduced the scope for its non-committal attitude that had 
prevailed during prior periods of accommodationism, and encouraged a new kind of 
tactical behaviour in response to party competition within Catalonia over proposals 
for new financing models. Such tactical behaviour included, for example, taking a 
more determined stance in favour of a Concierto-style model during the statute 
reform negotiations and then a particularly critical attitude towards the 2009 reform 
of the LOFCA, in both cases when it was in opposition to the left-wing tripartite 
coalition government and could thereby put pressure on its main competitor ERC in 
government. Ultimately, CiU’s inability to achieve a suitable fiscal pact for 
Catalonia in 2012, in a climate of rising pro-sovereignty sentiment in Catalonia and a 
context of economic deterioration, proved a decisive moment for the party 
federation, as it shifted its position clearly in favour of support for the right to 
decide, and eventually, in the case of CDC (but not UDC), independence for 
Catalonia. The issue of regional financing has thus played a significant role in 
influencing CDC’s shift from accommodationist to pro-sovereignty politics. As well 
as the evolving nature of relations with Madrid, intra-regional factors such as party 
competition and pressures from civil society have had a significant bearing on the 
timing of CDC’s shifts in attitude towards the financing question and beyond. 
 
Supranational dynamics have influenced regional financing and thereby parties’ 
territorial strategies and behaviour: 
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In recent years, in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-2008, CDC’s 
(amid wider Catalan) dissatisfaction with the regional financing system has also been 
impacted by dynamics at EU and international level, since the deficit targets set by 
the EU authorities for Spain have, in turn, also required adjustment by Spain’s 
regional authorities, and the financial crisis resulted in most regions being shut out of 
the public debt markets, thus forcing them to become reliant upon loans from the 
central government. The Spanish-Catalan and inter-regional dynamics within Spain 
that have traditionally impacted regional financing negotiations have thus been 
influenced to an unprecedented extent by developments at the supranational and 
international level. As the financial crisis took hold in Spain, Catalonia’s financial 
situation – along with that of the other central and regional administrations in Spain 
– deteriorated in particular from 2010 onwards when the full impact of Spain’s 
austerity cuts hit and the international markets lost confidence in Spain. As one of 
the largest regions and therefore one with particularly high financing needs, the 
Catalan government became increasingly reliant upon centralised funding 
mechanisms created by the Spanish government when it lost access to the markets to 
raise funding to supplement revenues from taxes. These centralised funding 
mechanisms, in turn, required Catalan adherence to strict deficit targets set by the 
Spanish government for regional governments in Spain, in order to meet the overall 
targets set by the EU authorities. And yet Catalonia became one of the most frequent 
underperformers in terms of meeting these fiscal targets. This scenario served to 
exacerbate already existing tensions between Spanish and Catalan authorities over 
regional financing, not only reigniting the debate over the level of financing afforded 
to Catalonia under the common system, but also raising a dispute over the question 
of to what extent the Spanish central government has used arguments of 
rationalisation for economic purposes as a guise for ideologically-motivated 
recentralisation due to the party’s Spanish centralism. Interestingly, however, even 
on occasions where clear messages have been issued by the EU authorities to the 
Spanish authorities to crack down on regional spending to help rein in Spain’s 
overall deficit, these have had little or no perceptible impact on CDC’s attitude 
towards the EU, with its blame for the need to rein in spending focused almost 
exclusively on the central government. This bears a parallel with the PNV’s 
behaviour vis-à-vis its own interests in relation to the EU context, in the sense that, 
despite the fact that the EU continues to pose a number of obstacles to the 
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development of substate fiscal autonomy verging on sovereignty in EU member 
states, the PNV focuses on the Spanish state as the main obstacle to a greater Basque 
participation at EU level in fiscal matters and beyond, rather than the EU framework 
itself (Chapter 5). In part, this may be tactical, since it serves both CDC and the 
PNV’s purpose to focus their criticisms on the Spanish state as too centralised, but it 
is not just a question of instrumentalism. In both cases, the nationalist parties remain 
strongly pro-European despite the obstacles. 
 
Contribution to knowledge 
This thesis hopes to have contributed to a fuller understanding of how 
political dynamics in relation to the Basque Concierto have influenced the PNV’s 
territorial strategies and behaviour. The predominant focus in both the media and 
academia on the politicised debate over whether or not the Concierto is a ‘privilege’ 
in comparison with the common financing regime has neglected a fuller analysis of 
political behaviour and dynamics in relation to the Concierto itself, which this thesis 
has investigated. This has involved extensive interviews to understand how bilateral 
relations between Madrid and the Basque region over the Concierto have played out 
in recent decades, what the main areas of dispute have been, and what this has meant 
for the PNV’s evolving agenda (Chapter 4). The PNV is well known for being a pro-
EU party resolutely in favour of European integration, but apart from a few 
exceptions (e.g. Gillespie 2015b), there have been few in-depth analyses of the 
evolution of its relationship to Europe and the party’s objectives in this regard, 
which is perhaps a reflection of the fact that its goals for greater participation in 
Europe are rather vague, gradualist and open-ended in any case. This thesis hopes to 
have provided a new dimension to the question of the PNV in the EU context by 
providing an analysis (in Chapter 5) of the PNV’s attempts to develop the Concierto 
increasingly as a model of fiscal sovereignty in Europe and the implications of this 
for its wider sovereignty agenda. The detailed ins and outs of Spanish-Basque 
disputes over issues such as whether the Basques require representation in EU 
Council working groups on fiscal matters are often very technical matters dealt with 
by the relevant Basque treasury administrations and the upper echelons of PNV 
government, rather than more general issues used by the PNV to galvanise public 
support for the party or indeed understood by the PNV in its entirely. Nevertheless, 
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the gradualist steps taken by the PNV since the late 1990s to obtain some degree of 
representation in EU fiscal decision-making bodies (mainly Ecofin) provide a key 
insight into the incremental approach used by the party towards its goal for the 
Basque Country to be treated as an equal to Spain in Europe in fiscal matters and 
beyond, and importantly, the discrepancies with Spanish authorities in this regard.  
The thesis has also shed light (in Chapter 6) on the hitherto largely 
unexplored terrain of the intraregional and inter-provincial political dynamics 
concerning the Concierto within the Basque region itself, given the complexity of the 
situation whereby each of the three provinces raises its own taxes. The way the 
Concierto works internally within the Basque region is, in many ways, very opaque, 
in terms of relations between the Basque government and the provinces, and among 
the provinces themselves. Very little of what goes on in the meetings of the Basque 
Council of Public Finances and the Basque Tax Coordination Body emerge into the 
public domain. By drawing on interviews with treasury officials from the provincial 
administrations, this thesis hopes to have made a start at shedding light on the 
complexity of the internal dynamics within the region regarding the Concierto given 
the extensive fiscal and financial powers it affords to the provinces, and what the 
implications of this situation have been for the PNV’s territorial strategies and 
behaviour. This certainly marks a fundamental contrast to the Catalan case, where 
local financing (i.e. to the provincial level and municipalities) is heavily centralised 
and controlled by the central Spanish government, bypassing the regional 
government, and the issue has therefore become a bone of contention for Catalan 
nationalists who want local financing to be under regional government control. 
In the Catalan case, as discussed in earlier chapters, a number of studies have 
analysed the under-funding of the region both in terms of resources from the 
common system and infrastructure spending, while others have used public opinion 
data to show how economic considerations have played a role in the increase in 
support for independence among Catalan citizens in recent years. This thesis has 
contributed a different dimension to the question of the relationship between 
financing concerns and pro-sovereignty sentiment in Catalonia by focusing instead 
on party attitudes towards regional financing and their evolution over a long time 
period, since demands for reform of regional financing have been a major theme of 
Catalan political debate for more than a decade. It has analysed how CDC’s attitudes 
towards regional financing have evolved since the Transition, the factors that have 
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shaped this, and the consequences for its evolving territorial agenda. To provide 
context for CDC’s (and wider Catalanist) recent behaviour, this thesis has also 
provided a substantial analysis of the nature of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 as it 
impacted Spain’s regions, including especially Catalonia, and the consequences for 
the rise in pro-sovereignty sentiment in Catalonia. Few studies have looked in any 
depth at the complexity of the interrelationship between international pressures on 
Spain during the crisis (in the form of the EU’s deficit reduction requirements for 
Spain and the behaviour of the international markets towards Spain) and central-
regional tensions within Spain itself (as a result of Spain’s division of deficit targets 
for different levels of government and its provision of funding mechanisms for cash-
strapped regional and local authorities shut out of the markets). This thesis has 
therefore studied this interrelationship and the implications for pro-sovereignty 
agendas in Catalonia. 
Finally, as well as providing insights into each of the two case studies 
individually, the comparative approach taken in this thesis has helped to shed further 
light on the main research question. For example, an in-depth analysis of the bilateral 
dynamics of the Concierto within a genuinely bilateral model, in contrast to the 
‘bilateral’ negotiations between Madrid and Catalonia within the context of an inter-
regional financing model, has helped to explain why accommodationist attitudes 
have ultimately been able to persist for longer within the PNV than in the Catalan 
case. It is not just a question of the fact that the Basques receive more money than 
the Catalans since the Concierto is based on their fiscal capacity rather than 
estimated needs. What is also fundamentally important is the fact that there has been 
significantly more scope for deals and trade-offs in bilateral negotiations over the 
Concierto than in Spanish-Catalan negotiations over the inter-regional financing 
system, and this becomes much clearer through a comparative analysis. Moreover, 
the comparative analysis has brought out the importance of the differences in internal 
political dynamics within the two regions. Internal political dynamics within the 
Basque region (and indeed within the PNV itself) in relation to the Concierto and its 
inter-provincial dimension have encouraged the PNV's moderation and also reduced 
the scope for nationalist alignment with the izquierda abertzale, given their very 
different views on the Concierto and fiscal agendas. This provides a strong contrast 
to Catalonia, where the longstanding consensus that regional financing needs 
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improved has not only led to competitive and tactical behaviour by CDC to outbid 
others, but also more of a united front to seek a better deal for Catalonia. 
It is primarily via this analysis of internal political dynamics within the 
Basque and Catalan regions in relation to regional financing that this thesis hopes to 
have contributed to the existing literature on regionalist-nationalist party behaviour 
outlined in Chapter 1 (pp. 24-33). As I stated there, the literature on the behaviour of 
regionalist-nationalist parties as they move into mainstream politics has sought to 
address the question of what impact engaging with everyday left-right politics has on 
their territorial agendas, and how their stances on socio-economic issues feed into 
their vision of the society they wish to create. However, the analytical frameworks 
which have started to emerge in this regard have so far tended to neglect an analysis 
of the implications of competing socioeconomic visions between different nationalist 
parties within individual regions, in favour of more wide-ranging cross-country 
comparative conclusions. For example, Massetti and Schakel (2015) carry out a 
cross-country comparative study which leads them to argue that ‘the relative 
economic position of a region is a key variable for explaining how regionalist parties 
acting in relatively rich regions tend to adopt a rightist ideology, while regionalist 
parties acting in relatively poor regions tend to adopt a leftist ideology’ (2015: 865). 
They carry out a large-scale quantitative study to demonstrate this, and then reassert 
their findings through a more in-depth qualitive study of two parties, the Lega Nord 
(LN) in Italy and the Scottish National Party (SNP) in Scotland, but they do not go 
further to consider in any detail what happens when more than one regionalist-
nationalist party is competing within a region, potentially with very different 
socioeconomic visions.  Similarly, Alonso et al. (2015), in their investigation into 
parties’ electoral strategies in a two-dimensional political space, carry out a large-
scale multinomial logistic model to to find that ‘in contrast to the niche party thesis, 
regionalist parties strategize simultaneously along the territorial and the economic 
dimension of competition’ (2015: 851). They examine ‘the repertoire of party 
strategies in a two-dimensional space’ and develop ‘some tentative explanations of 
the circumstances in which the parties use one or another strategy’ (2015: 859), but 
in so doing they focus on the interaction between regionalist and statewide parties 
and how this conditions regionalist party behaviour, rather than the implications of 
competition between regionalist parties within the region itself for regionalist party 
behaviour.  
266	
 
This thesis hopes to have contributed new insights to this literature by 
examining the internal dynamics between competing regionalist-nationalist parties 
within regions themselves, how this internal competition has impacted the way in 
which regionalist-nationalist parties subsume the left-right dimension of politics into 
the centre-periphery dimension, and how different levels of fiscal decentralisation 
can impact their strategies in this regard. It has pointed tentatively to the idea that 
regionalist-nationalist parties operating in regions with greater levels of substate 
fiscal autonomy must develop stronger fiscal and economic policy agendas than their 
counterparts in regions with lower fiscal authority. This, in turn, suggests that 
competing fiscal agendas between regionalist-nationalist parties within the same 
region can pose more of an obstacle to their collaboration on wider territorial goals, 
whereas in regions with less fiscal autonomy and therefore less of a need for strongly 
developed fiscal policy agendas, it is more possible for regionalist-nationalist parties 
to subordinate their differents on left-right politics to achieve collaboration on wider 
territorial matters. Similarly, this thesis has shown that even if the relative economic 
position of a region may often determine a regionalist-nationalist party’s stance on 
left-right issues (as argued by Massetti and Schakel 2015), it is not an impediment to 
reigonalist-nationalist parties developing different agendas on the left-right axis of 
competition, and indeed using these to compete against each other to the detriment of 
their possible collaboration on territorial issues, as seen clearly in the case of the 
PNV and Bildu in the Basque Country.  
Of course, this thesis has only studied the cases of the Basque and Catalan 
regions, and a much larger number of cases would need to be studied in order to see 
if the findings in relation to these two regions have wider relevance. The vastly 
different levels of fiscal decentralisation in different states and the often 
idiosyncratic nature of sub-regional political systems would also pose problems to 
wider comparison (the Basque case, with three treasuries at provincial level, is 
certainly unique). Nevertheless, this thesis has demonstrated that internal political 
dynamics within individual regions and the individual characteristics of these 
regions themselves can have an important bearing on regionalist-nationalist party 
behaviour, and that one of the structural factors that can influence such internal 
political dynamics is the type of regional financing system in place in the region in 
question. Such an analysis of the implications of what happens below the regional 
level has tended to be neglected to date in the emerging frameworks seeking to 
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analyse regionalist-nationalist party behaviour, which usually take the regional level 
of party competition itself and its interaction with statewide competition as the main 
focus of analysis. 
 
Further research 
          While this thesis has focused on identifying ways in which regional financing 
has influenced shifts in the territorial strategies and behaviour of the mainstream 
Basque and Catalan nationalist parties, there are inevitably limitations to the role of 
this variable. Most notably, regional financing was not a major factor in the PNV’s 
decision to break its longstanding alliance with the Socialists to form a nationalist 
alliance instead with the Basque radical left under the Lizarra Pact, nor its 
subsequent decision to forge ahead alone with the Ibarretxe Plan once the alliance 
with the radical left had been broken. This shift away from accommodationism 
corresponded first and foremost to other factors addressed in Chapter 2, including 
the PNV’s attempt to find a means to address the ongoing problem of terrorist 
violence; its frustration with the limits to the advances in autonomy for the Basque 
region that could be achieved while the terrorist problem persisted; and the 
atmosphere of increasing confrontation and competition between Basque nationalists 
and the Spanish PP. In the Catalan case too, despite the clearer link between 
dissatisfaction with regional financing arrangements and the rise in pro-sovereignty 
agendas in recent years, the longstanding debate over the regional financing system 
in Catalonia has been a symptom of, and indeed overtaken by, a broader clash 
between the Spanish and Catalan governments that is not solely or primarily 
economic in nature. One obvious area of further research would thus be to widen the 
scope of analysis to refer more to other factors (cultural, social, political and 
economic), in addition to regional financing, that also help towards a fuller 
understanding of what explains the shifts in territorial agendas undertaken by these 
parties since the late 1990s.231  
                                                
231 The research for this thesis has been linked to a wider ESRC-funded research project led 
by Richard Gillespie on ‘The Dynamics of Nationalist Evolution in Contemporary Spain’ 
[ES/J007854/1] which constituted an initiative in this direction, aiming to investigate the 
different factors that have impacted shifts in Basque and Catalan nationalist party agendas. 
Work in this regard gave rise to a special issue of Nationalism and Ethnic Politics (21:1) co-
edited by Professor Gillespie and myself, also published in book format (Gillespie and Gray 
2015).  
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Another area for future research would be to undertake a more in-depth study 
of the PNV at local and provincial level, and the implications for its coherence, 
strategies and behaviour. This thesis has made a start in investigating the 
heterogeneity of the PNV across territories by looking specifically at the 
implications of the Concierto for the PNV’s behaviour in different provinces as well 
as for its overall coherence, but there is plenty of scope for further work on the party 
at local or provincial level, given the lack of studies in this area (De Pablo: 2008, on 
the history of the party in Álava, is a notable exception). Regarding the intraregional 
dimension, there is also scope for work investigating the dynamics between the PNV 
and civil society in the Basque region – and whether these vary across provinces. 
This thesis has made a contrast between the fluid relationship that has emerged 
between CDC and civil society organisations in Catalonia on the one hand, and the 
more isolated behaviour of the PNV on the other, as seen, for example, in the fact 
that the Ibarretxe Plan was very much a party-led initiative. However, while the 
relationship between parties and civil society in Catalonia is certainly more explicit, 
a fuller exploration of the relationship between the PNV, nationalist trade unions and 
social movements in the Basque region in recent decades could possibly shed further 
light on the PNV’s behaviour. The Basque region is unusual in that it has historically 
had two very political trade unions – ELA (usually associated more with the PNV) 
and LAB (usually associated more with the izquierda abertzale) – which have at 
times sought to exercise pressure on the PNV and the izquierda abertzale with regard 
to their territorial agendas. Similarly, two social platforms – Elkarri, created in 1992, 
and its successor Lokarri, created in 2006 – aimed to pursue a peaceful solution to 
the Basque conflict via dialogue. Have these trade unions and social movements 
played a role in influencing the PNV’s territorial strategies and behaviour, 
particularly in the late 1990s?232 Such dynamics within the Basque region and their 
potential influence on the PNV have tended to be overlooked in analyses of the party 
traditionally focused instead on its behaviour in elections and vis-à-vis Madrid. 
           A third area of research would be to investigate the impact of the wider 
political transformation currently taking place in Spain at central government level 
(which has made forming a government impossible following the December 2015 
                                                
232 My interest in this question was sparked by interviews with Xabi Anza, member of the 
executive of ELA, on 25 April 2014; and Jonan Fernández, founder of Elkarri, on 21 May 
2014. 
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elections) on the evolution of the Catalan and Basque territorial problematics. This 
thesis has discussed how traditional Catalan nationalists who had long fought for 
greater recognition for Catalonia’s language and culture were increasingly joined in 
the wake of the crisis by a new wave of disaffected Catalans who were not 
necessarily traditional nationalist party supporters but had come to resent Catalonia’s 
economic treatment at the hands of the Spanish state and the austerity measures 
being imposed during the crisis, as well as the levels of corruption not only among 
Spanish but also Catalan nationalist politicians. While the traditional nationalist 
party CDC, seen as part of the traditional establishment and associated with 
corruption, consistently declined in support, the pro-independence movement overall 
still gained momentum due to the alliance with left-wing pro-independence parties 
ERC and the CUP and civil society groups. And yet left-wing Podemos, the new 
Spanish party that has captured much of the protest vote against the traditional 
Spanish parties in Spain, fared very well in Catalonia in the 2015 general elections, 
winning in Catalonia as part of an alliance with other left-wing parties there. It also 
challenged the dominance of the PNV in the Basque region by very nearly winning 
there, capturing the most votes, but falling one seat short of the PNV. The possibility 
mentioned in Chapter 6 of left-wing alliances between the izquierda abertzale and 
other progressive left-wing forces in the Basque region, against the more 
conservative PNV, thus did not look beyond the realm of possibility. This context 
calls for an in-depth analysis of the mutual interaction effects between Spain’s 
political crisis in general and the Basque and Catalan territorial problematics, and 
what this means for the PNV and CDC as well as the wider Basque and Catalan 
nationalist movements.  
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APPENDIX 1 - List of interviewees  
 
In alphabetical order 
 
Name, date(s) of interview(s), party affiliation (where relevant) and brief 
biography 
 
Agirre, Xabier, 7 April 2014 
PP president of the province of Álava 2007-2011. Member of the Basque parliament 
for Álava 2004-2007. 
 
Aguirre, Carlos, 13 October 2014 
PSE Basque Economy and Treasury Minister 2009-2012, under the Basque 
government of Patxi López. Previous positions of responsibility from 1987 onwards, 
during the years of PNV-PSE Basque coalition governments, included Director of 
Planning for the Economic and Planning Department (1987-), Director of Analysis 
and Studies in the area of Social Affairs (1991-), and Director of Economy and 
Planning for the Department of Justice, Economy, Work and Social Security (1995-). 
 
Anasagasti, Iñaki, 7 March 2014 
PNV spokesperson in the Spanish parliament for 18 years from 1986 to 2004. Most 
recently, senator for Vizcaya in the Spanish Senate (upper house of parliament), 
2004-2015. Previously, deputy for Vizcaya in the Spanish parliament 1986-2004 and 
member of the Basque parliament for Vizcaya 1980-1986.   
 
Anza, Xabi, 25 April 2014 
Member of the executive committee of the Basque trade union ELA. 
 
Aranburu, Mikel, 5 May 2014 
Member of the technical team of the Navarran treasury department since 1980. Since 
2015, Treasury and Financial Policy Minister of the Navarran regional government. 
 
Ardanza, José Antonio, 10 April 2014, 28 April 2014 
PNV President (lehendakari) of the Basque regional government 1985-1999. 
Previously, president of the provincial government of Guipúzcoa 1983-1985 and 
mayor of Mondragón (Guipúzcoa) 1979-1983. 
 
Arrieta, Sabino, 2 April 2014 
Businessman affiliated to the PNV. Deputy interior minister for the Basque 
government in the 1980s. 
 
Azpiazu, Pedro, 15 September 2014 
PNV deputy for Vizcaya in the Spanish parliament since 2000 and economic 
spokesperson (including on Concierto-related matters). 
 
Bel, Germà, 27 April 2015 
Deputy for Junts pel Sí in the Catalan parliament since October 2015 after running as 
head of the Junts pel Sí list for the province of Tarragona in the Catalan regional 
election of 27 September 2015. Previously affiliated to the PSOE/PSC, and PSC 
deputy for Barcelona in the Spanish parliament 2000-2004. Also Professor of 
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Applied Economy at the University of Barcelona, known for his work on 
infrastructure spending in Spain, in which he argues that Spain has used 
infrastructure as a ‘nationbuilding’ tool, creating a centralist transport network that 
has had a detrimental economic impact on Catalonia (see Bel 2012).  
 
Beloki, José Ramón, 27 February 2014, 8 April 2014 
PNV deputy for Guipúzcoa in the Spanish parliament 2004-2011.  
 
Bosch, Jaume, 19 March 2015 
ICV deputy for Barcelona in the Catalan parliament 2003-2015. ICV spokesperon 
during the Catalan statute reform negotiations. 
 
Castells, Antoni, 25 March 2015 
PSC Catalan Economy and Finance Minister 2003-2010, under the two left-wing 
tripartite coalition governments in Catalonia. Professor of Public Policy at the 
University of Barcelona, known for his work on fiscal federalism. 
 
Colomines, Agustí, 23 March 2015 
Director of the Fundació Catalanista i Demòcrata (Catdem) 2007-2013. Catdem was 
a foundation linked to CDC, created by Artur Mas to refound Catalanism, who 
appointed Colomines as its director. Previously, Colomines had been associated with 
left-wing and pro-independence parties, organisations and movements, for example 
he participated in the founding in 1979 of the party Nacionalistes d’Esquerra in 
favour of self-detemination for Catalonia, which dissolved a few years later into 
Iniciativa por Catalonia. Professor of Contemporary History at the University of 
Barcelona, specialising in the history of the Catalan nationalist movement. 
 
Corominas, Lluís, 27 January 2016 
CDC. First vicepresident in the Catalan parliament since 26 October 2015. Second 
vicepresident in the Catalan parliament 2012-2015 and 2008-2010. Deputy for 
Barcelona in the Catalan parliament since 2003.  
 
Damborenea, Antón, 9 July 2014 
President of the Basque PP in Vizcaya since 2008. 
 
Egibar, Joseba, 8 April 2014 
PNV deputy for Guipúzcoa in the Basque parliament since 1990, and PNV 
spokespeson in the Basque parliament since 1998. Also president of the executive of 
the PNV in Guipúzcoa since 1987. 
 
Erkoreka, Josu, 14 March 2014 
PNV. Since 2012, Basque government spokesperson and Director of Public 
Administration and Justice. Previously, PNV deputy for Vizcaya in the Spanish 
parliament 2000-2012, and PNV spokesperson in the Spanish parliament 2004-2012.  
 
Fernández, Jonan, 21 May 2014 
Founder of the Basque social movement Elkarri in 1992 (dissolved in 2006), 
designed to help achieve a peaceful end to the Basque conflict through dialogue. 
 
Franco, Helena, 5 September 2014 (interviewed together with Itziar Miner) 
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Bildu Treasury minister, provincial government of Guipúzcoa, 2011-2015. 
 
Goikoetxeta, Iñaki, 10 April 2014 (interviewed together with Andoni Ortuzar), 7 
July 2014 
Member of the PNV executive and in charge of the party’s international relations. 
Substantial involvement with the PNV since the 1980s. 
 
Hernández Goicoechea, José Luis, 7 October 2014 (interviewed together with 
Sebastián Zurutuza Mujika) 
Head of the Service for Regulatory Development and Legal Advice, Treasury of 
Guipúzcoa (technical team). 
 
Homs, Francesc, 28 January 2016 
Deputy for Barcelona in the Spanish parliament since January 2016 and 
spokesperson for the Catalan parliamentary group of Democracia i Llibertad (CDC 
refounded). Previously, spokesperson for the Catalan government 2010-2015 and 
minister for the presidency of the Catalan government 2012-2015, among other 
roles. CDC deputy in the Catalan parliament 2003-2010, and CiU lead spokesperson 
for negotiations for the new 2006 Catalan autonomy statute in that period.  
 
Huguet, Josep, 9 June 2015 
Affiliated to ERC since 1989, after previously forming part of other pro-
independence left-wing parties and movements in the 1970s and 1980s. Catalan 
Minister for Innovation, Universities and Business in 2006-2010 under the second 
tripartite coalition government, and Minister for Business, Tourism and Consumer 
Affairs in 2004-2006 under the first tripartite coalition government. Key 
spokesperson for ERC on the reform of regional financing during the statute reform 
negotiations under the first tripartite government, as well as a key referent within 
ERC in the 1990s pushing for a Concierto for Catalonia. Other roles have included 
ERC spokesperson in the Catalan parliament 1999-2004, and member of the Mixed 
Commission for Transfers between the Spanish state and the Catalan government 
1993-1995. 
 
Ibarretxe, Juan José, 8 April 2014, 28 October 2014 
PNV President (lehendakari) of the Basque regional government 1999-2009. 
Previously, Deputy President and Minister of the Treasury and Public 
Administration of the Basque government 1995-1999. Other roles have included 
president of the provincial parliament of Álava 1986-1991. 
 
Larrea, Pedro, 20 June 2014 
PNV Deputy Basque Treasury minister in the mid 1980s and previously Treasury 
minister for the provincial government of Vizcaya. 
 
Larreina, Rafael, 7 April 2014 
EA deputy for Guipúzcoa in the Spanish parliament since 2011. Member of the 
Basque parliament 1990-2009. 
 
Martínez Bárbara, Gemma,  4 April 2014, 16 May 2014, 8 October 2014 
(interviewed together with José Rubí Cassinello on all three occasions) 
Head of the Fiscal Policy Service, Treasury of Vizcaya (technical team). 
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Mas-Colell, Andreu, 25 January 2016 
CDC Catalan Economy Minister 2010-2016 under the two governments of Artur 
Mas. Previously, Minister for Universities, Research and Information Society in 
2000-2003. Leading academic specialising in microeconomics. 
 
Mediavilla, Koldo, 9 April 2014 
Member of the PNV executive, responsible for institutional matters since 2012. First 
Secretary of the provincial parliament of Vizcaya since 2011. Previous roles 
included General Secretary of the Presidency, provincial government of Vizcaya, 
2003-2011. 
 
Miner, Itziar, 5 September 2014 (interviewed together with Helena Franco) 
Bildu Director of Fiscal Policy in Guipúzcoa, 2011-2015 
 
Mintegi, Laura, 7 April 2014 
Spokesperson for EH Bildu in the Basque parliament, 2012-2014.  
 
Montero, Txema, 11 March 2014 
Formerly member of HB in the 1980s, expelled from HB in 1992 for his stance 
against ETA. Has since collaborated with the PNV, though without becoming 
affilliated to the party. Expert in the politics and sociology of the Basque region.  
 
Múgica, Gonzalo, 18 July 2014, 28 August 2014 
PSE legal adviser to former deputy lehendakari Ramón Jáuregui regarding the 
transfer of competences to the Basque government and social security matters in the 
1980s and early 1990s. 
 
Olabarria, Emilio, 11 April 2014 
PNV deputy for Álava in the Spanish parliament, 2004-2015 and 1986-1996. 
Member of the Basque parliament for Álava, 2001-2004 and 1984-1986.  
 
Olano, Xabier, 29 May 2014 
Bildu Director of the Treasury of Guipúzcoa, 2011-2015. Bildu candidate for 
President of Guipúzcoa at the 2015 provincial and municipal elections (stood 
unsuccessfully). Longstanding affiliation to the izquierda abertzale. 
 
Ortuzar, Andoni, 10 April 2014 (interviewed together with Iñaki Goikoetxeta) 
Head of the PNV executive since 2013. Previously, head of the Vizcayan executive 
of the party 2008-2013. 
 
Padrol, Heribert, 13 July 2015 
Lawyer. Has acted on occasion in an advisory capacity to Artur Mas, including on 
regional financing matters. CiU deputy for Barcelona in the Spanish parliament 
2000-2002.  
 
Pujol, Jordi, 24 February 2016 
CDC/CiU President of the Catalan government 1980-2003. 
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Rubí Cassinello, José, 4 April 2014, 16 May 2014, 8 October 2014 (interviewed 
together with Gemma Martínez Bárbara on all three occasions) 
Technical Secretary General, Treasury of Vizcaya (technical team). 
 
Salinero, Manuel, 2 September 2014 
PSE General Secretary of the Basque President 2009-2012, under the government of 
Patxi López. In and out of politics since the 1980s. Legal adviser on issues 
concerning social security and the transfer of competences to the Basque government 
at times in the 1980s and 1990s. Strong involvement on behalf of the PSE, for 
example, in the drafting of the Zubia Report (Informe Zubia) of 1993 by the then 
PNV-PSE Basque government, on the competences still to be transferred to the 
Basque government.    
 
Uriarte, Pedro Luis, 11 April 2014 
PNV Basque Economy and Treasury Minister under the first Basque government of 
1980-1984. Lead Basque negotiator for the Concierto agreement of 1981. 
 
Uribesalgo, Aitor, 10 October 2014 
PP Treasury minister, provincial government of Álava, 2011-2015. 
 
Urieta, Aitor, 22 May 2014 
Bildu town councillor for Zeberio (Vizcaya). 
 
Zabaleta, Iñaki, 8 April 2014 
One of the founders of Sortu. Long history of involvement with the izquierda 
abertzale. 
 
Zurutuza Mujika, Sebastián, 7 October 2014 
Various technical roles within the provincial government of Guipúzcoa. Most 
recently, Head of the Service of Institutional Commitments, 1993-2015. Previously, 
Head of Section responsible for the Quota and Financial Contributions, 1992-1993. 
Also worked as an economist for the provincial government in 1987-1992.  
 
 
Academic consultations 
 
In addition to the above interviewees, I would also like to thank the following 
academics for meeting with me more informally at various stages of this project to 
answer questions, in particular: 
Ander Gurrutxaga, University of the Basque Country (specialist in the sociology of 
the Basque Country) 
Ignacio Zubiri, University of the Basque Country (specialist in the Concierto) 
Eduardo Alonso Olea, University of the Basque Country (specialist in the Concierto) 
Fernando de la Hucha, Public University of Navarre (specialist in the Concierto and 
the Convenio) 
Juan Cruz Allí, Public University of Navarre (specialist in the Convenio and Basque-
Navarran institutional relations, also with significant previous political experience in 
this regard) 
Roldán Jimeno, Public University of Navarre (specialist in the Convenio) 
Hugo López, Public University of Navarre (specialist in the Convenio) 
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Ángel de la Fuente, FEDEA (specialist in regional financing) 
 
I would also like to thank financial experts and analysts at Madrid-based economic 
consultancy firm Analistas Financieros Internacionales (AFI) (especially César 
Cantalapiedra) and also BBVA’s credit research team in London (especially Agustín 
Martín) for providing me with relevant data and reports on Spain’s regions.  
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APPENDIX 2 – Participant information sheet 
 
The following information sheet was emailed to all interviewees when they were first 
contacted to request an interview: 
                                                                                         
 
Los nacionalismos en España: 
La evolución de las propuestas territoriales en el País Vasco y Cataluña 
 
INFORMACIÓN PARA PARTICIPANTES 
 
Se le invita a usted a participar en un estudio de investigación. Le ruego que se tome 
el tiempo de leer la siguiente información y no dude en contactar con la 
investigadora (datos abajo) si desea más información.  
 
1. El proyecto 
Caroline Gray (doctoranda de la Universidad de Liverpool) está investigando la 
evolución de los proyectos territoriales de los partidos políticos en el País Vasco y 
Cataluña desde los años ochenta hasta la actualidad. Su estudio incluye un análisis 
del impacto de los distintos acuerdos de financiación autonómica (el concierto 
económico frente al régimen común) en las propuestas territoriales de los partidos 
nacionalistas. Esta investigación está financiada por el Consejo de Investigación 
Económica y Social del Reino Unido (Economic and Social Research Council, 
ESRC), proveedor principal de fondos en dicho país para investigaciones académicas 
en el campo de las ciencias políticas, económicas y sociales. Es co-investigadora en 
un proyecto más amplio sobre la evolución de los nacionalismos vasco y catalán 
dirigido por el profesor Richard Gillespie, Catedrático de Ciencias Políticas en la 
Universidad de Liverpool. La información sobre dicho proyecto titulado “The 
Dynamics of Nationalist Evolution in Contemporary Spain”, que dura del 2013 hasta 
finales de 2015, se encuentra en la siguiente página web: nationalismsinspain.com 
 
Caroline Gray está residiendo e investigando durante varios meses tanto en el País 
Vasco como en Cataluña, sobre todo para entrevistar a miembros de partidos 
políticos y otros expertos con conocimientos especializados en la materia, con el fin 
de conocer sus opiniones sobre la evolución de los movimientos nacionalistas en 
España, especialmente en los últimos 30 años.  
 
2. Propósito de la investigación 
 
El propósito de este proyecto basado en la Universidad de Liverpool es llegar a 
entender mejor por qué los movimientos nacionalistas periféricos han tenido 
distintas relaciones con el Estado español a lo largo del tiempo, variando entre un 
acercamiento entre los gobiernos central y autonómico en algunos períodos y la 
búsqueda de un mayor nivel de autonomía o independencia en otros. 
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Se centra sobre todo en examinar los distintos factores políticos, económicos y 
sociales que han contribuido a la evolución de los proyectos territoriales de los 
partidos políticos en el País Vasco y Cataluña. Esto implica analizar una serie de 
dinámicas que incluyen el impacto de los distintos acuerdos financieros que tienen 
las dos comunidades autónomas con el Estado español; sus relaciones con los 
sucesivos gobiernos centrales en Madrid; la competición y las alianzas entre partidos 
políticos a nivel autonómico; y la relación entre los partidos políticos y la sociedad 
civil, entre otros factores.  
 
3. ¿Por qué está usted invitado/a? 
 
Se le invita a participar debido a sus conocimientos y/o experiencia de los procesos 
políticos y movimientos nacionalistas en el País Vasco y/o en Cataluña o de sus 
respectivos sistemas de financiación. 
 
El objetivo de Caroline Gray es entrevistar en persona a varios miembros de cada 
partido político (vasco, catalán, español), que se elegirán por su área de 
responsabilidad (actual o pasada) dentro del partido o porque se les considera 
representativos de una tendencia o corriente definida dentro del partido. También 
tiene la intención de entrevistar a miembros de la sociedad civil y académicos y 
técnicos especializados en la materia. 
 
4. ¿Qué pasará si participo? 
 
Se propone el uso del castellano en las entrevistas ya que Caroline Gray lo habla con 
total fluidez. 
 
Se grabará la entrevista a no ser que el participante manifieste una preferencia en 
contra. La grabación de las entrevistas no es imprescindible, pero debido a las 
ventajas prácticas de hacerlo se le agradecería su permiso. Si prefiere que no se 
grabe, se tomarán algunas notas durante la entrevista. Toda grabación de las 
entrevistas se anonimizará antes de su almacenamiento y, al igual que los apuntes 
que se hayan tomado, sólo se guardará hasta la publicación de los resultados de la 
investigación y sus traducciones.  
 
El tiempo solicitado para una entrevista será normalmente de una hora 
aproximadamente. Las entrevistas normalmente tomarán lugar en las oficinas del 
participante. 
 
Se le invita a participar con la esperanza de que le interese el tema de las entrevistas 
y considere útil el proyecto. La participación no conlleva beneficios económicos. 
 
5. ¿Qué se hará con los resultados del estudio? 
 
Los planes de publicación de Caroline Gray incluyen:  
 
• Una tesis doctoral 
• Varios artículos de investigación sustanciales que se remitirán a revistas 
académicas  de prestigio internacional 
278	
 
• La co-edición (junto con el profesor Richard Gillespie) de un volumen de 
artículos  basado en los debates celebrados en talleres de investigación que se 
prevé organizar 
 
No se citará textualmente ninguna de las respuestas de los participantes en ninguna 
publicación generada por el proyecto, a no ser que den su consentimiento expreso 
para ello. Se respetarán plenamente las solicitudes de preservar el anonimato. 
 
Los participantes tendrán la posibilidad de solicitar copias de los artículos de 
investigación según se vayan publicando o detalles bibliográficos de los mismos. 
 
6. Preguntas 
 
Si tiene cualquier pregunta sobre el proyecto o sobre cualquier aspecto de su 
participación en el mismo, por favor, no dude en contactar con Caroline Gray para 
más información: 
email: xxx 
teléfono: xxx 
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APPENDIX 3 – Sample interview questionnaires 
 
 
A selection of five interview questionnaires is provided in this Appendix as follows, 
to give an indication of the range and breadth of interviews conducted.  
 
pp. 280-282: Sample interview questionnaire 1 – Juan José Ibarretxe (8 April 
2014, 28 October 2014) 
 
pp. 283-284: Sample interview questionnaire 2 – Helena Franco and Itziar 
Miner (5 September 2014) 
 
pp. 285-286: Sample interview questionnaire 3 – Antoni Castells (25 March 
2015) 
 
pp. 287-288: Sample interview questionnaire 4 – Josep Huguet (9 June 2015) 
 
pp. 289-290: Sample interview questionnaire 5 – Andreu Mas-Colell (25 
January 2016)  
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Sample interview questionnaire 1 – Juan José Ibarretxe (8 April 2014, 28 
October 2014) 
 
Initial general interview on the PNV and Basque politics on 8 April 2014:  
 
La época de Ibarretxe 
 
1. Bajo su presidencia del partido, el PNV intentó reformar el estatuto de 
Gernika. ¿Cómo analizaría usted los orígenes de aquella acentuación del 
soberanismo dentro del partido?  
 
2. Hay ciertos análisis que se refieren a su iniciativa como algo ‘desde arriba 
hacia abajo’. ¿Es cierto, o había presiones desde la sociedad vasca para 
cambiar el marco estatuario? 
 
3. ¿Hay que ver el Plan como algo dirigido por su propio liderazgo o contaba 
con el compromiso total del partido?  
 
4. ¿Cómo le parece el argumento que dice que ‘la radicalización que se percibió 
dentro del nacionalismo vasco fue, en parte, consecuencia de un 
resurgimiento del nacionalismo español o de una recentralización del Estado 
español’? 
 
5. Durante sus presidencias, ¿era la experiencia del Tripartito en Cataluña un 
punto de referencia para el PNV? 
 
6. Para explicar el auge de soberanismo durante aquellos años, ¿es relevante 
solamente el marco vasco-español, o hay otros factores que también ayudan a 
explicarlo como, por ejemplo, la evolución política de la Unión Europea o 
ciertas tendencias globales o internacionales? 
 
7. Visto desde hoy, ¿le parece que se cometieron errores en la forma de buscar 
más autogobierno bajo sus presidencias? 
 
8. ¿Qué influencia sigue teniendo su Plan en la actual política vasca? 
 
9. ¿Y qué influencia cree usted que ha tenido el Plan en el actual giro 
soberanista en Cataluña? 
 
La vida interna del partido 
 
10. La elección de Josu Jon Imaz como presidente del partido, ¿supuso un 
verdadero revés para el sector más soberanista del PNV? 
 
11. ¿Sintió usted la necesidad de suavizar el Plan siguiendo los resultados de las 
elecciones de 2005?  
 
12. La posición del sector más soberanista del PNV, ¿fue debilitada por la 
decisión de Eusko Alkartasuna de poner fin a la alianza electoral entre los 
dos partidos? 
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13. El PNV, ¿está condenado a vivir con la tensión interna entre autonomistas y 
soberanistas, o se ha podido superar bajo el liderazgo de Urkullu?  
 
14. ¿Cuál fue la naturaleza del Pacto dentro del PNV que resultó en la elección 
de Iñigo Urkullu como presidente del partido en el 2007?  
 
15. Urkullu quitó de la agenda cualquier plan para un referéndum, por lo menos a 
corto plazo. ¿Cree usted que sigue existiendo la posibilidad de un referéndum 
sobre temas de soberanía en los años que vienen? 
 
16. ¿Qué espera usted del planteamiento del ‘nuevo estatus político’ anunciado 
por el Lehendakari Urkullu? 
 
17. Una pregunta sobre el contexto territorial de la política vasca. La importancia 
del nivel provincial, ¿en qué medida dificulta el desarrollo de cualquiera 
estrategia del PNV, teniendo en cuenta las diferentes estructuras de 
competición electoral en cada provincia? 
 
18. ¿Siguen existiendo ciertas discrepancias dentro del PNV sobre la división de 
competencias (incluyendo el poder recaudatorio) entre las diputaciones y el 
gobierno autonómico?  
 
El PNV y la política vasca 
 
19. A la hora de decidir las prioridades políticas del PNV, ¿suele prevalecer el 
debate interno del partido o hay influencias por parte de asociaciones, lobbies 
o grupos afines?  
 
20. ¿Por qué no ha sido posible aquí una colaboración entre nacionalistas y 
socialistas para intentar reformar el estatuto, como en Cataluña? 
 
21. ¿Cómo va a influir la ausencia de ETA en el planteamiento de la cuestión 
nacional por parte del PNV, y en su política de alianzas? 
 
22. ¿Ve usted posible una unificación de fuerzas independentistas en el País 
Vasco, es decir Bildu más fuerzas soberanistas del PNV? 
 
23. La legalización de la izquierda abertzale, ¿ha tenido algún impacto en la 
posición de los sectores más soberanistas dentro del PNV, teniendo en cuenta 
que vuelven a ser competitores electorales? 
 
 
Follow-up interview on 28 October 2014 specifically on the Concierto and the 
PNV: 
 
El concierto económico 
 
24. ¿Que implicaciones tenía para el concierto económico su propuesta sobre un 
nuevo Estatuto Político para Euskadi?  
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25. A su juicio, ¿Cómo se ha podido usar el concierto para construir Euskadi? 
 
26. Algunos dentro del PNV sostienen que “El concierto confiere las facultades 
de un Estado”. ¿Qué opina usted sobre esta consideración? 
 
27. Bajo el concierto son las diputaciones que recaudan, pero dentro del PNV 
históricamente ha habido momentos en los que se ha propuesto una mayor 
centralización en el gobierno. ¿Cuál ha sido su visión sobre el balance de 
poderes entre el gobierno central y las diputaciones? 
 
28. ¿Cómo valoró usted la reforma del concierto en el 2002 durante la cual usted 
era lehendakari? 
 
29. ¿Cómo funciona el encaje de las haciendas vascas dentro del contexto de la 
Unión Europea? 
 
30. ¿Cómo se suelen resolver los asuntos conflictivos entre el gobierno vasco y 
el gobierno español en relación al concierto? ¿Cómo funciona esa relación 
bilateral? 
 
31. ¿Cómo funcionan las relaciones internas entre las diputaciones en relación 
con el concierto? A su juicio, ¿cuáles son los aciertos y las carencias del 
funcionamiento interno del concierto? ¿Y cuáles son las implicaciones para 
las dinámicas políticas en el País Vasco? 
 
283	
 
Sample interview questionnaire 2 – Helena Franco and Itziar Miner (5 
September 2014) 
 
1) Históricamente el concierto económico ha sido algo que la izquierda 
abertzale ha querido superar ya que no cuadra con su visión de un Euskal 
Herria independiente. A mí me interesa ver cómo ha ido evolucionando la 
visión de Bildu sobre el concierto desde que tomó las riendas de la hacienda 
de Guipúzcoa. ¿Qué piensan ustedes sobre el modelo ahora que habéis tenido 
la experiencia de gestionarlo directamente? ¿Cuáles son los aciertos y las 
carencias del modelo, según Bildu? 
 
2) Según la visión de Bildu, ¿cómo se podría o se debería desarollar más el 
concierto?  
 
3) ¿Qué opinan sobre el hecho de que el gobierno vasco puede crear impuestos 
pero las diputaciones no? 
 
4) ¿Cómo se comparan las visiones del PNV y de Bildu sobre el concierto 
económico y el nivel de poder regulatorio sobre los impuestos que da a las 
diputaciones? ¿Los dos partidos estáis de acuerdo en lo que son las carencias 
del modelo y en lo que falta por desarrollar? ¿O no?  
 
5) ¿Qué opinan ustedes sobre el uso del concierto por parte del PNV y cómo se 
compara con la visión que tiene Bildu? 
 
6) El sindicato ELA ha publicado bastantes informes criticando lo que 
consideran como un uso neoliberal del concierto por parte del PNV. ¿Hasta 
qué punto está de acuerdo Bildu con estas valoraciones? 
 
7) ¿Hasta qué punto es posible que Bildu propugne un model fiscal distinto 
desde Guipúzcoa cuando se requiere cierto nivel de coordinación y 
armonización entre las tres diputaciones (y dentro de España y Europa 
también)?¿Cuáles son los grandes logros del gobierno de Bildu en materia 
fiscal en Guipúzcoa, a su juicio?  
 
8) Si Bildu recauda más que las otras diputaciones vascas mediante la creación 
de más impuestos en Gipuzkoa, según tengo entendido el dinero extra 
recaudado se tiene que repartir entre las tres diputaciones debido a la manera 
en que funciona el modelo de aportaciones. ¿Qué opinan ustedes sobre ese 
aspecto del funcionamiento interno del concierto? 
 
9) ¿Cómo han reaccionado los empresarios en Guipúzcoa a las medidas fiscales 
que ha introducido el gobierno de Bildu?  
 
10) ¿Cómo reaccionan ustedes a las críticas de otros partidos que acusan a Bildu 
de haber exagerado los cambios que ha hecho a la política fiscal?  
 
11) En el curso de verano sobre la fiscalidad organizado por la Universidad del 
País Vasco en San Sebastián el verano pasado, Helena, usted sugirió que el 
hecho de introducir nuevos impuestos en Guipúzcoa como el de grandes 
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fortunas no recauda mucho dinero en sí en términos relativos, sino que sirve 
para legitimar el sistema fiscal ante los ciudadanos y así reducir el fraude. 
¿Hasta qué punto cree que se va consiguiendo este objetivo?  
 
12) ¿Ustedes ven posibilidades de colaboración entre Bildu y el PSE en 
Guipúzcoa en cuanto a políticas de izquierdas? 
 
13) ¿Hasta qué punto son importantes los temas sociales y fiscales para Bildu en 
comparación con la agenda territorial y nacional? Como es la primera vez 
que la izquierda abertzale está gobernando en una diputación, me interesa 
saber hasta qué punto la experiencia de gobernar ha ido influyendo en sus 
prioridades.  
 
14)  En el 2013 el PP, el PSE y el PNV en Guipúzcoa todos pactaron juntos en 
contra del proyecto de presupuestos para el 2014 que Bildu presentó, así que 
Bildu al final ha tenido que implementar los presupuestos que acordaron los 
otros partidos. ¿Cómo ha sido esta experiencia para Bildu?  
 
15)  Si Bildu hubiera tenido mayoría absoluta en Gipuzkoa en vez de necesitar el 
apoyo de otros partidos, ¿qué medidas fiscales habría introducido? 
 
16) Desde 2012, las tres diputaciones vascas están gobernadas por tres partidos 
distintos: el PP en Álava, el PNV en Bizkaia y Bildu aquí. ¿Cómo afecta esta 
situación a la coordinación entre las tres haciendas vascas? ¿Hay 
discrepancias sobre temas de política fiscal y el concierto entre las 
diputaciones?  
 
17) A su juicio, ¿cuáles son las ventajas y desventajas de tener tres haciendas 
vascas en vez de una? ¿Qué opinan sobre la organización territorial de 
Euskadi y el balance de poderes entre el gobierno autonómico y las 
diputaciones? 
 
18) En las negociaciones bilaterales entre los gobiernos vasco y español sobre el 
Concierto y el cupo, en la comisión mixta, ¿hasta qué punto tienen voz las 
tres diputaciones?  
 
19) ¿Cómo reacciona Bildu a las críticas de otras comunidades autónomas 
sugiriendo que el sistema del concierto no es lo suficientemente solidario con 
el resto de España?  
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Sample interview questionnaire 3 – Antoni Castells (25 March 2015) 
 
1) Durante la Transición, ¿qué modelo de financiación buscaban los socialistas 
para Cataluña y cómo se comparó con la visión de otros partidos en aquel 
entonces? 
 
2) Durante su último mandato, Jordi Pujol se convirtió públicamente a la idea de 
una especie de concierto para Cataluña en el 1997 y luego en el 2000 se creó 
la Comisión de Estudio para la Mejora del Autogobierno. Así, en aquel 
entonces, ya se empezaba a hablar de cambios sustanciales al nivel de 
autonomía de Cataluña y a su sistema de financiación. ¿Cómo reaccionó el 
PSC entonces?  
 
3) ¿Cuándo empezó el PSC a contemplar la idea de un gobierno catalanista y de 
izquierdas? ¿Qué conflictos causó dentro del partido entre los sectores más y 
menos catalanistas? 
 
4) Como parte del Pacto del Tinell para formar la coalición de izquierdas en el 
2003, los tres partidos constituyentes llegaron a un acuerdo sobre sus 
objetivos en cuanto a la financiación autonómica. ¿Cómo se logró conciliar 
las perspectivas distintas sobre la financiación autonómica de los tres 
partidos? Sobre todo, ¿cómo se acercaron posiciones el PSC y ERC? 
 
5) ¿Cuándo empezó el PSC a plantear un nuevo modelo de financiación 
autonómica? ¿Qué quería exactamente? Según entiendo el PSC siempre ha 
sido muy reticente sobre la idea de un concierto catalán: ¿Cómo pensaba el 
partido que se podía lograr cambiar el régimen común de manera satisfactoria 
para Cataluña?  
 
6) Durante todo el proceso de negociación sobre el Estatuto, entiendo que el 
Instituto de Estudios Autonómicos desempeñó un papel clave, 
proporcionando propuestas e informes sobre todo tipo de temas incluyendo la 
financiación autonómica. ¿Qué opinaba el PSC sobre las propuestas que 
venían del IEA en cuanto a la financiación y sobre el papel del IEA? 
 
7) Se discutieron muchos temas importantes en las negociaciones del Estatuto, 
el reconocimiento de Cataluña como nación, el blindaje de las competencias 
catalanas, etc. ¿En qué momentos de las negociaciones y debates sobre el 
Estatuto fue tema clave la financiación autonómica?  
 
8) Las negociaciones para el nuevo Estatuto causaron una batalla entre ERC y 
CiU para ser el partido que propusiera las propuestas más avanzadas para una 
Cataluña autónoma. ¿Cómo afectó esta batalla concretamente al tema de la 
financiación autonómica? 
 
9) ¿Cuándo empezó CiU de verdad a pedir un pacto fiscal para Cataluña? Y, a 
su juicio, ¿por qué? 
 
10) Un concierto a lo catalán: ¿en qué se diferenciaría del concierto vasco según 
la visión que se tiene desde Cataluña? 
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11) Uno de los últimos obstáculos en el 2005 que casi impedía el acuerdo en el 
parlamento catalán sobre el nuevo Estatuto fue el tema de la financiación 
autonómica, que luego se resolvió con un acuerdo entre Maragall y Mas. 
¿Qué pasó? 
 
12) Luego en el parlamento de Madrid también, el tema de la financiación seguía 
siendo un obstáculo a un acuerdo sobre el texto del Estatuto, y al final se 
resolvió el tema a último momento con un acuerdo entre Zapatero y Mas. 
¿Por qué Mas aceptó rebajar tanto sus objetivos para la financiación? 
 
13) Usted negoció la reforma de financiación de 2009 dentro del marco del nuevo 
Estatuto. ¿Cómo se desarrollaron las negociaciones para la reforma? ¿Cómo 
valora la reforma? 
 
14) ¿Cuál fue la perspectiva del PSC en la comisión parliamentaria que hubo en 
2011 para estudiar la posibilidad de un nuevo modelo de financiación basado 
en el Concierto? 
 
15) A su juicio, ¿hasta qué punto el hartazgo con el sistema de financiación 
autonómica ha influido en el auge independentista en Cataluña en los últimos 
años?   
 
16) ¿Cómo interpreta usted el viaje que hizo Artur Mas a Madrid para pedir un 
pacto fiscal en el 2012 tras la Diada? 
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Sample interview questionnaire 4 – Josep Huguet (9 June 2015) 
 
1) Durante la Transición, ¿qué modelo de financiación buscaba Esquerra para 
Cataluña y cómo se comparó con la visión de otros partidos en aquel 
entonces? 
 
2) La reforma del régimen común de 1996 fue el primer salto cualitativo ya que 
se amplió considerablemente el abanico de cesión de tributos, incluyendo una 
parte importante del IRPF. ¿Cuál fue la reacción de Esquerra a esta reforma? 
¿Le pareció un avance cualitativo?  
 
3) Usted había trabajado en los años anteriores, de 1993 a 1995,  como 
representante de Esquerra en la Comisión Mixta de Transferencias entre el 
Estado español y la Generalitat. Además, en los años 90 entiendo que usted 
se especializó en temas económicos y de financiación en su trabajo para 
Esquerra y defendió la necesidad de un nuevo modelo de financiación para 
Cataluña. ¿Cuáles fueron sus experiencias en cuanto a lo que funcionaba y lo 
que no funcionaba con la financiación autonómica en aquel entonces? ¿Hasta 
qué punto la reforma de 1996 del régimen común pudo arreglar los 
problemas que había? 
 
4) CiU pareció contento con la reforma de 1996 en un primer momento, pero no 
duró su satisfacción. A partir de 1997 Jordi Pujol se convirtió públicamente a 
la idea de la necesidad de una especie de concierto bilateral para Cataluña. 
¿Cómo vivió usted desde Esquerra la evolución de la perspectiva de CiU 
sobre la financiación autonómica a lo largo de los años 90? 
 
5) A finales de los 90 y a principios del siglo nuevo, usted y algunos otros 
representantes de Esquerra promovieron el acercamiento entre los grupos de 
izquierdas para facilitar una alternativa al gobierno de CiU. ¿Cómo se logró 
resolver las diferentes perspectivas sobre la financiación autonómica entre el 
PSC, Iniciativa y Esquerra para llegar al acuerdo entre los partidos de 
izquierdas?  
 
6) Como parte del Pacto del Tinell para formar la coalición de izquierdas en el 
2003, los tres partidos constituyentes llegaron a un acuerdo sobre sus 
objetivos en cuanto a la financiación autonómica. ¿Cómo se logró conciliar 
las perspectivas distintas sobre la financiación autonómica de los tres 
partidos? Sobre todo, ¿cómo se acercaron posiciones el PSC y ERC? 
 
7) Después de las elecciones catalanas de 2003, como parte del acuerdo de 
gobierno entre los partidos de izquierdas, había que llegar a un acuerdo sobre 
la financiación. Me contó Antoni Castells cuando le entrevisté que él redactó 
junto con usted un acuerdo de diez puntos sobre la financiación un fin de 
semana en diciembre (6 y 7) para reconciliar perspectivas del PSC y 
Esquerra. La inspiración de Castells y su partido era claramente un modelo 
federal, no el concierto, pero hicieron algunas concesiones para que Esquerra 
pudiera estar de acuerdo. ¿Cómo vivió usted estas negociaciones? ¿Cuál fue 
su perspectiva? 
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8) Se discutieron muchos temas importantes en las negociaciones del Estatuto, 
el reconocimiento de Cataluña como nación, el blindaje de las competencias 
catalanas, etc. ¿En qué momentos de las negociaciones y debates sobre el 
Estatuto fue tema clave la financiación autonómica?  
 
9) Las negociaciones para el nuevo Estatuto causaron una batalla entre ERC y 
CiU para ser el partido que presentara las propuestas más avanzadas para una 
Cataluña autónoma. ¿Cómo afectó esta batalla concretamente al tema de la 
financiación autonómica?¿Cómo logró Esquerra reconciliar presiones 
distintas ya que tenía el Partido Socialista de Catalunya por un lado que no 
quería pedir un concierto, y CiU por otro que quería pedirlo? 
 
10)  Un concierto a la catalana: ¿en qué se diferenciaría del concierto vasco 
según la visión que se tiene desde Cataluña y según Esquerra? 
 
11) Uno de los últimos obstáculos en el 2005 que casi impedía el acuerdo en el 
parlamento catalán fue el tema de la financiación autonómica, que luego se 
resolvió con un acuerdo entre Maragall y Mas. ¿Qué pasó?  
 
12) Luego en el parlamento de Madrid también, la financiación seguía siendo un 
obstáculo a un acuerdo sobre el texto del Estatuto, y al final se resolvió a 
último momento con un acuerdo entre Zapatero y Mas. ¿Cómo se logró el 
acuerdo? ¿Estuvo Esquerra al tanto de lo que pasaba? 
 
13) ¿Cómo funcionó la negociación del nuevo sistema de financiación 
autonómica de 2009 después del Estatuto?¿Qué pensó Esquerra del 
desarrollo de las negociaciones para el acuerdo, del acuerdo en sí y de su 
posterior desarrollo? 
 
14) ¿Cuál fue la perspectiva de Esquerra en la Comisión Parlamentaria que hubo 
en el 2011 para estudiar la posibilidad de un nuevo modelo de financiación 
basado en el concierto? 
 
15) A su juicio, ¿hasta qué punto el hartazgo con el sistema de financiación 
autonómica ha influido en el auge independentista en Cataluña en los últimos 
años?   
 
16) ¿Cómo interpreta usted el viaje que hizo Artur Mas a Madrid para pedir un 
pacto fiscal en el 2012 tras la Diada? 
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Sample interview questionnaire 5 – Andreu Mas-Colell (25 January 2016) 
 
1) Durante la Transición, ¿hubo discrepancias dentro de Convergència sobre el 
modelo de financiación que se quería buscar para Cataluña? Se ha hablado de 
posibles diferencias entre Jordi Pujol y Ramón Trias Fargas. ¿Cuál es su 
punto de vista sobre este asunto? 
 
2) En 1997, Pujol empezó a hablar públicamente de la necesidad de una especie 
de concierto catalán. ¿Por qué entonces, justo después de la reforma de 
financiación de 1996? CiU pareció contento con la reforma de 1996 en un 
primer momento. ¿Por qué no duró su satisfacción? 
 
3) Se creó la Comisión de Estudio para la Mejora del Autogobierno en el 2000. 
Luego llegó el gobierno tripartito de izquierdas al poder en el 2003 y empezó 
el proceso de la reforma estatutaria. ¿Hasta qué punto influyó la decepción 
con el sistema de financiación en los deseos de revisar la autonomía catalana 
e intentar mejorarla, en comparación con otros factores? 
 
4) ¿En qué momentos y hasta qué punto fue un tema clave la financiación 
autonómica en los debates para un nuevo Estatuto autonómico?  
 
5) Las negociaciones para el nuevo Estatuto causaron una batalla entre ERC y 
CiU para ser el partido que presentara las propuestas más avanzadas para una 
Cataluña autónoma. ¿Cómo afectó esta batalla concretamente al tema de la 
financiación autonómica?  
 
6) Durante todo el proceso de negociación sobre el Estatuto, entiendo que el 
Instituto de Estudios Autonómicos desempeñó un papel clave, 
proporcionando propuestas e informes sobre todo tipo de temas incluida la 
financiación autonómica. ¿Qué opinaba Convergència sobre las propuestas 
que venían del IEA en cuanto a la financiación? 
 
7) Cuando Convergència proponía un concierto a la catalana durante los debates 
sobre el Estatuto: ¿en qué se diferenciaba del concierto vasco?  
 
8) Uno de los últimos obstáculos en el 2005 que casi impedía el acuerdo en el 
parlamento catalán fue el tema de la financiación autonómica, que luego se 
resolvió con un acuerdo entre Maragall y Mas. ¿Qué pasó? 
 
9) Luego en el parlamento de Madrid también, la financiación seguía siendo un 
obstáculo para un acuerdo sobre el texto del Estatuto, y al final se resolvió en 
el último momento con un acuerdo entre Zapatero y Mas. ¿Cómo se logró el 
acuerdo? ¿Por qué Mas aceptó rebajar tanto sus objetivos para la 
financiación?  
 
10) ¿Cómo funcionó la negociación del nuevo sistema de financiación 
autonómica de 2009 después del Estatuto? ¿Qué pensó CiU del desarrollo de 
las negociaciones para el acuerdo, del acuerdo en sí y de su posterior 
desarrollo? 
 
290	
 
11)  Hubo una comisión de estudio en el parlamento hacia finales de 2011 sobre 
un nuevo modelo de financiación para Cataluña basado en el concierto 
económico. ¿Cuál fue la perspectiva de Convergència en aquellas 
negociaciones? 
 
12) ¿Cómo interpreta usted el viaje que hizo Artur Mas a Madrid para pedir un 
pacto fiscal en el 2012 tras la Diada? 
 
13) El Fondo de Liquidez Autonómica y los otros fondos como el de Proveedores 
que se crearon en el 2012 debían ser temporales, pero al final parece que se 
han convertido en algo más permanente. ¿Qué cree usted de la situación?  
 
14) Catalunya depende totalmente de los fondos de financiación creados por el 
gobierno central de momento. ¿Por qué, en su opinión, ha acabado Cataluña 
en una posición financiera mucho peor que la de la comunidad de Madrid? 
¿Hasta qué punto se debe a las injusticias del sistema autonómica? ¿O 
demasiado gasto en Catalunya durante los años del tripartito, etc? 
 
15) Hay un debate sobre hasta qué punto la recentralización del PP en cuanto a la 
financiación de las CCAA corresponde a los imperativos de reducción del 
déficit impuestos por la UE, o hasta qué punto corresponde más bien a 
motivos ideológicos del PP. ¿Qué opina usted sobre el asunto? 
 
16) ¿Cómo valora usted el reparto de los límites de déficit entre el gobierno 
central y los gobiernos autonómicos? 
 
17) ¿Está pendiente una nueva reforma de la LOFCA. ¿Participará plenamente 
Cataluña en el proceso? 
 
18) Usted ha hecho comentarios a periódicos últimamente sugiriendo que Mas ha 
dado demasiadas concesiones en temas ecónomicos a la CUP. ¿Cuál es su 
perspectiva sobre las negociaciones que han tenido lugar últimamente para 
formar un gobierno en Cataluña? 
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